

# SHALL I SLAY MY BROTHER BOER?

An Appeal to the Conscience of Britain.

BY

WILLIAM T. STEAD.

*Hayds*


"In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Kruger, an ultimatum which would have certainly been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war, it would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war, and, as I have pointed out already, it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Kruger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, in which Secretaries of State, standing in this place, have repudiated all right of interference—that would be a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise."

*Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in the House of Commons, May 8th, 1896.*

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# SHALL I SLAY MY BROTHER BOER?

An Appeal to the Conscience of Britain.

BY

WILLIAM T. STEAD.

Ef you take a sword an' dror it  
An' go stick a feller thro',  
Guv'ment ain't to answer for it ;  
God'll send the bill to you."

*Lowell.*

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*Hon. Secretaries.*

## PREFACE.

---

I HAVE returned from a prolonged sojourn at the Hague, where the representatives of all the Powers were busily engaged in making provision for the preservation of the World's Peace.

I find my own country ringing from end to end with preparations for War.

I ask—Why?

For answer I am confronted with a weltering chaos of despatches, and my ears are deafened by the familiar bray of Jingo journalism.

But I have sought in vain for any statement, clear, precise, and universally accessible, setting forth soberly and seriously within the compass of a readable pamphlet, of the case either for or against an appeal to the *ultima ratio* of Nations.

As no one has yet produced such a pamphlet, I have perforce set my hand to the work.

This *brochure* is the result.

I am painfully conscious of its defects, but I venture to believe that it does at least bring into strong relief some of the considerations which should dominate the decision of a Nation suddenly called upon to confront the supreme issue of Peace or War.

WILLIAM T. STEAD.

September 21st, 1899.

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# SHALL I SLAY MY BROTHER BOER?

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## CHAPTER I.

### A PERSONAL APPEAL.

IF we may judge from what we read in the newspapers the British Government, fresh from the Peace Conference at the Hague, is about to make war on the Transvaal.

Before the word is given to suspend the Ten Commandments and let loose Hell in South Africa, I venture to address a personal appeal to the conscience of my fellow-countrymen.

War is either the most imperious and sacred of all duties or it is the greatest of all crimes, the sum of all villainies.

Are we quite sure that in sending horse, foot, and artillery to carry fire and sword through the Transvaal, we shall be doing the will of God and fulfilling our duty to our fellow-men?

The question is at least worth careful consideration by all citizens and prayerful consideration by all Christians.

For the Boers of the Transvaal, however unpopular they may be, are nevertheless our brethren.

Before we decide to slay our brother, we surely ought to approach the discussion of his guilt with an anxious, nay even a tormenting desire to ascertain whether we are in solemn sad reality shut up to this solution and no other of the question at issue.

If the matter in dispute involved but the life and liberty of one single man, even if he were the basest and wickedest of mankind, the conscience of mankind would not merely demand, but insist, upon suspension of judgment until everything that can be urged by the accused in his own defence had been fully heard, and a verdict returned

by a jury of impartial men, who were no parties to the suit, who had no personal animus against the prisoner, and who, above all, had no hope of profit by his condemnation.

How much more, then, is it incumbent upon us to banish from the Judgment Seat whose verdict may doom not one single man, but hundreds and thousands, to a violent death, all motives of passion and prejudice, of personal resentment, or of Imperial ambition, in order that the capital sentence may not be passed, until we have at least afforded the threatened State the irreducible minimum of security against mistaken judgment which the law guarantees the red-handed murderer.

To all those of my fellow-countrymen who are declaring that there is nothing for it but to cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war, I venture to address a simple question.

Have you before giving judgment which involves you in the responsibility of taking your brother's life devoted five minutes' serious thought as to whether your motives are free from prejudice and self-interest?

It is, alas! but too evident that the majority of those who swell the cry for war put themselves out of court by the very statements which they make in defence of their clamour.

"The Boers are a bad lot. Their arrogance is insufferable. They whipped us at Majuba Hill. It is now our turn to pay them out.

"Therefore," so runs the argument, "let us cut their throats."

Or, again, we are told that "our Imperial interests, our national prestige, compel us to go to war."

That is to say, "Let us slay our brother Boers, for it is our interest so to do."

Do you think that either of those pleas will pass muster?

Let it be admitted that the Boers are an insufferable lot of canting ruffians, who are never weary of boasting that they whipped us at Majuba and worsted us at Doornkop; is that good enough to justify the employment of the armed strength of the British Empire to massacre them into modesty?

In the opinion of our Continental neighbours, the Briton is just as insufferable as the Boer. He is the modern Pharisee who has looted the world and for a pretence makes long prayers. He never ceases to boast that he whipped France at Waterloo and Trafalgar and bested the whole Continent in the game of grab. But we should hardly regard these things as sufficient justification for an onslaught on Britain by a European coalition in order to teach us a lesson in humility and good manners.

The fact that we do not like the Boers is a reason, not for easily acquiescing in the verdict of Death, but for distrusting our own judgment, and carefully making allowance for the influence of personal feeling when we pronounce the capital sentence from the judgment seat.

But that is not by any means the only consideration which should be borne in mind by our people at this crisis.

The Court should not only be impartial; it should be in possession of all the facts. Every man in the jury-box should have heard all that can be urged on both sides of the case, and he should not return his verdict until he has a clear grasp of the vital issues.

Is that so with all of those who are clamouring for, or, as the cant phrase has it, "are regretfully resigning themselves to the inevitable"?

Every one knows that with the immense majority nothing of the kind has even been attempted.

There has been an infinite confusion of conflicting telegrams and voluminous despatches: a confusion so confounded that at this moment probably not one per cent. of those who profess to believe that war is inevitable could give an articulate statement of the reasons for the faith that is in them.

This surely is not the mood in which a great Christian nation should unsheath the sword.

I appeal to each reader of these pages, whether or not he or she has taken as much pains to master the facts and to rid himself of prejudice, as he would deem it his im-

perative duty to take if the question at issue merely involved the settlement of a disputed account in a County Court?

If his conscience answer that question in the negative, how dare he in the sight of God and man give his voice in favour of slaying his Brother Boer?

## CHAPTER II.

### A BRITISH DREYFUS CASE.

THE conscience of the whole civilised world has cried out in indignant unison against the travesty of justice which has just been witnessed at Rennes.

But the case of Dreyfus is but as the parable of the ewe-lamb, by which the prophet Nathan brought home to the Hebrew monarch a sense of his far more exceeding guilt.

"Thou art the man!" cried the ancient prophet to King David. "Thou art the man!" the accusing voice of Humanity will thunder in the ears of John Bull, if he should carry out, what seems his present intention, of making war on the Transvaal on pretences compared with which those of the Court-martial at Rennes were respectable.

Dreyfus, like the Boer, belonged to an unpopular race. Personally, he appears to have been somewhat bumptious. Like the Transvaal, he was tried by a tribunal strongly prejudiced against him, and his conviction was obtained by the same unblushing appeals to national passion and self-interest which are relied upon in our press for hounding this nation into war.

In Mr. Chamberlain we have the General Mercier of the situation.

The verdict at Rennes condemned an innocent individual to save the honour of the French army.

If we go to war with the Transvaal, we condemn to death a State to save the prestige of the Jingoese who degrade the cause of British Imperialism by their savage determination to avenge Majuba.

The Court-martial at Rennes was not the first Court that tried Dreyfus. Neither is the present crisis the first attempt on the Transvaal.

The first attempt on the Transvaal was made three years ago, when Mr. Rhodes, with the full cognizance of Mr. Chamberlain, aided and abetted the conspiracy to overthrow the Boer Republic. This, like the first Court-martial which

condemned Dreyfus, was a comparatively venial mistake, an error of judgment for which much excuse may be made.

In the ridiculous farce of the hushing-up committee at Westminster we had the counterpart of the Zola trial, which, although it concluded in a false verdict, nevertheless enlightened the world as to the complicity of Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office in the attempt on the Transvaal.

The whole civilised world with unanimity execrated the miscarriage of justice which led to the condemnation of M. Zola.

But there was almost as universal a howl of execration from the press outside Great Britain at the way in which the South African Committee conspired to suppress evidence and to whitewash Mr. Chamberlain. The conscience of the civilised world was revolted by such a travesty of "investigation."

The verdict at Rennes of guilty with extenuating circumstances had its exact counterpart in the censure pronounced by the South African Committee on Mr. Rhodes, qualified by the extraordinary speech by Mr. Chamberlain in defence of the man whom, as member of the Committee, he had just condemned.

The refusal to take the evidence of Colonel Schwarzkoppen and Colonel Panizzardi is paralleled by the refusal to produce the incriminating cables, and the astounding and scandalous refusal to allow Mr. Hawksley to give evidence which would have exposed the whole conspiracy.

Then in the fulness of time, the Transvaal has been again arraigned, and is being led forth for execution by no impartial tribunal, but by the very man, our own General Mercier, whom every Boer believes—not without reason—to have been privy to the conspiracy of 1895, and who has the strongest personal reasons for wishing to settle old scores with President Kruger.

Lying, perjury, and all the hideous offences against justice which we have been denouncing when they occurred in France, were rife before the South African Committee.

And the proposed war on the Transvaal is but the sequel to that disastrous and scandalous episode in our South African history.

Those who do not know or have forgotten the facts will howl at this plain statement of the analogy between the case of Dreyfus and that of the Transvaal. But the fact that outside the British Empire its justice will be universally admitted, should at least give the most heedless pause, and suggest grounds for

a very careful examination of the facts of the case on which we are being rushed into war. Let us remember that the judgment of foreigners often anticipates the judgment of posterity.

It may be hoped that, inasmuch as the first Dreyfus case was brought to a close after a long series of scandalous miscarriages of justice by the full, free and unsolicited pardon of the innocent accused, so we may anticipate that, even at the eleventh hour, the conscience of this country may awake, and the Prime Minister of the Queen will remove from the national escutcheon a stain as foul as that by which the Dreyfus case sullied the fair fame of France.

---

### CHAPTER III.

#### A PLEA FOR POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE.

THE British Empire, including its Protectorates, which are virtually under our control, covers an area of thirteen and a half million square miles of land, and extends to all the navigable salt water of the world. Its population, according to the latest census, considerably exceeds four hundred million human beings.

On the other side there is a country of about the size of Italy, about 100,000 square miles in area, inhabited by less than 1,000,000 persons, all told. Of this million, three-quarters are blacks. The total number of white people, men, women, and children, in the Transvaal—counting every one as white, whether he is a Polish Jew, Boer, or Englishman—is only 250,000, or less than the present population of West Ham. This minute fragment of humanity is divided into two unequal parts, the smaller of which, whose numbers are variously estimated—Mr. Kruger says that his burghers do not exceed 30,000 men—is in exclusive possession of all political power. All the trouble springs from the difficulty of reconciling the just claims of the majority of new-comers, recently arrived settlers, with the political authority of the old Boers. Because 80,000 Dutch-speaking people are at loggerheads with 150,000 folk, who for the most part speak English, the whole Empire has been convulsed, and every newspaper is discussing the question of the Transvaal as if it were a tremendous Imperial problem affecting the destinies of the world.

The first thing to be done, in order to see the subject in its true perspective, is to

reduce the dimensions of the Transvaal question to the proportions of West Ham. The residents in West Ham outnumber the white residents in the Transvaal, and probably in civilisation, in homogeneity, and in many of the best qualities of citizenship deserve to rank higher than either Boers or Uitlanders in the scale of humanity. Nevertheless, West Ham and all its inhabitants might be swallowed up like Korah, Dathan, and Abiram without the multitudinous millions of the British Empire feeling any appreciable loss. Yet because the two fractions of a West Ham aggregate of humanity in a remote South African upland region are unable to agree as to the terms on which they should dwell together side by side, our newspapers resound with bellicose clamour, and the man in the street feels as if he were on the verge of a war worthy the name. Distance lends not only enchantment to the view, but entirely distorts the perspective. A huge Homeric laugh would convulse the British public at the thought that the political quarrels between a majority and a minority of West Ham politicians would justify the moving of regiments and mustering of armies; but this seems quite natural and even desirable to many when the West Ham unit is as far away as Pretoria and Johannesburg.

It is this total lack of all sense of political perspective which lies at the bottom of all the trouble. "*De minimis non curat lex.*" To settle the squabbles of Little Pedlington, it is absurd to invoke the mighty machinery of Imperial power. The Transvaal is the Little Pedlington of the world. But the need for a West Ham standard is not confined to the Transvaal. Some such scale of measurement is equally necessary in discussing the affairs of the Cape Colony. There we have a territory considerably larger than that of France, inhabited by 2,000,000 of human beings, and of these 2,000,000 three-quarters are blacks. The total white population of the Cape Colony, including Bechuanaland, does not exceed the population of Leeds. This population also is far from being homogeneous, but in the case of Cape Colony the white majority is Dutch. The situation is indeed exactly reversed. In the Cape Colony it is the Dutch who command a majority, although it is a British Colony, while in the South African Republic the Dutch are in a minority, although the government is entirely in their hands. The wrangle in South Africa at present arises from the desire of the British

minority in the British Colony to assist the British majority in the Dutch Republic to secure a share in the government of their adopted country. To translate it into English integers of population, we would say that a progressive minority in Leeds wishes to help a progressive majority in West Ham to obtain the municipal franchise in West Ham and a fair share of the seats in the Town Council. That is, reduced to plain English, all there is about the matter, and it is well to keep this thing in remembrance, for when we read our newspapers we are apt to imagine that the Transvaal trouble is of mountainous dimensions. In reality, it is a mole-hill, a mole-hill so minute that nothing but the magnifying power of the journalistic telescope could possibly have led a sane people to devote so much of their time and energies to a settlement of such a controversy.

Further, the mere statement of the disproportion between the antagonists in the threatened war should suffice to cover our Bobadils with shame. On the one side, a world-encircling empire, with 400,000,000 of population; on the other side, the tiniest Tom Thumb of a mannikin state, divided against itself, which cannot command the support of 100,000 whites, men, women, and children included. There are more adult able-bodied paupers in receipt of poor-law relief in the unions and parishes of England than the whole of the Boer population of the Transvaal. If we exclude women, children, and bed-ridden old men, it is probable that there are almost as many able-bodied men in common lodging-houses in London at this moment as the whole of the adult male Boers, whom we are magnifying into an antagonist with whom the empire need not be ashamed to cope. The phrase which Mr. Morley quoted from Swift, concerning the odds in a contest between ten armed men and one man in a shirt, was very apposite to the comparative strength of the British Empire and the Transvaal. No doubt this enormous preponderance of military force which is at our command encourages the baser portion of our community to halloo for a war from which they would shrink if they had been pitted against an antagonist of their own size. "Hit him on the head; he's only a little one," seems to be the accepted standard of music-hall chivalry. But I am loath to believe but that with every right-thinking, sane Briton the absolute impotence of our insignificant adversary operates as a strong

argument in favour of abstaining from an appeal to force.

But, it will be said, "Remember Majuba Hill, where despite all this disproportion of strength the Boers gave you a licking which we have never forgotten and for which we are now going to pay them out." Of all the illustrations of the ludicrous results arising from ignorance of the simplest facts, there is very little to beat this continual harping upon Majuba Hill. To read much that is written in English newspapers, it might be imagined that the whole force of the British Empire arrayed against the embattled Boers at Majuba Hill, and that in a fair trial of strength, in which each side put forth the whole military resources, the flag of England had been beaten to dust. As a matter of fact no more preposterous misconception of facts could be conceived by mortal man. The much talked-of Majuba Hill was a mere frontier row, in which the whole force under the British command did not exceed eight hundred men. It would be just as reasonable to regard the issue of a prize-fight in Johannesburg between a burly Boer and an under-sized Briton as inflicting a stigma upon our flag. Majuba Hill was little better than a mere affair of the outposts of empire. Every empire, every army, even the most victorious, has numberless Majubas to look back upon, even in its most victorious campaigns.

Our men were badly led, they lost two hundred and eighty of their number, the Commander-in-Chief fell dead on the field, and the name of Majuba became from that day a byword of reproach in the British army. There is no doubt to the completeness of the defeat of the British force; but it is simply preposterous to pretend that the battle was anything like a test match between the British and the Boers. In this light, however, it has come to be regarded by the ill-informed on both sides, and the man in the street probably imagines that at Majuba Hill the whole British army was beaten by the Boers. The fact that less than one complete regiment was engaged will probably be news to most of those who read these pages.

But it is held by some that notwithstanding the long annals of glory which make up the military history of England, this slight reverse cannot be suffered to remain unavenged. Nothing will go right in South Africa until we have met the Boers once more in battle, and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat. But the restoration of the independence of the Transvaal was not

assented to until we had placed ourselves in a position utterly to annihilate the forces of the Transvaal. Lord Roberts was sent out with an army sufficient to have walked over the Transvaal from end to end, but even before he had arrived, Sir Evelyn Wood had mustered sufficient soldiers and was in a strong enough position to crush whatever resistance the Boers might have offered. This was frankly admitted by the Boers themselves. When two armies confront each other in battle array, there is no necessity for a trial of strength if the weaker frankly admits its weakness, and throws up the sponge before a shot is fired. This was practically what the Boers did. We did not wish to retain the direct government of the Transvaal in our hands, and we were pledged to give them local self-government in accordance with English ideas. They were contented to accept the settlement which we offered, although they would dearly have liked to have achieved their complete independence. They saw, however, that they had no chance against the British forces, so they accepted the Convention of 1881. Those who argue that the Boers should have been beaten merely mean that a certain number of throats should have been cut in order to seal in blood the recognition of our superiority in fighting force. Is this worthy, I do not say of a Christian nation, but even of human beings who have emerged from aboriginal savagery?

If any one questions the accuracy of this account of Majuba Hill and its sequel, I would refer him to no less an authority than Mr. Chamberlain himself, who, speaking in the House of Commons in 1896, said:—

"I was a member of the Government that sanctioned the retrocession of the Transvaal after the defeat of Majuba Hill. I remember as if it were yesterday a despatch coming from Sir Evelyn Wood, who commanded our troops, in which he said that, humanly speaking, the Boer army was at his mercy, and he awaited the instructions of the Cabinet to go on and to attack it. We withheld those instructions, and instead we accepted an armistice, which resulted in the Convention of 1881. Why did we take those steps? Because, in the first place, we believed that the annexation of the Transvaal had been made involuntarily by this House under a misapprehension of the facts. The House was told when the annexation was made that the Boers were themselves in favour. It appeared afterwards that the House had been entirely misinformed, and, under these circumstances, the Government of the day came to the conclusion that the annexation ought to be annulled, and, having come to that conclusion, we did not think it was worthy of a great powerful nation to use its strength to shed further blood and to pursue the war after the object for which the war had been waged had been conceded. Since then there have been many and

different opinions as to the policy of the course we took. Many have condemned it. (Ministerial cheers.) Although I am inclined to remind the Committee, that one of those who condemned us most severely—the late Lord Randolph Churchill—when he afterwards visited South Africa, came to the conclusion that our policy was as wise as it was magnanimous, because he convinced him-elf that, even if we had gained what we believed, and which I still believe, was within our grasp, we should have left behind such bitter feelings between races which inhabit South Africa that we should have had greater troubles in the future than we had had in the past. Whatever else may be thought of that policy, at all events it can not be denied that it was a magnanimous policy, such as I believe no other nation, under similar circumstances, has pursued.” (Cheers.)

That it was a magnanimous policy, and was recognised by the Boers themselves in that light, has never been denied. President Kruger in one of his most recent despatches referred with profound appreciation to this demonstration of the might and magnanimity of Great Britain. In the Transvaal the leaders of the Boers have always recognised the peace as “a proof of England’s noble and magnanimous love of right and justice.” No doubt the more ignorant Boers have imagined that because we did not seal our ascendancy in slaughter, we recognised their superiority. Certain persons who are still in the barbarous stages never can be taught excepting by object-lessons of the most sanguinary character; but it is not for civilised States to conduct their relations on the assumption that the rudest and most ignorant members of their respective communities are to be the supreme judges as to the significance of the policy pursued.

That the present war should be advocated in order to avenge Majuba Hill, represents the abdication of the leading minds of the community, who know the facts, and the establishment of the prejudice and ignorance of the least informed members of the community as the deciding factor in international affairs.

This is only one small illustration of the need for a more accurate appreciation of the comparative importance of the affairs with which we have to deal. To see the whole British Empire agitated by this storm in the Transvaal tea-cup is a melancholy illustration of one of the besetting weaknesses of governments under the sway of excited and ill-informed multitudes. To see “the ocean into tempest hurled, to waft a feather or to drown a fly,” is not an edifying spectacle, nor is it usually supposed to be a wise adjustment of means to the end, to use a Nasmyth hammer to crack a nut, but what else is it

but this which we are witnessing to-day? The Imperial hammer is being brought out at infinite expenditure of time and money in order to get it into position to crack the Transvaal nut. Unfortunately the expenditure of time and money is by no means the most serious aspect, for in addition to a wasteful and useless expenditure, we have the guilt of homicide, which, before a supreme tribunal, might be indistinguishable from wilful murder.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

##### MR. CHAMBERLAIN AS A DANIEL COME TO JUDGMENT.

IT is well calculated to give pause to those who are wildly clamouring for war against the Transvaal, to know that the man who leads them on was only three years ago profoundly convinced of the immorality, the impolicy, not to say the criminality, of the course which they are adopting. Probably no Secretary of State has ever afforded his opponents so many telling quotations in support of their views as the present Colonial Secretary. It is not necessary to go back to the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain, when the member for Birmingham was regarded as one of the bright and shining lights of the Radical Party. Everything that Mr. Chamberlain said when he was member of the Gladstone Cabinet would naturally be discounted by those who regard such utterances as belonging to a period of immaturity, before the present Colonial Secretary had found salvation in the Unionist camp. I shall forbear, therefore, from making a single quotation from any of the speeches delivered by Mr. Chamberlain in his Radical days. The passages to which I would call the careful attention of my readers are taken without exception from the public utterances made by Mr. Chamberlain when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies in the present administration. None of them date back further than the beginning of 1896. In these speeches we find laid down with characteristic precision and emphasis principles of South African policy which ran directly counter to the course which the War Party is at present pursuing.

1ST PRINCIPLE—KEEP IN WITH THE  
DUTCH.

On the 22nd April, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain, addressing a select audience at the Constitutional Club, after pointing out the fact, which is as plain as the sun at noonday, that Great Britain is the paramount power in South Africa, went on to define what ought to be the governing principle of our policy in those regions.

“In South Africa,” said Mr. Chamberlain, “two races, the English and the Dutch, have to live together. At the present time and probably for many years to come the Dutch are in the majority, and it is therefore the duty of every statesman, of every well-wisher of South Africa to do all in his power to maintain amicable relations between the two races. In our own Cape Colony the Dutch also are in a majority. There are tens of thousands of Dutchmen in the Cape Colony who are just as loyal to the throne and to the British connection as, let me say, our French Canadian fellow subjects in the Dominion of Canada. At the same time these Dutch fellow subjects of ours very naturally feel that they are of the same blood as the Dutchmen in the two neighbouring Republics, and they sympathise with their compatriots whenever they think that they are to be subject, or are likely to be subject, to any injustice or to the arbitrary exercise of force. It was, therefore,” he went on, “a proposition to be universally accepted that we must use every exertion and exhaust every means of securing good feeling between the Dutch and the English. It is true that as the paramount power in South Africa we could not be indifferent to the grievances of the Uitlanders . . .

“But as a Dutch Government, as well as an English Government, it ought to be our object, in endeavouring to secure the redress of their grievances, to carry with us our own Dutch fellow-subjects. (Cheers.) Up to a recent date—until recent events—the sympathy of the Dutch population at the Cape, in the Orange Free State, and even of the Progressive Dutchmen in the South African Republic itself—the sympathy of all was with the Imperial Government, and with the Uitlanders in endeavouring to secure the redress of their grievances. There has been a revulsion of feeling since, from causes which are well-known to you, but I do not despair, in fact I have a confident hope, that we shall be able, in the course of no lengthened time,

once more to restore the situation as it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, and to have at our backs the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population in Africa; and if we have that, the opinion—the united opinion—which that will constitute will be an opinion which no power in Africa can resist. Now, gentlemen, that is the policy, the South African policy, of Her Majesty’s Government.” (“Hear, hear.”)

But this was not by any means the only reference which Mr. Chamberlain made to the importance of keeping on good terms with the Dutch. On the 14th February, 1896, he declared that the keynote of the policy, not of this Government alone but of all Governments in South Africa, was to conciliate the two races and to secure the Dutch support. Mr. Chamberlain said:—

“We are constantly reminded of the fact that our Dutch fellow-citizens are in a majority in South Africa, and I think I may say for myself as for my predecessor that we are prepared to go as far as Dutch sentiment will support us. It is a very serious thing, a matter involving most serious considerations, if we are asked to go to war in opposition to the Dutch sentiment.”

In 1897, when Sir Alfred Milner was entertained at dinner on the 28th March on his departure for the Cape, Mr. Chamberlain once more referred to the fundamental principle of sound policy in South Africa. “The problem,” said Mr. Chamberlain, “before us and before him is not an insoluble problem. For what is it? It is to reconcile and to persuade to live together in peace and goodwill two races whose common interests are immeasurably greater than any differences which may unfortunately exist.”

Here we have, therefore, laid down clearly and succinctly the touchstone of sound statesmanship in South Africa. After the maintenance of the paramountcy of Great Britain in South Africa, which has never been called in question, the one object which every British statesman must keep in mind, as the *sine qua non* of a successful policy in South Africa is to keep in line with the Dutch, to have at our back the sympathy and the support of the majority of the Dutch population in South Africa. This, of course, is plain common sense.

Ever since George III. lost us the American colonies by endeavouring to carry out a policy of Imperialism which ignored the wishes and prejudices of the colonists, Great Britain has maintained and extended her colonial Empire on the principle of conceding self-

government to the Colonies which are sheltered by the Union Jack. The sheet-anchor of the whole Imperial system is that the colonists must be allowed to do as they please; that to each colony as soon as it arrives at a sufficient stage of maturity, there must be conceded responsible government, and that the local majority rules. It is by the adoption of this principle that we have established peace, tranquillity, and loyalty among the French Canadians, where seventy years ago there was nothing but discontent effervescing every now and then into actual rebellion. By the adoption of the same principle, which indeed we forced upon the Cape colonists almost against their will, we have placed the control of the Cape Colony in the hands of the majority of the electors whose representatives create the executive government by which the affairs of the colony are managed.

In the Cape Colony at this present moment, the white population is divided into two unequal parts; the larger section, numbering 230,000, are either Dutch or of Dutch descent. Side by side, intermingled with these Dutch-speaking fellow-subjects, is the minority of 146,000 men of British descent, speaking English. Down to the year 1872 the Cape Colony was without responsible government. Twenty-seven years ago we insisted upon investing them and investing the local voting population with the control of their destinies, and as that local voting population is predominantly of Dutch descent, it is not to be wondered at that in the House of Commons at the Cape, which consists of ninety members, the Dutch have at this moment a majority of twelve, or nearly one-seventh of the whole number. It is obvious, therefore, that if constitutional government is to be carried on in the Cape, and the principles which have been established as the only sound principles of colonial policy are to be adhered to, Mr. Chamberlain was perfectly right in declaring that we are a Dutch Government as well as a British Government, just as in Canada we are a French Government as well as an English Government. Hence the one test to be applied to any and every policy which is proposed in Downing Street should be whether or not it will enable us to act with the support of the Dutch majority in whose hands we have placed the control of the destinies of Cape Colony. Let that be regarded, therefore, as the first principle which should govern our policy in South Africa at the present crisis. Does it or does it not

secure for us the support of the Dutch? Does it or does it not tend to promote the union of the two races? Does it or does it not enable us, in Mr. Chamberlain's phrase, "to have at our backs the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population in South Africa?" If it does it bears with it the credentials of success. If it does not, it is foredoomed to failure. That is the first point upon which we have to thank Mr. Chamberlain for laying down the law in terms of unmistakable precision.

### (2.) NO WAR TO ENFORCE REFORMS.

The second point on which we are glad to quote Mr. Chamberlain's words is the famous declaration which I have printed on the cover of this pamphlet as to the impossibility of waging a little war against the Transvaal. Replying to those who urge him to draw the sword to reduce the grievances of the Uitlanders in 1896, on May 8th, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain said, in answer to Sir William Harcourt in the House of Commons:—

"In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Kruger—an ultimatum which would have certainly been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war. It would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war. As I have pointed out, it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Kruger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, with which successive Secretaries of State standing in this place have repudiated all right of interference, that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise." (Cheers.)

This, therefore, is the second point upon which we welcome Mr. Chamberlain as a Daniel come to judgment. When we are urged to go in and whip the Boers, let us remember that, in the words of the Colonial Secretary, the war which was thus lightly invoked "will be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war"; and further, it will not only be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war, but it will have no moral justification.

### (3.) NO CLAIM TO INTERFERE.

The third point Mr. Chamberlain laid down is that we have no right to make a claim to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal.

"In the last communication," Mr. Cham-

berlain said on May 8th, 1896, "I sent to the Press, I defined what I conceived to be our rights in the matter. I said we did not claim and never had claimed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, but we did claim, both as representing the interests of our fellow-subjects in the Transvaal and as the paramount Power in South Africa responsible for the security of the whole country, to make friendly representations to him and to give him friendly advice as much in his interests as in our own."

Again, speaking on the same point on February 13th, in the House of Commons, Mr. Chamberlain expressly disclaimed any right to force reforms on President Kruger. He said:—

"I do not say that under the terms of the Convention we are entitled to force reforms on President Kruger, but we are entitled to give him friendly counsel . . . If this friendly counsel which he was then offered, was not well received," Mr. Chamberlain declared "that there was not the slightest intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to press it. All they will ask is that President Kruger himself should suggest some alternative . . . I am perfectly willing to withdraw it, and to seek a different solution if it should not prove acceptable to the President. The rights of our action under the Convention are limited to the offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce."

(4) DON'T WORRY ABOUT WORDS.

Another principle upon which Mr. Chamberlain insisted in those days with commendable emphasis was, that the essential thing was not a phrase or a word, but the reality of a fact. For instance, on the 9th of May, 1896, he said:—

"I do not care about words. It matters not whether we call ourselves suzerain or paramount; but it is an essential feature in our policy that the authority and influence of this country should be predominant in South Africa." And the predominance and influence of this country in South Africa was then to be achieved, in his opinion, by bringing about a better feeling of union and concord between the two great races which now inhabit that country. If, therefore, we would pursue a wise and statesmanlike policy in South Africa, we must not care about words, and we must be supremely indifferent

whether or not we call ourselves suzerain. We must concentrate our efforts upon bringing about a better state of union and concord between the English and the Dutch. This is sound sense, and cannot be too frequently insisted upon.

(5.) DON'T ASK MR. KRUGER TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

The fifth point upon which Mr. Chamberlain laid down sound principles in 1896 was that President Kruger would be perfectly justified in rejecting any proposal which, in his opinion, is calculated to undermine his own position. This passage is very notable, and may be commended to those who are indignant with President Kruger for not at once accepting Sir Alfred Milner's demand for a five years' franchise. Mr. Chamberlain said, speaking of his suggestion to President Kruger that the majority of the population should have the franchise, and should have a fair principle of political power:—

"The answer that has hitherto been given, not on the part of the Government of the Transvaal but on the part of some of its friends, has been that to grant this request would be to commit suicide, inasmuch as the moment the majority got the franchise the first use they would make of it would be to turn out the existing Government of the Transvaal and substitute a government of their own liking. ('Hear, hear,' and laughter.) I confess I thought there was some reason in that objection. It is rather difficult to attempt to persuade anyone so capable as President Kruger that it would be desirable that he should proceed to his own extinction, and accordingly I brought before him an alternative suggestion which, at all events, would relieve him from that difficulty. . . . The question is whether President Kruger will consider that that proposal will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does he will be perfectly justified in rejecting it."

(6.) "PATIENCE! TIME IS ON OUR SIDE."

At the South African dinner on May 21st, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain declared "that the prosperity of South Africa depended less upon its marvellous natural resources, upon its agriculture and its mining industries, than it does upon the statesmanship, the wisdom, and the moderation of the men who are mainly responsible for its political destiny. He then quoted, with high approval, the address, signed by sixty-five members of the Cape Parliament representing the Afrikaner constituencies, to Lord Rosmead, in which they stated, "that there need be no apprehension whatever of the existence of any spirit of hostility in the minds of the Afrikaner people against England, if South

Africa be left to work out its own destiny." They prayed Her Majesty's Government to resist all efforts to induce them to depart from "that policy of moderation and conciliation which can alone secure the real progress and true happiness of South Africa." "Those," said he, "are wise, moderate, and patriotic words. We must have patience; we can afford to wait. Time is on our side, and I do not doubt its healing hand will close the wounds that have been so rudely opened, and will remove all obstacles in the way of the prosperity of South Africa."

(7.) DONT DESPATCH ARMIES, BUT RESTORE GOODWILL.

At this moment when the barbaric tom-toms of militant Jingoism are reverberating in our ears and we read daily exhortations to the Colonial Secretary to launch an ultimatum and despatch an army to compel President Kruger to concede reforms dictated at the sword's point, it may be well to recall Mr. Chamberlain's solemn public pledge on the subject. Speaking in reply to Sir Ashmead Bartlett—"That will never be my policy," said Mr. Chamberlain. Let us hope that he will be as good as his word. In any case, when we listen to these imperious demands for the despatch of armies to enforce an ultimatum, let us at least remember the grave and weighty words in which Mr. Chamberlain ridiculed the folly, exposed the illegality, and condemned the policy which now finds enthusiastic support from those who call themselves his most devoted followers.

On August 12th, 1896, replying to Sir Ashmead Bartlett, who had assailed Mr. Chamberlain's policy, he asked:—

"What is the alternative? What is the policy which the honourable gentleman would put forward if he were standing here in my place? What would be the policy of the hon. member for Sheffield as Colonial Secretary? (Laughter.) We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Kruger that unless the reforms which he was specifying were granted by a particular date, the British Government would interfere by force. Then I suppose he would come here, and ask this House for a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000—it does not matter particularly which (laughter)—and would send an army of 10,000 men, at the very least, to force President Kruger to grant reforms in a state in regard to which not only this Government but successive Secretaries of State have pledged themselves repeatedly that they would have nothing to do with its internal affairs. That is the policy of the honourable gentleman. That is not my policy. My policy has been to restore the good feeling which was beginning to be created between the Dutch and the British population. . . . Common prudence demands

that at all events we should give time for the feeling of irritation produced by the Raid to subside, and that we should not base upon our own wrong a demand for reform that would be absolutely unjustifiable under such circumstances. (Cheers.) That is my policy, and I believe that policy is succeeding."

We have here, therefore, seven principles clearly laid down by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the guidance of our South African policy. They are good principles, and Mr. Chamberlain expresses them with characteristic vigour. They are accompanied with a definite pledge that he will "never" adopt the alternative policy based upon the principles of an ultimatum, the despatch of troops, and the levying of war, in order to force internal reforms upon the Transvaal. But unfortunately Mr. Chamberlain seems to have turned his back upon everyone of his seven principles, and to have forgotten the public pledge which he gave as to his resolution never to adopt a policy advocated by Sir Ashmead Bartlett, which, in the opinion of the Jingo press, is on the verge of being adopted by Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues. If we take those seven principles, string them together, and apply them as a seven-fold test to the policy which is advocated by the War Party, we find that they run counter to it at each point of the seven. It would indeed be difficult to frame a more severe condemnation of the present policy of the Colonial Office than by simply printing side by side the principles upon which Mr. Chamberlain declared his determination to act, and the principles upon which he has acted. Take, for instance, the very first and the most important of all, his explicit recognition of the fact that, after the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa, there is nothing so important as the union of the Dutch and British, and the securing of Dutch support to British policy. What do we see to-day? That there is not a Dutchman in South Africa, whether in the Cape or Natal, or in either of the Republics, who is not convinced that the policy which Mr. Chamberlain is advocating is fatal to the best interests of Africa, and will be opposed to the uttermost by the whole strength of the Dutch population. Instead of having the Dutch at our backs, we have half of them standing, bayonet in hand, preparing to receive our attack, while the other half are only waiting for an opportunity to trip us up, if not to strike us in the back, while we march our troops northward for the purpose of slaughtering their kinsmen. So far from having secured the support of the Dutch population,

the Dutch Ministry which is at present in power under Mr. Schreiner at Cape Town, has declared its determination to endeavour to preserve neutrality in the war which our Jingoese propose should be waged by the British against the Transvaal; and the very latest news from Capetown tells that the fifty-three members of the Cape Parliament, which only contains ninety all told, have signed an address to their brothers in the Transvaal expressing profound sympathy with them in their present tribulation, and confining their advice to President Kruger to the suggestion that he should accept the proposal for a Joint Commission, a proposal which he had already accepted.

According to the majority of the Ministerial papers, there is nothing left for us to do except to adopt the policy which Mr. Chamberlain pointed out would be as immoral as it was unwise—viz.: that of despatching an ultimatum and backing it up by an army in order to begin what he has told us will be a long war, a bitter war, and one which could not fail to be disastrous to the best interests of South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain cannot complain if his own policy is judged by the standard of his own professions. All that we ask him is that he will remember what he said in 1896, and act up to it. Instead of this, he is applauded on every hand by the hotheads of his party, because they believe that he is acting in direct opposition to all the seven principles above enumerated. Why cannot Mr. Chamberlain return to Chamberlainian principles, and abandon those of Sir Ashmead Bartlett, which he appears to have adopted in face of his positive declaration that he would never be guilty of such an act?

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## CHAPTER V.

### HOW THE TROUBLE AROSE.

IF we go back to the origin of things, we need to begin this chapter with the story of the great Trek. Early in the century a considerable number of Dutch farmers left the Cape Colony and migrated northward, in order to find a place where they could live in their own fashion, and govern themselves in their own way. One of the reasons that drove them northward was because they were denied the rights which they are now denying to the Uitlanders. A chief reason, no doubt, which led them to make the great exodus into the wilderness

was the desire to deal with the natives in their own way without the interference of meddling British officials or philanthropic slave-emancipating British Governments. But the reason which they gave themselves was that they were denied a representative government by the English colonial authorities which had suppressed the High Court of Justice, abolished their Senate and Landrost Courts, and done away with the official rights of the Dutch language in the law courts and in petitions and memorials to Government. After various wanderings, many hardships, and more than the usual vicissitudes which fall to the lot of white men pioneering in an untracked wilderness inhabited by warlike savages, they succeeded in establishing themselves as an independent Republic, in the great grazing country north of the Vaal River. They were a rude, sturdy race, somewhat resembling Scotch Covenanters in their religious ideas, trained on the Old Testament, and familiarised from childhood with the use of weapons. Mr. Chamberlain, describing them, when he was Minister of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, said:—

“The Boers are not naturally a warlike race; they are a homely, industrious, but somewhat rude and uncivilised nation of farmers living on the produce of the soil; they are animated by a deep and even stern religious sentiment, and they inherit from their ancestors, the men who won the independence of Holland from the oppressive rule of Philip II. of Spain, their unconquerable love of freedom and liberty. Are not these qualities, which commend themselves to men of the English race, are they not virtues which we are proud to believe form the best characteristics of the English people?”

Despite all their natural virtues, they were never regarded with much sympathy by the British authorities in South Africa. Before they settled in the Transvaal they had established themselves in Natal, from which they were driven by force of arms, and it was not without considerable difficulty that in 1852 they succeeded in securing a recognition for their independence from the dominant Power in South Africa. From 1852 down to 1877 they lived apart from the rest of the world in their own fashion, occasionally coming into sharp collision with missionaries like Livingstone, and scandalising the conscience of their British neighbours by the method in which they applied the principles of Joshua to the swarthy Hittites in the midst of whom they were encamped.

In 1877, however, the ever-encroaching paramount Power annexed the country, but promised the Boers that they would be allowed a representative Government of their own, and that they would be almost as free under British sovereignty as they were before they came under the Union Jack. This promise was not fulfilled, for the simple reason that, had they been allowed to govern themselves, the first use they would have made of the privilege would have been to haul down the Union Jack and re-establish their independence. They waited and hoped that the turn of party politics in England would enable them to regain their lost liberties without an appeal to the sword.

Lord Beaconsfield went; Mr. Gladstone succeeded him, but unfortunately being pre-occupied with the settlement of the Eastern Question, he failed to realise the intensity of the devotion of the Boers to their national independence. He declared that the Transvaal could not be severed from the Empire, but he accompanied this declaration by a resolve to let them have Home Rule on a broad and liberal basis. This did not content the Boers. All, however, might have gone well, had the British representative in Pretoria been a man in sympathy with their aspirations and capable of reconciling them to their lot. Unfortunately he was a military martinet, who regarded the Boers as incipient rebels, and the disaffection grew apace. As soon as Mr. Gladstone's decision was known, the smouldering embers burst into a blaze.

The Boers rose in an insurrection which our military authorities on the spot endeavoured to stamp out with forces entirely inadequate to the task which confronted them. On two or three occasions a small force of British troops was worsted when they came into collision with the Boers, and the crowning defeat of Majuba Hill suddenly forced home to Mr. Gladstone the conviction that the Boers were sufficiently in earnest about their liberties to kill and be killed in defence of them. He sent out an army sufficient to overpower all resistance, and then when the Boers admitted their position was hopeless from a military point of view, he concluded the Convention of 1881, by which the Boers received their country back again, subject to the suzerainty of the British crown.

Three years later, the Boers, who were dissatisfied with the position of political dependence which was secured them by the Convention of 1881, came to London

to ask that they might be relieved from the suzerainty, and that the Convention might be amended so as to give them the same absolute right of internal self-government that was possessed by the Orange Free State, which is an international sovereign state. Lord Derby was then Colonial Minister. Both by constitution and by conviction Lord Derby was indifferent to Imperial interests in South Africa. It was with great effort that we succeeded at that time in inducing him to confine the Transvaal within its present limits, and so save the northern road to Rhodesia, which, but for the agitation of Mr. Mackenzie and others in this country, would have been sacrificed to the expansionist instincts of the Boers. Having saved that out of the fire, Lord Derby was left free to do as he pleased with the rest of the Convention. What he did was to supersede the Convention of 1881 by the Convention of 1884, in which, in deference to the wishes of the Boers, all reference to the suzerainty of Great Britain was dropped. This was done, as Lord Derby afterwards explained in the House of Lords, of set purpose. Lord Salisbury, when the Convention of 1881 was concluded, had denounced the suzerainty as a mere sham without a single particle of sovereignty about it, and Lord Derby in 1884 declared that there was no reason for maintaining a phrase which was objectionable to the Boers, for all that he wanted was to secure the control of the foreign relations of the Transvaal State in our own hands. This was done by the clause which provided that the Transvaal should not conclude any treaties with any foreign Powers without submitting them to our approval. If we did not veto them within a certain limited time, they became valid. That was the last rag of suzerainty or sovereignty which was left to us by the Convention of 1884.

It is probable that everything would have gone on quietly enough in the Transvaal if it had not been for the discovery of the great goldfield of the Rand. This immense deposit of mineral wealth attracted to the Transvaal adventurers from all countries, and in a year or two a great mining community came into existence at Johannesburg. The goldfield of the Rand is one of the richest in the world, and the output last year of gold was valued at £10,000,000. The primitive virtues of the Boer, which were developed by long struggle with wild beasts and savages in the wilderness, were not exactly calculated to enable him to cope with this sudden

influx of a heterogeneous population from all parts of the world. Mining camps are not schools of all the virtues, nor was Johannesburg exactly the place in which to open a young ladies' boarding-school. The newcomers, however, if they brought many vices and much disorder into the Transvaal, converted an almost bankrupt community of impecunious Boers into the wealthiest state in South Africa. President Kruger and the elder Boers who had taken part in the Trek regarded the influx of the foreigner with profound alarm, and by way of protecting their beloved Republic against the pernicious influence of the Uitlanders they raised higher and still higher the restrictions upon the franchise.

President Kruger had promised Sir Evelyn Wood when the Convention of 1881 was being negotiated that the British subjects should have the same civil rights as the burghers of the Republic. This promise President Kruger maintains has been fulfilled, because the Uitlanders, despite restrictions upon the franchise, were offered the franchise on condition that they consented to bear the burden of military service, which was enforced from time to time upon the native population. British and American miners, however, who went to the Transvaal to make their fortune, were in no mood to be sent on expeditions against natives, and as they objected to be commandeered for native wars, President Kruger considered he was fully justified in practically excluding them from all voice or share in the election of members to the Volksraad or in the election of President.

It is easy to understand, and to a certain extent to sympathise with President Kruger's attitude; but it is not less plain to see that friction was inevitable between a great unrepresented tax-paying, industrial community and the community of herdsmen which jealously retained in its own hands the whole executive authority of the State. A section of the Boers, headed by General Joubert, recognised the impossibility of his permanently maintaining the Uitlander community in Johannesburg under the oligarchical government of the Boers of Pretoria; and for some years the struggle went on between the progressist Boers under General Joubert and the old Tory Doppers under President Kruger, the latter invariably triumphed, although their power was dwindling and the duration of their domination was bound up with the life of President Kruger.

The Boer administration of Johannesburg was by no means ideal. There

were scandals, stories of corruption, among the Boer officials, which might easily be paralleled in the annals of Tammany Hall in New York. But on the whole, although there was great unrest and discontent, the immense prosperity of the Rand and the Pactolean flood of wealth which enriched both the Boers and their taxed but unrepresented subjects, averted any direct outbreak.

In 1895 a period of depression made the industrial community of Johannesburg keenly aware of the disadvantages of working under Boer administration, which endeavoured more or less to administer a great modern mining community on principles which dated back to the time of the Book of Judges. Nevertheless, on the whole they rubbed along much better than might have been expected. There were great complaints of monopolies, especially of the dynamite monopoly, which enriched the concessionaires at the expense of the mining community, whose industry, energy and enterprise had made Johannesburg the first city of South Africa. The working population also had its own grievance says the police, who were underpaid, corrupt, and brutal on occasion. An agitation sprang up in favour of the redress of these admitted grievances, and this agitation gained so much in volume and intensity as to lead Mr. Rhodes to imagine that Johannesburg was on the verge of revolution.

Up to 1895 Mr. Rhodes had set his face against everything that would tend to alienate his friends the Dutch. He was the hero of the Afrikaner Bond, the sworn ally of Mr. Hofmeyr, and he had persistently turned a cold shoulder to the representations made by the discontented Uitlanders, feeling that it was impossible to champion their cause and at the same time to retain his hold upon the Dutch. In the summer of 1895, however, strong representations were made to him that if he did not support the Uitlanders they would make a revolution in the Transvaal, depose Paul Kruger, and establish a republic which would be much more hostile to Great Britain than that of the Boers had ever been. It was necessary, therefore, in order to secure the paramount interest of Great Britain in South Africa, to support the insurrectionary movement in order that, when the inevitable came to pass, the new State might be in friendly relations with the other South African colonies. Mr. Rhodes sent a trusty emissary to London to inform the Colonial Office of

the altered situation and to keep them advised of what he proposed to do. Money and arms were provided for the Uitlanders, who were supposed to be yearning for an opportunity to vindicate their right to self-government and to overturn the Government which flourished upon their taxes, while refusing them representation. Unfortunately the impatient zeal on the part of Dr. Jameson, led to a miscarriage of the whole scheme. He had been stationed with a small armed force on the frontier in readiness to be used by the High Commissioner, after the insurrection had broken out, in restoring order and re-establishing peace in the Transvaal. The Uitlanders put off and put off the moment of the anticipated insurrection, and Dr. Jameson, instead of waiting until the insurrection had broken out, rode in on his famous raid, in order to encourage them to revolt. This spoiled everything. Johannesburg did not rise; Dr. Jameson and his men were surrounded and made prisoners at Doorn-Kop; the leading conspirators among the Uitlanders were arrested and condemned to death—a sentence, however, which was commuted into a heavy money fine, and the power of Paul Kruger once more was supreme.

The grievances of the Uitlanders, however, were unredressed, and the sympathy which they might otherwise have had in this country was dried up considerably owing to their failure to make the insurrection which would have settled everything, and placed the government of the Transvaal upon a broad democratic basis. Mr. Chamberlain from time to time made efforts and representations on their behalf, but always disclaimed any right to intervene. To these representations President Kruger very frequently turned a deaf ear, and the Boers fortified themselves against a renewed attack upon their independence by laying in plentiful supplies of arms and munitions of war, by building a strong fort which commands Johannesburg, and passing a series of laws which made the position of the Uitlanders worse than before.

Meantime the only element of hope was in the increasing strength of the Progressive party among the Boers, which at the last election had for the first time obtained a majority in the Volksraad. "Time is on our side," said Mr. Chamberlain, and with reason. President Kruger is an old man of seventy-four; he is the only rallying-point for the reactionary Tories of the Transvaal; his death will be the signal for the general dis-

solution of the majority which he has kept together with great astuteness for so many years, and the Uitlanders would then have been in a position to have practically dictated their own terms.

Unfortunately for this comfortable programme, various local causes of irritation gave renewed impetus to the discontent of the Uitlanders. Considering the average amount of unpunished homicide, which is regarded as normal in the great mining communities or Western States of America, it is somewhat astonishing to find that there were only two cases alleged in which murder was done in Johannesburg for which no punishment was exacted by the Courts. A Wesleyan minister's wife, of the name of Applebee, was done to death, and the crime was never brought home to any one. The case, however, which created the most commotion was that of a man called Edgar.

There is considerable dispute about the facts in the case, but, taking it at the worst, this is what happened. Edgar, who seems to have been of somewhat bad character, met three drunken men in the dark in the street outside his house. One of them insulted him, and was promptly knocked down. Edgar then walked home, and was sitting in his bedroom talking to his wife when three policemen arrived, broke down the house door, and shot Edgar dead. The man who shot him was arrested and tried, but acquitted on the ground that he fired in self-defence. Taking the facts at their worst, the commotion which this episode occasioned must seem astounding to those who are familiar with the readiness with which policemen in the great American cities use their revolvers in the discharge of their duty; and it even occasions considerable amazement to those who remember the way in which British workmen were bludgeoned as they lay helpless in the cells of our police courts by the Metropolitan police at the time of the Trafalgar Square Riots, without a single policeman ever being brought to justice. Nevertheless, the case was taken up passionately by the working population of Johannesburg, and out of the agitation thus stimulated there came a great petition to the Queen, pleading for a redress of grievances. This petition, which set forth at some length all the grievances of which the Uitlanders complained, was received by Sir Alfred Milner in the spring of this year, and by him forwarded to the Imperial Government. This was the beginning of all the trouble.

Sir Alfred Milner, who had just returned

to South Africa after a long visit to this country, in which he had ample opportunities of learning the views of the Colonial Secretary of State, telegraphed a despatch on 5th May which asserted, in the most uncompromising terms, the necessity for intervention in the affairs of the Transvaal." "The right of Great Britain to intervene," he said, "to secure fair treatment of the Uitlanders, was fully equal to her supreme interest in securing it. They were our subjects; only in very rare cases had they been able to obtain any redress by the ordinary diplomatic means. The true remedy was to strike at the root of all those evils. The case for intervention was overwhelming. The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of Helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for redress, steadily undermines the influence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government within the Queen's dominions. A mischievous propaganda in favour of making the Dutch Republic the paramount Power in South Africa," he declared, "was producing a great effect upon a large number of our fellow-colonists. Thousands of the Cape Dutch were being drawn into disaffection. Nothing could put a stop to this propaganda, except some striking proof of the intention of Her Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its position in South Africa. This," he thought, "could best be done by obtaining for the Uitlander a fair share in the government of the country." This despatch, written in somewhat more than his old *Pall Mall* style, led the Cabinet to give Sir Alfred Milner permission to hold a conference with President Kruger and see what could be done.

If that despatch had been confined to the Cabinet, for whose perusal alone it must have been intended, much of the present mischief would never have arisen. Unfortunately Mr. Chamberlain could not resist the opportunity of using so vigorous a weapon in favour of a policy to which he was committed. He published the despatch, and South Africa has been in hot water ever since. Passions have been excited which may easily overmaster those who kindled them, and a move which was intended to secure a perfectly legitimate end by perfectly legitimate means became the beginning of a stormy and warlike agitation which threatens to involve us in war.

It will be seen from the following chapter

that the Transvaal Government, so far from meeting Sir Alfred Milner's demands with an absolute *non possumus*, made an offer on 19th August to concede even more than Sir Alfred Milner had ever asked for in return for a merely nominal concession. Why that offer was not accepted is one of the mysteries which many explain by the supposition that a peaceful settlement was the last thing desired in certain quarters. This, however, may be uncharitable. It would be better to give the Government the benefit of the doubt, and suppose that they erred from mere blundering rather than from deliberate ill-will.

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE STORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SEVERAL Blue Books have been published containing despatches from South Africa describing the course of the long and intricate negotiations which have taken place between Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Kruger on the subject of the hour.

Let it be premised at the outset that there is universal agreement as to the justice of the claim of the Uitlanders for some voice in the government of the country which they have adopted as their own. There is equal unanimity as to the fact that the British Government is bound by every consideration of honour, policy, and duty, to do what it can to secure for British subjects who have settled in the Transvaal equality of treatment before the law and admission to the full citizenship of their adopted country. This being the case it is only natural that Sir Alfred Milner should last June have endeavoured in friendly conference with President Kruger to arrive at some understanding on this matter. President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner met in the neutral territory of the Free State at Bloemfontein from the 31st May to the 5th June. Their discussions lasted for several days, but led to no immediate result. Sir Alfred Milner, more, as he tells us for the purpose of testing the mood of President Kruger than from any expectation of being able to achieve his political ends, suggested to Mr. Kruger that the simplest way of getting rid of the grievances of the Uitlanders was to allow them to become full citizens of the Republic after a residence in it of five years, and to allow them at least four seats in the Volksraad. The President would not hear of this,

declaring that were he to yield upon this matter, it would swamp the Republic, and place the control of the Transvaal in the hands of the Uitlanders. He said that his own burghers were only 30,000 in number, while the Uitlanders who might qualify numbered from 60,000 to 70,000. He brought forward an alternative scheme of his own, the effect of which was to concede the franchise to Uitlanders seven years after they arrived in the Republic, a two years period being required for naturalisation and an additional five years for the concession of the franchise. He, however, accompanied his offer of the seven years' franchise with a great number of limitations and conditions which practically rendered the concession of very little value. For the purpose of reference it may be well to quote here these conditions.

In the first place, every new-comer had to register himself within fourteen days after his arrival. He could then obtain naturalisation after two years on complying with the following conditions: (1) Six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalisation. (2) Two years continuous registration. (3) Residence in the South African Republic during that period. (4) No dishonouring sentence. (5) Proof of obedience to the laws: no act against Government or Independence. (6) Proof of full state citizenship and franchise or title thereto in former country. (7) Possession of unmortgaged fixed property to the value of £150, or occupation of house rented at £50, or yearly income of at least £200. (8) An oath similar to that of the Orange Free State.

After being naturalised, in five years they could obtain the full franchise on condition of: (first) continuous registration for five years after naturalisation; (secondly) Continuous residence during that period, &c.

Residents in the Transvaal before 1890, who naturalised themselves within six months after the passing of the proposed new law, could obtain the full franchise in two years after naturalisation. This was as far as President Kruger declared he could go. Over and over again he declared that to concede the franchise to the Uitlanders would sacrifice the independence of the Republic, and this he could not do, nor would his people allow him, even if he were willing to do so. The President constantly asserted that he had fulfilled the obligations entered into by the Conventions, and that he had offered the Uitlanders equal civil rights with those given to his own people, but they

refused to discharge the obligations of citizenship. Every Boer enjoying the franchise was liable to compulsory military service against the natives. The Uitlanders refused to render this military service, and therefore were legitimately (in President Kruger's opinion) shut out from the franchise.\*

There was a desultory discussion upon the dynamite monopoly, and upon various outstanding questions which, however, came to no definite end. There was a certain partial agreement arrived at upon the subject of arbitration without being closely defined in detail, and there was an interchange of views on several of the other questions which are outstanding between the Transvaal and the British Government, viz.: the indemnity for the Jameson raid, the designs of the Boers upon Zambaan territory in Zululand, and the question of Swaziland. The whole discussion between Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger is very interesting reading, but the gist of it may be summed up in Kruger's own words:—

\* It may be worth while here to explain the existing franchise law of the Transvaal Republic, as it was at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference:—

“By the Constitution the supreme legislative authority is vested in a Parliament of two Chambers, each of twenty-seven members, chosen by the districts. Bills passed by the second Chamber do not become law until accepted by the first. Members of both Chambers must be thirty years of age, possess fixed property, profess the Protestant religion, and never have been convicted of any criminal offence. The members of the first Chamber are elected from and by the first-class burghers, those of the second Chamber from and by the second-class burghers conjointly, each for four years. First-class burghers comprise all male whites resident in the Republic before May 29, 1876, or who took an active part in the War of Independence in 1881, the Malaboch war in 1894, the Jameson Raid in 1895-6, the expedition to Swaziland in 1894, and all the other tribal wars of the Republic, and the children of such persons from the age of sixteen. Second-class burghers comprise the naturalised male alien population and their children from the age of sixteen. Naturalisation may be obtained after two years' residence, and registration on the books of the Field-cornet, oath of allegiance, and payment of £2. Naturalised burghers may, by special resolution of the first Chamber, become first-class burghers twelve years after naturalisation. Sons of aliens, though born in the Republic, have no political rights; but, by registration at the age of sixteen, may, at the age of eighteen, become naturalised burghers, and may, by special resolution of the first Chamber, be made first-class burghers ten years after they are eligible for the second Chamber, or at the age of forty. The President and Commandant-General are elected by the first-class burghers only; District-Commandants and Field-cornets by the two classes of burghers conjointly. The Executive is vested in a President, elected for five years, assisted by a Council consisting of four members.”—“Statesman's Year Book,”

"Can His Excellency not understand that if I should give in to what he proposes, I would be practically giving my land away? I have to consider my Volksraad and my burghers, principally my burghers, and if I have to go back and convince them, I must tell them that something has been given in to me, if I give in to something."

Sir Alfred Milner could not, however, promise President Kruger anything, and the Conference broke up without arriving at any conclusion. Pending controversies, therefore, in Sir Alfred Milner's opinion, "must be allowed to take their course in the ordinary way." When Sir Alfred Milner returned to Capetown, he received a deputation and assured them that he had confined himself to the franchise "because to have pressed for the redress of Uitlander grievances one by one, to say nothing of other subjects of difference, would have been to engage in an irritating controversy and to spoil the chance of an amicable compromise on broad lines going to the root of the differences. It seemed best to strike straight at the root of the evil by giving the people whose interests Her Majesty's Government is bound to defend such a share of political power as would enable them gradually to redress their grievances themselves, and to strengthen, not weaken, the country of their adoption in the process; but just because I was relying upon a single remedy, it was absolutely essential that that remedy should be a radical one."

President Kruger returned to Pretoria, and proposed a Reform Bill, which Sir Alfred Milner on July 13th admitted was a considerable advance upon the proposals made by President Kruger at Bloemfontein. He still maintained the principle of seven years' residence, but in order to meet the objections taken to the provisos suggested at Bloemfontein, five considerable changes were made, all of them framed with the object of meeting the British protest against the cumbersome and complicated conditions which stood in the way of a substantial and immediate representation of the Uitlanders in the Volksraad. Meanwhile agitation continued both in Capetown and the Transvaal, and Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons declared that the seven years' franchise afforded a basis for negotiation, and he subsequently proposed that the Transvaal Government should assent to a Joint Commission of Enquiry on the spot as to the effect of the new law, the number of those who would be enfranchised thereby, and

generally to ascertain and report upon the effect which the seven years' franchise would have upon the position of the Uitlanders. To this proposed Joint Enquiry, President Kruger took the strongest possible exception, and to the astonishment of every one, in order to avoid the Joint Enquiry, he proposed to go further even than Sir Alfred Milner, who had asked him to concede the five years' retrospective franchise right out, and to give the Uitlanders eight fresh seats in the Volksraad, assuring them that their share of the representation should never fall below one quarter of the whole body. The offer was also made that the new burghers should be entitled to vote in the election for the President and Commandant-General. But this offer, which Sir Alfred Milner admitted was "as liberal as anything that he was prepared to suggest," was made subject to the following conditions:—

(1) That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action, and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place.

This condition received a very important explanation in a subsequent despatch dated September 2nd, in which the Secretary of State, Mr. Reitz, observed that "with reference to the question of intervention, this Government has neither asked nor intended that Her Majesty's Government should abandon any right which it really might have on the ground either of the Convention of London (1884) or of international law, to intervene for the protection of British subjects in this country."

(2) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being allowed tacitly to drop.

This, again, was explained in the subsequent despatch, as follows: "As regards the assertion of suzerainty, its non-existence has, as this Government ventured to think, already been so clearly stated in its despatch of 16th April, 1898, that it would be superfluous to repeat here the facts, arguments, and deductions stated therein. It simply wishes to remark here that it abides by its views expressed in that despatch."

(3) That arbitration, from which foreign element should be excluded, would be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme became law. They wished, however, to know whether the Government was willing that burghers of

the Orange Free State should be eligible for appointment as members of such a Court of Arbitration. What subjects should be regarded as arbitrable and what should not—the object aimed at being the automatic settlement of all points, both those which are in dispute at present and those which may arise hereafter.

These three conditions being granted, the Government would bring in a Bill conceding the five years' retrospective franchise, and giving eight additional seats to the Uitlanders, which would become law in a few weeks. This was the offer of the 19th August, and on the 2nd September, referring to the conditions, Mr. Reitz remarked that "the stipulations were most reasonable, and demand on the side of Her Majesty's Government no abandonment of existing rights, but solely the obtaining of the assurance that Her Majesty's Government would in future, as regards the Republic simply abide by the Convention of London (1884), and the generally recognised rules of international law. Moreover, that in points of difference principles should be brought into practice whose reasonableness and justice are recognised by all other States, the principle of arbitration, to wit."

Much to the surprise of President Kruger and his advisers, Mr. Chamberlain replied on the 28th August, in a despatch which President Kruger accepted as a refusal. Mr. Chamberlain's answer was certainly not a cordial acceptance of the liberal offer made him by the Transvaal. Instead of rejoicing at the concession of the five years' retrospective franchise, Her Majesty's Government suggest that the offer might be hampered by conditions which would impair its effect, and that therefore they wish, before accepting the offer, that either a joint or unilateral Commission should make an investigation in order to ascertain whether or not the proffered new franchise law would secure immediate and substantial representation of the Uitlanders. Until such report had been received, Mr. Chamberlain hoped the Transvaal Government would abstain from passing their new Reform Bill, in order that they might have the advantage of suggestions which the British Agent might make. This in itself was not particularly reassuring, and the evil effect was still more emphasised by the way in which Mr. Chamberlain referred to the annexed conditions. Instead of saying what might perfectly well have been said, that the Government would not regard this concession of the Transvaal as a precedent,

and that they would directly confine themselves to their rights under the Convention and under international law to protect their subjects from injustice, he replied as follows:—

"First, as regards intervention, Her Majesty's Government hope that the fulfilment of the promises made and the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future will render unnecessary any further intervention on their behalf, but Her Majesty's Government cannot, of course, debar themselves from their rights under Conventions, nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilised Power to protect outside subjects in a foreign country from injustice."

As no one had asked them to do anything of the kind, this elaborate setting forth of the suspicious and grudging attitude of mind which prevails at Downing Street was naturally calculated to have the worst effect.

Secondly, with regard to the suzerainty, Mr. Chamberlain said: "Her Majesty's Government would refer the Government of the South African Republic to the second paragraph of my despatch of 13th July."

This paragraph runs as follows:—

"Her Majesty's Government concur generally in the views expressed in your despatch, and have no intention of continuing to discuss this question with the Government of the Republic, whose contention that the South African Republic is a sovereign International State is not, in their opinion, warranted either by law or history, and is wholly inadmissible."

Finally there remains the question of arbitration. On this all that Mr. Chamberlain would say was that "the Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a tribunal of arbitration from which foreigners and foreign influence were excluded."

Then as if in order to convince the Boers that he did not desire a settlement, but wished only to raise continual fresh difficulties, he finished his despatch by saying: "Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration." He therefore suggested that there should be a further conference held at Capetown between President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner.

If, when this despatch had arrived at

Pretoria, there had been any confidence in the good faith of Mr. Chamberlain, and if President Kruger and Mr. Reitz had not been thoroughly convinced that the British authorities were determined to find a pretext for picking a quarrel, they might have ignored the very bad form of Mr. Chamberlain's reply, accepted the proposed Conference, and hoped for the best. But the grudging tones in which Mr. Chamberlain had met their advances, the sinister reminder that there were other subjects outstanding, and the refusal in any way to give any assurance that would soothe the susceptibilities of the Boers on the subject of the suzerainty, did their evil work. Hence the immediate result was a reply from Mr. Reitz on the 2nd September, stating "that this Government has observed with the deepest regret that Her Majesty's Government have not been able to agree to accept the proposal for a five years' franchise, and extension of the representation of the Witswatersrand, with the conditions attached thereto; the more so that from semi-official discussions they had thought that they might infer that their proposal would have been acceptable to her Majesty's Government." The reason why they thought they had reason to think so is explained in the communication which passed between Mr. Reitz and Mr. Conyngham Greene, our representative at Pretoria:—

After the Transvaal proposal containing the conditions that the suzerainty controversy should be dropped, and that no further interference should take place in the internal affairs of the Republic, had been formally presented, Mr. Chamberlain replied by wire:—

"If the Government of the South African Republic were to put forward such a proposal this Government would not consider it a refusal of the joint Commission, but would be prepared to consider it on its merits."

Mr. Conyngham Greene explained this in the following terms to Dr. Smuts:—

"You can see they are inviting your proposal, and they never would have done this unless they were prepared to accept it."

Notwithstanding the disappointment at the rejection of their offer, the Transvaal Government stated that they were quite willing that the British Government should make enquiries into the working of the existing franchise law, but that they thought that such an enquiry before the working of the law had been duly tested would be premature and probably of little value. They then, in a somewhat obscure paragraph,

suggested that they would like to have some more information as to how the proposed Commission should be constituted for dealing with points involving complicated details on questions of a technical nature.

Things having got into this mess, a Cabinet Council was held, and the despatch of the 8th September was sent out, in which they went back to the Transvaal offer of 19th August, and intimated that they were willing to accept everything the Transvaal offered without giving the Transvaal the equivalent for which it stipulated in exchange. They added, further, another demand in the shape of a claim that the new members in the Raad should be allowed to use their own language. "Give us," they said, in effect, "five years' retrospective franchise; grant us a Commission which will prove that the new Reform Bill is genuine, and not a fraud; permit the new members to use English in the debates in the Volksraad, and then we will go into a Conference to discuss other difficulties."

The reply of the Transvaal Government was natural and instant. They said, "Thank you for nothing. We offered you the five years' franchise in return for certain concessions on your part, which you have refused, and now you demand that you should take everything we offered, while you haughtily deny us the quid pro quo for which we asked."

The despatch from the British Government closed with the following sentences: "If, however, as they most anxiously hope will not be the case, the reply of the South African Republic Government is negative or inconclusive, Her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement."

For the answer to this they had not long to wait. The despatch was heralded with a great fanfare of trumpets in the Ministerial press, the writers in which did their best to represent it as an ultimatum which was to be followed immediately by the despatch of an army. A sinister significance was given to these journalistic outpourings by the announcement that it was decided at once to increase the English garrison in South Africa by 10,000 men. This was represented as a measure of defence, not of aggression, and as such was a melancholy illustration of the increased danger to which British interests had been exposed by the ill-advised policy that has been pursued this summer. It needed 10,000

additional bayonets in order to defend against a self-created danger, British interests in South Africa which, before Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Chamberlain began their ill-advised policy, were perfectly safe with a garrison of less than 10,000 men all told. The Boers, finding themselves summoned to reply to a despatch which, notwithstanding all that Mr. Morley and Mr. Courtney have said, can only be regarded as a somewhat insolent demand for a concession for which we absolutely refused to pay the price, and assailed at the same time by the menace of military preparations, were naturally more suspicious than usual. As a result we had the following reply, which, as the last utterance of the Transvaal Government on the subject, it is worth while printing in full.

"*SIR*,—South African Republic Government have had the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note Sept. 12 in answer to their Note Sept. 2.

"In answer, this Government wishes to state that it learns with a feeling of deep regret that it must understand that Her Majesty's Government withdraws from the invitation sent in your letter of Aug. 23, and accepted by this Government, and substitutes in its place an entirely new proposal.

"The proposal which has now elapsed contained in the letters of this Government of Aug. 19 and Aug. 21 was induced by suggestions given by British Agent to State Attorney, and these were accepted by this Government in good faith, and on express request, as equivalent to an assurance that the proposal would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

"It was in no way the object of this Government either then or now to make any needless recapitulations of its contention about its political status as an independent State as defined by Convention of London, 1884, but only to try to put an end to the state of tension by meeting Her Majesty's Government upon a proposal which it supposed to be constituted, both in spirit and in form, in such a way as it was given to understand to be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

"This Government cannot disguise from itself that in making the proposals contained in its Note of Aug. 19, it probably ran the danger not only of its being disclaimed by South African Republic Volksraad and people, but also that its acceptance might affect the independence of State by, as therein proposed, giving an immediate vote in the Legislature of the State to a large number of in-pouring Outlanders, but it set against that the continuous threatening and undoubted danger to its highly-prized independence, arising from claim of Suzerainty made by Her Majesty's Government, from the interference of that Government in the internal affairs of this Republic, and from the want of an automatically working manner of regulating differences between Her Majesty's Government and this Government, and was in consequence prepared to recommend to South African Republic Volksraad and to people to run the danger attached to offer made, in order to avoid the certainty of the greater danger.

"Inasmuch, however, as the conditions attached to the proposal, the acceptance of which constituted the only consideration for its offer, have been declared unacceptable, it cannot understand on what grounds

of justice it can be expected that it should be bound to grant the rest, and with a view to the assurance given by the Secretary of State for Colonies that he would not consider the said offer as a refusal in answer to his invitation to a joint inquiry based upon existing franchise law and scheme of representation for Witwatersrand goldfields, it cannot understand why as soon as this invitation was accepted (as was done by this Government in its Note, Sept. 2) Her Majesty's Government declares that it cannot any longer agree to the inquiry on this subject and for purposes which that Government itself proposes.

"It is also not clear to this Government on what grounds Her Majesty's Government, after having recently by means of its invitation intimated that it could not declare without an inquiry whether franchise law and resolutions taken about representation would afford immediate and substantial representation to the Outlanders in South African Republic, is to-day in a position, without having made any inquiry so far as this Government is aware, before the law can have been tested in its operation, to declare that the measure just mentioned is insufficient for the object contemplated.

"It trusts that it will clearly appear from the foregoing that Her Majesty's Government is under a misunderstanding if it supposes that this Government has ever recognised that it has considered the lapsed proposal contained in letter Aug. 19 without the conditions imposed therein, and repeated in the Note Aug. 21, as a reasonable proposal, or made it as a proposal, and still less that this Government was or is of opinion that its earlier proposal could be extended with advantage to the Republic without observance of those conditions, or that the Republic would not suffer any violation of its independence.

"However earnestly this Government also desires to find an immediate and satisfactory course by which existing tension should be brought to an end, it feels itself quite unable as desired to recommend or propose to South African Republic Volksraad and people the part of its proposal contained in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of its Note Aug. 19 omitting the conditions on the acceptance of which alone the offer was based, but declares itself always still prepared to abide by its acceptance of the invitation [of] Her Majesty's Government to get a Joint Commission composed as intimated in its Note of Sept. 2. It considers that if conditions are contained in the existing franchise law which has been passed, and in the scheme of representation, which might tend to frustrate object contemplated, that it will attract the attention of the Commission, and thus be brought to the knowledge of this Government.

"This Government has noticed with surprise the assertion that it had intimated to British Agent that the new members to be chosen for South African Republic Volksraad should be allowed to use their own language. If it is thereby intended that this Government would have agreed that any other than the language of the country would have been used in the deliberation of the Volksraad, it wishes to deny same in the strongest manner. Leaving aside fact that it is not competent to introduce any such radical change, they have up to now not been able to understand the necessity or even advisability of making a recommendation to the Volksraad in the spirit suggested. Hence also the immediate and express denial given to British Agent by State Attorney to any question of that nature.

"Inasmuch as the proposal for any further conference has been made specially dependent on the acceptance of a proposal which this Government does

not feel at liberty to recommend to Volksraad, it would perhaps be premature to deal with it further at the present time. It merely wishes, however, to remark that it has not yet been made clear to it which are the definite questions which would be discussed [at] proposed Conference, and which could not be subjected to arbitration, but it is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government thinks that they could readily be settled by means of friendly discussions, while it further welcomes with much pleasure prospect disclosed by Her Majesty's Government of the introduction of a Court of Arbitration for the decision of all points of difference and points to be discussed at the Conference, and is ready and willing to co-operate towards the composition of such a Court, and that the more as it is its firm intention to abide entirely by the Convention of London, 1884, as its efforts have been continuously to do.

"Finally this Government continues to cherish hope that Her Majesty's Government on further consideration will feel itself free to abandon idea of making new proposals more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions, and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal for a Joint Commission as first proposed by Secretary of State for Colonies in Imperial Parliament, and subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by it. If Her Majesty's Government is willing, and feels able to make this decision, it would put an end to the present state of tension, race hatred would decrease and die out, the prosperity and welfare of South African Republic and of whole of South Africa would be developed and furthered, and fraternisation between the different nationalities would increase."

Nothing could have been more natural than such a response. The Boers were in the position of a man who, having offered to pay £20 for his neighbour's horse, finds himself suddenly summoned by the neighbour to hand over that sum with an additional £5, and at the same time is curtly told that after he has paid his money he shall not have the horse. This way of doing business might well bring the blush to the cheek of the most hardened horse-dealer who ever jockeyed his customer at a Yorkshire fair. "We will give you the five years' franchise," said the Boers, "if you will drop the suzerainty and establish a Court of Arbitration." "We won't drop the suzerainty," was the reply, "and as for arbitration, well, we will talk about it. Now then, fork out your five years' franchise, and add thereto the concession that English shall be used as well as Dutch in the debates of the Volksraad." Of course the Boers replied, "We will see you further first. This means war and nothing but war. No matter what concessions we make, it is for you all take and no give. No sooner do we accept your own proposals than you bring fresh demands upon us. Therefore we cannot do business on those terms."

So the matter broke off. Ministers met on Friday to exercise their right "to reconsider the situation *de novo*," and to formulate

their own proposals for a final settlement. It is sincerely to be hoped that they will reconsider the situation *de novo*, and if they were to entrust the further conduct of their negotiations to a Colonial Minister less suspect than Mr. Chamberlain, there might be some chance of their arriving at a satisfactory solution of a situation, the difficulties in which are almost entirely of his making.

## CHAPTER VII.

### OLIVE SCHREINER'S APPEAL.

ON September 18 the Johannesburg correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* received the following appeal from Olive Schreiner:—

"Meetings should be held throughout the British Isles in support of the position taken up by Mr. John Morley in his Arbroath speech if a national disaster is to be avoided. The generous arrangement made by the people of the Transvaal for admitting foreigners to the citizenship of their little State has exceeded all that was anticipated. If their advances are not being met in the same spirit, the conviction is being forced on them that the men for the hour in authority in England have determined to goad them into war and take their land from them. The story of wrong in 1895 gives strength to this conviction. By ceaseless misrepresentation and exactions, which would mean the surrender of their land, we are to-day driving one of the bravest and most heroic little Teutonic folk the world has seen to despair. We are setting them with their backs to the wall and offering them this choice—'Your land or destruction.' They are prepared to give the only answer possible to a small race under such conditions.

"Let England clearly understand what war in South Africa means. The largest Empire the world has ever seen will hurl its full force against a small State of about thirty thousand men, including lads of sixteen and old men of sixty, without a standing army or organised commissariat. The entire little people will have to resolve itself into an army of wives and daughters, who will prepare the bread and meat the farmers put into their saddlebags when they go out to meet our enemies. To-day the women in the Transvaal are demanding guns, that they may take their part in the last stand.

"We may crush this little people with the

aid of the Australians and the Canadians, since the British Isles seem unable to crush them alone. We have numbers and wealth on our side; they have a conviction that their God fights with them. Ours is a politicians' war; theirs is a people's. But with our vast resources we must literally crush them, though they may sell their lives dear at a cost of twenty or thirty millions and of a heavy loss among our soldiers. We may take the land and lower the little flag of his independence so dear to the Boer, but we shall have placed a stain upon our own that the centuries will not wash out. England and South Africa will both have lost. England will have lost in honour, and will have cut that cable of affection and sympathy which alone can permanently bind South Africa to her. South Africa will be left torn and bleeding in every part, consumed by bitterness, till such time as she is strong enough to rise and work out her own redemption and carve out her own great fortune. Only the international speculator who, through his persistent misrepresentation by means of the press, has wrought this evil will gain and fill his already over-filled pockets with South African gold.

"It is said the bulk of the English nation have no desire to take his land or independence from the Boer, nor to shed English blood and sacrifice English honour in order that a few international speculators may gain command of the Transvaal goldfields. This is true. But there are times in the life of a nation when silence and inaction are as criminal as active participation in crime.

"We English in South Africa have never wholly lacked, from the days of General Dundas and Sir George Grey down to those of Sir William Butler, a line of great Englishmen who have perceived that the true line of statesmanship lay in dealing with the South African problems in a spirit of manly justice, simple straightforwardness, and a broad humanity. Let the principles which animated the action of these men be reverted to, and the bond of sympathy and affection binding South Africa to England will never be broken."

"Words in Season: an English South African's View of the Situation"—Olive Schreiner's previous contribution to the discussion of the topic of the day—began with a comparison between the sentiments of the English and Dutch South Africans, and incidentally tells the history of South Africa from the Dutch point of view. Olive Schreiner thinks that love—the love of man for woman and woman for man—is rapidly

amalgamating the English and Dutch into one South African people. She says:—

#### THE SOUTH AFRICAN DUTCH.

In the Cape Colony, and increasingly in the two Republics, are found enormous numbers of cultured and polished Dutch-descended South Africans using English as their daily form of speech, and in no way distinguishable from the rest of the nineteenth century Europeans. Our most noted judges, our most eloquent lawyers, our most skilful physicians, are frequently men of this blood; the lists of the yearly examinations of our Cape University are largely filled with Dutch names, and women as well as men rank high in the order of merit. It would sometimes almost seem as if the long repose the people have had from the heated life of cities, with the large tax upon the nervous system, had sent them back to the world of intellectual occupations with more than the ordinary grasp of power. In many cases they go home to Europe to study, and doubtless their college life and English friendships bind Britain close to their hearts as to ours who are English born. The present State Attorney of the Transvaal is a man who has taken some of the highest honours Cambridge can bestow. Besides, there exist still our old simple farmers or Boers, found in the greatest perfection in the midland districts of the Colony, in the Transvaal and Free State, who constitute a large part of the virile backbone of South Africa. Clinging to their old seventeenth century faiths and manners, and speaking their African taal, they are yet tending to pass rapidly away, displaced by their own cultured modern children; but they still form a large and powerful body. Year by year the lines dividing the South Africans from their more lately arrived English-descendent brothers are passing away.

#### LOVE AS A FACTOR IN POLITICS.

Love, not figuratively but literally, is obliterating the line of distinction; month by month, week by week, one might say hour by hour, men and women of the two races are meeting. In the Colony there are few families which have not their Dutch or English connections by marriage; in another generation the fusion will be complete. There will be no Dutchmen then and no Englishmen in South Africa, but only the great blended South African people of the

future, but speaking the English tongue, and holding in reverend memory its founders of the past, whether Dutch or English. Already, but for the sorrowful mistakes of the last years, the line of demarcation would have faded out of sight; external impediments may tend to delay it, but they can never prevent this fusion: we are one people. In thirty years' time, the daughter of the man who landed yesterday in South Africa will carry at her heart the child of a de Villiers, and the son of the Cornish miner who lands this week will have given the name of her English grandmother to his daughter, whose mother was a le Roux. There will be nothing in forty years but the great blended race of Africans.

#### THE UITLANDERS.

But during the last few years a new phenomenon has started up in South African life. The discovery of vast stores of mineral wealth in South Africa, more especially gold, has attracted suddenly to its shores a large population which is not and cannot, at least at once, be South African. This body is known under the name of Uitlanders (literally "Foreigners").

To those who know the great mining camps of Klondyke and Western America, it is perhaps not necessary to describe Johannesburg. Here are found that diverse and many-shaded body of humans, who appear wherever in the world gold is discovered. The Chinaman with his pig-tail, the Indian Coolie, the manly Kafir and the Half-caste, all forms of dark and coloured folk are here, and outnumber considerably the white. Nor is the white population less multifarious and complex. On first walking the streets, one has a strange sense of having left South Africa, and being merely in some cosmopolitan centre, which might be anywhere where all nations and colours gather round the yellow king. Russian Jews and Poles are here by thousands seeking in South Africa the freedom from oppression that was denied that much-wronged race of men in their own birthland; Cornish and Northumberland miners; working men from all parts of the earth; French, German and English tradesmen; while on the Stock Exchange men of every European nationality are found, though the Jew predominates. The American strangers are not large in number, but are represented by perhaps the most cultured and enlightened class in the camp, the mining engineer and large importers of mining machinery being often of that race;

our lawyers and doctors are of all nationalities, while in addition to all foreigners, there is a certain admixture of English and Dutch South Africans. In the course of a day one is brought into contact with men of every species. Your household servant may be a Kafir, your washerwoman is a Half-caste, your butcher is a Hungarian, your baker English, the man who soles your boots a German; you buy your vegetables and fruit from an Indian Coolie, your coals from the Chinaman round the corner, your grocer is a Russian Jew, your dearest friend an American. This is an actual, and not an imaginary, description. Here are found the most noted prostitutes of Chicago, and that sad sisterhood created by the dislocation of our yet unco-ordinated civilisation, and known in Johannesburg under the name of continental women, have thronged here in hundreds from Paris and the rest of Europe. Gambling, as in all mining camps, is rife; not merely men, but even women put their money into the totalisator, and a low fever of anxiety for chance wealth feeds on us.

#### A HELPFUL ANALOGY.

Rightly to understand the problem before the little Transvaal Republic to-day, it is necessary for Englishmen to imagine not merely that within the space of ten or twelve years, forty millions of Russians, Frenchmen, and Germans should enter England, not in dribbles and in time extending over half a century, so that they might in a measure be absorbed and digested into the original population, but instantaneously and at once; not merely, that the large bulk of them did not intend to remain in England, and were there merely to extract wealth; not merely, that the bulk of this wealth was exported at once to other countries, enriching Russia, France, and Germany out of the products of English soil; that would be comparatively a small matter—but, that the bulk of the wealth extracted was in the hands of a few persons, and that these persons were opposed to the continued freedom and independence of England, and were attempting by the use of the wealth they extracted from England to stir up Russia and France against her, that through the loss of her freedom they might the better obtain the command of her wealth and lands. When the Englishman has vividly drawn this future for himself, he will hold, as nearly as is possible in a nutshell, an image of the problem which the people and Government of the Transvaal Republic are called on to face to-day.

## THE THREAT OF WAR.

If it be asked, why at this especial moment we feel it incumbent on us not to maintain silence, and what that is which compels our action and speech, the answer may be given in one word—WAR! The air of South Africa is heavy with rumours; inconceivable, improbable, we refuse to believe them; yet, again and again they return. There are some things the mind refuses seriously to entertain, as the man who has long loved and revered his mother would refuse to accept the assertion of the first passer-by that there was any possibility of her raising up her hand to strike his wife or destroy his child. But much repetition may at last awaken doubt, and the man may begin to look out anxiously for further evidence.

We English South Africans are stunned; we are amazed; we say that there can be no truth in it. Yet we begin to ask ourselves, "What means this unwonted tread of armed and hired soldiers on South African soil? Why are they here?" And the only answer that comes back to us, however remote and seemingly impossible, is—WAR! To-night we laugh at it; and to-morrow when we rise up it stands before us again, the ghastly doubt—war! War—and in South Africa! War—between white men and white! War!—Why?—Whence is the cause?—For whom? For what? And the question gains no answer. We fall to considering. Who gains by war? Has our race in Africa and our race in England interests so diverse that any calamity so cataclysmic can fall upon us as war? Is any position possible that could make necessary that mother and daughter must rise up in one horrible embrace, and rend, if it be possible, each other's vitals? . . . Believing it impossible, we fall to considering, who is it gains by war?

## THERE IS PEACE TO-DAY.

There is peace to-day in the land; the two great white races, day by day, hour by hour, are blending their blood, and both are mixing with the stranger. No day passes but from the veins of some Dutch South African woman the English South African man's child is being fed; not a week passes but the birthery of the English South African woman's child gives voice to the Dutchman's offspring; not an hour passes but on farm, and in town and village, Dutch hearts are winding about English and English

about Dutch. If the Angel of Death should spread his wings across the land and strike dead in one night every man and woman and child of either the Dutch or the English blood, leaving the other alive, the land would be a land of mourning. There would be not one household nor the heart of an African born man or woman that would not be weary with grief. We should weep the friends of our childhood, the companions of our early life, our grandchildren, our kindred, the souls who have loved us and whom we have loved. In destroying the one race he would have isolated the other. Time, the great healer of all differences, is blending us into a great mutual people, and love is moving faster than time. It is no growing hatred between Dutch and English South African born men and women that calls for war. On the lips of our babes we salute both races daily.

Then we look round through the political world, and we ask ourselves what great and terrible and sudden crime has been committed, what reckless slaughter and torture of the innocents, that blood can alone wash out blood? And we find the blood.

And still we look, asking what great and terrible difference has suddenly arisen, so mighty that the human intellect cannot solve it by means of peace, that the highest and most noblest diplomacy falls powerless before it, and the wisdom and justice of humanity cannot reach it, save by the mother's drawing a sword and planting it in the heart of the daughter? We can find none.

## THE MUUR KAT OF THE TRANSVAAL

It may be said, "But what has England to fear in a campaign with a country like Africa? Can she not send out a hundred thousand or a hundred and fifty thousand men and walk over the land? She can sweep it by mere numbers." We answer yes—she might do it. Might generally conquers; not always. I have seen a little *muur kat* attacked by a mastiff, the first joint of whose leg it did not reach. I have seen it taken in the dog's mouth, so that hardly any part of it was visible, and thought the creature was dead. But it fastened its tiny teeth inside the dog's throat, and the mastiff dropped it, and, mauled and wounded and covered with gore and saliva, I saw it creep back into its hole, in the red African earth. But might generally conquers, and there is no doubt that England might send out sixty or a hundred thousand hired

soldiers to South Africa, and they could bombard our towns and destroy our villages; they could shoot down men in the prime of life, and old men and boys, till there was hardly a kopje in the country without its stain of blood, and the Karoo bushes grew up greener on the spot where men from the midlands had come to help their fellows fall, never to go home. I suppose it would be quite possible for the soldiers to shoot all male South Africans who appeared in arms against them. It might not be easy, a great many might fall, but a great Empire could always import more to take their places; *we* could not import more, because it would be our husbands and sons and fathers who were falling, and when they were done we could not produce more.

#### VICTORY THE WORST DEFEAT.

Then the war would be over. There would not be a house in Africa, where African-born men and women lived, without its mourners from Sea Point to the Limpopo; but South Africa would be pacified—as Cromwell pacified Ireland three centuries ago, and she has been pacified ever since! As Virginia was pacified in 1677; its handful of men and women, in defence of their freedom, were soon silenced by hired soldiers. . . . A hundred or a hundred and fifty thousand imported soldiers might walk over South Africa; it would not be an easy walk, but it could be done. Then from east and west and north and south would come men of pure English blood, to stand beside the boys they had played with at school and the friends they had loved; and a great despairing cry would rise from the heart of Africa. But we are still few. When the war was over the imported soldiers might leave the land—not all. Some must be left to keep the remaining people down. There would be quiet in the land. South Africa would rise up silently and count her dead and bury them. She would know the place where she found them. South Africa would be peaceful. There would be silence, the silence of a long exhaustion—but not peace! Have the dead no voices? In a thousand farmhouses black-robed women would hold memory of the count, and outside under African stones would lie the African men to whom South African women gave birth under our blue sky. There would be silence, but no peace.

#### OLIVE SCHREINER'S 5000.

You say that all the fighting men in arms might have been shot. Yes, but what of the women? If there were left but five thousand pregnant South African born women, and all the rest of their people destroyed, those women would breed up again a race like to the first. Oh! Lion-Heart of the North, do you not recognise your own lineage in these whelps of the South?—who cannot live if they are not free!

The grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the men who lay under the stones (who will not be English then nor Dutch, but only Africans) will say, as they pass those heaps, "There lie our fathers, or great-grandfathers, who died in the first great war of independence," and the descendants of the men who lay there will be the aristocracy of Africa. Men will count back to them, and say: My father or my great-grandfather lay in one of those graves. We shall know no more of Dutch or English then, we shall know only the great African people. And *we*? We, the South Africans of to-day, who are still English, who have been proud to do the smallest good so it might bring honour to England, who have vowed our vows on the honour of Englishmen and by the faith of Englishmen. What of us?

#### EMPIRE: BANYAN OR UPAS?

Do not think that when imported soldiers walk across South African plains to take the lives of South African men and women that it is only African sand and African bushes that are cracking beneath their tread: at each step they are breaking the fibres invisible as air, but strong as steel, which bind the hearts of South Africans to England. Once broken they can never be made whole again: they are living things: broken they will be dead. Each bullet which a soldier sends to the heart of a South African to take his life wakes up another who did not know he was an African. You will not kill us with your Lee-Metfords: you will make us. There are men who do not know they love a Dutchman, but the first three hundred that fall, they will know it.

Do not say, "But you are English, you have nothing to fear: we have no war with you!" There are hundreds of us, men and women who have loved England; we would have given our lives for her; but rather than strike down one South African man

fighting for freedom, we would take this right hand and hold it in the fire, till nothing was left of it but a charred and blackened bone.

#### OLIVE AS AN AFRICAN FRANKLIN.

I know of no more graphic image in the history of the world than the figure of Franklin when he stood before the Lords of Council, in England, giving evidence, striving, fighting, to save America for England. Browbeaten, flouted, jeered at by the courtiers, his words hurled back at him as lies, he stood there fighting for England. England recognises now that it was he who tried to save an empire for her; and that the men who flouted and browbeat him lost it. There is nothing more pathetic than the way in which Americans who loved England, Washington and Franklin, strove to keep the maiden vessel moored close to the mother's side, bound by the bonds of love and sympathy, that alone could bind them. Their hands were beaten down, bruised and bleeding, wounded by the very men they came to save, till they let go the mother ship and drifted away on their own great imperial course across the seas of time.

England knows now what those men strove to do for her, and the names of Washington and Franklin will ever stand high in honour where the English tongue is spoken; the names of Hutchinson, and North, and Grafton are not forgotten also; it might be well for them if they were!

Do not say to us: "You Englishmen, when the war is over, you can wrap the mantle of our imperial glory round you and walk about boasting that the victory is yours."

We could never wrap that mantle round us again. We have worn it with pride. We could never wear it then. There would be blood upon it, and the blood would be our brothers'.

We put it to the men of England. In that day where should we be found—we who have to maintain English honour in the South? Judge for us, and by your judgment we will abide. Remember, we are Englishmen!

#### WHAT SIR ALFRED MILNER NEEDS.

Looking around to-day along the somewhat overclouded horizon of South African life one figure strikes the eye, new to the circle of our existence here; and we eye it with something of that hope and sympathy

with which a man is bound to view the new and unknown, which may be of vast possible good and beauty. What have we in this man, who represents English honour and English wisdom in South Africa? To a certain extent we know. We have a man honourable in the relations of personal life, loyal to friend, and above all charm of gold; wise with the knowledge of books and men; a man who could not violate a promise or strike in the dark. This we know we have, and it is much to know this; but what have we more?

When a woman rules the household with none but the children of her own body in it her task is easy; let her obey nature and she will not fail. But the woman who finds herself in a large strange household, where children and step-children are blended, and where all have passed the stage of childhood and have entered on that stage of adolescence where coercion can no more avail, but where sympathy and comprehension are the more needed—that woman has need of large and rare qualities springing more from the heart than from the head. She who can win the love of her strange household in its adolescence will keep its loyalty and sympathy when adult years are reached, and will be rich indeed.

There have been Englishmen in Africa who had those qualities. Will this new Englishman of ours evince them, and save an empire for England and heal South Africa's wounds? Are we asking too much when we turn our eyes with hope to him?

Further off also, across the sea, we look with hope. The last of the race of great statesmen was not put into the ground with the old man of Hawarden; the great breed of Chatham and Burke is not extinct; the hour must surely bring forth the man.

We look further yet, with confidence, from the individual to the great heart of England—the people. The great, fierce, freedom-loving heart of England is not dead yet. Under a thin veneer of gold we still hear it beat. Behind the shrivelled and puny English Hyde, who cries only "Gold!" rises the great English Jekyll, who cries louder yet, "Justice and honour!" We appeal to him; history shall not repeat itself.

Nearer home we turn to one whom all South Africans are proud of, and we would say to Paul Kruger, "Great old man, first but not last of South Africa's great line of rulers, you have shown us you could fight for freedom; show us you can win peace. On the foot of that great statue which in the

future the men and women of South Africa will raise to you let this stand written, 'This man loved freedom and fought for it; but his heart was large; he could forget injuries and deal generously.'

And to our fellow Dutch South Africans, whom we have learnt to love so much during the time of stress and danger, we would say, "Brothers, you have shown the world that you know how to fight, show it you know how to govern; forget the past; in that Great Book which you have taken for your guide in life, turn to Leviticus, and read there in the 19th chapter, 34th verse: 'Be strong, be fearless, be patient.' We would say to you in the words of the wise dead President of the Free States which have become the symbol of South Africa, 'Wacht een beetje, alles zal recht kom.'" (Wait a little, all will come right.)

On our great African flag let us emblazon these words, never to take them down, "FREEDOM, JUSTICE, LOVE"; great are the two first; but without the last they are not complete.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

### SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT ON THE SUZERAINTY.

ADDRESSING his constituents at New Tredegar on September 20th, Sir W. Harcourt made the following speech, referring specially to the question of the suzerainty—a subject upon which he can speak with authority, as he was a member of the British Government that concluded the Conventions of 1881 and 1884.

#### ON THE BRINK OF WAR ONCE MORE.

I should have been glad to address you upon subjects which concern your social welfare. I would have alluded also to those religious questions upon which your chairman has touched; but there has appeared before us now the spirit of war—"Hear, hear"—that spirit which is the real enemy of social reforms and of public economy. It is a strange thing, but it is true, that for the last four years we have been told constantly that we are on the brink of war. At one time we were told that we were on the brink of war with Russia, at another time with Germany, and at another time with France. I hope that the time will some day arrive when we shall be able to live through a year without

being on the brink of war. (Cheers.) I agree with the chairman that war, if it is not necessary, and if it is not just, is the greatest of human crimes. It is that which brings with it to both sides the greatest of human misery, and it is our duty as Christian men, and as Englishmen, before we allow ourselves to be embarked in war to examine the question to the very bottom, to satisfy ourselves that we are reduced to that dire necessity. Now, we are to be at war, we are told, and there is a war party in this country. We are told that we are to go to war with a country which was thus described by the present Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain.

#### WHY?

It was a country which had just been lawlessly invaded under the auspices of a man who was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony and a Privy Councillor to the Queen; and Mr. Chamberlain described the people I am speaking of—the people of the Government of the Transvaal—as a foreign Government with which Her Majesty is at peace, and with whom it is in treaty relations. I call your attention to this. I am afraid it is not going to be a very interesting speech; it ought to be an interesting speech, because it is upon a subject that most gravely affects us all in our character and in our welfare. But you will allow me to the best of my ability to argue it out in the gravest manner—"A country with whom Her Majesty is at peace and in treaty relations." Why are we not to remain at peace with that country? Why are we not to observe these treaty relations? What has happened since to bring up to the verge of war? That is what you ought to know, what you ought to consider, and upon what the people of this country ought to form their judgment. I have been told, and I saw it in a paper this morning, that "the less Sir William Harcourt says upon this subject the better." (Laughter.) I will tell you why I cannot and I ought not to keep silence upon this subject. (Cheers.) I shared with Mr. Chamberlain in Mr. Gladstone's great Government of 1880 the responsibility of framing the Constitution of that State. ("Hear, hear.") For that Constitution he and I and all of that Cabinet are equally responsible. We are responsible for the precise definition of its rights and its obligations, and it is my duty to set forth before you the facts as they are present to my mind, and to assist you, my constituents, in forming a just judgment on the question. ("Hear,

hear.") I am not a volunteer in this matter. I am one of those who were publicly responsible for the settlement that was made between the British nation and the Government of the Transvaal, and it is in that capacity that I claim to speak. I cannot read without indignation and reprobation the persistent attempts of the war Press—I was going to call it the Rhodes Press—in England and at the Cape to aggravate the position of affairs, difficult as they are, to exasperate the controversy, to pervert the facts, and to do all that in them lies, and at every moment when we seem to be near a settlement to obstruct that settlement in the direction of peace. There is such a party, there is such a spirit, and there are such attempts going on in this country. I confess that I have always felt, and still feel, a sentiment of justice and sympathy towards a brave and a simple people, who, whatever errors they may have committed, are deeply attached, as we are, to the independence of their country. (Cheers.)

#### WHY THE BOERS WENT ACROSS THE VAAL.

Gentlemen, if there was anything which should induce President Kruger to give a favourable ear to the appeals for reform it would be the experience through which he and his people went themselves when they became exiles from the land of their birth. I will give you the words of a book which has been written by Dr. Voight on the history of the Transvaal Government and people for the last fifty years. Now this is what he tells us of what we called the grand trek, when the Dutch people left Cape Colony and settled in the Transvaal and other parts of Africa. What was the cause? Why, they complained of the treatment they had received from the British Government in Cape Colony. Dr. Voight said that what we had done to them was a policy of the suppression of the High Courts of Justice. That is one of the complaints to-day. He says it was "the policy of the suppression of the High Courts of Justice, the abolition of the burgher Senate, of the Courts of Landrost, and of the official rights of the Dutch language in petitions and memorials to the Government and in the law Courts. All the causes which have been referred to as giving rise to the emigration movement may be grouped under one heading, for all the grievances of the emigrants arose from one cause, they desired self-government, and

under British administration this was denied to them. In their own words,—'We ascribe all these evils to one cause—namely, the want of a representative Government, refused to us by the executive authority of that same nation which regards this very privilege as one of its most sacred rights of citizenship, and that for which every true Briton is prepared to give his life.'" That was the history of the grand trek by which the settlement of the Transvaal people took place. (Cheers.) A pathetic story it is. President Kruger ought to remember that, and I hope he will remember the grievances of which they complained at our hands, which drove them from the place of their birth, and made them abandon the land of their fathers—words musical to the ears of Welshmen. (Cheers.) One of the leaders of that movement, whose name was well known and venerated among the Dutch people of the Transvaal, said, in a proclamation, when they left the land under British dominion—"We quit this colony under the full assurance that the English Government has nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference in the future. We solemnly declare that we leave this country with a desire to enjoy a quieter life than we have hitherto led. We shall not molest any people nor deprive them of the smallest property; but, if attacked, we shall consider ourselves fully justified in defending our persons and effects to the utmost of our ability against every enemy. We are leaving this fruitful land of our birth, on which we have suffered enormous losses and continual vexation, and are about to enter a strange and dangerous territory; but we go with a firm reliance upon an all-seeing, just, and merciful God, whom we shall always fear and humbly endeavour to obey. In the name of all who leave this colony with me." That was signed "P. M. Retief."

#### SEEKING FOR PEACE THEY FIND A GOLD- FIELD.

That is a document which you cannot read without solemn thoughts before you enter on a terrible conflict. The hopes of tranquillity with which these poor people went were cruelly deceived, unhappily for them, whatever it may have been for others. This new land of theirs, to which they went to seek for peace, turned out to be a goldfield. We have got a goldfield here which is a field of

peace, but goldfields are not always fields of peace. (Laughter and "Hear, hear.") They experienced a fate which a great Roman poet described when he said, "To what practices does not the lust of gold compel the hearts of men?" (Cheers.) Or, as another Roman moralist said, "Gold is best situated where it is not discovered"—(cheers and laughter)—a happiness which has not been granted to the Rand, but may still, perhaps, be reserved for Rhodesia. The first and last word of these gold-hunters is war, in order to lead to annexation; it is the old question which was asked, "Hast thou killed and also taken possession?" (Loud cheers.)

#### MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S ACCOUNT OF THE BOERS.

I recall with pleasure the words which Mr. Chamberlain used when we were colleagues together in a Liberal Government. He said, "The Boers are not naturally a warlike race; they are a homely, industrious, but somewhat rude and uncivilised nation of farmers living on the produce of the soil; they are animated by a deep and even stern religious sentiment, and they inherit from their ancestors, the men who won the independence of Holland from the oppressive rule of Philip II. of Spain, their unconquerable love of freedom and liberty. Are not these qualities which commend themselves to men of the English race, are they not virtues which we are proud to believe form the best characteristics of the English people?" And mark this last sentence. "Is it against such a nation that we are to be called upon to exercise the dread arbitrament of arms?" (Cheers.) That was spoken after Majuba, and it is as true to-day as it was then. ("Hear, hear.") Those were Liberal principles, and, whatever may have happened to others, it has not happened to us to abandon them. (Cheers.) I say those were Liberal principles, and, although I know that those sentiments are rejected by the speculators in diamonds and gold as what they are pleased to call "unctuous rectitude," yet they are the old principles which, I hope, still actuate the British people. ("Hear, hear.") They are the distinction between right and wrong—a distinction which can never be obliterated without disgrace and without dishonour. (Cheers.) It is in those principles alone that you can seek the greatness of

your nation and upon which you can found the eternal blessing of peace.

#### THE CONVENTION OF 1881.

Those words which I read to you describe the principles upon which, in that Government of 1881, we determined to restore upon certain conditions the independence of the Transvaal. We were violently attacked at the time. It was said we were dishonouring the country; that we ought to have avenged Majuba. I have never been, and never will be, afraid of that Convention. (Cheers.) I shall always consider it a memorable record of the policy of that righteousness which exalteth a nation. You may call it "unctuous rectitude" if you please. Those are not our principles, and those are not the principles upon which we acted when we had the power and the authority to act.

Now, I must ask you to bear with me patiently while I endeavour to explain to you what was the limit of the independence which was then granted, regranted I should say, to the Transvaal State. Now, it was considered then, and it is considered now, that the Transvaal State ought not to enter into foreign relations by treaty with other countries without the consent of the British Government. In my opinion, that was a proper and just principle. That Convention, as it was called, of 1881 reserved to Great Britain the right of veto upon treaties with foreign States. Secondly, in regard to its internal administration, it limited, in a certain degree, the internal government and autonomy of the Transvaal State; but, as Lord Derby, who was then Colonial Secretary, stated (I give his words), "in all other respects entire freedom of action was accorded not inconsistent with the rights expressly reserved," so that in the Convention of 1881—follow me here—it was in that first Convention of 1881 the independence so limited was expressed by the word *suzerainty*, a vague word, but one which was employed in that Convention of 1881.

#### WHAT WAS DONE IN 1884.

Now, as the principal obstacle to a satisfactory settlement of the differences has unfortunately turned upon the ubiquity of that phrase, and it has a different understanding by both parties, you must allow me as precisely as I can to explain to you as it presents itself to my mind what that question of *suzerainty*, as it is called, is. In 1883,

two years after the Convention of 1881, when we were still in office, President Kruger and a delegation came to London and complained of the limitation that had been imposed upon them in the Convention of 1881, and they desired certain alterations in those limitations, including the question of suzerainty, and those demands were in part refused, and in part they were granted: and in place of these proposals the late Lord Derby, who was then Colonial Secretary, wrote this to President Kruger and the delegates in London:—"I submit for your approval a draft which Her Majesty's Government propose in substitution for the Convention of 1881." Therefore there was not to be a modification of the Convention, but there was to be a new Convention. Now, a very important document was that draft sent by Lord Derby. It was not printed in the British Blue Book, but the Transvaal Government have produced it and printed it in their correspondence.

#### WHY "SUZERAINTY" WAS LEFT OUT.

In the Convention of 1884 the word "suzerainty" was expressly struck out and obliterated, and Lord Derby in the House of Lords gave the reason for its omission. The reason he gave for its omission was, "We have abstained from using the word because it is not capable of legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding." Has it not led to misconception and misunderstanding, and is it not the misconception and the misunderstanding of that word and what is conveyed by it which is now the present danger, and, as I understand it, the only danger of war? ("Hear, hear.") Then as for the new Convention. You have a Convention in which the word "suzerainty" has disappeared. You have a reservation of the control of this country over the treaty relations of the Transvaal, and what was the result of that new Convention? The result of that new Convention was stated by Lord Derby; and now this is a very important statement. He said:—"By the omission of those articles in the Convention of 1881 which assigned to her Majesty and the British Government certain specific powers and functions connected with the internal government, and the foreign relations, your Government will be left free to govern the country without interference, to conduct its diplomatic intercourse, and shape its foreign policy, subject only to the requirements

embodied in the fourth article of the new draft that any treaty with a foreign State shall not have effect without the approval of the Queen."

#### WHAT WAS KEPT.

Therefore I think you may take it with absolute certainty that the new Convention of 1884 was this. It kept the control of foreign affairs under the veto of the British Government, and in respect of their internal affairs struck out the word "suzerainty," leaving, or giving, to the people of the Transvaal absolute internal authority—home rule, in fact, for themselves. (Cheers.) I should say that Lord Derby had also in that speech said: "We have kept the substance"—and he explained what the substance was—"a controlling power which gives us the right of veto over a treaty with foreign Powers." That was the substance. He did not say—on the contrary, he said exactly the opposite—he did not say they had kept the control of the internal affairs which was given to the Government of the Transvaal. Lord Cairns and Lord Salisbury had argued with great force that where you did not keep control over the internal affairs the word "suzerainty" was not appropriate, because that meant a general authority over all affairs; and that is the ambiguity under which we are now suffering. The word "suzerainty" was obliterated, and the matter, as I say, remained upon that footing.

#### LORD DERBY'S TELEGRAM.

I have seen in *The Times* to-day an extract from Lord Derby which I have not had the opportunity of verifying, but I give it to you as I read it there; and I have no reason to believe it is incorrect. He used these words. It is said that he telegraphed a few days before—that is, before his speech in the House of Lords, to which I have referred—to the acting High Commissioner of the Cape, as follows:—"Convention signed to-day; the same complete independence in the Transvaal as in the Free State; conduct and control of diplomatic intercourse with foreign Governments conceded; Queen's final approval of the treaties reserved; delegates appear well satisfied, and there is a cordial feeling between the two Governments." Nothing can be clearer than that.

## THE PREAMBLE OF 1881 DEAD.

I have seen an argument put forward which I have never been able to understand, that when the new Convention was made, not the old Convention was copied, but the old preamble. Why should we copy an old preamble in a new Convention? In the preamble of 1884 the word "suzerainty" disappears, and it is not found in any of the articles of that Convention. This may seem rather technical to you, but it really lies at the bottom of what is at issue to-day. When this question arose the Government of the Transvaal put forward their arguments against this claim of general suzerainty. It is an entire mistake to assert that it was originally put forward by President Kruger. On the contrary, in one of the despatches of Mr. Chamberlain he had asserted this doctrine of the suzerainty remaining in the preamble of 1881, and it was in reply to a despatch of his of October 16, I think it was of 1897, that that despatch from the Transvaal was written. I have read that argument of theirs, and all I can say, remembering all the facts of the case, and reading them now by the light of what has since occurred, I can see no valid answer to that argument of theirs.

## AN ETYMOLOGICAL QUESTION.

Indeed, upon receiving that argument Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner at the Cape, says this:—

"I am unable myself to see anything very material in this controversy (that is, the suzerainty). Both parties agree that the Convention of 1884 determines their mutual relations, and the Government of the South African Republic has repeatedly declared its intention of abiding by the terms of the Convention. What the right interpretation of these clauses is seems to me a matter of moment. Whether the relationship created by them is properly described as suzerainty is not, in my opinion, of much importance. It is a question of etymological rather than of political interest."

Very well, I agree to that. It is an idle discussion upon a word, but the real question is, what was the substance? The substance to us was the giving authority to this country over the foreign relations of the Transvaal, and the substance to them was giving them complete independence in the management of their own affairs. ("Hear, hear.") I use the word "independence" because it is used

in the very last despatch of her Majesty's Government, and it was used in the despatch as the description of the grant to the Transvaal.

## THE TRANSVAAL NOT A SOVEREIGN INTERNATIONAL STATE.

In the course of that discussion on the question of suzerainty, in the despatch of May 9th, the Government of the Transvaal set up a claim that their right of government arose, not from the Convention of 1884, but from the inherent right of the Republic as a sovereign international State. I wish to deal fairly in this controversy, and, as I have criticised and rejected the theory that the suzerainty was retained in the Convention of 1884, so I say I think this was a claim put forward on the part of President Kruger and the Transvaal State which could not be maintained, and for the same reason. You cannot say "suzerainty" when you have only a partial suzerainty; so you cannot claim the position of a sovereign international State when you have surrendered the control of your foreign affairs. ("Hear, hear.") The position is this—that both sides have made an allegation which cannot be maintained. This was a claim by the Transvaal which, in my opinion, is quite indefensible, and I think the British Government has been perfectly right in repudiating the claim. As made in that form it is not a sovereign international State. In that sense it is also not true to say the British Government have a suzerainty when they have only got a partial control. This is the real *crux* at the present moment. ("Hear, hear.") Neither of these positions can be maintained, and if you could only get rid of them we should have peace to-morrow. (Cheers.)

## LET US STICK TO THE CONVENTION OF 1884.

The use of these vague terms only leads to confusion. Let me give you an illustration. A man has a right of way to a footway, and he claims a general right of way for horses and carts and carriages. It is idle for him to put forward a claim to a general right of way for horses and carriages when he had only a footway. ("Hear, hear.") Instead of claiming a general right of way we ought to be more exact and claim only a footway. (Cheers.) That is exactly the position in regard to the claim of

suzerainty. ("Hear, hear.") Both parties are pledged to the observance of the Convention of 1884, and when you have got a precise document which defines the real relation of the parties, what is the use of going into these vague terms of suzerainty and international control? When we have got this document, in Heaven's name let us stick to it. (Loud cheers.) Of course, it does not exclude the right of a State to protect its own subjects from ill-treatment. We possess that right all over the world. It has never been denied; in fact, it has been explicitly admitted by the Government of the Transvaal. I have endeavoured to make clear to you the difficulties and the dangers which have arisen from the controversy upon the subject of suzerainty. To see the matter as I believe it actually is you must start with the subordination of the Transvaal in regard to foreign affairs, and its independence as regards its own domestic affairs. It is no use beating about the bush or using ambiguous words to cover unjust claims on either side, and let us stand upon the Convention of 1884.

#### THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Now, you will ask, if that is so clear, what is the meaning of these tangled negotiations which have been going on for weeks and brought us within the danger of war? Great, and I think undeserved, blame has been cast upon President Kruger and the Transvaal Government for the delay which has taken place in reaching a settlement. Why, I think you know something of this—that a vital change in the whole political system of the internal government of a country like the Transvaal has been called for. There is no doubt about it. It is a great change, it is a reform, a good reform, one which we should do everything in our power to advance and press, as we have done a great many reforms; and we have met with a great deal of delay. They have not taken their stand, as they might possibly have done, upon their absolute independence in their internal affairs granted by the Convention. They have not resisted all reforms. They went to the conference at Bloemfontein some three months ago and then there was no question of an ultimatum, no word of suzerainty raised. There were two parties met to settle a question which required to be settled upon equal and upon friendly relations, and the phrase used in inviting them to the conference was, on the part of the British Government—these were

the words, I think, of Sir Alfred Milner—"they were confined to friendly suggestions." That was all right; interference with their independence was disclaimed; they were not bound to go to the conference at all; there was no question of an ultimatum at all. I recall the statement made by Mr. Chamberlain so lately as 1896 upon a motion brought forward by myself in the House of Commons, words which are worth recalling to the attention of the country.

#### WHAT WAR WOULD MEAN.

On May 8, 1896, in answer to myself in the House of Commons, Mr. Chamberlain, who was speaking then of the jingo party, said:—"In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Kruger—an ultimatum which would certainly have been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war. It would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war. As I have pointed out, it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Kruger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, with which successive Secretaries of State standing in this place have repudiated all right of interference, that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise." (Cheers.) Let me repeat those words again, because they ought to go forth at this moment, I think, to the nation. "To go to war with President Kruger," said Mr. Chamberlain, "in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, with which successive Secretaries of State standing in this place have repudiated all right of interference, that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise." (Cheers.) What has changed those circumstances since May 8, 1896?

#### RIGHT OF INTERFERENCE REPUDIATED.

"In the last communication," Mr. Chamberlain went on, "I sent to the Press, I defined what I conceived to be our rights in the matter. I said we did not claim and never had claimed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, but we

did claim, both as representing the interests of our fellow-subjects in the Transvaal and as the paramount Power in South Africa responsible for the security of the whole country, to make friendly representations to him and to give him friendly advice as much in his interests as in our own." That is straight enough. Now, that is the description given by a responsible Minister of the situation as it then stood. What is there to alter the situation? Mr. Chamberlain was quite right in referring to the successive Secretaries of State who had defined the position. Mr. Sydney Buxton in November, 1895, being pressed to interfere forcibly in this matter, said "a principle had been laid down very clearly and very definitely by the late Government in a sentence with which the present Government felt themselves in accord. It was written in February, 1890, with reference to a question regarding the international affairs of the Transvaal—viz., the franchise of British subjects—and whether the Imperial Government was entitled to interfere. That was a question which in 1890 was pressed upon the Government of Lord Salisbury then, and you will hear the statement by Mr. W. H. Smith, who was the respected leader of the House of Commons, as the representative of that Government." And he said this—"The Convention of London made in 1884 between her Majesty and the South African Republic contains no express reservation of the Queen's right of suzerainty, and though her Majesty retains under the Convention the power of refusing to sanction treaties made by the South African Republic with foreign States and nations and with certain native tribes, the cardinal principle of that settlement"—mark this—"was that the internal government and legislation of the South African Republic shall not be interfered with." What is the use of talking of the existence of suzerainty over their international affairs reserved in the preamble of the Convention of 1881 which was done away with by the Convention of 1884.

Mr. Buxton, speaking on behalf of the late Government—and I was then the leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and the statement was made in my presence and with my authority, and it was a statement which bound the British Crown and the British nation—said :—"That was an interpretation of the existing relations between England and the Transvaal which he thought very clearly laid down the principles which guided our conduct in the matter. Though

they might differ from the way in which the Transvaal carried out their principles of administration, he did not see that under existing circumstances the Government had a right to forcibly interfere with regard to those questions." If you go for authority you have had it from the year 1884 down to the present time, as Mr. Chamberlain said, "by successive Governments all speaking the same language upon the same subject." ("Hear, hear.") There is another speech which might be quoted—but I think I have quoted enough—made on March 20th this very year to the same effect by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons. Now what happened at the Conference of Bloemfontein? Well, naturally, when a question touching the whole of their Constitution arose differences of opinion came up. The Transvaal Government thought too much was asked of them and Sir Alfred Milner thought too little was conceded, and the Conference did not come to a solution at that time, but there was no breach in consequence. Everybody expected that still further negotiations would take place and some further communications would be made. It was too much, in my opinion, to expect that any Government should agree without reluctance and demur to a complete revolution in their political system. No doubt it was likely that they should be to a certain degree jealous and suspicious of parting with their political power. It is not surprising, in my opinion, having regard to the authors and abettors and approvers of Mr. Rhodes's raid and the ravings of the South African League, whose avowed object is to overthrow their independence and to destroy their Government.

#### THE CONCESSIONS MADE BY THE BOERS.

With a Government in such a position you cannot wonder that they carefully scrutinise the changes that they make in their Constitution, and that is what took place at Bloemfontein. It is only necessary to read to-day the language of the war Press in England and the Cape to acknowledge that such suspicions are not without justification. Did ever a governing class consent at a moment's notice to such a revolution as this? Think of the long years that we required in England to effect such a revolution, and let the Tories who are without sin cast the first stone. (Laughter.) They blame President Kruger for a delay of three months. How long was the concession of just reforms in this country delayed by what Mr. Chamberlain calls an

oligarchy? Soon after the failure of Bloemfontein advances were made by President Kruger. Within a month new proposals were made which it was not denied were in advance of his former proposal. You will find that they did not seem sufficient to the English Government. I daresay the English Government were right. They were not sufficient, and they declined to accept them, as they had declined to accept the proposals at Bloemfontein. But within a week or two the Transvaal Government proposed amendments in a manner and in a form of which Mr. Chamberlain expressed his approval. I will read you his words of July 17th this year—not very long ago—with reference to the plan proposed to the Volksraad and approved by it. Mr. Chamberlain said:—"These proposals are in advance of previous concessions, and leave only a difference of two years between Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger." That is his statement of the proposal accepted by the Volksraad and President Kruger as late as the last part of July. Mr. Chamberlain thus receives those proposals, which were proposals of a seven years' qualification, and he says:—"Happily, each new scheme seems to be an advance on that which preceded it, and her Majesty's Government hope that the latest proposals may prove a basis of settlement on the lines laid down by Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein." I do not call that obstinacy on the part of the Transvaal Government. On the contrary, they are making successive concessions, no doubt reluctantly, for, as I say, no man parts with his political power without some reluctance.

#### SEVEN YEARS "A SATISFACTORY BASIS."

But under the pressure, and the right pressure, of the English Government, by remonstrances of all kinds, they have yielded that which Mr. Chamberlain said on July 27th offered a satisfactory basis for discussing a settlement. There is no reason to go to war for that; but he desired, and I do not think it was wrong, that there should be an inquiry between the Transvaal Government and the British Government as to the sufficiency of the provisions which, he said, formed the basis of a settlement. The Transvaal Government did not like the idea of a joint inquiry. You can understand that very well, because, claiming their independence, they said: "If we go into a joint inquiry, that is admitting you as a partner in the concern and in the settlement of the

question. It is for you to form your own opinion on the subject, and represent it to us; but we do not like a joint inquiry." Therefore, in place of the joint inquiry what did they do? They said: "Rather than have a joint inquiry we will give you your own terms, as you originally proposed them."

#### FIVE YEARS' FRANCHISE AND THE QUID PRO QUO.

They offered in August, in the first place, a five years' qualification, which Sir Alfred Milner had demanded at Bloemfontein, and made an offer as liberal, or more liberal, than that which we ourselves had proposed in June. ("Hear, hear.") I do not see either the obstinacy or the delay in that. You began your controversy in June, and in August you get a practical acceptance of the terms you yourselves had proposed two months before. As to the sufficiency of the franchise in the offer, there is not, and cannot be, any dispute, but it is to be observed that the Transvaal made that offer subject to two conditions, and it is upon those conditions that the matter has gone off. It was rejected by the British Government. As regards the franchise, her Majesty's Government do not deny that it was a perfectly good proposal. Let us then examine these conditions, because they will determine the whole question. Were the conditions such as ought to have involved the rejection of that final proposal of President Kruger's? In my opinion they were not. (Cheers.) That the last proposal of a five years' qualification has not been carried through is, I think, a great disappointment and a great disaster. What we ought to do is to see if the offer is true, and if it is, the Uitlanders will get all that ever has been asked for them, and they will secure that voice in the government of the Transvaal which we all desire for them. Why was this offer rejected? These were the two conditions.

The Transvaal Government said they made that offer on the condition that the present intervention should not be made a precedent for similar action in the future, that no interference with the internal affairs of the Republic should take place, and that her Majesty's Government should not further insist upon the assertion of the suzerainty, but that the subject should be allowed to drop. What was there unreasonable in that? Here you have a special interference with their franchise on the proposal of the Transvaal Government itself. What they ask is, "Don't use this as

a precedent for everything else, and in the future no interference with the internal affairs of the Republic shall take place." That is not unreasonable. That is the Convention of 1884, and both parties contend that they stand upon the Convention. Then they go on to ask that her Majesty's Government will not further insist upon the suzerainty, that this subject shall be allowed to drop. It was allowed to drop in 1884. ("Hear, hear.") That is exactly what did happen; the claim to suzerainty did drop then; and I do not understand why such conditions as these are to be regarded as impossible, and to be rejected. I have shown you what the relations of the two States are, and these conditions are conformable to the Convention of 1884, by which those relations are governed.

#### WHY NOT DROP THE SUZERAINTY?

On the other hand the Transvaal Government say that they accept the position of the British Government in regard to their general right—not a particular right in the Transvaal by a suzerainty, but the general right of the British Government to protect their own subjects. They say:—

"This Government has neither asked nor intended that her Majesty's Government should abandon any right which they have under the Convention of 1884, or under international law, to interfere for the protection of the British subjects in this country as in any other foreign State."

What they do demand is that, having consented to this particular intervention, it shall not be made a pretext or a precedent for further interference, and that the term suzerainty, which was dropped in 1884, should continue to be dropped in 1899. Now, my opinion is that those were not unreasonable conditions. (Cheers.) They were conditions which might be accepted, and if so the whole thing might be settled to-morrow upon that footing. The objection taken by the British Government in their last note rejecting this settlement was not to the conditions as stated in the proposal of the Transvaal Government, but to a condition which was not then put forward at all.

#### AT LEAST FOR HOME CONSUMPTION.

They referred to the former assertion I have spoken of—to the Transvaal as being a sovereign international State. The British Government are quite right to repudiate this,

but they might have said:—"Of course we repudiated your claim to be an international State, but we do not insist upon, we drop as before, the term suzerainty." I have always said that that claim upon the part of the Transvaal Government was not justified, that the British Government were right in repudiating it. It was not put forward as a condition to the acceptance of these terms. These conditions having been refused, the Transvaal Government said:—"Oh! then we withdraw our offer." And they would recur to the law, the seven years' franchise, which Mr. Chamberlain said was a fair basis of discussion, and they would no longer propose five years. Well, I think the Transvaal Government were wrong; having made the proposal of five years they ought to have adhered to it and ought to have adhered to the conditions. I think the conditions ought to have been accepted, and, as I said before, the Uitlanders would have had a five years' qualification and we should be exactly in the position we deliberately assumed in 1884. (Cheers.)

#### VOICE OF REASON AGAINST WAR.

Now, in my opinion, upon this quarrel, upon an ambiguous suzerainty, you are not to go to the issue of arms. Is it not possible that we can revert to the position of a few weeks ago when this reasonable offer was made accompanied by reasonable conditions? We do not want to alter the offer, because every one admits that it is good, but if there is an ambiguity in the definition of the conditions, for God's sake let us go and clear it up and not go to war about it. (Cheers.) In my opinion what ought to be done is to accept the franchise as offered for examination. I think it is fair that there should be an examination of the details and that the Government should give the assurance to the Transvaal which the Transvaal have asked for. That is, the assurance that under the name of suzerainty they will not claim to interfere in every particular whenever they choose in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. ("Hear.") Is it beyond the resources of diplomacy to retrieve a false position like this on both sides and to restore this offer of August which has now fallen through?

#### WHAT DOES PARAMOUNTCY MEAN?

We hear a great deal of talk about supremacy, of the paramountcy. They are

big words, and these big words you ought to consider and understand what they mean and how far they go and how far they will lead. In some senses of course we are suprême in South Africa. We have the command of force. We are supreme and irresistible in our force. We can do what we like. We can crush these Dutchmen in the Transvaal, and you will have to crush the Dutchmen all over South Africa. You may send out a *corps d'armée* and you can do that; of that there is no doubt. But that, I hope, is not the question. For us it is not what we can do, but what it is right we should do and what we ought to do. (Cheers.) That is the only supremacy which I claim for the English nation. (Renewed cheers.) When you talk of supremacy does it mean that you have the right to override and destroy the Convention into which you entered in 1884, and interfere whenever you like and in whatever matters you like in the internal government of the Transvaal after you have guaranteed to the Government of the Transvaal internal autonomy? Is that what you mean? They talk of paramountcy in South Africa. Well, the Transvaal is not the only independent community there which has the right of governing its own affairs. There is the Orange Free State; that is not subject to your authority at all. Is this word "paramountcy" intended to tell the Orange Free State that you claim to interfere with their affairs too in all particulars? Is it a wise and statesmanlike thing to flaunt that at this moment in the face of the Orange Free State in South Africa? (Cries of "No.") In my opinion, it is most foolish and the most dangerous thing you could do at the present moment. ("Hear, hear.")

#### NO CASE FOR ARMED INTERVENTION.

We have obtained already by the representations we have made, and rightly made, a fair offer of an adequate franchise for the Uitlanders upon conditions which are not unreasonable, and to go to war in such an issue as that now before us would be, in my opinion, wholly without justification. There is here—I say it after the deepest reflection—there is no *casus belli*. In saying that I am happy to find from the newspapers of to-day that I am speaking in entire accordance with the recognised leader of the Opposition, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. He has telegraphed, "My view of the question remains precisely as stated in the House of Commons on July 28th. Subsequent negotiations have

become complicated, and the matter more confused, but the essential merits are unchanged, and the solution not beyond the competence of straightforward diplomacy and good will." And he refers to what he had said in the House of Commons on July 28: "I must only repeat what I have said elsewhere, that from the beginning of this story to the end I can see nothing whatever which furnishes a case for armed intervention"; and again, "a war with one of the independent States in South Africa would be one of the direst calamities which could occur." That is the language of a man who has authority to speak for the Liberal party, and I hope and believe that those are the sentiments which the Liberal party will sustain. (Cheers.) They are the sentiments upon which we have acted in the past, and which I for one, whatever may betide, will act upon in the future. (Cheers.)

#### WHY CLOSE THE QUEEN'S REIGN IN BLOOD?

I know how, in the arrogance of irresistible might and the lust of insatiable dominion, the minds of men are inflamed and blinded by passion and by crime. They are incapable of recognising that magnanimity, that greatness of soul, which is the highest characteristic of a great nation. But to the man who can feel and think it is hard to conceive the horror of a war waged by Christian men against each other in the presence of savage tribes, a war waged against people deeply attached to the independence of their country, an independence which was guaranteed and which they honestly believe to be at stake. A war waged for what? For the details of a Franchise Bill, for a difference of two years in the qualification. A poet of old exclaimed "Is it your pleasure to wage a war which will be crowned with no triumphs?" For even the heathen bequeathed no triumph to the victor in a civil war. A war between the British and the Dutch races throughout South Africa, which when your superiority is asserted—as of course it will be—will leave behind it an inheritance of undying hatred in the hearts of the people among whom you will still have to live—such a war will be a dreadful close to an expiring century and a glorious reign. (Cheers.) While the voice of reason may still be heard and the path of peace is still open, something may yet be done before it is too late to avert such a shameful catastrophe. (Loud cheers.)

## A WANTON AND UNJUST WAR.

In reply to a vote of confidence, Sir William Harcourt said,—I cannot but thank you, not so much for the reception you have given me personally as for the agreement that you have expressed in the sentiments which I have endeavoured to deliver. You may easily believe that in a crisis of this character I have spoken under a sense of deep responsibility. I am thankful to have found myself in accord with one who has led the van in the cause of peace—I mean Mr. John Morley. (Cheers.) On these subjects he and I have always thought alike and have acted together; and I have been able to quote to you the accordance in this view that there is no ground for war of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman—(cheers),—a man of sound judgment and a man who occupies a position which we all regard with honour and respect. I do hope that we shall adhere to the principles which we have always professed, and that we shall resist any attempt to embark this country upon a wanton and unjust war. (Loud cheers.)

## CHAPTER IX.

## MR. MORLEY: SPEECH AT ARBROATH.

THE Right Honourable John Morley, M.P., addressed a meeting of his constituents at Arbroath on September 6th. The following is a report of his speech:—

Gentlemen,—I did not suppose, when some days ago I fixed the date of this meeting, that it would find us in a very acute phase of a very acute crisis. On another occasion I should have liked very much to have talked to you about those domestic questions which, after all, concern us who live in these islands as closely as any others—(“hear, hear.”) But it is idle, when you hear the sound of approaching war in your ears, to talk about ground values or old-age pensions, or any of these things, and without being uncharitable I am told that I am going beyond my duty, or even my rights, in addressing you, that the situation is so critical that nothing but silence is the proper attitude for anybody who addresses a British audience. Yes, but two must play at silence—(“hear, hear”)—and when the air

resounds with the clamour of those who ought to be steadying public opinion, instead of inciting it to new impatience and new excitement, I think after all that the very humblest of Members of Parliament may be considered free to address his constituents. No, I would say more—not only free, but this is one of the moments when it is his bounden duty—(“hear, hear,” and cheers)—and his highest responsibility to examine, with those who sent him to Parliament, what the conditions are in which the country now finds itself. (“Hear, hear,” and cheers.)

## WHAT WAR WOULD MEAN FOR SOUTH AFRICA.

I am quite alive to my responsibilities. I do not put them any higher than this, that I happen to be the Member for the Montrose burghs—(“hear, hear,” and cheers)—and I submit to you that it is my duty, when we see the fiend of war sailing slowly upon black expanded wings across our horizon, it is the duty of a Member of Parliament to tell his constituents what he thinks of so ominous a situation—(“hear, hear,” and cheers)—because you all know, the moment the first shot is fired, then all the origins, the first contentions, are forgotten, and the whole business is involved with passion and prejudice and the thirst for mastery, and truth and justice are overwhelmed in what the poet describes as floods and whirlwinds of tempestuous fire. I want us to consider before then what is the situation—I want us to consider it before the newsboys are shouting in the streets cries of “Brilliant victory and enormous slaughter.” (“Hear, hear.”) I want us to consider it not as some of our instructors in the Press do, not in the humour of the rabid dog, but as responsible and rational citizens of the most powerful State in the world—(“hear, hear,” and cheers). I have said I should avoid any party or personal references; but I will say at once, without any beating about the bush, that what I am after is this: To bring into your minds this proposition—that all the evils and mischiefs of delay in connection with the present situation in South Africa are dust in the balance compared with the evils and mischiefs of a war in South Africa. (“Hear, hear,” and cheers.) I do not speak—because I want to avoid controversy so far as I can—I do not speak of the harm done to our national credit and national honour. I do not speak of the weakening of our national strength at this moment. I speak of the evils

and mischiefs that would be done by war to that pacification, that consolidation of South Africa, which has been the avowed aim of all statesmen of both parties in this country ever since these problems arose. (Cheers.)

#### THE ORIGIN OF THE TROUBLE.

I assume that you all know the circumstances out of which this crisis has sprung. You all know that, some fifteen years ago, the Transvaal—now the South African Republic—was by the Queen's Government invested with all the privileges of self-government in 1884. Then there came what neither those who negotiated that arrangement on this side, nor those who negotiated it on the side of the Transvaal anticipated—there came a discovery of gold. The discovery of gold was followed, and it always is, by the immigration into the territory inhabited by a pastoral people, very limited in numbers, first of all, of a number of persons who I suppose, without want of Christian charity, one may say were not exactly the salt of the earth. (Laughter.) Then there followed others, and in these thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years that have intervened since then, there has been an immense immigration into this territory, the independence of which the Queen had given to those who live in it. I do not go into details, because I know that most of you here are perfectly conversant and familiar with them. The difficulty is not owing to the Transvaal Government; it is certainly not owing to our Government; the difficulty arises from the circumstances of the case. It creates an exceedingly complex problem, a problem abounding with embarrassments, and all that we can ask either of a Government or of ourselves, when we are forming our own opinion is this, that we shall not make that problem more complex and these difficulties more numerous or aggravated.

#### FIVE POINTS OF AGREEMENT.

Now we all agree that there is a state of things in the South African Republic which is in the highest degree desirable to have put right. (Cheers.) That is my first proposition. This is my second proposition—in trying to get that state of things put right, we must remember that the South African Republic has good grounds for caution, and that no language should be used which should feed the suspicion of the

Government of the South African Republic that under the plea of reform we wish to steal their country from them. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.) My third proposition is this, that in putting the state of things in Johannesburg and the Rand right, we do not put a great many other even more serious things wrong, and I will explain to you, by-and-by, what I mean by that. Fourth—You must so shape your policy and so conduct your negotiations as to carry with you the sympathetic and the friendly judgment of the Dutch population in the various communities that make up the great province of South Africa. Fifth—Remember your pledged word! That is the foundation on which I propose to build up the case, that I shall present to you to-night. I have said that both sides agree.

#### THE PERIL FROM THE PRESS.

Yes, responsible men on both sides, but human affairs are not always transacted by responsible men, they are not even always guided and shaped by responsible men, and what is the danger of this situation is that irresponsible men, not looking at it from the point of view either of the strength of the empire, or the good government of the Transvaal, or of South Africa as a whole, shall somehow or other sweep the sensible people off their feet. That is the danger. The other day there was a passage in a newspaper which I shall mention in a moment, where it was said:—

"We believe that excision and cauterisation only will effect a permanent cure. Not until the Boers have been completely defeated in the field will the reputation of British arms and the authority of the paramount power be rehabilitated."

You will be rehabilitating the authority of the paramount Power, and restoring the reputation of British arms. That passage comes from a special correspondent at Pretoria, which is the capital of the Transvaal, of the *Scotsman*, that very affable and genial organ of yours—(laughter)—which gives the poor Scottish Liberals such doses of excision and cauterisation, but which, after all, if we may judge from the last two elections in the very heart of the authority of this journal, has such wonderful little effect in curing the inveterate Liberal malady of an incorrigible patient. (Laughter.) I have indicated principles which have been accepted by all statesmen who have had to consider this question.

## WHAT GOOD WILL VICTORY DO?

Now, suppose you have a war, and suppose that you are successful in that war, I assume that. As Swift said a good many years ago, "I have never heard that ten men armed to the teeth were not very likely to be a match for a man in his shirt." (Laughter.) I assume military success. Suppose you have won your battles, suppose, as was rather ominously foreshadowed by an important man a month ago, you have torn up the convention, that settles our relations to the South African Republic, and suppose you have incorporated the Transvaal as a British province. Now what will you have done? For one thing, you will in the process have divided the Dutch and the English in the Cape Colony. The supreme care of statesmen has been—both of South African statesmen and British statesmen—the supreme care has been to unite those two sections, an object in which great progress has been made. The ten armed men, then, having crumpled up the man in the shirt, the first result will be that you will have sown the seeds of division between the Dutch and the English in Cape Colony.

## ONLY IRELAND OVER AGAIN.

Second, you will have turned the Orange Free State—which is now very good friends with us—into an enemy. Thirdly, by the conflict between the two races of the whites—the English and the Dutch—the British and the Dutch—(laughter and cheers)—by the conflict you will have—indeed, some say you already have—stirred up a spirit of restlessness among the native population of South Africa. And considering the vast superiority in numbers, and the horrors of war between the white races and the Kaffirs, you cannot exaggerate the mischief of such a proceeding as that. What will you do next? You have won your battle. You will make the Transvaal Republic a Crown colony, and for a long time after your war it will have to be held by force, and everywhere in the circumscription or district outside the Rand, where the gold is, where the British population is, you will set up a sort of loyalist Ulster, and everywhere outside of that you will find your Government and your authority corroded with the spirit of disaffection. Just look back a few years. In 1877 you annexed the Transvaal, and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in perfect good faith,

and with every intention of carrying out his promise—gave an undertaking to these men in these days that they should have set up a system of self-government. Did it happen? Not from any want of good faith in Sir Michael Hicks-Beach it did not happen, because for three and a half years after that step was taken the sullen disaffection of the Boers in the Transvaal Republic was such that no statesman with a sense of responsibility would have thought for a moment of conferring upon them these privileges of self-government which had been promised to them. Well, that is exactly the difficulty that will confront you the day after you believe yourselves to have ended the conflict. You will have to set up a government which will be Ireland over again with what is called a loyalist district, and outside of that an enormous territory, as I say, saturated with sullen disaffection. (Cheers.) Now, is this the wretched state of things that you are going to war over? Is a burden of this kind to be added to all the other burdens that lie upon the shoulders of those who administer this Empire? Is this burden to be added to it?

## A PLEA FOR PATIENCE.

Gentlemen, I have a pretty wide faith in the unlucky share that human folly exerts in human affairs. History teaches me how large a share that is—the share of French folly, Dutch folly, English folly. (Laughter and cheers.) You do not quarrel with my English adjective this time.

But, gentlemen, I do not believe that there could be a more insensate example of human folly than a war which is not only to land you with those added burdens upon your shoulders, but is to overthrow all the objects which all the statesmen for the last forty years have had at heart. My maxim would be this in those difficulties and perplexities—that they are difficult I am the last to deny or to underrate—my watch-word all through is "Patience, patience, patience." ("Hear, hear," and cheers.)

## A WORD FOR THE EIGHT-DAY CLOCK.

We were told the other day that the sands in the hour-glass were running down. (Cheers.) I would not have an hour-glass. ("Hear, hear," laughter and cheers.) I would have the good, steady, old-fashioned eight-day clock. (Cheers and laughter.) If they have not got one at the Colonial Office—(cheers

and laughter)—I am sure there is one at the Foreign Office. (Loud cheers and laughter.) All their remonstrances with the Turk were done by the eight-day clock. (Cheers.) I do not believe in going into negotiations sitting down at a table with a sand-glass and loaded revolvers strewed all about the table. (Laughter and cheers.) I don't say this for the sake of the Boers of the Transvaal only—they will tell you to-morrow morning that I am pro-Boer. (Laughter.) Well, if it is not impertinent to say it—I am not sure whether it is or not—I do not believe there can be greater differences in temperament, in pursuits, in tastes, in beliefs, than there are between the Boers and the very humble individual who is now addressing you. ("Hear.")

#### HOW THE TRANSVAAL BEHAVED AFTER THE RAID.

It is not for the sake of the Transvaal Republic alone; it is for the sake of South Africa, and it is for our own sake—"Hear, hear"—and, gentlemen, I am going to remind you of something, which in the anger of the hour it may be very unpalatable to remind you of, you remember the affair of the Raid. How did the Government of the South African Republic behave at that moment, after the Jameson Raid? I was turning over an old Blue-book—only, after all, three years old—the other day, and this is the kind of language which was used about the conduct of the South African Republic at that moment. Here is what Sir Hercules Robinson, who was then the High Commissioner, said of the conduct of the Government of the South African Republic then:—

"I take this early opportunity of testifying in the strongest manner to the great moderation and forbearance of the Government of the South African Republic, under exceptionally trying circumstances."

Only three years ago! Well, then the Secretary of State, Mr. Chamberlain, wrote this on the same occasion:—

"President Kruger's magnanimity, if he were to hand over the prisoners, would be very highly appreciated by me."

In another passage he says, writing to President Kruger:—

"I myself have always felt confidence in your magnanimity, and your Honour may rest confident that I will strictly uphold all the obligations of the London Convention of 1884."

Considering the feeling that has been raised against the Government of the South

African Republic, I venture to recall that to you, and I venture to say this, that in this difficult moment—difficult for these Dutchmen as it is difficult for us, when I think of all that has been said about magnanimity and forbearance, what I should like us to do; to pay them back in their own coin. (Cheers.) And now I want to come to close quarters.

#### FAIR PLAY FOR THE OUTLANDERS.

I fully agree with the object of the policy defined by the present High Commissioner—fair play for the Outlander population in the South African Republic. (Cheers.) That is a question on which there is no division whatever among us. We are all for insisting upon fair play to the Outlander population of the South African Republic—"Hear, hear"—of whom a large portion are our own kith and kin. The question is how to set about it. Now the first policy of the Government is thus set out by the High Commissioner. All these fellow-countrymen of ours being in a position of great disadvantage, and suffering what in this country we regard as grievances, the question was how to put these right. It seemed best to strike at the root of the evil, best for them and best for the South African Republic and her Majesty's Government to put these fellow-citizens of ours in a position to help themselves by giving them a share of political power through the franchise. Give them, as Sir A. Milner said, such a share as would enable them gradually to redress their grievances themselves, and to strengthen, not to weaken, the country of their adoption in the process. He said that he relied on a single remedy, and that remedy was the honest extension to our fellow-countrymen in the South African Republic of the electoral franchise.

#### THE PARADOX OF THE FRANCHISE.

There was a paradox, as Sir A. Milner calls it, in this operation, and a very important paradox. A paradox is a thing seemingly contradictory and contrary to common-sense. But I do not quarrel with the word. The only effective way of protecting our subjects was to help them to cease to be our subjects. Let me for a moment explain that, by an Act of Parliament passed in the reign of the Queen, a British subject, if he gets a full right of burghership in the South African Republic, forfeits his right as a British subject and only gets it back after a term of five years' residence in British

dominions. Mark this, therefore, that if you are going to slay Boers for the sake of the franchise, you are going to kill them because they object to turn good British subjects into statutory aliens. (Laughter.) This conversion is an operation for which there are many things to be said, only I do think this—that it is not an operation for which the people of this country will willingly go to war. (Cheers.) I am the last man, I hope, to be afraid of a paradox, but the notion of using British troops to help British subjects to cease to be British subjects, and to become statutory aliens, is indeed a paradox. (Cheers.) I am not quarrelling with it at all. That was the policy of her Majesty's Government, and already I think you may take it that policy has been in principle conceded. But it has not been conceded very rapidly.

#### PIG-HEADED OLIGARCHS NEARER HOME.

We are told that the Boers of the Transvaal are a set of pig-headed oligarchs. (A laugh.) I think we know something about oligarchs. I withdraw the "pig-headed," because it is not polite to apply to Englishmen or Scotchmen, but leave oligarchs. When I remember how long it took to get the Reform Bill of 1832, which emancipated Scotland, how many years of agitation it took John Bright to get the country to agree to the franchise for the artisans in the towns, when I think how long it took for the franchise of the villagers of the county, I think that we know something about oligarchs. Yes, it will really be one of the little ironies of politics if a war is going to be made upon the Transvaal Republic for being a little slow in extending the franchise, by Lord Salisbury, who left a Government because they were going to extend the franchise to the towns, and by Mr. Goschen, who would not join the Government rather than extend the suffrage in the counties. (Laughter.)

#### LET US STICK TO THE FRANCHISE!

Well, now let us pass that. Why is the policy of an extension of the franchise changed? It was deliberately adopted by the High Commissioner and by her Majesty's Government. Now proposals have been made since which, in truth, give a wider franchise than was asked. Why do we now proceed instantly to open new questions, to make fresh demands and suggest further Conferences? The first policy was that the

Outlanders, having divested themselves of British citizenship, were gradually, by their energy, their intelligence, their resource, to work for the redress of their grievances. Now it seems that instead of leaving them to work gradually we are going, not gradually but peremptorily, to insist on these reforms. We in the House of Commons were never told that what we had adopted as the policy of the Government on the 28th of July was extension of the franchise, as to which we were all of one mind. We were never told that the Secretary of State might one day transform that policy, that he might turn it into something quite different. What he then said was, "a substantial and immediate representation such"—I think these are his very words—

"such as will enable them to put forward their views and grievances, to secure that public opinion shall be directed to them, and perhaps in the long run to obtain satisfaction and sufficient redress."

#### THE SHIFTING OF GROUND AND RAISING OF TERMS.

These were the words, and that was the policy, and when we left the House of Commons that night we left, understanding that the prospect was a fairly promising one. Now you will never persuade me, in spite of all the clamours and vociferations of fire-eaters—that the plain, straightforward people of this country liked this shifting of ground, this raising of terms—(cheers)—or that they will feel any easier in their minds or their consciences as they look on and see their business done in this way. Take the case of a strike. Suppose an employer insists upon certain terms as to hours and wages, and after a struggle the men give way. Suppose the master after that says he will lock out unless they accept fresh requirements, or piles up penalties against the offenders. A wise and a good employer would never do such a thing, and if an employer did such a thing he would be condemned by public opinion, and public opinion, I think, would condemn, and has already condemned, a negotiator who first asks for something, then when he gets it says that it is not what he meant, and finally insists that, whether it proves to be what he meant or not, he must have something else into the bargain. (Cheers.)

## THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE.

Such a spirit in private dealings between man and man would, I think, be very ill regarded, and I believe the people of this country have already begun to make up their minds to condemn the same spirit in negotiation when it is pursued by a representative of the strongest Government in the world in dealing with the weakest.

It is not for me or for any of us to advise the Government of the South African Republic, but I think I may say this, as one who has watched those affairs for a great many years—I hope that the South African Republic will go into the conference which is now pressed upon them, not because, Heaven knows, we mean to swallow them up, or to let raiders swallow them up—(cheers)—but to prevent the chance of all those wrongs and mischiefs which might befall them. I hope they will go into the conference, and that they will strip the franchise which they are now willing to concede of every ambiguous term and every dubious restriction. To do less is to play into the hands of their adversaries, whoever and whatever they may be, and may endanger the best interests of their own State and of that great territory of which their own State is a part. We may know to-morrow what answer the Government of the South African Republic is going to make, and not knowing with any authority what it is, that is my hope—that they will go into the conference, and that they will meet frankly the demand for the franchise, not because we have a right to press it upon them, but because I believe that consideration of policy, in their own interest, counsels it to them. (Cheers.)

## SUZERAINTY AND THE FLAVOUR OF SOVEREIGNTY.

I have just said, we have no right, and this brings me to the word suzerainty. It is said we have a suzerainty over the South African Republic. Sir Alfred Milner said: "There is nothing material in this controversy as to whether we" have a suzerainty or not, nothing material. It is an etymological point, not a political point. My own view of suzerainty is that it is a word which nobody can define, but it has got a flavour of sovereignty in it, and yet it is not sovereignty. The Boers hate the word because it has got that flavour in it, and the war party in the Cape and in other

places like the word because they hope to import into it something or another which may enable them, under a mask of sovereignty, to do things which only unlimited sovereignty would sanction. Well, though it is only a matter of a word, many of you must know that some of the bloodiest and most obstinate struggles in the history of mankind have been struggles about words. Blood has been shed, tracts of the surface of the globe have been laid waste. Fierce and unquenchable hate between race and race have been kindled by quarrels about words, even about diphthongs. Therefore, do not let us believe that because, as the High Commissioner says, it is a mere matter of a word that it is not a very dangerous point. I for one am very glad to believe that this part of the discussion between ourselves and the South African Republic is not likely to be seriously pressed. But I am amazed at the little comprehension that those who take part in public discussions in the Press and on the platform, and also apart from public discussion and in private, are often wont to display, of the conditions of the relations now subsisting between Great Britain and the South African Republic.

## TRANSVAAL CITIZENS NOT QUEEN'S SUBJECTS.

As I understand from a lawyer's point of view—certainly my own native wits would have taught me as much, only you cannot safely set your own native wits against a lawyer's—(laughter)—the citizens of the South African Republic—are not the Queen's subjects. The South African Republic is not in the Queen's dominions. Will you listen?—Extracts are very disagreeable at a large meeting of this kind. Will you listen to the words of the Lord Chief Justice of England when he was trying the raiders in the summer of 1896? Now this is what he said:—

"Recollect what these raiders were tried for. They were tried for making a war from within the Queen's dominions, upon the dominions of a friendly State." ("Hear, hear," and cheers.)

Now what did the Chief Justice who presided at the trial say?

"The position of the South African Republic is determined by the two Conventions of 1881 and 1884. The result is that under these Conventions the Queen's Government recognises the complete independence and autonomy of the South African Republic subject only to the restriction of the Convention of 1884,

to the effect that the South African Republic should have no power to enter into any treaties without this country's consent.

That is the definition of the highest authority you can have of the status of the South African Republic. I will not read what was said by Lord Derby about the Convention of 1884, yet I think I will trouble you with it—Lord Derby said to the Transvaal, “Your Government will be left free to govern the country without interference, and to conduct its diplomatic intercourse and shape its foreign policy, subject only to the requirements embodied in the 4th article, that any treaty with a foreign State shall not have effect without the approval of the Queen.”

I'll come to a very remarkable declaration of the Colonial Secretary himself.

#### TRANSVAAL—“A FOREIGN STATE.”

When it is said now that they are a subordinate State, subject to a paramount Power—listen to this. This is what the Colonial Secretary said on the last day of 1895. He wrote of Dr. Jameson's action in breaking into “a foreign State which is in friendly treaty relations with her Majesty”—not a subordinate State—but “a foreign State in friendly treaty relations with her Majesty,” whether that is accurate or not I won't say. What can the Colonial Secretary mean by talking of the relation between a paramount and a subordinate State? What language can be more needless, irritating and provocative or more inconsistent with the language used by all his predecessors and by nobody more clearly and emphatically than by himself than the language he is now beginning to use? This is the last extract I am going to trouble you with. But recollect in this controversy you cannot be too peremptory in insisting upon chapter and verse. You are dealing with a people who are not your people. They are a sort of kith and kin, but they are not your people. And in dealing with that kind, and perhaps with yourselves, you must regard the precise and accurate terms in which the footing of each has been respectively defined. (“Hear, hear.”) What did Mr. Chamberlain say in 1896? “As regards the internal affairs of the Republic, I may observe that independently of rights of intervention in particular matters arising out of the Convention of 1884, Great Britain is justified in the interests of South Africa as a whole,” “as well as the peace and stability of the

South African Republic.” Justified in what?—“in tendering this friendly counsel as regards the newcomers, who are mostly British subjects.” Friendly counsel! Sending 50,000 troops! There is something more there than friendly counsel. I submit to you that language of this kind expressly excludes all claim as a paramount Power to insist by force upon any matters which are not fairly reserved by the Convention. The only claim is the right of friendly counsel and friendly representation in the interests of South Africa, and not the sovereign right of a paramount Power.

#### BRITISH SUPREMACY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

One more point before I close on this claim of some general supremacy outside the Convention of 1884. I really cannot understand how anybody can pretend to defend it, having defined our relations by a special document, how can we set that document aside by producing a general claim, by producing it suddenly like a juggler producing a card from up his sleeve? (Laughter.) When they accepted that agreement from us in 1884 they took us at our word.

They did not know that we meant to reserve this claim of a special general supremacy. What is the use of stunning—I want to press this point upon your attention—what is the use of stunning or stupefying us as the newspapers do by asking the question as to whether Great Britain can renounce what they style her paramountcy, whether she can give up her position as paramount Power and so forth? Of course, in any true sense Great Britain cannot renounce her position as a paramount and supreme Power in a special sense.

When Napoleon Bonaparte went into negotiations and made a treaty with the Austrians, he found that in the draft they had put the words, “We recognise the French Republic.” Napoleon said: “Strike that out. The man who cannot see the French Republic is a man who cannot see the sun in the heavens. He is blind.” (Laughter.) And so in South Africa the man who cannot see British supremacy in its true sense is a man who cannot see the sun in the heavens, for it is a supremacy not derived from documents, from agreements, or from conventions. It is derived from the facts of the case, from the enormous wealth, from the vigorous energy, from the ideas and institutions which Great

Britain carries with her. That is what her supremacy consists in, what her paramountcy consists in. I want to bring you to close argument upon this point. When you hear, as you will hear, talk of paramountcy—I dread catch-words, but let us deal with that catch-word—what do you mean by paramountcy?

#### PARAMOUNTCY, NOT DICTATORSHIP.

Do you mean that Great Britain is free to dictate to the South African Republic? To dictate; I do not say to argue about negotiations—to dictate to the South African Republic what her franchise shall be? To insist on having our own way about her judiciary, about her municipal government, and all the rest of the attributes of a stable community? Is that what you mean? If you do mean that, it leads to a very remarkable conclusion, and it is this—that Great Britain is not paramount in a single one of her self-governing colonies, because in not one of these great self-governing colonies in Australia, in South Africa, would any British statesman dream of going and saying, "I represent the paramount power, and I tell you that your franchise shall be so and so, and your municipal franchise so and so, and your jury law and your press law so and so."

#### HOW TO SHATTER THE EMPIRE.

You would have the Empire shattered in a month. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.) They call us, I believe, Little Englanders. (Laughter.) Those men who write in this way, and who talk in this way, and who think in this way, they'll make England, as they call it, little enough before they are done with it. (Laughter and cheers.) Yes, there is little paramountcy in the use of that particular expression. (Laughter.) I have forgotten old history, but I have a sort of a notion that suzerainty and paramountcy was what Edward I. alleged—(hear, hear)—and I think you did not much approve of it, so far as I remember. (Laughter.)

These are the true legal points. They are now using language, the war party—for I have no other word for them—they are now using language which rests upon claims that are wholly indefensible, and wholly inconsistent with the state of things upon which our Empire subsists. (Cheers.) I wish to say a word before I sit down upon the continental support of the war party. I well recollect that people used to ridicule

Mr. Gladstone and the rest of us because we sometimes said that the civilised world was on our side. They would not have that. They thought it ridiculous. Now, observe that the very same people who would never tolerate "civilised world" from us are now filling their columns with the praises lavished upon Her Majesty's Government in their resolution to fight—by Russia, by Germany, by Austria, by France, and, indeed, I am not sure that even the veteran Turk has not been pressed into service. Does it ever occur to them—I am amazed that it does not—that this sympathetic and genial and magnanimous slapping of John Bull on the back by foreign Powers perhaps is not quite as disinterested as it looks. For us to have 50,000 or 60,000 soldiers fighting in the Transvaal, with the certainty of having to keep a good many troops locked up there for an indefinite number of years to come, would assuredly not make us stronger but considerably weaker in any troubles that we might have with European Powers. But this is a delicate matter, and I am a charitable and unsuspecting man, only it strikes me as well worth thinking about. I have not attempted to make an exciting speech to you. I have carefully avoided any moral exaggeration, I have carefully avoided anything like I hope personal or party attack. (Cheers.) Because I believe the moment is far too serious for any of these adornments of platform oratory. I have tried to do my duty as your representative and to tell you how these things figure themselves in my own mind. There are times when right, when justice, when an unselfish regard for the welfare of mankind, when the necessities of natural self-preservation, national existence, may force a community to take upon itself the grievous responsibilities of war; there is no such case here. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.)

#### FRANCHISE FIVE YEARS OR SEVEN.

But when you hear, as you may, by-and-by, of as I said, of brilliant victories and immense carnage and your children ask you what it is all about, what is your answer going to be? Franchise? Five years or seven years. Is that what you are killing men for, not savages, though I really don't know why the killing of savages should be thought such a very light business. (Hear, hear.) Killing men who share, substantially share, your own religion and partake of your own civilized order. Is it to be said you are

going to kill them for two years in a franchise law? The "Times" the other day had an article—its eyes full of tears, and wringing its hands—because owing to the bad government of the South African Republic, dynamite was so many pounds a ton when it ought to be so many shillings a ton. Is that what you are going to kill men for? Hear, hear.) Paramourncy? No.

#### FUSION, THE ONLY TRUE POLICY.

The whole policy is not paramourncy, but fusion. The British and the Dutch have got to live together in South Africa. Do not say to one race you are to be at the top and the other shall be at the bottom. No. Let there be fusion, not paramourncy. Are you going to fight them for paramourncy when you know, apart from its guilt, it can only lead to new burdens and new responsibilities and new difficulties. Are you going to war in order that you may have your hands free to tear up a treaty to which you have solemnly set your seal and to wipe out, to crush, a little state whose independence you have repeatedly declared your intense anxiety both to respect and to cherish?

#### WAR WITH DISHONOUR.

A war of that kind will not be a war with honour, it will be a war with deep dishonour. ("Hear, hear," and cheers.) And what a mockery will such a war make of all the professions that have been made emphatically and in capital letters within the last few months, especially upon behalf of peace. What a farce—what a hypocritical farce—to send your important representatives to The Hague to try whether something cannot be done to introduce better principles into the relations between States. What a farce, what an example, for this country, which has hitherto vaunted and boasted—and justly boasted—that it is in the front of great moral, pacific, and progressive causes.

#### "WE DON'T WANT A PIRATE EMPIRE."

What an example for us to set to the armed camps and the scheming Chancelleries of Continental Europe! What a shadow to cast upon the reign of the Queen! Yes, Empire they say—Empire, yes, but we don't want a Pirate Empire. Let us be sure, to borrow Mr. Chamberlain's figure, let us here to-night be sure that when the sand runs low in the little hour-glass which is the measure of the

life of a man we, at all events, shall be able to think that we have been in this constituency staunch and true to those principles of good faith and national honour and solidity and sober judgment which have won for Britain her true glory and her most abiding renown, and in this wanton mischief and in this grievous discredit, neither part nor lot shall be yours or mine. (Loud cheers.)

## CHAPTER X.

### MR. COURTNEY AT MANCHESTER.

MR. JOHN A. BRIGHT presided over a meeting of seven thousand Lancashire men and women who met in St. James's Hall, Manchester, on Friday, September 15th, to protest against war with the Transvaal. Mr. Morley and Mr. Courtney were the principal speakers. There was some disturbance at the beginning from a small minority of malcontents, but at the end the resolution was carried with great enthusiasm by an overwhelming majority. The following report is taken from the *Manchester Guardian*.

#### MR. COURTNEY'S SPEECH.

MR. LEONARD COURTNEY, M.P., who was received with loud and continued cheering, said that Mr. Morley had been able to appeal to them as a Lancashire man, and he (Mr. Courtney) was proud to think that after a little interval Mr. Morley was heard as Lancashire men were accustomed to hear one of themselves. He came before them with no such claim. He was a perfect stranger. ("No, no.") He could not claim to be an inhabitant of the county, but he appealed to that love of fair play which we claimed as the best characteristic of our countrymen. To him this question was not new, because when he first entered Parliament twenty years ago he took a prominent part in connection with that phase of it which then appeared—"hear, hear,"—and he was simply sustaining there what he had endeavoured to do when twenty years younger.

#### THE JUSTIFICATION FOR MEETINGS.

Many critics would condemn that meeting, many of his own friends had been anxious and apprehensive that it might be injurious to the cause he had at heart. ("Hear,

hear.") They said "The moment is critical, the situation is better than it has been. Don't take a step which may make certain that calamity which you so strongly deprecate." If he had thought for one moment that in coming there he should be doing anything prejudicial to the cause of peace he would not have come. But he had come because it appeared to him that the situation was indeed critical. The worst characteristic at this moment was found in the mistaken temper of our countrymen—"No"—and it was the duty of every man who thought he might in any way say a word that would bring them to a more accurate appreciation of the situation as it was, to a juster judgment of the men with whom they had to deal, to step forward and say it, knowing that by so doing he would be doing the best for the cause of peace. (Cheers.)

#### THE PERIL OF THE POSITION.

The situation was indeed formidable. Troops were being hurried to South Africa—"Hear, hear"—from India, and from our own shores, and it was said that the Boers were arming also and were importing ammunition and rounds of cartridges by hundreds and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands, preparing for the fight. (Cheers, and a voice, "Let 'em all come!" and laughter.) Was not that, then, a situation in which an incautious word, a freak, an outburst of some drunken Boer or some drunken Outlander—there were many of that kind amongst them. (A voice, "No," and laughter.) The courage of his friend at the back there was magnificent. (Laughter.) He wished he would come a little forward and let him recognise and admire him in detail. He said there were men of that character in both, and a single misdeed might so excite the already excited temper here and in South Africa that the crackle of musketry might follow, and then all would be lost. Now or never was the time to speak. Now or never was the time to appeal to the good sense, to the good temper, of our countrymen, and ask them quietly, seriously, as friends in council, to consider what it was they had to deal with. And let him ask them whether there was not ample cause for being even a little tender in respect of our judgment of those Boers whom some of us were so eager to condemn.

#### WHY THE BOERS DISTRUST US.

What had the Boers had in the course of their history to make them trust us? What was the past on which Paul Kruger had to look back? Let them put themselves for a moment in his place. ("Hear, hear.") A boy of six years of age, he was taken by his father and family away from Cape Colony into the wilderness, trekking into the wilderness in order that they might be free. They were followed, they were headed back, they were driven into a corner, and not till after fifteen years of scattered fighting did we ultimately recognise their claim to live apart from our control. In the year 1852 we recognised not merely the South African Republic, or what was its predecessor, but recognised the Orange Free State. And from 1852 to 1877 there was peace—Dutchmen and Englishmen lived side by side and prospered. Why could not we restore, without a miserable attempt at arms which would fail, the situation such as it existed in that quarter of a century? In 1877 we annexed the Transvaal, and we promised them self-government. We never ventured to give it them. We knew that if we created a representative Assembly its first act would be to disown the annexation. In 1881, after the business of Majuba Hill, of which many of them made great store, but which, let it be remembered, within the last month Paul Kruger had spoken of as a slight affair, not determining the fate of his people, because after that we with our force could have annihilated the forces opposed to us. Paul Kruger had recognised that fact—(cheers)—and the noble action of Mr. Gladstone and the English people. He rejoiced that they approved that retrospect, and he was glad to know that a daughter of Mr. Gladstone was there. The point was this—Majuba Hill was a mere episode, a trifle in the history of a great controversy, and it was not because of that, it was because we were convinced that a wrong had been committed that we restored the liberty of the South African Republic. He knew too well there were men—and it would be almost impossible to expect otherwise in the case of soldiers—whose eyes lighted up with satisfaction at the thought of undoing that wretched business. Were we going to be the slaves of military passion? (Cries of "No, no.") A soldier was a good servant but a very bad master. (Cheers.)

## THE QUESTION OF SUZERAINTY.

Well, we restored the Transvaal in 1881 by a Convention, a Convention which gave us suzerainty. Three years passed, and in 1884 there was another Convention, a Convention which said nothing about suzerainty, which dropped the word, and which contained something which Lord Derby, the man who made that Convention, declared was the essential thing he wanted—the word he cared nothing about. He wanted the control of the foreign relations of the Boer Republic. He put that in the second Convention, and nothing more. That Paul Kruger and the Boers again within the last month had declared they had no desire to undo. (“Hear, hear.”) They recognised most fully that they were bound to submit, before they concluded treaties with foreign States, them for sanction of the Queen. Beyond that they said there was no claim to suzerainty whatever. That was the argument.

## A CASE FOR THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE.

Now, was there any reason why an argument of that kind—if it was worth arguing—which dwelt upon the terms of two written documents, should not be submitted to the highest legal opinion to determine what the truth was. (Cheers.) If it was the case between one of our own great corporations and some trading or other company, that had entered into a contract with them, and had made two written agreements, successively one party said the second was a substitution for the first, and the second party said they stood together. Was there any reason why a thing of that kind should not be submitted to the legal judgment which alone was competent to determine it? The Boers asked to have it so submitted. He himself held a strong opinion upon it that there was no suzerainty. Others held that there was. On a point of that kind no man should be rash to declare that he must be right, especially if he was one party to the controversy. But he was ready to submit, and he said in the House of Commons that if he were President Kruger he would be ready to submit that question, which was purely a legal question, to the judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, barring one or two members of that Committee, who, as members of the Government, had pronounced judgment upon it, and in whom President Kruger would not have

perfect confidence. He (Mr. Courtney) knew lawyers, and he was quite confident, even if the legal members of the present Government had seats upon the Judicial Committee, they would be found trying the case, not as politicians, but as lawyers. He would not recommend, and no man with an apprehension of the feelings of others, would recommend that course to the Transvaal Government, but he could recommend and would recommend, that this question of the suzerainty, if it was worth anything, should be referred to the Judicial Committee. But was it worth anything? Was it worth fighting for? (“No.”) One party said there was suzerainty; the other said there was not. What came of it? Did they deduce anything from it? The one thing they deduced was the right to control foreign treaties. That one thing the Transvaal allowed.

## A MERE ETYMOLOGICAL QUESTION.

For the rest it was a word, a name; and for his part, if he were the Transvaal, though quite ready and willing and eager so as to remove a difficulty to submit it to the judicial interpretation of which he had spoken, he should not be in the least concerned if one set of men went on repeating “suzerainty” till Doomsday, because he should say on his side whenever he wanted, “There is no suzerainty whatever.” Up to the beginning of this century our sovereigns called themselves kings of France at the very time they were making treaties with the other king of France. The other king of France never said anything about it, and our king of France never made any claim in consequence of it, and it was an idle claim that eventually got dropped. Suzerainty, if it meant anything more than the right to control treaties was pure usurpation, and there was nothing in the treaties to justify such a use of the word. He should treat it as a matter of no importance, and he should be quite content to drop the discussion of it, which was what he understood the Dutch Boers at one time proposed to do.

## THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL.

He had endeavoured to show them that up to 1884 the Boers had something to complain of. They had complained that they were not allowed to go out in peace at first, and they have complained after twenty-five years that their country was annexed. But had nothing happened since 1884? Why was it that since 1884 our relations with

South Africa had not been as specific, as settled, and as satisfactory, as our relations with the Orange River Free State? (A voice: "Gold mines.") Gold mines was the answer. (Cheers.) His friend at the back had hit it. It was because there were gold mines there—(cheers)—that was why we had not been able to restore the relations which existed formerly but which did not exist to day. He was amazed to find in the press of this country, even in such a paper as the "Times," this statement:—"We must, in the interests of the British Empire, insist upon the supremacy of Great Britain throughout South Africa, except the Orange Free State." Why that exception? If supremacy was so urgently wanted elsewhere why not there? Because supremacy in the one case meant gold, and in the other it did not. (Cheers.) In 1895 and 1896 the Boers had, it must be admitted, two great grounds of jealousy of us, and when it was urged that they should do this and that—that they should admit the suzerainty and establish equality and give an equal franchise, was it strange that they should suspect that there was something behind which was going to take away their freedom? He had already dwelt on the suzerainty.

#### THE QUESTION OF THE FRANCHISE.

He would refer now to the matter of the franchise. The situation now turned, it was said, upon the demands in Mr. Chamberlain's last despatch. On the whole that despatch was clothed in language which gave no just ground of resentment to those to whom it was addressed—(cheers),—which was a rebuke to the fire-eaters of the press, and most of all to a man whom he knew, whom he held as a friend, a man holding a great position in relation to this matter, whose name he scarcely dared to mention—such power he had over it still—but whom he must designate as a lost mind. He meant Sir Alfred Milner. (Cheers.) He had not used that phrase without much hesitation. He did not wish to give pain to a man with whom he had lived in familiar converse, but there were things moving one which were mightier than the susceptibilities of individuals. (Cheers.) He dared not retract the judgment which had been forced from his lips. That despatch of Mr. Chamberlain had been a great rebuke to the fire-eaters here and elsewhere. He hailed it, he was glad of it,

and if he had any influence with Paul Kruger, and if Kruger was able to control his Boers in this matter, he would say, "Accept the proposals of that despatch and establish equality." But he would ask those present, as fair-minded men, to realise the hesitation which Kruger and his Boers might feel in accepting these proposals. Let them try to put the case in relation to another land, to another set of circumstances, and see how the problem looked. He would take the case of the Yukon, which was rich with mines, and lay within the dominions of Canada, close to the frontier of the United States. There was already a dispute about a boundary, which he hoped, however, would not turn to mischief.

#### A PARALLEL FROM KLONDYKE.

The citizens of the United States flocked into the Yukon, like Canadians and Englishmen. By-and-by, probably very soon, representative institutions would be set up. Suppose the United States citizens who flocked in claimed to vote and to be elected. (A voice: "Let them.") Very well. They went in and became members of the representative Assembly of Canada; and the first thing they did when they got there—if they obtained a majority—was to declare independence of Canada—"Rot"—and the next thing was to declare in favour of annexation to the United States. ("Hear, hear," and dissent.) His friends at the back thought that was an absurd and chimerical hypothesis. Did they know how Texas became part of the United States? It was exactly in that way. Americans swarmed over and created the Republic of Texas, detaching it from Mexico, and then annexed the Republic to the United States. He did not suppose any danger of that kind would be found in Yukon. They would not like it if it existed; and he was only asking them to realise what a Boer would think if a similar danger attached to his country. (Cheers.) Was there any such danger? ("No.") He would ask that gentleman if he remembered that when that claim to be registered and to vote and become citizens of the Transvaal was first advanced it was coupled with a claim not to renounce allegiance to the Queen. They were to have both, and it was not till our lawyers said it was impossible—that they must elect to be one or the other—that they made up their minds.

## THE BOERS DO WELL TO BE FEARFUL.

The Boers were naturally alarmed nevertheless. He (Mr. Courtney) advised the Boers to accept—not because they would be overwhelmed, for if it were wrong to accept on other grounds, and he were a Boer, he would fight and die for it—(cheers)—but to accept for this reason. Englishmen and Scotchmen and Irishmen and Dutch were bound to live together in South Africa. That was what Mr. Morley had been trying to beat into them, and he (Mr. Courtney) hoped and thought he had succeeded. The war party would make it impossible by declaring war. He would advise Paul Kruger to make it impossible that they should separate by giving them the franchise together. (Cheers.) It was his best hope, it was his country's best hope, for the future that the Dutch and English should live side by side as they had up to 1877, as they would live again were it not for this infernal taint of gold mines—(cheers)—and the miserable inflammation excited by the press, the characteristics of which he could not sufficiently express, but he would say this—void of all conscience and void of all Christianity. (Cheers.)

## HIS ADVICE TO THE BOERS.

Now, he had said on the matter of suzerainty that he would advise readiness to submit, but that advice was not necessary, because already the Boers had expressed once and again their readiness to submit to arbitration, the most legal arbitration, but on the matter of the franchise and concurrent demands which completed it he would say, "Accept it, because that's the best way of fighting out your own salvation." But could they believe that Paul Kruger could persuade his Boers to accept that or any other similar solution unless they found some assurance that in England and from Englishmen they would receive fair play—(cheers)—and equitable judgment? (Cheers.) Let them cease their greed for lies, with which too many were trying to glut them. (Cheers.) They were lies and nothing but lies. (Cheers.) He had come there to ask them to cease from devouring the disgusting meal. (Cheers.)

## A WORD FOR PAUL KRUGER.

Some of them were old enough to remember what happened in the world's history a

generation ago. Thirty-six years ago there was being fought on the other side of the Atlantic one of the greatest controversies of our century—it might be said of our civilisation—and during that time Abraham Lincoln, whom we now respected as a hero and honoured as a martyr, Abraham Lincoln was derided, Abraham Lincoln was the object of contumely and scorn, just as Paul Kruger was to-day. They wondered how their fathers were so wild in their judgment. Let them beware lest they followed in their steps and repeated in reference to another man the same error. He did not share Paul Kruger's creed or his political principles, and was not in unison with many of his thoughts. But had they never, in their travels in Lowland Scotland or in his own Western Cornwall, met with simple farmers and peasants who read their Bibles day and night, and found them constant sources of consolation and instruction? Such men ought to help them to understand Paul Kruger. There was the example, too, of Oliver Cromwell. But when a similar soul came before them to-day no knowledge of Cromwell helped them to understand him. What a dreadful judgment; what a sentence of condemnation upon ourselves; and, in spite of all, we remained as obdurate as our forefathers.

## A FINAL APPEAL.

Let them not think the claim of suzerainty to be a reality worth fighting about. It was a technical and legal question, properly referable to a legal tribunal. And, for the rest, he had said what he desired to say about the political franchises in Africa; and he had appealed to them, as he desired to appeal, to do, if they possibly could, something to free their minds from the prejudices of the past—something to enable them to see more accurately what was going on under their eyes. They thought of attaining justice by war, confusion, the destruction of society. Never. (Loud cheers.) He had come to try to appeal to them to open their minds in respect of this matter. He saw that in the vast majority no such appeal was wanted. ("Hear, hear.") He gloried in that fact. "Men and women of Manchester," concluded Mr. Courtney, "be it your just boast that you, foremost of England and of the United Kingdom, were resolved that nothing should be done to destroy the most glorious traditions of our past, that nothing should be done to prevent the future keeping up and sustaining the record of these traditions." (Loud and prolonged cheers.)

## CHAPTER XI.

## WHAT WAR WOULD MEAN.

TO count the cost is surely one of the first duties of all those who incite us to war. How many of the eager crowd which is clamouring "to have a slip in to the Boers," have calmly calculated what it would cost?

There are, of course, some cases in which the balance of advantage, or of disadvantage, is so overwhelming there is no need to count. If our country were invaded we should fight and fight to the bitter end at any cost, without even counting the cost. That is President Kruger's position. He is threatened with invasion, and with the extinction of his national existence. At any cost, without even counting of the cost, he must fight as a man fights when he has his back against the wall and a dozen men are stabbing at him in front.

But that is not our case. Not even the wildest fanatic of Jingoism ever imagined that there was even a remote possibility that the Boers would invade and endeavour to conquer the British Empire or any part thereof. It is Britain and not the Transvaal which has brought South Africa to the verge of war. The Boers may be responsible for much discontent. Their Government may be as bad as the Outlanders say. But although that might have provoked rebellion within the limits of the Transvaal, it would never have menaced the peace and security of any territory beyond their frontiers; it certainly would not have challenged us to war.

It is we who have taken the initiative. It is we who can if we please give peace to South Africa by abandoning the policy of armed coercion against which the Dutch are in open or in secret revolt.

Therefore, as we alone are responsible for forcing the political controversy into a military phase, and as the war, if war there be, will be entirely of our making, if our first duty is to be sure that our quarrel is just, our second not less certainly is to ascertain how much its prosecution will cost.

It will not be denied that the matter of costs enters largely into the question of whether or not even the greatest of wars should be undertaken. It would have been a perfectly just war if we had attacked the Turk to compel him to abstain from massacre in Armenia. But our Government decided, and probably decided rightly, that the cost

was too great. For cost does not merely mean financial expenditure. It meant in the case of Armenia, according to Lord Rosebery, the forcing on of a general European war.

The money element is often the smallest factor in the question of the cost of war. A war may be perfectly just, and even expedient in certain circumstances, if it could be prosecuted to a successful close, without exposing us to perils, and entailing an expenditure both of blood and treasure altogether out of proportion to the value of the object sought to be attained. It will not be denied by any one that the grievances of 100,000 Uitlanders, however great they may be, would not be sufficient to justify our declaring war against a Republic as strong as that of France or the United States, if for no other reason than this, that no such war could be fought without the sacrifice of 100,000 lives on either side, or twice as many as the total number of Uitlanders whose grievances it was sought to redress. It is, therefore, obvious that the question as to what the war would cost in blood and treasure is a vital element which must always be taken into account, and this element may decide the question adversely to a war, even if our quarrel were absolutely just, and the end to be gained desirable in every way.

We are first confronted by the fact that although the Transvaal is a little State, a war with it will not be a little war. It will, as Mr. Chamberlain said, be a long war, a bitter war, and a civil war. It may also be a servile war; that is to say, while we are engaged in cutting the throats of the Boers the native population, which outnumbered many times the whole of the white settlers in South Africa, may determine to take a hand in the game, and strike for their own aims and objects. Each side will be under great temptation to enlist the services of savages. Already we are told by the advocates of war that we can let loose the Swazis upon the Transvaal in the north, and the Basutos upon the Orange Free State in the south. On the other hand, the Boers who, despite all their patriarchal relations with the natives, have nevertheless considerable control over their Kaffirs, may be driven to reprisals, and the net result of the quarrels about the etymological ghost of suzerainty may result in the two Christian races that inhabit South Africa letting loose the whole semi-subdued forces of heathen savagery upon the women and children, who, until this fatal controversy arose, were living peacefully together in the

Republics and Colonies of South Africa. The figures concerning the relative strength of the white and black populations in South Africa are thus stated by a well-informed writer in the *Morning Leader* :—

We find that, according to the census of 1891, there were 376,987 Europeans in the Cape Colony, as compared with 1,150,237 natives and coloured people. The average increase since then has been about 2·64 per cent. for the Europeans and 2·04 per cent. for the natives, so that we may consider that the proportion has not changed much since 1891. In the colony of Natal there were in 1891, 46,800 Europeans, 41,100 Indians, and 455,900 natives and coloured people. In Bechuanaland, Matabeleland, and the newly-acquired country, the disparity between the races is still greater. In Basutoland, for instance, the natives number 250,000, and the whites 600 only!

Thus we see that, taking the two colonies of Natal and the Cape, there were 413,787 Europeans, as compared with 1,606,237 natives. Also that Basutoland alone can furnish more than half as many natives as there are Europeans in the two colonies.

These figures, however, deal solely with the natives in Natal, Basutoland, and the Cape. In addition to this we have to reckon the Zulus on the borders of Natal, the Swazis, and the three-quarters of a million natives who are living in the Transvaal. Altogether it will probably not be an over-estimate to say that in that region of South Africa over which Britain claims to be the paramount Power, we have at least 4,000,000 of blacks for less than 1,000,000 of white men. If the two white races are launched into an internecine conflict, it is inevitable that the blacks will take a hand in the bloody game, with results at which humanity will shudder, but for which we and we alone will be solely responsible. The possibility of a native war is a terrible addition to the possible consequences of driving matters to an extremity with the Transvaal. When once the signal is given, we shall let loose the aboriginal forces of savagery, to outrage the women and carry fire and sword through the homesteads of the Transvaal. As the Turk was justly held responsible for all the outrages of the Bashi-Bashouks, and the Circassians who desolated Bulgaria, so we shall be responsible for the orgy of blood and lust which will follow the unloosing of South African savagery upon the white population of the Republic and the Colony.

But do not let us imagine for a moment that it is only against the Boers that the black man will turn his assegai. Blood is thicker than water with blacks as well as with whites, and if once the horrors of a servile war are let loose in South Africa, the natives who "see red" will not draw fine distinctions between the particular languages which the various whites may speak. That such a war will be a grave addition to our military difficulties is shown by the fact that competent authorities have estimated that if it takes 50,000 to conquer the Transvaal and the Free State, we should have at least 80,000 in the field if the blacks go on the warpath. This factor in the situation is one which should occupy almost the first place in calculation of the unconsidered consequences that may result from a declaration of war.

In the second place we have to face the military resistance of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Every competent authority who has studied the question on the spot, from Dr. Jameson downwards, is convinced that it would be the gravest of all grave mistakes to attempt to conquer the Transvaal unless we can at least put man to man into the field against the Boers. In the Transvaal President Kruger believes he can muster 30,000 men, while the Free State will add from 15,000 to that number. They will be joined probably by 5,000 others from the Cape Colony and Natal, so that we have to face the armed resistance of 50,000 Europeans who are armed with the best weapons, amply supplied with munitions of war, who are operating in their own country, and who can boast of being one of the toughest fighting breeds that Europe has produced. The disproportion between the Transvaal and the British Empire is, of course, so enormous that it seems ridiculous to discuss the element of chances, but it is hardly any greater than that which existed between the Spanish monarchy and the burghers of Holland when William the Silent raised the standard of revolt. I do not, however, discuss the possibility of defeat. I only mention the numbers of the Boers in order to indicate the strength of the army which we shall have to send to undertake the conquest of the country. South Africa, until Sir Alfred Milner fired off his fatal despatch of May last, was tranquil, loyal, and prosperous, with a less garrison than 10,000 men. As the immediate result of the Chamberlainian policy we have been compelled to send an extra 10,000 men to the Cape, merely in

order to hold our own against the dangers which the impolicy of our authorities have created. But with 20,000 men in South Africa we are not as safe as we were with 8,000 at the beginning of the year, nor is our Imperial position so secure as when we relied upon the smaller garrison. Before we can attempt offensive operations against the Transvaal and the Free State, we shall have to ship another army corps of 30,000 men to the seat of war, and as Mr. Chamberlain has told us that it will be a long war, it will be no holiday procession. For the next six months, at least, we shall have to keep a minimum of 50,000 men in South Africa. These 50,000 men for military purposes elsewhere in the Empire will be as useless as if they did not exist. So far as the safety of our shores is concerned or our ability to hold our own with jealous rivals, the effect of the Transvaal war is practically equivalent to a reduction of the British army by 50,000 men.

The third question to be considered is when we are likely to be able to recall these 50,000 men. In the first case, we may send 50,000 there, but 50,000 will not return. The butcher's bill will be heavy, and most of the brave fellows who steamed out of Southampton docks amid the cheers of the crowd will leave their bones in the distant veldt.

In the next place, there is considerable doubt as to whether we shall be able to recall any of them for a long time to come. For the Boers will take a good deal of beating, and after they have been beaten they will need a great deal of holding down. Nor is it the Boers alone. There are the natives who will be excited by the slaughter going on in their midst, and, more important than anything else, there will be the Dutch in the Cape Colony. We shall have to hold South Africa with a permanent garrison which we can ill spare, nor do we see any end to it. The net result of conquering the Transvaal may be to add to our dominions the goldfields of the Rand; but not all the increased taxes that will be levied on the Raad will pay the increased cost which will be entailed upon our military budget by the necessity of having to hold South Africa down with a bayonet. "You can do anything with bayonets," it was said of old time, "except sit upon them." It is in order to secure this privilege of sitting upon bayonets in South Africa that we are invited to fling ourselves into this unjust and causeless war.

Fourthly, we have to consider the possible results of this campaign upon our position in the Cape Colony. The quotations which we have already made from Mr. Chamberlain's speeches show that all British interests in South Africa rest upon a union between the Dutch and the English. We are now going to shatter that union for ever. There is no doubt from the utterances of the President of the Free State, and also from the address of sympathy sent to the Transvaal by 53 out of 90 members of the Cape Parliament, that the Dutch race will be solid against us in South Africa, if we persist in going to war. Those who rely so confidently upon the strength and the wealth of the Empire forget that it is quite on the cards that we may lose South Africa altogether if we do not mind what we are about. The great healing work of the last twenty years which has been carried on by the Afrikander Bond and Mr. Rhodes has made the Dutch population as loyal as the British. It was a Dutch majority which voted £30,000 per annum to the Imperial Navy—a contribution which many of the wealthier Colonies have never made. At the Queen's Jubilee, the loyalty of the Dutch was vouched for in the strongest terms by Sir Alfred Milner, and there is no reason to doubt that the healing process of time was rapidly and steadily welding the Dutch into one family. All this will be undone. The flames of civil war will be lit up in every province in the colony; and in every Dutch heart, after we have crushed the Transvaal, there will be implanted anew the deadly feeling of hatred against the conqueror which of all sentiments takes the longest to eradicate. As the result of war there are only two alternatives. Either we lose South Africa outright by finding the task of conquering the country and holding it beyond our power, or we create another Africa within the Imperial fold, a disaffected, discontented community which will seize every opportunity in order to harass the Government and create difficulties for the Empire. We shall not be able to give them representative government; responsible government will have to be abolished, both in the Cape and possibly in Natal. So obvious is this that some acute foreign observers believe that Mr. Chamberlain has deliberately got up the whole thing in order to abolish the Cape Parliament and reduce the Cape to the status of a Crown Colony. But that will not last. The British tax-payer is much too heavily pressed to bear the burden of two Irelands upon his

shoulders, and sooner or later we shall lose South Africa as we have lost the United States. The warning of Oliver Schreiner on this point is very pertinent, and should be well weighed by all those who imagine that the only question at issue is paying out the Boers for Majuba.

Fifthly, there is another point which will weigh very little with some people but which weighs, I confess, a very great deal with me. The great strength of England among the nations is not so much military as moral and naval. Her naval strength depends upon our ability to devote the requisite millions to the maintenance of a supreme navy, but our moral strength depends upon our fidelity to the great principles which we profess before high heaven and all the nations of the earth on all occasions. Who can estimate the slump in the moral stock of Great Britain in every capital of the world, if, as a sequel to the Peace Conference, we plunge into war with the Transvaal! Talk about unctuous rectitude, was that phrase ever more aptly applied than to a Government which after spending months in elaborating the machinery for arbitration, defies the public opinion of the world, tramples under foot the representations of the responsible Ministers of the Crown in the Colony most concerned, and rushes headlong into war with a small nation which has already conceded the substance of everything we asked. A good deal has been said concerning a propaganda of peace on the continent; but all that is knocked on the head summarily by what has already been done in the way of menacing war in the Transvaal.

Another point which intensifies the hostile feeling of our neighbours and still further destroys our claim to represent either morality or humanity in this matter is the fiendish exultation of our Jingoës in the prospect of using Dum Dum bullets against our brothers the Boers. I speak that which I know, having been for two months in constant communication with the representatives of all the nations who met in the capital of Holland, when I say that however ill-founded the prejudice against the Dum Dum bullet may be, it exists with an intensity which may well make us pause before we insist upon using the expanding bullet against white-skinned foes. The use of the Dum Dum was apologised for on the ground that it was necessary to employ such a bullet against savages. No one at the Hague ventured to say in the name of England that we proposed to use the Dum

Dum against civilised foes. With the solitary exception of the United States, which voted with us on the Dum Dum, because we voted with them on the question of asphyxiating shells, every Power represented at the Hague expressed strong condemnation of the use of Dum Dum bullets. That condemnation represents the verdict of the civilised world. The verdict may be unjustified by the facts, but the prejudice exists everywhere and when our people gloat as they do over using Dum Dums against the Boers, they irritate the public opinion on the Continent against Great Britain in a fashion which may easily have very dangerous consequences. Mr. Morley talked about "a pirate Empire," and that, of course, is what we shall be; but even pirates do not use poisoned bullets, and the Dum Dum, in the opinion of the foreigner, is quite as much opposed to the rules of legitimate warfare as the practice of poisoning wells or torturing the wounded.

Seventhly, this intensification of the hatred for Britain among her neighbours, the feeling that she is at once Pecksniff, Pharisee, and Pirate, will tend to increase the temptation of rival empires to seize the opportunity which we are about to afford them of taking action against us. I do not mean war. No nation, excepting England, is foolish enough to go to war when it can obtain what it wants without drawing the sword. What our rivals, France, Germany, and Russia, will probably do is to wait until we are up to the middle in the Transvaal bog, and then to apply the process of squeeze. I do not impute anything evil to any one of these Governments, I only know that they are like smart men of business, rival firms, with interests which are often opposed to our own. They look after their own business, and when they have got us in a tight place, and John Bull is fast by the leg in the Transvaal trap, they will make their hay when the sun shines. Many questions crop up in which we may have to hold our own, notably in China. If we are going to war with the Transvaal we seriously diminish our effective force in China.

Then there is the question of Afghanistan. At any moment the Ameer of Afghanistan may die. Already sinister rumours are current as to fighting close by the Penjdeh frontier, and the outbreak of a civil war in Afghanistan with more or less illegitimate Russian pretenders struggling for the vacant throne, would make us bitterly rue the day when we depleted the Indian garrison in order to pursue a policy

of passion and revenge in the Transvaal. I hope nothing may happen in Afghanistan, but we need to keep our weather-eye open in that direction, and also in the direction of France in all that concerns Egypt. We think that we have consolidated our position in Egypt by the victory of Omdurman. Our international position there is as indefensible as ever, and at any moment that it suits them the Egyptian question may be raised by France in its most disagreeable form. As for our doing anything for the unfortunate Armenians or Macedonians, or attempting to fulfil our treaty obligations to the subject populations of the Turkish Empire, that is out of the question. There are millions of them, it is true, and their grievances consist in being exposed to constant liability to rape, plunder and massacre. But what are their grievances, even although we ourselves are responsible for them, for we forced the Macedonian populations back under the sovereignty of the Porte, compared with the necessity of avenging Majuba Hill or insisting that the Outlanders shall have their franchise after five years' residence instead of seven? He must be a very sanguine man who, at the close of this century, can look round the frontiers of the Empire and come to the conclusion that we can afford to lock up 50,000 men in South Africa for an indefinite period at a time when we have such great difficulty in recruiting, that people are beginning to talk of a modified conscription in order to keep our regiments full.

Eighthly, as to the actual expenditure, Mr. Chamberlain, replying to Sir Ashmead Bartlett, suggested that a Transvaal war would cost from £10,000,000 to £20,000,000 sterling. This is a consideration which I have reserved for the last, because in many respects it is the least. It is nevertheless well calculated to give us pause. What do our suffering classes at home, who are denied the redress of their grievances, think of a proposed expenditure of £20,000,000 sterling in order that 60,000 Uitlanders may have their franchise two years earlier than it is offered to them already. £20,000,000 sterling for 60,000 Uitlanders gives an average of £300 per Uitlander per head all round. The Uitlanders themselves would very gladly accept £300 and put up with a two years' postponement of the franchise; indeed, it is very doubtful whether they would not gladly make the deal for a £5 note each. In any case a more monstrous disproportion between the money expended, and the object which it is proposed to gain could hardly be imagined.

This money is to be poured fourth like water in order that we may slay our brother Boer. If we were to keep it at home we might begin the rehousing of the poor in South and East London. We might make at least a good beginning towards the establishment of a system of Old Age Pensions. There is, in short, hardly any limit to what we might do if we had £20,000,000 to use for purposes of mercy and philanthropy instead of wasting it as it is proposed to do, on mere bloodshed and butchery.

Let us then sum up the cost of the war upon which so many of our people are for embanking with such a light heart. We shall get off cheaply, if it does not cost us more than 10,000 lives and £20,000,000 sterling. It will entail a permanent increase of our military burdens in South Africa, and saddle us with a Dutch Ireland, where we might have had a country as loyal and contented as Scotland. It will render responsible government impossible at the Cape, and will precipitate a civil and a servile war, the end of which no one can foresee. In addition to all this it will weaken our Imperial power by locking up one-half of our available fighting force in the uplands of South Africa, and expose us to be squeezed by our jealous rivals wherever their interests conflict with our own.

Now if these things be so, and there is no one who has studied the subject who will not admit that I have not exaggerated the result of embarking upon the long and bitter war which Mr. Chamberlain deprecated three years ago, are we not justified in asking whether, even if we have moral justification for slaying our brother Boer, we can pretend that we are justified as a matter of policy in facing such enormous perils and incurring such gigantic expenditure for the accomplishment of that purpose?

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## CHAPTER XII.

### HOW PEACE MAY BE PRESERVED.

READING over in cold blood the series of despatches which have been exchanged between the British and Transvaal authorities, it is difficult to conceive any controversy on which a settlement could be more easily arrived at. It is not very difficult to point out how peace may be preserved, the one difficulty of the situation is ended; for how is it that every road

that led towards peace should have been persistently barred?

Broadly speaking, the result of the negotiations between Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger come to this—that everything Sir Alfred Milner asked, and more than everything that he asked, was conceded by President Kruger on three conditions, every one of which could be accepted and ought to be accepted. To take the last first, there is the question of arbitration. It is almost incredible that a Government which has achieved no little renown before all the world for its strenuous advocacy of the cause of arbitration at the Hague should have failed to hail with effusive gratitude the repeated appeal to President Kruger for the establishment of a tribunal of arbitration for the settlement of future difficulties between us and the Transvaal. Instead of doing this—they did not, it is true, reject the proposal—they merely said that they were willing to discuss it, which is a very half-hearted way of meeting a person who asks you to accept your own favourite prescription.

As to the first condition, there seems to be a substantial agreement between both parties. The Transvaal asked that "Her Majesty's Government should agree that the present intervention should not form a precedent for future similar action, and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic should take place," to which Mr. Chamberlain replied:—"Her Majesty's Government cannot debar themselves from their rights under the Conventions, nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilised power to protect its subjects in a foreign country from injustice." To this the Transvaal Government replied: "This Government has neither asked nor intended that Her Majesty's Government should abandon any right which it really might have on the ground either of the Convention of London (1884) or of international law, to intervene for the protection of British subjects in this country." The only difference between them is that Mr. Chamberlain speaks of the "Conventions," whereas the Transvaal Government rightly confined themselves to the Convention of 1884, which is the only one in existence. Mr. Chamberlain's use of the plural is apparently intended to raise from the dead the ghost of the Convention of 1881, the preamble of which it is now pretended did not go the way of all the clauses which followed; but that brings us directly to the only real question which is at issue between the two Governments, viz.: the

question of suzerainty, for the only reason why the pretence is made that the preamble of the Convention of 1881 continues to exist, although all the rest of the Convention has perished, is because of the reference it contains to the suzerainty of the Crown. If, therefore, we can get rid of the question of the suzerainty, there is no longer any reason for the fiction that the preamble of 1881 is still in existence. It is argued that the preamble of the Convention of 1881 must be regarded as still in existence because there is no clause in the Convention of 1884 conceding self-government to the Transvaal. It is argued, therefore, that as the Transvaal has self-government, the preamble of 1881 must remain as the only legal instrument by which its right to self-government is recognised. But this legal instrument contains also the clause "subject to suzerainty." Therefore the suzerainty is indissolubly tied up with the grant of self-government. This is an ingenious piece of legal pedantry, but it is a mere cobweb that need not detain for a moment the serious statesmen who are endeavouring to fit phrases to facts and not facts to phrases.

The question of suzerainty is dealt with at such length by Sir William Harcourt in his speech, the salient portions of which are reproduced in another chapter, that it is not necessary to go over the same ground again. Suffice it to say that Mr. Chamberlain has laid down as one of the great principles which should govern South African policy that we should not worry ourselves about phrases, but stick to facts, and that Sir Alfred Milner has declared that the question of suzerainty is etymological rather than political. Etymologically it is no doubt true that any limitation upon the sovereignty of one State by another entitles that other to regard itself as the suzerain of the former. The word "suzerainty" was deliberately excised from the Convention of 1884, because, as Lord Derby explained, it was a vague word, likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding. The substance of suzerainty was kept strictly defined by being limited to a right to veto any negotiations into which the dependent State might enter with foreign Powers. But to this substance of suzerainty the Transvaal Government takes no exception. The Boers do not wish to alter or amend the Convention of 1884. They did not even ask us to define afresh the fact that our suzerainty never had any existence excepting in so far as it limited their sovereign right to conclude treaties

with whom they pleased. They only asked that Her Majesty's Government should not insist further upon the assertion of the suzerainty, and that the controversy on the subject should be tacitly allowed to drop. This surely is a very reasonable and simple suggestion. It does not ask that we should declare the suzerainty non-existent, but merely that we should not further insist on the assertion of the suzerainty, which is a mere matter of words, for they do not in the least object to our exercise of its substance.

It would therefore seem that the whole quarrel which threatens to convulse South Africa with a long and bitter civil war turns upon the question whether or not we will "further insist upon the assertion" of our right to use an etymological expression, our right to exercise the substance that is implied by that expression being absolutely uncontested.

What could have been simpler if men were swayed, I do not say by fraternal feeling or by Christian sentiment, but even by most ordinary commonsense, than to ask President Kruger to renew his offer of August 19th and for us to accept it as it stands? By this means we should, as Sir Alfred Milner declares, have struck at the root of all these injuries of which the Uitlanders complain; we should have secured a more liberal settlement than we ventured to ask for; we should not have parted with a single iota or a fractional part of the substance of our paramount position in South Africa; we should have preserved everything and maintained everything on one condition—at the cost of what? The sacrifice of an etymological expression which ruffles the susceptibilities of our Boer brothers. Surely never have two States stood confronting each other in arms, ready to drench the battlefield with human blood over a question of such tenuity that it requires the training of a schoolman to appreciate its significance. The momentous subject upon which they used to debate in the middle ages as to how many angels could dance upon the point of a needle is about as practical and as serious and as capable of a satisfactory solution as the question whether or not the ghost of a verbal suzerainty should be allowed to walk after the Convention in which it is mentioned has expired. Hence, therefore, if peace is to be preserved, all that need be done is to make an etymological sacrifice to secure an immense political advantage.

That is one way out. Another is to accept the seven years' franchise which Mr. Chamberlain recognised as a real advance upon

previous proposals in which we hoped to find the basis of a satisfactory settlement.

He proposed a Joint Commission to inquire into the conditions of the new law. The Boers objected at first, but they have now accepted it. Why not make this tardy acceptance of the Joint Commission the basis for a settlement?

But there is no difficulty about finding means of preserving the peace. There is more difficulty in finding out how to force the Boers, who have conceded almost everything we asked, into the war which they have done their best to avoid.

The only danger is that President Kruger may fail to keep his young Boers in hand. There are in the Transvaal, strange and melancholy though the fact may be, men as reckless, as passionate, and as blind to the ultimate results of their actions as our young Boers of the *Daily Mail*. They see the military cordon gradually tightening round their frontier. They believe what our war party tells them, that war is inevitable, and that Mr. Chamberlain has determined at any cost to pick a quarrel with Mr. Kruger in order to get an excuse to annex the Transvaal. Why, they say, should we wait to be strangled?

But even if they get out of hand and make a dash for positions of vantage outside their frontier, still there need be no war, there must be no war.

We look to Lord Salisbury to keep the peace—even then.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE PRAYER THAT WE DARE NOT PRAY.

IF we go to war with the Boers upon any or all of the pretexts now put forward by those who are clamouring for the slaying of our Brother Boer, there is one prayer which henceforth we dare not pray. It is an old prayer, a familiar prayer, the one prayer which our ancestors always used in times of trial and peril when they made appeal to the Lord of Hosts by the ordeal of battle. That prayer—need I name it—is

### GOD DEFEND THE RIGHT!

It is a prayer which, if we go to war with the Boers, so long as the war lasts no one dare pray who on the survey of the evidence

contained in the foregoing pages shares my conviction that in appealing to the sword in this crisis Britain is in the wrong.

We may, of course, be mistaken. We make no claim to political infallibility. The grounds of our conviction have been plainly stated with due reference in chapter and verse to the authorities upon whose evidence as experts we have gone. On those facts we see no way of escape from the conclusion that we have no warrant, divine or human, to slay a single Boer, to say nothing of organising the slaughter of thousands. War, if it takes place, will be, it seems to us, on our side unjustifiable homicide on a colossal scale, wilful murder deliberately resorted to in order to slake the passion of revenge or minister to the lust for aggrandisement. And God's blessing on that enterprise we dare not invoke.

Let there be no mistake about this matter. While admitting fully and unreservedly that there may be many persons who honestly and conscientiously can say that, after a careful study of the whole situation, they do sincerely believe that they have received from the Almighty an imperative mandate to imbrue their hands in their brothers' blood, the real motive force in favour of war in this country has no such moral backing. Talk to any one in the street, listen to after-dinner speeches, and read the outpourings of the Jingo press, and the truth is plain, palpable, and unmistakable. The average man hates the Boers; he cherishes a revengeful grudge for Majuba; he covets the Naboth's vineyard of the goldfields, he is swollen with a spirit of Imperial pride. We see around most of the seven deadly sins urging us to war. Hatred, revenge, covetousness, pride, these are the open and undisguised mainsprings of the agitation for war. It is these unholy and impious passions which are overpowering the wills and darkening the judgment of the crowds which cheer the departing troops, and of the journalists who hound us on to war. But for their aid, the few serious students of public affairs who on public and moral grounds, feel convinced that in this crisis they owe no higher duty to God and man than to cut their brothers' throats, would be utterly powerless to deflect British policy from the paths of peace into the ways of war.

If this be so, and I doubt whether even Mr. Chamberlain himself would deny it, how dare we pray for the blessing of God on such an enterprise? So far as nine-tenths of its supporters are concerned, this threatened

war is prompted not by Christian virtues but by those sentiments of hatred, revenge, and pride which, if there be any truth in any religion, to say nothing of that of Christ, cannot be entertained without sin or indulged without peril. Those who conscientiously differ from us on the main question, may not shrink from the allies who alone render their policy possible. But even they may well pause and consider that a man is known by the company he keeps, and that a policy which manifestly attracts all the unregenerate elements of our nature to its support should be doubly suspect.

Each of us has his own responsibility. Mine weighs heavily upon me in this crisis. I have been, and still I hope will be, the personal friend of the leading actors in this grave tragedy. So far as man may serve his fellow man I have to the best of my poor ability striven to serve the cause of the British Empire in South Africa in days when many of the roystering rowdies who yell for war regarded Africa and things African as unworthy of notice. My record for loyalty to my friends, to Mr. Rhodes, and to Sir Alfred Milner is unimpeached and unimpeachable. Nor do I deny that in the case of both these men, political loyalty is reinforced by a warm and lasting personal affection. I am no extreme partizan of peace at any price. I am certainly on eulogist of the Boers. I recognise the sacred right of insurrection. I believe that taxation without representation is tyranny, and I have defended and excused Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain for their preparations to secure the success of the anticipated insurrection in Johannesburg, and which were so lamentably marred by the rash precipitancy of Dr. Jameson. But I cannot, I dare not, I will not follow their lead on the present occasion. With all my endeavours to force my conscience to acquiesce in the policy which Sir Alfred recommends, I cannot do it. Sore at heart and with deep regret I feel myself bound not merely to sever myself from my old comrade, but to do my uttermost to evoke such an expression of public opinion in this country as will peremptorily bar the way to war.

For the war with which we are threatened has no justification in the laws of God or man—a war impolitic, unnecessary, and unjust. In such a war who dare pray

GOD DEFEND THE RIGHT!

Were I to make such a prayer what would it mean?

It would mean that I prayed Almighty God, the Lord of Hosts and God of Battles to defend the Boers against my own countrymen. It would be a cry to Heaven that the British forces should meet with a series of new Majubas culminating in an overwhelming crushing catastrophe — an Imperial Sedan.

If "God defend the right!" then the Boers will be victorious in defending their independence against our aggression. For, as was said by them of old time, "there is no restraint to the Lord to save by many or by few."

It is a question for deep heart searchings for all of us whether, if this war breaks out, we ought not, despite it all, continue to pray that God would defend the right, even although we know that if He made bare His arm, the invading armies of Britain would be scattered as chaff before the whirlwind. For terrible as defeat would be, and perilous to our prestige, the failure of a great Empire to subdue a handful of herdsmen; nevertheless, it might be a less peril, a minor evil than the consequences of a campaign of triumphant wrong. Better a thousand times that wrongdoing should be followed by exemplary punishment than that our people should take to heart the devil's lesson that might is right and that it does not matter how unjust our cause so long as we have the stronger battalions. For in that case the passing victory over the Transvaal would be but the stepping-stone to a disaster in which the Empire might be overthrown.

"Till now," wrote Mr. Reitz, the Transvaal Secretary of State, "I have always had a certain amount of respect for the British Empire on account of its great traditions and the glorious part it has played for centuries in the policy of Europe. But the policy it has followed in South Africa for the last fifty years is nothing but an attempt to obtain Naboth's vineyard at any cost. I believe in an Almighty God and a God who is just, and unless this British nation repents at the eleventh hour, then shall this vast empire on which the sun never sets go the way of those other empires which preceded it—the Medes, the Persians, the Roman Empire, and Napoleon."

Who is there who with Mr. Reitz believes in an Almighty God and a God who is just, can shrink from his conclusion?

"God!—who cares about God" is the practical response of the coarse average sensual politician. "God has no vote! That kind of baby-talk may do for the Boers, but not

for the enlightened citizens of the British Empire!" So in effect they say by their every act and deed. But God Almighty is not an Outlander in His own Universe. Nor is the law changed by which the nations which forget God are turned into Hell—a very real Hell is this very modern world.

If we slay our brother Boer with no better warrant than a desire to wipe out Majuba or seize the Gold-fields, we sink to the level of the cut-throat and the buccaneer, and we shall not long have to wait for the vengeance and the doom. War is popular, says Mr. Chamberlain's journalistic troupe and with a hurricane of huzzas, we may be launched into this great crime. What does it matter? A few thousand Boers will die in defence of their fatherland, but the Union Jack will fly once more over Pretoria, and South Africa which might have been an Australia will become another Ireland, a millstone tied around our neck, the only disaffected province in the whole of our Colonial Empire. Our General Mercier would have triumphed over his Transvaal Dreyfus, and from the censurers of his journalistic acolytes would go up as strong incense the flattering words proclaiming a great triumph of Imperial statesmanship. They think they can ignore considerations of justice and of right.

But the Destinies think not so; to their judgment chamber lone  
Comes no voice of popular clamour, there Fame's trumpet is not blown.  
Your majorities they reek not; that you grant, but then you say  
That you differ with them somewhat—which is stronger, you or they?  
Patient are they as the insects that build islands in the deep;  
They hurl not the bolted thunder, but then silent may they keep;  
Where they have been that we know, where Empires towered that were not just,  
Lo! the skulking wild fox scratches in a little heap of dust.

## CHAPTER XIV.

WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO?

I CONCLUDE this hurriedly compiled pamphlet by a direct personal appeal to every one who reads these pages.

What are you going to do?

Despite all the bullying clack of widely circulated newspapers, despite the paralysed

impotence of the Opposition, I have sufficient faith in the deep ingrained piety of my countrymen to feel assured that when once they realise the real nature of the controversy by which they are being dragged into a wanton and unnecessary war, they will peremptorily forbid the perpetration of so heinous a crime.

But the sands are running out in the hour-glass and in a few days it may be too late.

We still believe that we are a self-governing people. We still imagine that the British democracy has some right to be heard before Ministers of the Crown, commit the Empire to war. Parliament is not sitting. The House of Commons has never approved a policy of war against the Dutch of South Africa. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, as I have shown in a preceding chapter, has repeatedly and solemnly declared that the policy of the Government was in almost every point diametrically opposed to the policy which is now hurrying us into war. Sir Edward Clarke, the most eminent Conservative out of office, has expressed moderately what we have a right to expect before the irrevocable step has been taken.

"I cannot imagine it possible that Ministers would take the responsibility of advising the Crown to declare war against the South African Republic in enforcement of a policy which has not yet been announced or even formulated without taking the proper means of ascertaining whether that policy has the approval and support of the people of the United Kingdom. There may be reasons, not yet apparent, which would justify war with the Transvaal, but we have a right to know them before we are committed to such a war."

Not only have we a right to know these as yet unknown "reasons," but it is our imperative duty to declare that until such reasons are produced and are approved by Parliament as overwhelming and unanswerable, Ministers shall not take another step in the direction of war.

But I am not so much concerned about this as about the individual duty of each of us private citizens who have been suddenly roused to a sense of the imminent peril in which we stand of being committed to an unjust and an unnecessary war. Put not your trust in princes, it was said in old days when princes ruled. Put not your trust in Members of Parliament is the variant suited to our own times. It is never from the representatives but always from their constituents that we have to look for an expression of the will of the people, and especially for the utterance of the deep earnest convictions which time and again have arrested rulers

bent upon wicked wars, have preserved the nation from bloodguiltiness and the Empire from immeasurable disaster.

This is no mere matter of party politics. I rejoice to believe that there are, among Ministers of the Crown, men with as deep an abhorrence of the crime which is contemplated in South Africa as any one in the Empire, from our gracious Sovereign, whose reign must not be sullied by so foul a stain, down to the poorest of her faithful subjects who night and day pray in an agony of supplication that we may not be allowed to imbrue our hands in our brothers' blood. But the forces which press for war are mobilised and loudly articulate. Those which long for peace are without organization, and the still small voice of reason is drowned in the brazen clangour of preparations for war.

It rests with us private citizens, each to the full measure of our own capacity and influence, to exert ourselves to the uttermost to avert the threatened war. Woe be unto each of us if in this supreme moment we ignore the appeal which rings trumpet-tongued through the land to be up and doing before the fatal die is cast which dooms us to war.

War, it cannot too constantly be repeated, is either the most inexorable of all duties, or it is the most ghastly of all crimes. What we need now is earnest, serious, sober thinking as to whether for such a war we can say that we are absolutely certain that there is no other way of dealing with our Brother Boer excepting by cutting his throat. Read for yourselves the facts of the controversy, and ask, as before the Judgment seat of God, whether the difference between five and seven years' term of residence before enfranchisement is adequate cause to let loose upon South Africa the incalculable horrors of civil and servile war.

A thousand causes, each affecting the welfare of far more fellow-creatures than all the Outlanders ten times told, are crying unheeded for the thought, the treasure, and the energy that will be wasted on the slaughtering our Brother Boers. It is easy to begin a war, but the end who can see? Our Empire is not so well beloved by all its neighbours that we can afford to dissipate in the subjugation of another and more distant Dutch Ireland the meagre resources of our military strength.

If after due consideration you, my reader, are convinced that there is no just cause for war, if you come to the conclusion that you have no mandate from God or man to slay your Brother Boer, then in God's name give neither rest to your limbs nor slumber to

your eyelids till you have done the utmost that in you lies to rouse your fellow-citizens to a sense of their peril.

Ministers of the Prince of Peace, leaders of labour organizations, representatives of all those who in any way are able to influence or to rouse the attention of their fellow-men, now is the time to speak. To-morrow it may be too late!

It is not necessary for me to enter into details as to how you can bring your personal influence to bear.

If you cannot secure public protest by your fellow-townsmen in public meeting assembled, you can write to your Member of Parliament, your newspaper editor, and your minister of religion. There are a thousand ways in which you could and would make your influence felt, if you realised that you yourself individually may have to stand with hands reeking with your brother's blood before the judgment seat of God.

What is wanted more than anything else is action, prompt, energetic, unceasing action, to bring the facts before the nation at large. By tongue, by pen, by the distribution of printed matter, no means should be left untried to avert the threatened doom.

If before his duty man with listless spirit stands,  
Ere long the great Avenger take the task from out  
his hands.

Will you help? If so, set about it at once, and if you don't know how, and want direction, write to—

THE SECRETARY OF THE  
TRANSVAAL COMMITTEE,

Offices at— *St. Ermin's Mansions,  
Westminster, S.W.,*

And at— *49, Spring Gardens,  
Manchester,*

for pamphlets and information.

## AFTER HIS RETURN FROM AFRICA.

So good an authority as Dr. Lionel S. Beale is of the opinion that a large share of the best work of the world is done by bilious persons. They are also, he thinks, for the most part long lived. Some physicians who examine applicants for life insurance are said to prefer bilious risks—so to term them. Now if this *be true* it can be explained only on the theory that bilious people take better care of themselves than others do. And even that is doubtful. At all events, I undertake to affirm that there is not a single sufferer of this sort who would not be glad to get rid of his trouble even if it shortened his life and lowered his wages. And (what is more) I don't believe for a minute that it would have that result. Give me a good digestion and a sound liver—all the doctors and insurance offices to the contrary notwithstanding.

And so thinks the author of the subjoined statement, who speaks from a ripe experience in the matter. "I was always a strong, healthy man," he says, "up to January, 1884, when upon my return from South Africa I began to sicken. At first I was taken with vomiting bile every three or four weeks, and later in the autumn the attacks became more frequent. For days and days I did nothing but retch and vomit. I had no desire to eat, and the little food I took gave me excruciating pain at my chest, and a gnawing sensation at the pit of the stomach. My mouth tasted like rotten eggs and was full of black, slimy matter. For weeks at a time I retched and strained to clear this dirty slime from my throat and stomach.

"I lost flesh rapidly, and became so weak and emaciated I was only a shadow of my former self. I had great pain and trouble in passing my kidney secretion; it was thick as milk. I also had great pain at my back and around the heart. I lay in bed for five days, doing nothing but shake. I trembled from head to foot—the very bed shaking under me. For days I never touched a morsel of food.

"In this half-dead, half-alive state I continued year after year, being so weak and helpless that I had to use a stick to enable me to hobble about the house; and I lost all the pleasures of life. A doctor at Mortlake attended me from time to time and gave me medicines, but after spending several pounds I gave up his treatment, as I got no better. I then saw another doctor, and afterwards, in September, 1885, I went to St. Thomas's Hospital, where I was an indoor

patient for ten days. Getting no proper relief I went to the Brompton Consumptive Hospital, where they gave me cod liver oil and other medicines. The doctor said it was my liver, and that I was inclined to be consumptive. After six weeks I left off going, as the medicine did me no good. Cold, clammy sweats at this time broke over me. I was bathed in them, and in the morning was too exhausted to dress. My condition was now deplorable, and all who saw me thought I could not live much longer. My face was *like a corpse*, I was as *thin as a rake*, my eyes sunken and eyelids drawn. Even my wife lost all hope of my recovering.

"In January, 1894, a book was left at my house, and my wife read about a man at Southsea having been cured by Mother Seigel's Syrup after the doctors had given him up. As many of his symptoms were like mine I consented to try this medicine, and sent to Messrs. Coppin Bro.'s Stores at Richmond for a supply. After taking the first bottle I found myself better. I could enjoy my food and the pain was easier. This gave me confidence to persevere with the medicine, and when I had taken three bottles I was able to go to work. I have taken twelve small bottles in all, and *can now eat anything*, and am free from all pain. *I can walk five or six miles and can work from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. without being fatigued or tired.*" (Signed) A. CHESTER, 6, Ellenor Cottages, Stanley Road, East Sheen, Richmond, Surrey.

Mr. Chester's statement is made under the Statutory Declaration Act of 1835, and will be published elsewhere in that form with fuller comment than is possible in this brief article. A more striking case, or a more impressive illustration of the power of the well-known remedy that wrought so complete a cure, cannot be conceived. The liver is one of the most important organs concerned with the digestive process, collaborating, as it does, directly with the stomach and kidneys, both in nourishing the body and in removing the waste products from the system. One of its chief functions is to take from the blood the collection of acids called the bile, and expel it by means of the bowels. This failing, the whole body is filled with virulent poisons, as in Mr. Chester's case. And to accomplish this work, and to renew the vigour of the liver, nothing yet known compares with Mother Seigel's Syrup.

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
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**WELL!** The writer may be correct about many testimonials, but he is wrong about Blickensderfers. We have never paid one penny to any writer of a testimonial to the Blickensderfer Typewriter. We have hundreds of them, and we don't think better could be had for paying for them. Besides that, we have our machines giving perfect satisfaction in the hands of countless other people who have never given any testimonial, and would not do so whatever they were paid.

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**£7 10s.**

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
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They insist upon having it.

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
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
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Arthur Guinness, Sons & Co., Limited, Brewers, Dublin,	{ had in 1897 } { They now use }	about 7 typewriters of various makes. <u>over 30 Royal Bar-Lock Visible-Writing Typewriters.</u>
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The Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies	{ had in 1894 } { They now use }	about 6 typewriters of various makes. <u>over 30 Royal Bar-Lock Visible-Writing Typewriters.</u>
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