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These stratagems only confirm one thing

CAMPAIGNS for the freedom of Nelson Mandela were of the release of a "terrorist" and not a political leader, and those who support it should realise this.

Such is the view of both the Minister of Police, Mr Louis le Grange, and the Commissioner of Police, General Mike Geldenhuys, expressed after Friday's attack on the Booyens Police Station.

"Those responsible for the attack were Mandela and (Walter) Sisulu," their prepared joint statement said. (The attackers had left behind pamphlets calling for the release of the two men.)

The authorities, employing a devious combination of statement and implication, have attempted to connect the incident with the "Free Mandela" campaign, and in so doing have tried to suggest that the campaign, this newspaper, its editor, and all those who support them are responsible for inciting the attack.

It is true that the statement did not actually SAY it, but its wording left no doubt as to its meaning.

As a propaganda exercise, it is appallingly inept; the motives behind it being so transparent.

Firstly, the police must be feeling somewhat uncomfortable over the fact that two vans filled with smuggled weapons could avoid their security precautions, such as they are, and drive round the streets of the biggest city in the country.

It is to be expected, therefore, that they would want nothing more right now than to pinpoint blame, somewhere, anywhere, so as to try

to avoid the full impact of any possible public censure themselves.

Secondly, white politics being as inbred as it is, in that whites usually ever only talk to the people they agree with, the statement was probably intended primarily for this country's minority of hard-liners, which group both the Minister and the General identify with strongly.

This is the group both men wish to impress and maintain full credibility with, so they tell them what they most want to hear.

If this is all the effect the statement will have, it would be easy to dismiss with the lukewarm contempt that it deserves. But we fear that this will not be the case.

The statement, without making any direct accusation, cleverly associates the campaign, and therefore SUNDAY POST, with guerilla activities.

Because it was made by two respected members of the white community, it will be valuable ammunition for critics of the campaign in their enthusiastic attempts to prove that it has incited anti-South African feelings and that action should be taken against it.

The statement on its own is not enough to achieve this. But it adds considerable weight to a growing body of similarly contrived "evidence" against the campaign in particular and the black Press in general.

We look upon these stratagems with mild amusement. They confirm yet again that the political initiative has been taken from whites, that they know it and are now wriggling in their discomfort.

IT is a cliché that most of whites in Johannesburg are abysmally ignorant of Soweto, which is sometimes described romantically as Johannesburg's twin city but which is more accurately viewed as a dormitory for its black workers.

A major study of Soweto by the Urban Foundation, released for publication today, demonstrates that the cliché is justified at several levels.

The ignorance is not confined to the white layman. In some respects, it extends even to specialists.

Take a "simple fact" like Soweto's population, on which most planning for Soweto's future should be based.

The Urban Foundation reports "no accurate figures are available for the present population".

Noting that the 1970 census figure of 597 390 was "considered to be a gross underenumeration," the foundation goes on to refer to three estimates of Soweto's population, including one by the West Rand Administration Board (Wrab) based on a projection of the underestimated 1970 figure.

The foundation notes further that estimates for the number of people per house vary from an official Wrab figure of seven to another of 14 quoted by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce.

From these figures, it deduces another three population estimates for 1978: a low estimate of 731 633 (seven people per house), a medium estimate of 1 057 435 (10 people per house), and a high estimate of 1 485 171 (14 people per house).

The foundation concludes: "In the light of above estimates it is considered that a 1978 population of around 1-million in Soweto would be a realistic assumption. It is generally accepted that over 30% of the total population is illegal."

On the basis of its 1978 estimate the foundation anticipates that Soweto's population will increase to 1 620 000 by the year 2 000 through natural increase alone.

Excluded is the imponderable factor of how many blacks will elude the pass laws and enter Soweto illegally between now and the turn of the century.

The foundation's study does, however, provide a wide range of data which could help to make Johannesburg's whites more aware of Soweto and its unknown number of residents.

Quoting the findings of 1977 Bureau of Market Research, the foundation gives the average household size for Soweto as 5.93.

It defines a household as "a group of people living together in one dwelling unit and sharing the same cooking facilities."

It is not clear how an average household size of nearly six

After two years of research the Urban Foundation has produced what is probably the most comprehensive and detailed study to date of Soweto, the huge township which emerged from comparative anonymity four years ago to attract world-wide interest as the focal point of the 1976 unrest. PATRICK LAURENCE reports.

is reconciled with the Foundation's acceptance of 10 as the number of people per house, unless households, sometimes live in a single room where they share cooking facilities—a conclusion suggested by a sentence later on about four or five people sharing bedrooms.

Whatever the precise explanation, analysis of incomes per household in 1977 shows that nearly one-fifth (18.7%) of Soweto households were living below the Household Subsistence level.

The number of wage earners per household is appreciably higher for blacks in Soweto than whites in Johannesburg: 1.98 against 1.31.

The foundation comments: "The relatively high number for black households may reflect the economic necessity of having more wage earners... as well as the larger household size."

On unemployment in Soweto, the foundation says: "It is very difficult to obtain up-to-date and accurate data on unemployment levels."

It then quotes three recent surveys, all which point to "very serious" and rising unemployment in Soweto, particularly among young people.

All except the 38 000 hostel residents, live in the nearly 100 000 houses. Of these, 99% are simple three or four room dwellings, the majority of which do not have internal bathrooms or lavatories.

The standard house, the 51/6, was devised as a prototype in 1961. "It... comprises four rooms and a outside lavatory.

"Few have floors, these are mainly ash or smooth earth. No ceiling is provided and the roof consists of asbestos sheeting with no gutters."

The 51/6 is no longer being built. But thousands were built before the decision was taken to replace them with the improved 51/9 type, which has four rooms and an internal bathroom and lavatory.

Most people in Soweto live close to violence, with one in four households having at least one victim of robbery, assault, rape or theft.

Less than a third of the victims reported the crimes to the police.

The foundation says: "The main reason given for not reporting the crime to the police was that the victim did not

have faith that the police would be able to trace the assailant."

Another reason was fear of reprisals by the criminals, which seems to point to scepticism by victims of the police's ability to protect them.

There is "antipathy towards the police and security forces," but much of it could be reduced by modification to, or abolition of, influx control and the pass laws, the foundation says.

Technical breaches of these laws cause an "exorbitant proportion of arrests."

Sowetans are not well educated on the whole. Only 1.5% of adult Sowetans have had post-matric education and only 12.8% have passed standard eight.

Education in Soweto exhibits many of the deficiencies which characterise black education generally: poorly qualified teachers (84% of teachers have only a junior certificate or a lower educational qualification), high pupil-teacher ratios (47:1), high drop-out rates, and antipathy towards, or reservations about, separate black education among pupils and teachers' organisations.

Besides being the largest concentration of urban blacks in South Africa, Soweto is also the most ethnically mixed. It is, to quote the foundation, "poly-ethnic in terms of tribal or language groups".

Zulus are the dominant group numerically. They constitute about one-third of the total population.

Tswana, the next biggest group, form just under one-fifth of the population.

The Nguni, a larger grouping consisting of Zulus, Xhosa and Swazi, account for about 46% of the population.

The population tends to concentrate in ethnic clusters, largely as a result of a decision by the old Department of Native Affairs in 1964 to enforce ethnic segregation. The policy has since been abandoned.

Standing back and trying to get Soweto into perspective produces a grim vista of a rapidly growing population fast outstripping the growth in facilities and resources.

It would be a frightening prospect even if the political militancy of black youth could be cancelled from the equation, which it cannot.

Take housing: there is a

shortage of at least 37 000 dwelling units, which means that before the year 2 000 620 000 people or 114 620 households will have to be provided.

The problems in meeting the demand are manifest in these facts: since 1970 only 5 000 houses have been built; only 733ha of land remains for development in Soweto.

The phrase "bursting at the seams" is often applied to Soweto.

The state of sewerage system, as described in the Foundation report, gives a literal dimension to the danger.

After referring to overloading, overcharging, silting and erosion of Soweto's sewerage system, the foundation says: "Although there are relief systems currently under construction, the areas most seriously affected—the Orlando East and part of Diepkloof—will only be relieved after 1985."

There are incipient problems of water supply.

To provide an assured supply of water the Rand Water Board needs a 24-hour supply in the reservoirs.

The reservoirs at Doornkop Aeroton and Meadowlands have a 12-hour supply. At present rates of consumption, they will be down to 5½ hours within five years.

The existing reservoir capacity is 116megalitres. The estimated requirement by 1983 is 470megalitres.

"To meet the required storage capacity about 10 additional reservoirs at a total cost of R22-million will be required."

As the foundation points out, these problems should be seen in the context of an unresolved leadership issue in Soweto, in which the officially approved Soweto Council leaders have little credibility with the people—and in context of the Soweto Council's ill-defined relationship with Wrab.

The present policy framework requires Soweto to be financially self-sufficient (although it has no valuable property on which it can impose taxes).

Official policy also sees Soweto as a separate unit from the rest of the Witwatersrand (by which it is surrounded).

In its simplest recommendation, the foundation calls for Soweto to be viewed and developed as a part of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Region.

"To some readers the facts and realities reported in this study may possibly present a dismal and discouraging picture," the report says.

"The Urban Foundation prefers to view it as a challenge and an opportunity to prove that the system of free enterprise in South Africa involves a sense of social responsibility, which can make it a determining force in realising the goal of a just and equitable society."