

417.3 (25/1)

Contact "Day"

**VOORLOPIGE ONDERSOEK NA INFORMELE
VESTIGING IN STELLENBOSCH**

**DEPARTEMENT BEPLANNING EN ONTWIKKELING
MUNISIPALITEIT STELLENBOSCH
FEBRUARIE 1993**

1. INLEIDING

Die proses van verstedeliking skep 'n vraag na toepaslike behuisung vir mense wat na die stedelike gebiede trek. Diegene wat nie behuisung kan vind wat hulle sak pas nie het die keuse om akkommodasie met ander te deel of om skuilings van hul eie op te rig. Die tekort aan formele behuisung en die omvang van oorbewolking in bestaande woongebiede is sodanig dat die ontwikkeling van informele nedersettings onafwendbaar is.

Sedert 1983 is die Staat besig om stelselmatig te onttrek aan die voorsiening van behuisung en die verantwoordelikheid oor te skuif na die privaatsektor. Alhoewel dit aanvaar word dat 'n wye spektrum behuisung voorsien moet word om die verskillende vlakke van bekostigbaarheid aan te spreek, voorsien die privaatsektor nie behuisung wat die armste mense in die gemeenskap pas nie. Die privaatsektor se vermoë om dit te doen word aan bande gelê deur 'n aantal faktore soos onder andere die beskikbaarheid van goedkoop grond, die beskikbaarheid van finansiering en ontoepaslike standaarde.

Die ontwikkeling van informele nedersettings is nie 'n proses wat uniek aan Suid-Afrika is nie. Dit vind oral in die Derde Wêreld plaas. Dit regverdig nie die onvoorwaardelike aanvaarding van die proses nie, maar dui daarop dat informele nedersettings aanvaar moet word as 'n belangrike en permanente komponent van die residensiële sektor en dat die hoofrolspelers op 'n positiewe wyse betrek moet word.

Belangrike aanvoerwerk en navorsing is reeds op die gebied van informele behuisung gedoen en die Departement Beplanning en Ontwikkeling van Stellenbosch Munisipaliteit is nie van voorneme om die wiel oor te ontwerp nie. Derhalwe gaan daar in hierdie verslag tot 'n groot mate gesteun word op dokumentasie van instellings en organisasies wat op hierdie terrein werksaam is. Hierdie dokumentasie kan beskikbaar gestel word aan enige persoon wat 'n meer volledige studie van die onderwerp wil maak.

Die doel van hierdie verslag is nie om met kitsoplossings vir die probleem van plakkery of lae koste behuisung vorendag te kom nie, maar om die tafel te dek vir 'n beplanningsproses waar verskillende moontlike strategieë met die gemeenskap onderhandel kan word en wat hopenlik sal uitloop op oplossings waaroor daar algemene konsensus bestaan.

In die lig van 'n gebrek aan inligting oor die informele bewoners in Kaya Mandi, was die Departement genoodsaak om te kyk na die bevindings van studies wat die Stedelike Stigting in die PWV en die RGN in die Hottentots-Hollandkom gedoen het. 'n Soortgelyke studie ten opsigte van die informele bewoners in Kaya Mandi sal natuurlik steeds van groot waarde wees in die toekomstige beplanning vir lae koste behuisung.

In hierdie verslag word daar derhalwe eerstens gekyk na die bevindings en uitgangspunte van die Stedelike Stigting, die ANC en die RGN na aanleiding van intensiewe studies wat onderneem is. Tweedens word die situasie in Kaya Mandi deeglik ontleed na aanleiding van die Struktuurplanondersoek van Makroplan en derdens word daar kortliks gekyk na grondbeskikbaarheid in en rondom Stellenbosch.

2. BEVINDINGS EN UITGANGSPUNTE VAN DIE STEDELIKE STIGTING

Bron: Policies for a New Urban Future : Informal Housing : Part 1 - The Current Situation, Augustus 1991.

2.1 *Bevindings uit die PWV - studie (Oktober 1987 - Maart 1990)*

(a) Die volgende statistieke is besonder insiggewend:

- Bykans 60 % van die totale aantal wonings vir Swartes is informeel. Hiervan is 86 % agterplaasstrukture of buitegeboue en die res strukture in vrystaande nedersettings (groeperings informele strukture wat op vakante grond in en om formele dorpe opgerig is).
 - Die totale aantal strukture in vrystaande nedersettings in die PWV het toegeneem van 28 500 in November 1987 tot 49 200 in die laaste maande van 1989. Die bevolking in hierdie areas het met 300 % toegeneem oor 'n tydperk van twee jaar.
 - Huishoudings in vrystaande nedersettings het in 1990 'n gemiddelde maandelikse inkomste van R450 verdien. Hierteenoor was die gemiddelde maandelikse inkomste van huishoudings in agterplaasstrukture en buitegeboue R750 en dié in formele huise R900.
 - Die maandelikse spandering op akkommodasie van huishoudings in vrystaande nedersettings was R1,00 teenoor R36 van dié in agterplaasstrukture.
 - Tussen 1987 en 1989 is daar in terme van werklike getalle meer informele strukture in agterplase opgerig as in vrystaande areas.
- (b) Die volgende belangrike gevolgtrekkings spruit uit die studie voort:-
- Om inwoners van informele nedersettings te brandmerk as 'n werklose, polities - onstabiele en parasitiese groep wat van die platteland na die stede gestroom het, veral ná die afskaffing van instromingsbeheer, is moontlik in sekere gevalle geldig, maar die *werklikheid is baie meer kompleks*.
 - Verder is die beeld van 'n algemene toestand van armoede vals. Daar is inderdaad 'n *duidelike sosio-ekonomiese hiërargie* onder die PWV se informele behuisingstipes (agterplaasstrukture, vrystaande skuilings en buitegeboue). Die laagste sosio-ekonomiese vlakke word by die inwoners van vrystaande skuilings gevind.
 - Van al die inwoners van informele nedersettings in die PWV is 49 % in die PWV gebore en in verdere 22 % in ander stedelike gebiede. Altesaam 72 % van die informele bewoners woon vir tien jaar of langer in die PWV.
 - Daar is egter tekens dat 'n groeiende aantal bewoners van informele behuising in die PWV nuwe in-migrante is.
 - Die belangrikste redes waarom mense in informele toestande woon is *behuisingstekorte, bekostigbaarheid en 'n begeerte na ruimte en selfstandigheid*. Die feit dat die meeste informele nedersettings naby groot werksplekke voorkom beklemtoon die belangrikheid van *nabyheid aan werksgeleenthede*.
 - Alhoewel huishoudings in informele behuising oor die algemeen 'n laer inkomste het as dié in formele behuising, is dit opmerklik dat die *vlakke van werkloosheid* nie hoër is in die informele areas nie. 23 % van die steekproef in die ouderdomsgroep 18 - 65 in formele behuising het aktief werk gesoek teenoor 21 %, 20 % en 16 % in agterplaasstrukture, vrystaande skuilings en buitegeboue onderskeidelik. Daar kan dus geargumenteer word dat informele bewoners tot 'n groot mate deel van die stedelike ekonomie is.

- Soos by sosio-ekonomiese vlakke is daar 'n duidelike hiërargie in die *onderwys- en bekwaamheidsvlak* sigbaar onder die PWV se informele behuisingstipes. Die hoogste vlakke van ongeskoolde word by die inwoners van vrystaande skuilings gevind (41 % van hierdie inwoners wat wel werk het is ongeskoolde). In teenstelling met die persepsie dat informele bewoners 'n eenvormige verarmde gemeenskap is wat op die kant van die stedelike ekonomie leef, is die informele bevolking net so heterogeen en ekonomies-geïntegreerd as die formele bevolking. Die belangrikste verskille tussen die informele en formele bevolkings lê in onderwys-, bekwaamheids-, beroeps- en inkomstevlakke.
- (b) Alhoewel die bevindings van die PWV-studie nie in die algemeen op ander gebiede in die land toegepas kan word nie, is die bevindings ten opsigte van die oorsprong van informele bewoners en die relatiewe armoedevlak van die inwoners in vrystaande nedersettings waarskynlik algemeen geldig.

2.2 *Belangrike uitgangspunte van die Stedelike Stigting*

- (a) Dit is belangrik dat die krisis-gedrewe selfhelp-pogings van huishoudings wat desperaat is om 'n dak oor hul kop te kry *nie geromantiseer word nie*. In baie gevalle word daar grootskaalse ontbering ondervind in die lig van struikelblokke soos onsekerheid oor eiendomsreg, 'n gebrek aan finansiering en die afwesigheid van basiese tegniese advies en bystand. Aan die anderkant is dit so dat informele behuising 'n konstruktiewe antwoord op die behuisingkrisis in Suid-Afrika is.
- (b) 'n Belangrike kenmerk van informele nedersettings is die algemene *gebrek aan mag en kwesbaarheid* van die inwoners. Hulle is dikwels uitgesluit van formele politieke en sosiale strukture en hul belange is swak verteenwoordig.
- (c) Die verskynsel van informele nedersetting word ernstig benadeel deur veelvuldige bronne van *potensiële en werklike konflik*. Dit is daarom van kritieke belang dat die politieke konteks van informele vestiging in ag geneem word en dat meganismes vir konflikhantering ondersoek word. Konflik manifesteer op ses terreine:
 - Konflik tussen faksies binne die informele nedersettings;
 - Konflik met formele woongebiede;
 - Konflik met hostelbewoners;
 - Konflik met hoë inkomste bure;
 - Konflik met owerhede; en
 - Konflik tussen owerhede en hoë inkomste inwoners.
- (d) Formele behuisingprogramme kon nie daarin slaag om huise te voorsien teen die skaal en tempo wat vereis word nie. Die huise wat voorsien is, was meestal te duur vir die mense wie veronderstel was om dit te bekom. Verder het geen enkele sektor die hulpbronne om die behuisingagterstand en toekomstige vraag aan te spreek nie.
- (e) Informele behuising is 'n *belangrike en permanente* komponent van die residensiële sektor. Beleid en standpunte wat geskoei is op die *formele* huisvesting van al of die meeste van hierdie mense sal tot 'n vergelyk moet kom met die skaal en werklikhede van die probleem.

- (f) Gemeenskapsdeelname is 'n essensiële komponent van die soeke na oplossings vir die behuisingsvraagstuk. In hierdie beplanningsproses is dit belangrik dat gemeenskappe (veral informele gemeenskappe) effektief georganiseer word met die oog op deelname.

3 BEVINDINGS EN UITGANGSPUNTE VAN DIE ANC

Bron: A Summary of the proceedings of the Housing Workshop hosted by the ANC-Department of Economic Policy, Soweto, September 1991.

3.1 Definiëring van behuising en die elemente daarvan

Daar is twee maniere om na die begrip "behuising" te kyk:

- Dit kan as 'n *fisiese produk* gesien word, ruimtelik gevestig, 'n kommoditeit wat vir wins verkoop word; of
- dit kan as 'n *proses* gesien word wat verskeie fasette het en verskillende betekenis vir verskillende mense inhou.

As behuising as 'n proses gesien word, kan dit die volgende inhou:

- (a) Behuising behoort aan die bewoners 'n gevoel van *sekuriteit* en *permanensie* te bied, met ander woorde dat hy/sy nie forseer sal word om te skuif nie. Dit kan op verskeie maniere bewerkstellig word - nie noodwendig net deur eiendomsbesit nie.
- (b) 'n Persoon moet weet dat hy/sy die *koste van behuising* kan bybring, veral diegene wat ongereeld inkomste ontvang. Nadat 'n persoon vir sy behuising betaal het, moet daar nog genoeg geld beskikbaar wees vir basiese behoeftes soos kos en klere.
- (c) Behuising moet *toereikende skulling* en *behoorlike geriewe* soos water, sanitasie en energie verskaf op so 'n wyse dat dit nie die inwoners forseer om op noodsaaklike middele soos kos terug te sny nie.
- (d) Die *ligging* van 'n persoon se tuiste in verhouding tot sy werkplek en die koste van vervoer is kritiek vir so 'n persoon se oorlewing, veral diegene wat nie 'n vaste inkomste verdien nie. Toegang tot opvoedkundige, kulturele en ander gemeenskapsfasiliteite is ook baie belangrik.
- (e) Daar behoort 'n gevoel van trots en bevrediging by mense te wees ten opsigte van die plek waar hulle woon.
- (f) Behuising behoort as 'n *belegging* deur die inwoners gesien te word.
- (g) Behuising speel 'n belangrike rol in die "*empowering*" van gemeenskappe in die ontwikkelingsproses. Dit gebeur deur mense wat saamwerk op behuisingskwessies en die opbou van sterk gemeenskapsbaseerde organisasies.
- (h) Behuising kan 'n middel wees in die *herstrukturering* van apartheidsdorpe en - stede - om die arm deel van die bevolking nader aan die sakegebiede en werkplekke te bring en om die mense se toegang tot die hulpbronne van dorpe en stede te verbeter.

Aangeheg as AANHANGSEL 1 is 'n direkte uittreksel uit genoemde dokument wat die *elemente van behuising* uiteensit. Die vrae wat hier gevra word kan as 'n "check-list" dien wanneer beplanning vir laekostebehuising gedoen word. Dit behoort ook op gesamentlike forums waar behuisingskwessies bespreek word, aangespreek te word.

Aangeheg as AANHANGSEL 2 is 'n verdere direkte uittreksel uit genoemde dokument wat die verskillende moontlike tipes behuising uiteensit en kortliks ontleed.

4 BEVINDINGS EN UITGANGSPUNTE NA AANLEIDING VAN DIE HOTTENTOTS-HOLLANDKOM STUDIE

Bron: Squatting in the Hottentots Holland Basin : Perspectives on a South African Social Issue, RGN, 1992

4.1 Oorsprong en oorsake van informele vestiging in die Hottentots-Hollandkom

Daar word algemeen aanvaar dat die enorme toename in informele behuising in die Hottentots-Hollandkom 'n direkte gevolg is van die opheffing van instromingsbeheermaatreëls en dat die meerderheid van die inwoners vanaf onafhanklike state soos die Transkei en Ciskei kom. Die studie het egter getoon dat bykans twee-derdes van die persone wat ondervra is, in die Hottentots-Hollandkom gewoon het voordat hulle in informele nedersettings inbeweeg het. Die studie het die volgende bevind:-

- (a) 52 % van die informele bewoners is in die Transkei, Ciskei en Oos-Kaap gebore, 33 % in die Wes-Kaap en Kaapse Skiereiland (uitgesonderd die Hottentots-Hollandkom) en 14 % in die Hottentots-Hollandkom. Die meerderheid van die mense wat buite die Hottentots-Hollandkom gebore is, het egter eers na ander plekke in Kom getrek en vir 'n tyd lank daar gewoon voordat hulle in hul huidige woonplek ingetrek het. Slegs 9 % kom *direk* van die Transkei en Ciskei.
- (b) 52 % van die informele bewoners woon reeds vir langer as vyf jaar in die Hottentots-Hollandkom en 31 % vir langer as tien jaar. Die gemiddelde tyd wat hierdie mense in die Kom woon is 9,4 jaar. Hierteenoor woon slegs 15 % van die informele bewoners vir langer as vyf jaar in die informele nedersettings en is die gemiddelde tyd wat die mense daar woon slegs 3,9 jaar.
- (c) Alhoewel migrasie van informele bewoners *na* die Hottentots-Hollandkom na 1985-86 toegeneem het, kan hierdie toename nie die fenomenale groei in informele nedersettings gedurende die afgelopen drie tot vier jaar verklaar nie. Anders gestel beteken dit dat die groei van informele nedersettings nie op sigself 'n akkurate aanduiding is van instroming na die Hottentots-Hollandkom nie, of van verstedeliking *per se* nie.

4.2 Redes vir informele vestiging

- (a) Ekonomiese of werkverwante kwessies het 'n groot rol gespeel in mense se keuse om informeel te vestig. 41 % van die mense wat ondervra is het hulle vorige woonplek verlaat as gevolg van redes soos afdankings, werkloosheid, swak besoldiging en afstand van werkplek.
- (b) Die ander hoofredes wat aangevoer is, is akkommodasieverwant. 50 % van die informele bewoners het redes aangevoer soos gebrek aan akkommodasie, uitsetting, familie-verwante probleme, oorbewoning, deur wet verplig om te skuif, gebrek aan privaatheid en onaangename/onveilige buurt.
- (c) Die belangrikste redes waarom mense 'n spesifieke informele nedersetting gekies het om in te woon is die volgende:
 - Geen ander heenkome (36 %)
 - Naby familie en vriende/beter toestande (23 %)

- Op soek na werk/naby werkplek (12 %)
- Wil onafhanklik weees/eie plek besit (9 %)

Interessant is dat slegs 8 % die plek gekies het omdat hulle daarvan of van die mense gehou het. Nog meer interessant is dat slegs 2 % bekostigbaarheid van informele behuising as hoofrede aangevoer het.

- (d) 61 % van die informele bewoners het aangedui dat hul huidige akkommodasie in 'n informele nedersetting 'n verbetering is op hul vorige akkommodasie. Slegs 28 % het dit as 'n stap agteruit gesien.

4.3 *Ekonomiese profiel*

- (a) 31 % van die ekonomies-aktiewe deel van die informele bevolking is werkloos. Dit dui daarop dat die werkloosheidskoers onder informele bewoners nie beduidend verskil van dié onder formele bewoners nie. 60 % van die ekonomies-aktiewe bevolking werk in die *formele sektor*. Dit laat slegs 9% wat in die informele sektor werksaam is.

- (b) Van *al* die inwoners-

- werk 25 % in die formele sektor;
- werk 7 % in beide die formele en informele sektor;
- werk 5 % in die informele sektor;
- is 7 % huisvroue;
- is 16 % werkloos; en
- is 38 % skoolgaande ouderdom of jonger.

- (c) Die belangrikste tipes werk wat deur die informele bewoners gedoen word is huishulp/char/skoonmaker (28 %), tuinwerker (13 %) en algemene werksman/handlanger (16 %). 90 % van die mense werk in die Hottentots-Hollandkom.
- (d) Die gemiddelde persoonlike inkomste van die hoof van die huishouding en gade is R454 per maand. Die gemiddelde huishoudingsinkomste is R528 per maand. Die studie het ook bevind dat daar gemiddeld 'n spaarvermoë van slegs R74 per maand per huishouding is wat beteken dat fondse vir opgradering of verbetering in behuising en lewensomstandighede uiters beperk is.

4.4 *Behoeftes en voorkeure van informele bewoners.*

- (a) Op 'n vraag watter drie gemeenskapsfasiliteite in hul nedersetting die nodigste is, is 'n gesondheidskliniek (82 %), 'n kerk (78 %) en 'n crèche (64 %) aangedui.
- (b) Meer as die helfte (53 %) van die huishoudings het geen toegang tot enige rioolverwyderingsgeriewe nie.
- (c) Verder het die studie getoon dat *lopende water* in die huis die grootste siviele diensbehoefte (uitgesonderd riolering) is. Die keuse was soos volg:
 - Lopende water in die huis (54 %)
 - Elektrisiteit in die huis (26 %)

- Groot genoeg erf om aan te bou (18 %)
 - Straatbeligting (2 %)
- (d) Die inwoners van informele nedersettings het meesal baie moeite gedoen om hul eie woonplek aantreklik en aangenaam te maak binne die beperkings waaraan hulle blootgestel is. Buitestaanders behoort dus nie 'n informele nedersetting bloot op grond van eksterne voorkoms te beoordeel nie, maar op grond van die vele maniere waarop informele families aanvaarbare interne omgewings genereer.
- (e) Die informele bewoners het baie lae verwagtings ten opsigte van kwessies soos status, gemak en outonomie. Buiten die vanselfsprekende gevolgtrekking dat informele bewoners baie weinig gemak en outonomie geniet, blyk dit dat die mense hul status in die gemeenskap as baie laag sien.

4.5 Opsommings

Aangeheg as **AANHANGSEL 3** is 'n direkte uittreksel uit genoemde dokument waarin die belangrikste kwessies opsommend bespreek word.

5. ANALISE VAN DIE OPSET IN KAYA MANDI

Bron: Kaya Mandi Development Plan : Final Motivation Report, Macroplan, Oktober 1992

5.1 Bevolkingsgrootte

Tabel 1 dui die werklike bevolkingsgrootte (1989) asook die benaderde geprojekteerde bevolkingsgroottes, soos deur Macroplan bepaal, aan.

TABEL 1: BEVOLKING

JAAR	WERKLIKE	GEPROJEKTEERDE	
	1989	1993	2010
BEVOLKING	6 500	8 000	11 700

Die natuurlike aanwas van die bevolking word buitengewoon laag op 1,5 % per jaar gestel weens die aanvaarde beleid van beperkte groei vir Stellenbosch. Hierteenoor word die verstedelikingstempo (na Kaapstad) op 2,4 % per jaar deur die Sentrale Statistiekdiens bereken. Laasgenoemde syfer is ook in ag geneem by die berekening van die verwagte bevolking in die jaar 2010.

Tabel 2 toon die verwagte bevolkingsgroei aan soos deur Macoplan geraam. Van belang is die onderskeid wat getref word tussen persone wat in 'n familieverband staan teenoor hostelbewoners.

TABEL 2: BEVOLKINGSPROEKSIE

JAAR	BEVOLKING BINNE GESINSVERBAND	HOSTEL- BEWONERS*	KUMULATIEWE BEVOLKING
1992	6 121	1 659	7 780
1993	6 399	1 567	7 966
1994	6 681	1 475	8 156
1995	6 968	1 383	8 351
1996	7 260	1 291	8 551
1997	7 555	1 199	8 754
1998	7 791	1 107	8 898
1999	8 095	1 015	9 110
2000	8 403	923	9 325
2005	10 015	463	10 478
2010	11 751	3	11 754

* Hostelbewoners neem met 92 per jaar af en word dus bygereken by die bevolking binne gesinsverband.

5.2 Vestiging van bestaande bevolking

Die bevolking van Kaya Mandi word tans gehuisves in enkelwooneenhede, hostelle en informele strukture. Tabel 3 toon die verhouding van die bevolking tot die behuisingskomponent aan soos in 1989 bepaal is.

TABEL 3: VERHOUDING TUSSEN BEVOLKING EN BEHUISSING : 1989

BEHUISINGSTIPE	BEVOLKING	PERSENTASIE
ENKELBEWONING	1 151	18 %
HOSTELLE	4 786	73 %
INFORMEEL	587	9 %
TOTAAL	6 524	100 %

Alhoewel die bevolking tussen 1989 en 1992 met slegs 1256 mense toegeneem het, verteenwoordig dit ten opsigte van Kaya Mandi 'n jaarlikse groei koers van 6,04 %. Verder is dit ook insiggewend hoe aansienlik die verdeling van die bevolking tussen die drie behuisingsstipes in dié tydperk verander het (Tabel 4).

TABEL 4 VERHOUDING TUSSEN BEVOLKING EN BEHUISSING: 1992

BEHUISINGSTIPE	BEVOLKING	PERSENTASIE
ENKELBEWONING	1 236	16 %
HOSTELLE	2 812	36 %
INFORMEEL	3 732	48 %
TOTAAL	7 780	100 %

5.3 Oorbewoning

Die verhouding tussen gesinsgrootte en huishoudingsgrootte gee 'n aanduiding of daar oorbewoning voorkom al dan nie. Tabel 5 weerspieël die situasie soos dit in 1989 bestaan uit.

TABEL 5: HUISHOUDINGS- EN GESINSGROOTTE : 1989

BEHUISINGSTIPE	HUISHOUDINGSGROOTTE	GESINSGROOTTE
ENKELWOON	7,8	5,5
HOSTELLE	3,3	3,3
INFORMEEL	7,0	5,0

5.4 Besikbaarheid van reeds gedienste en beplande erwe

Die beskikbaarheid van erwe word gekompliseer deur die feit dat die totale aantal erwe in 'n sekere gebied weergegee word alhoewel die grond reeds toegeken of bewoon is. Streng gesproke is sodanige grond dus nie "besikbaar" nie, maar word dit wel aangegee as deel van die totale voorraad.

Tabel 6 toon die aantal erwe in Kaya Mandi aan en tref onderskeid tussen die ligging, gediens of ongediens en bewoningstatus.

TABEL 6: BESKIKBAARHEID VAN ERWE

LIGGING	ERWE	DIENSTE	BEWONING	BESKIKBAAR
Bestaande Enkelwoon	302	gediens	bewoon	0
18,5 ha (fase 1)	195	gediens	onbewoon	195
1,9 ha	70	gediens	bewoon	0
Monde Crescent	20	gediens	bewoon	0
TOTAAL	587	-	-	195

Grond wat reeds vir ontwikkeling identifiseer is en eersdaags gediens sal word, word in tabel 7 aangetoon.

TABEL 7: BESKIKBARE ERWE (TOEKOMSTIG)

LIGGING	ERWE	DIENSTE	BEWONING	BESKIKBAAR
18,5 ha (fase 2)	242	on- gediens	onbewoon	242
Monde Cresent	76	on- gediens	bewoon	0
TOTAAL	318	-	-	242

5.5 Vraag na erwe

Die Struktuurplankonsultante neem aan dat die ideaal sal wees om die totale bevolking van Kaya Mandi in enkelwonings te vestig. In die praktyk sal ernstig besin moet word of dit wel haalbaar is. Indien 'n gedeelte wel in een of ander vorm van hoër digtheid behuising gehuisves sal word, sal die onderstaande berekenings aangepas moet word.

Die huidige vraag na erwe word deur Macroplan bepaal deur te bereken hoeveel gesinne uit hostelle en informele strukture hervestig sal moet word. Tydens die opstel van die struktuurplan was daar 751 informele strukture en 355 gesinne in hostelle - 'n totaal van 1106 erwe benodig.

Intussen het 225 informele strukture afgebrand wat 526 strukture oorgelaat het. Van die 225 huishoudings het 115 op die reeds gedienste 1,9 ha grond hervestig en die res in agterplase. Volgens die Stadsraad van Kaya Mandi is die afgebrande gedeelte egter weer beset en het die oorblywende 526 strukture tans aangegroei tot sowat 1400. Dit dui op 'n aansienlike groei in die informele bevolking en beïnvloed tot 'n groot mate die syfers wat deur Macroplan geraam is.

Nie alleen het die vraag na erwe dus toegeneem nie, maar het die aanbod van erwe afgeneem. So byvoorbeeld is die vroeër-beskikbare 70 erwe van die gedienste 1,9 ha intussen heronderverdeel en toegeken aan 115 gesinne wat reeds hier woon. Die 195 erwe van die eerste fase van die 18,5 ha is ook toegeken en 5 huise is reeds opgerig. Slegs 15 van die persone aan wie dit toegeken is kan egter finansiering kry om huise te bou. Alhoewel hierdie 195 erwe reeds toegeken is, is dit toegeken aan inwoners van Kaya Mandi en kan die erwe steeds vir berekeningsdoeleindes as "beskikbaar" gesien word.

Die huidige tekort aan erwe kan uit die vraag na en aanbod van erwe bepaal word.

Vraag : 1750 (1400 + 350)

Aanbod : 437 (195 + 242)

Tekort : 1313

Daar moet dus onmiddelik 1313 erwe voorsien word om die huidige probleem die hoof te bied. Wanneer normale bevolkingsgroei bygereken word moet selfs nog meer grond voorsien word soos uit Tabel 8 blyk.

TABEL 8: GROND BENODIG TOT 2010

VRAAG	JAAR			
	1993	1995	2000	2010
Bevolking (Gesinsverband)	6121	6968	8403	11 851
Behuising	1313	1500	1818	2 562
Grond @ 22 eenhede/ha	60 ha	68 ha	83 ha	116 ha

Bogenoemde tabel is gebaseer op Macroplan se aanvaarde bevolkingsgroei wat afhanklik is van die beleid van beperkte groei. Indien die tendens wat sedert die struktuurplan se bekendmaking in Oktober 1992 tot op hede egter in ag geneem word, kan met sekerheid voorspel word dat die bevolkingsgroei (natuurlik en in-migrasie) heelwat hoër sal wees. Gevolglik sal heelwat meer grond as die wat Macroplan in die vooruitsig stel, benodig word.

5.6 *Beskikbaarheid van grond*

Dit is duidelik uit bogenoemde tabel dat daar nou reeds 'n ernstige tekort aan grond vir woonuitbreiding bestaan.

Die Struktuurplankonsultante het die volgende grond vir dorpsontwikkeling identifiseer:

TABEL 9: GEÏDENTIFISEERDE GROND VIR DORPSONTWIKKELING

GROND	EIENAAR	OPPERVLAKTE (HA)
Plaas 182/2	L Costa	5,1
Plaas 182/3	L Costa	1,4
Plaas 183/37	WS Smit	0,9
Plaas 81/8	WS Smit	0,9
Plaas 183/12	WS Smit	0,1
Plaas 183/5	WS Smit	3,1
Plaas 183/1	WS Smit	0,1
TOTAAL		11,5 HA

'n Digtheid van 20 eenhede per ha vir bogenoemde 11,5 ha word voorgestel. In die praktyk word ongeveer 60 % van die bruto oppervlakte wel vir erwe aangewend terwyl die orige 40 % vir paaie, sportvelde ensovoorts benut word. Hoe hoër die digtheid raak, hoe meer grond word vir paaie en ander nie-residensiële gebruike ingeneem. Tabel 9 dui die verhouding van digtheid ten opsigte van aantal erwe asook die erfgrouttes aan. In alle gevalle word die bruto-oppervlakte as 11,5 ha geneem.

TABEL 10: DIGTHEID VAN ONTWIKKELING

DIGTHEID	AANTAL ERWE	NETTO OPPERVLAKTE (60 %)	ERF-GROOTTES
20/HA	230	6,9 HA	300 m ²
25/HA	290	6,9 HA	240 m ²
30/HA	345	6,9 HA	200 m ²

Teen Macroplan se digtheid van 20 eenhede per hektaar kan 'n totaal van 230 erwe voorsien word. Daar moet egter ernstig besin word oor 'n hoër digtheid vir toekomstige woonontwikkelings.

Indien bogenoemde 11,5 ha ontwikkel word sal daar steeds 'n tekort van by die 1000 erwe bestaan om aan die 1993 vereiste te voldoen. Dit is dus duidelik dat nog bykomende grond gevind sal moet word, óf aangrensend aan Kayamandi óf elders.

5.7. Gevolgtrekking

Die Struktuurplan van Kaya Mandi bring die volgende aspekte sterk na vore:

- bepaling van groeikoers;
- besikbaarheid van grond;
- behuisingsdigtheid/-tipe; en
- finansiering

5.7.1 Groeikoers

Die voorafgaande opname en analise lig die dilemma van die Beplanner duidelik toe. Ten einde ontwikkeling vooruit te beplan moet 'n scenario ten opsigte van toekomstige bevolkingsgroottes aanvaar word. Weens talle eksterne faktore wat groeikoerse kan beïnvloed is dit soms baie moeilik om 'n geloofwaardige scenario te skets.

In die geval van die beplanning van Kaya Mandi, het die konsultant sy berekeninge gedoen met in agneming van die beginsel van beperkte groei. Die werklikheid het daarteen bewys dat sodanige scenario te simplisties is en nie sonder drastiese gevolge toegepas kan word nie. Die RGN is van mening dat 'n beperking op die fisies vrystelling van grond ten opsigte van enige gemeenskap slegs verdigting en oorbewoning tot gevolg het en die werklike probleem tydelik uitstel. Dit is baie duidelik dat beperkings wat in die verlede op die vrystelling van grond ten opsigte van veral Swartes geplaas is (deur instromingsbeheermaatreëls), tot 'n groot mate verantwoordelik is vir die opgehoopde tekorte waarmee owerhede tans gekonfronteer word.

In die praktyk kom dit daarop neer dat, sou beperkte groei nou op Kaya Mandi toegepas word, die owerhede weer oor 5 of 10 jaar met 'n soortgelyke probleem gaan sit.

Dit is dus van deurslaggewende belang dat 'n realistiese groeikoers aanvaar word. Sodanige groeikoers kan slegs by wyse van deeglike navorsing en met die volle samewerking van die gemeenskap bepaal word. Dit is ook hoogs te betwyfel of bevolkingsprojeksies vir die volle beplanningsperiode gedoen kan word in die afwesigheid van basiese inligting.

5.7.2 *Ontwikkeling versus bewaring*

Die Struktuurplan van Kaya Mandi onderstreep die feit dat daar 'n wenselike tekort aan grond bestaan. Die tekort word net vererger of verminder deur 'n manipulering van die groeikoers.

Weens Stellenbosch se landelike karakter sal dit nie wenslik wees om grond ongekontroleerd aan te wend vir dorpsontwikkeling nie. Kaya Mandi het beperkte uitbreidingsgebiede en in die meeste gevalle moet dorpsontwikkeling opgewees word teen die kwaliteit en verbeteringe van die grond wat dit beoog word om te beslaan.

Alternatiewe grond sal dringend identifiseer moet word. Sodanige proses van grondidentifisering sal deeglik nagevors moet word in samewerking met die gemeenskap. 'n Breër gebied as net Stellenbosch moet ondersoek word. Hier word onder meer verwys na Webersvallei, Pniel, Kylemore, Koelenhof en Klapmuts, alhoewel hierdie gebiede waarskynlik slegs die *langtermyn behoefte* sal aanspreek aangesien dit ver van werksgeleenthede is.

5.7.3 *Behuising*

Behuising as onderwerp het verskillende aspekte wat aangespreek moet word. Hier word veral verwys na behuisingstipe, behuisingdigtheid en behuisingbeleid.

Alternatiewe behuisingstipes moet ondersoek word ten einde 'n middeweg te vind tussen bekostigbaarheid en kwaliteit. Talle voorbeelde van behuisingstipes bestaan reeds en verg verdere aandag. Die mening van die gemeenskap ten opsigte van behuisingstipes moet deeglik in ag geneem word aangesien sekere vooroordele en wanopvattinge algemeen voorkom. Die moontlikheid om 'n perseel te ontwikkel met 'n verskeidenheid behuisingstipes om as voorbeelde te dien moet verder ondersoek word.

Soos aangetoon in Tabel 10 het 'n verandering van digtheid verrykende gevolge. Nie alleen word meer erwe beskikbaar gestel nie, maar word die geleentheid geskep om deur innoverende denke alternatiewe behuisingstipes te ondersoek.

5.7.4 *Finansiering*

Die ekonomiese toestand van die gemeenskap is meestal bepalend van die kwaliteit van behuising. Slegs 15 uit die 195 "grondbesitters" in Kaya Mandi se nuutste uitbreiding kan finansiering bekostig. Die onbekostigbaarheid van finansiering plaas huiseienaarskap buite die bereik van die breër gemeenskap.

Ten einde hierdie probleem aan te spreek moet óf behuising goedkoper voorsien word óf die inkomste van die gemeenskap verhoog word. Volgens Macroplan is die gemiddelde maandelikse inkomste per gesin die volgende (1989):

Enkelwonings	: R1125/maand
Informeel	: R647/maand
Hostelle	: R461/maand

Behuising kan slegs goedkoper voorsien word deur alternatiewe tipes behuising daar te stel of deur subsidiëring. Hierteenoor kan inkomste verhoog word deur skepping van werksgeleenthede.

Dit is dus duidelik dat intense gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid, deeglike navorsing oor 'n breë terrein en innoverende denke 'n voorvereiste is vir die suksesvolle beplanning van Kaya Mandi.

6. GROND BESKIKBAAR IN EN OM STELLENBOSCH

Die uitbreiding van Stellenbosch dorpsgebied word tot 'n groot mate beperk deur topografie (byvoorbeeld berge), natuurlike plantegroei (byvoorbeeld fynbos) en vrugbare landbougrond (wingerde en aarbeilanderye). Hierdie beperkende faktore het 'n invloed op die bekostigbaarheid en wenslikheid van dorpsontwikkeling.

Die doel van hierdie hoofstuk is om die grond wat tans beskikbaar is in en buite Stellenbosch te evalueer en deur middel van eliminasie 'n aanduiding te probeer kry van die grond wat tans moontlik vir woonontwikkeling benut kan word. Hierdie studie is gebaseer op 'n projek van Macroplan waarin alle vakante grond, ingesluit Munisipale huurgronde, publieke oopruimtes, staatsgrond en privaat landbougrond in en om Stellenbosch Munisipale gebied, geïdentifiseer is.

6.1 Die evaluering van grond

Die kaarte waarna in hierdie afdeling verwys word, sal *ter tafel* gelê word. Binne die ontwikkelde Stellenbosse dorpsgebied is daar baie min vakante grond behalwe publieke oopruimtes (sien Kaart 1) en privaat onbeboude erwe. Die grootste waarskynlikheid vir die vind van geskikte grond vir laekoste behuising wat aan die nodige vereistes voldoen, was dus geleë buite die bestaande ontwikkelde dorpsgebied.

Alle staats-, munisipale en privaatgrond wat binne en buite die munisipale gebied geleë is, is geïdentifiseer (Kaart 1 en 2) en weergegee in Tabel 11.

TABEL 11: MUNISIPALE EN STAATSGROND

KAART NR	PLAAS NR(S)	PLAASNAAM	GEBRUIK	OPPV
1	165/1 165/1A 169/1 170 171	IDASVALLEI PROPER SCHOONGEZICHT LITTLE WEDGE GLEN ALPINE GLENCOE	PLANTASIE SAAILANDE WINGERD	390
6	3363	MUNISIPALE KWEKERY	KWEKERY PLANTASIE	
18	181 EN 183		WINGERD	66
24	279A		BOORD	9,40
25	279D		ONBENUT	5
32	368		SAAILANDE	91
33	376		GOLFBAAN	71
34	377A - F	VREDENBURG/ VLOTTENBURG	WINGERD	9,42
36	376B, D, J, H 369G	BLAAUWKLIPPEN BLAAUWKLIPPEN	WINGERD	16,27
38	369C, P	CHRISTIAN BROS VALLEY LUSTRE		3,50
	366	KWV		62
		KWV		38
92	183/17	PLANTKWARENTYN (STAATSGROND)	LANDBOU AKTIWITEITE	89
TOTAAL				865 ha

Die meeste munisipale en staatsgrond, asook privaatgrond word vir landboudoeleindes aangewend, veral vir wingerd. Daar is met behulp van die 1987 lugfoto's en ter plaatse besoeke terreine geïdentifiseer wat tans onbenut lê. Hierdie terreine word weergegee in Tabel 12.

TABEL 12: GROND WAT NIE VIR LANDBOUDOELEINDES GEBRUIK WORD NIE.

KAART NR.	LIGGING	EIENDOM	OPPV	AFSTAND ¹⁾	BESKRYWING
1*	PL 165/1	MUNISIPALITEIT			GARDEN
	165/1A	MUNISIPALITEIT	10	4+	CITIES
12	ERF 7271	MUNISIPALITEIT	2	4+	ONBE- NUT
14	ERF 7255				
	6948, EN				
	6943	MUNISIPALITEIT	4	4+	"
26	PL 279D		5	4+	"
43A	PL 283	PRIVAAT	9	4+	2)
93	PL 175/3	PRIVAAT	3	1,5	ONBE- NUT
94	PL 272	PRIVAAT	2	4+	ONBE- NUT
95	PL 167/1	PRIVAAT	6	4+	ONBE- NUT + PLHUIS
96	PL 1075/ 2	PRIVAAT	9	4	ONBE- NUT
TOTAAL			50		

1) Afstand in kilometer vanaf Middeldorp (Markplein)

2) Plaashuise, maar geen lande (moontlik Nasionale Gedenkwaardigheid)

*Dit het geblyk dat 'n gedeelte van plaas 165/1A aan Garden Cities verkoop is. Tans is dit egter nog nie ontwikkel nie.

Hierdie geïdentifiseerde grond beslaan 'n totale oppervlak van \pm 50 ha. Van 'n totale aantal staats- en munisipale grond kan dus 21 ha nou as onbenut aangetoon word, wat ongeveer 3 % van die totale hoeveelheid munisipale en staatsgrond is. Die terreine is tussen 1,5 en 4 km vanaf die sentrale dorp geleë.

Daar moet egter besef word dat die wyse waarop hierdie grond geïdentifiseer is, net gegrond is op die feit dat dit tans nie vir landboudoeleindes gebruik word nie. Verdere detailspekte met betrekking tot hierdie grond moet nog ondersoek word, en daar moet ook bepaal word tot watter mate dit aan die vereistes vir laekoste behuising voldoen, indien enigsins.

Hierdie geïdentifiseerde grond kan egter as uitgangspunt vir verdere bespreking gebruik word. Dit is belangrik dat die behoeftes van die publiek in ag geneem sal word.

Bo en behalwe die grond in Tabel 11 is daar ten suide van die dorp 'n totale oppervlak van 1133 ha munisipale huurgronde. Hierdie grond word op 'n 50 jaar huurtermyn aan privaat persone verhuur. Daar is 'n insetkoste van sowat R1,5 miljoen op hierdie grond bestee ten opsigte van besproeiingskemas.

Behalwe die geïdentifiseerde onbenutte grond in Tabel 12 is daar ook ander munisipale grond in Tabel 11 wat oor tydperke van 10 tot 20 jaar beskikbaar sal kom, byvoorbeeld plaas 181/183 ten weste en noorde van Kaya Mandi.

Dit blyk dat die vind van addisionele grond vir woonontwikkeling, en dan veral vir laekoste behuising, geen maklike en goedkoop taak gaan wees nie.

7. **BEPLANNINGSOPSIES EN IMPLIKASIES**

7.1 **Basiese vereistes**

Volgens *Habitat* (die Verenigde Volke se Sentrum vir Menslike Nedersettings) is daar drie kritieke faktore wat in ag geneem moet word in die beplanning vir informele behuising:

(a) ***Die probleem moet verstaan word.***

Informele nedersettings en plakkerstoestande sal nie verdwyn as dit geïgnoreer of weggewens word nie. As beplanning oorgelaat word aan spontane kragte, sal die informele nedersettings waarskynlik teen 'n baie hoër koers as die dorp of stad se bevolking groei.

Dit moet ook nie as "normaal" aanvaar word in die sin dat daar niks of min aan gedoen word nie.

(b) ***Daar moet 'n politieke bereidheid wees om die situasie te verbeter.***

Owerhede moet hulself tot die oplossing van die probleme van informele bewoners verbind. In Sri Lanka en Colombia waar owerhede behuising as 'n sentrale deel van hoëvlak politieke strategie hanteer het, is redelike sukses behaal om die behoeftes van die armste deel van die bevolking aan te spreek.

(c) ***Aanvaarding van duidelik-gedefinieerde beleid met spesifieke doelwitte en realisties teikens.***

Dit is essensieel vir die motivering en mobilisering van amptenare en die algemene publiek om die behuisingsprobleem aan te pak. Dit is egter van kardinale belang dat gemeenskappe aktief betrek moet word by die bepaling van die beleid en doelwitte sowel as by die implementering.

7.2 **Ekonomiese aspekte**

Informele gemeenskappe kan nie enige substansiële belegging in behuisingsinfrastruktuur van die huidige of toekomstige regering verwag nie. Sentrale Owerheidsbesteding op behuising word ernstig aan bande gelê deur die skaarheid van fiskale hulpmiddels en is 'n massiewe staatsondersteunde behuisingsprogram onwaarskynlik. Dit blyk dus nodig te wees om die meer "pessimistiese" benadering te volg en die potensiaal van informele gemeenskappe om beplanningsopsies self aan te spreek, te ondersoek. Daar moet dus gekyk word na toegang tot bekostigbaarheidsvlakke, finansieringsbronne, dienstekostes en die verskillende metodes van dienslewering.

(a) ***Bekostigbaarheidsvlakke***

Volgens die RGN is die minimum inkomste wat nodig is vir 'n gesin van vier om homself te onderhou R463,62 per maand. (Dit was teen Maart 1991. As inflasie in ag geneem word kan hierdie bedrag tans meer as R600,00 per maand beloop). Indien 'n huishouding 'n inkomste gelyk aan of minder as die minimum bestaande vlak verdien, is daar vir alle praktiese doeleindes geen geld beskikbaar vir behuising nie. In die geval van die informele bewoners in die Hottentots-Hollandkom was die

gemiddelde maandelikse huishoudingsinkomste R528, wat R64 meer is as die minimum bestaansvlak. Volgens Macroplan is die gemiddelde maandelikse huishoudingsinkomste van informele bewoners in Kaya Mandi R647. Om 'n huislening van R10 000 oor 25 jaar terug te betaal teen 15 % rente per jaar kos R128 per maand. Die vooruitsig dat informele bewoners 'n substansiële bydrae tot hul eie behuisingsfinansiering sal kan maak, is dus redelik beperk.

(b) **Toegang tot finansieringsbronne**

Een van die groot struikelblokke in die ontwikkeling en voorsiening van laekoste behuising is toegang tot behuising- en verbandfinansiering. Selfs waar grond beskikbaar is, sal huishoudings nie in staat wees om hul fisiese lewensomstandighede te verbeter sonder toegang tot finansiering nie.

Finansiële instellings is steeds onwillig om finansiering aan informele gemeenskappe te verskaf. Die hoofinstellings het aangedui dat hulle onwaarskynlik geld sal leen aan voornemende huiseienaars waar die eiendom plus huis vir minder as R35 000 waardeer is.

Daar is egter onlangs 'n reeks finansiële pakkette ontwikkel om hierdie probleem aan te spreek. Daar is die eenmalige kapitaalsubsidie van die OOT (Onafhanlike Ontwikkelingstrust) waar R7 500 aan huishoudings wat minder as R1 000 per maand verdien, betaal word vir die voorsiening van gedienste erwe. Tweedens is daar 'n skema wat daarop gemik is om die vraag na behuising tussen R12 500 en R35 000 aan te spreek. Die skema genoem die "Loan Guarantee Initiative", het die voordeel dat leners slegs 'n 5 % deposito nodig het, maar terugbetalingspaaie hou steeds 'n groot probleem in aangesien dit buite bereik van die meeste informele bewoners is.

Derdens het die Ou Mutual en Perm pakkette saamgestel waar pensioen/voorsieningsfondse kollaterale voorsien vir lenings aan individue wat ten minste R700 tot R800 per maand verdien. Slegs 'n mindere deel van die informele bevolking verdien egter genoeg om te kwalifiseer.

Vierdens is daar 'n groepkredietkema. Die OOT en Stedelike Stigting het beide die moontlikheid ondersoek om klein lenings van tot R5 000 toe te staan aan lede van informele kredietverenigings. Alhoewel lenings aan individue toegestaan word, aanvaar die groepe gesamentlike verantwoordelikheid vir die lening.

In die lig van die voorafgaande blyk dit vanuit 'n beplanningsoogpunt dat 'n meer realistiese en wenslike scenario vir die meerderheid informele bewoners sal wees om te konsentreer op die voorsiening van meer bekostigbare behuisingsverwante *dienste*. Sodanige verbeterings gekoppel aan sekuriteit van eiendomsreg sal aan informele bewoners die addisionele aanmoediging verskaf om hul behuisingsomstandighede self te verbeter deur gebruik te maak van die beperkte hulpbronne tot hul beskikking.

(c) **Koste van dienste**

Die stelsel van dienstevoorsiening moet so gestruktureer word dat dit vir die informele bewoners bekostigbaar is, ten minste in terme van lopende koste. In die opgraderings- of voorsieningsproses moet die volgende drie vrae gevra word (ten opsigte van diensverbruik):

- Hoe gaan daar vir die gelewerde diens betaal word? Gaan elke verbruiker individueel gemonitor word of gaan 'n eenvormige tarief van al die lede van die gemeenskap verhaal word?

- Wanneer gaan die diensgelde ingesamel word - voor gebruik, tydens gebruik of na gebruik?
- Wie gaan die diensgelde by die verbruikers insamel? Gaan 'n privaat entrepreneur gebruik word, gaan munisipale amptenare dit doen of gaan dit op gemeenskapvlak georganiseer word.

Daar is geen "regte" stelsel van kosteverhaling nie, alhoewel daar in elke situasie 'n "beste" stelsel is. Ekonomiese doeltreffendheid met die klem op die verlaging van administratiewe kostes moet 'n primêre oorweging by beplanners wees. Dit blyk dat die vooruitsigte vir die bekostigbare voorsiening van basiese dienste (water, riolering en vullisverwydering) goed is, op voorwaarde dat *kapitale kostes* deur *eksterne bronne* gefinansier kan word.

7.3 Voor- en nadele van sekere opsies

Aangeheg as **AANHANGSEL 4** is 'n direkte uittreksel uit die RGN se verslag ten opsigte van die Hottentots-Hollandkom studie wat sekere opsies met elkeen se voor- en nadele uiteensit.

ELEMENTS OF HOUSING

The elements of housing can be identified as: land, services, infrastructure, houses, finances, communities and cities. We need to decide on our approach to issues arising from each of these. How does our approach influence our housing policy? Some of the strategic issues arising in relation to the elements of housing are as follows:

I LAND

- How will the disadvantaged get access to land? At what price? In which locations?
- Will there be redistribution to redress historic imbalances and injustices?
- What is our approach to squatting and occupation of land?
- What is our approach to removals?
- What alternatives do we have to market control of land? Some ideas are land banks, community controlled trusts.
- What tenure options will be available? Rent, freehold ownership, co-operative or other forms of non-profit ownership?
- What kind of densities are we looking at for development of land?
- What will be the relationship between different land uses such as residential, industrial and commercial?
- What will be the size of stands? What densities are acceptable?

II SERVICES: e.g. roads, water, electricity, sewerage disposal, refuse removal

- What are the basic minimum services that should be provided to every home?
- Who should pay for the construction and use of these services?
- Should end users pay for the full cost of providing the service? Or should they be subsidised by the state/employers?
- How can the poor benefit from the services infrastructure that already exists in the urban areas?
- How can the community participate in choosing what services they want and controlling the provisions?

III COMMUNITY FACILITIES: e.g. education, commercial, sports and community facilities

- What facilities should be provided to every community ?
- How can existing facilities in urban areas be used by the poor ?
- Who should pay for building and maintaining the facilities ?
- High costs of facilities provision are also related to the monopoly in the construction industry - what can we do about these monopolies and high costs ?
- What community involvement and control can there be in the provision of infrastructure ?

IV HOUSES

- What types of houses should be provided/offered ? subsidisation vs cost recovery, self-help (site and service), housing, completed houses, duplexes, flats, high rise flats etc.
- Where should the money for houses come from ?
- Who should be building the houses ? local state, national state, private construction companies, community housing co-operatives, families or individuals ?
- What kinds of tenures should be offered ? rental, individual or community ownership - profit or non-profit, joint ownership with community trust ?
- Who should be responsible for allocation of state housing ?
- Who should be responsible for maintenance and management of housing ? Where should the money for this come from ?
- What types of community involvement and control should there be ?
- What can we do about high costs of building houses ?
- What can we do about high costs of building houses ?
- How can we upgrade existing housing stock ? What priority do we give this ?

V FINANCE

- A key element of the housing process is finance - where should the money come from for all of the above i.e. land, services, infrastructure, houses ? Local/national state, private sector, individuals ?
- How can we make housing affordable ? What are the criteria by which we measure affordability ?

- What is our approach to subsidisation and full cost recovery ?
- What form should be public subsidy take ?
 - * a once off capital subsidy for providing infrastructural services,
 - * subsidy based on household income i.e. the lower people's income the greater the amount of subsidy,
 - * subsidies granted to banks and building societies to enable them to reduce interest rates (on average for every R100 you borrow, you pay back an extra R460 in interest),
 - * subsidies to financial institutions which are used to guarantee the loans they make in case of default by borrowers (this is the basis of the Loan Guarantee Fund);
- How can we make finance available to those who do not presently qualify for loans from banks, building societies ?
- Assuming resources are limited - how should resources be distributed amongst all those who need it and also in terms of the various elements of housing discussed above i.e. land, services, infrastructure and houses.

VI BUILDING COMMUNITIES AND CITIES


- What kinds/types of communities and cities do we want to build ?
- How do we reshape the apartheid city ? What physical constraints face us in this task ?
- How can we increase employment and community facilities in areas which do not have them now ?
- What is the future of the CBDs ?
- What building regulations and standards should we change ?
- What mixes should we have in our areas in terms of (i) incomes, (ii) races and (iii) densities ?
- What special opportunities should we create for the poor and marginalised ?
- How can communities participate in and control the planning of our communities and cities ?

THE FORM OF HOUSING DELIVERED

The resources available to address the housing need will always be limited to reach the ideal provision of housing. The needs therefore have to be prioritised and for this purpose they have to be properly defined. We have to look at whether we want to use our resources to provide some serviced/housing for as many people as possible (i.e. width) or we use the resources to give a better quality service/housing to fewer people (i.e. depth) or some combination of the two. Because different types of housing have different cost, social and environmental implications and lend themselves to different locations, forms of tenure and process of construction they have important implications for WHO (how many) are going to get WHAT (product), WHERE (near or far), WHEN (1, 2, 5, 10 years) and HOW (provided by the state or made by people themselves or a bit of each)? In examining these questions we could use the following method:

- (a) identify different types of houses
 - (b) identify issues to be considered about each type of house
 - (c) look at the implications of each issue for each type of house and draw out a range of specific and general implications.
- (i) **SERVICED SITES**

DIAGRAM 2



(a) **Type of Housing**

- Low level site and service to high level site and service
- free standing houses tend to use more land than attached houses
- if brick houses are not built plots need to be more than 250 sq metres to provide safety from fire and privacy

- if low level services then not a good location for inner city
- lots of land required - therefore not good for inner city
- houses most likely to be different types of shacks

(b) Location

The diagram above shows the location of housing within the city i.e. whether it should be in the inner city, suburbs or periphery. The suggested location for serviced sites is the periphery. One of the determining factors for the location is the cost of land. The lower diagram shows the type of house/product graphically.

(c) Cost/Finance

- Cost of sites will range from R1 500 (for low level sites) to R15 000 (for high level sites on difficult terrain)
- Less money required for sites only - therefore could be spread widely
- Private financial institutions unwilling to lend against sites with low level of servicing
- Mobilises household savings and sweat equity labour

(d) Tenure

- Security of tenure necessary for '*consolidation*' i.e. for the resident to build and develop the plot according to his/her needs

(e) Process of delivery

- Servicing of sites by the developers or state (local/national) some servicing could be done by peoples community trusts
- Individual responsible for house construction and improvement
- Little participation required

(f) Consequences


- '*Freedom to build*'
- Potential Ghetto

- Many sites available fast
- Easy to administer
- Little cost to state - therefore sustainable
- Social prejudice - shacks vs bricks
- High transport costs - distant location
- Low density - lots of land required
- individuals responsible for building house
- Potential fire hazards and poor quality housing
- little profit made on sale
- Little positive effect on the economy because few backward linkages into the materials sector are exploited

(ii)

SITE AND SERVICES AND ASSISTED HOUSING

DIAGRAM 3



(a) Type of Housing

- Site and materials to site and shell house
- Usually serviced site plus materials and maybe wall or slabs or shell house
- site could be smaller - 150 - 200 sq metres

(b) Location

Because of size of plots and level of services - most suitable location is the periphery of the city.

(c) Cost/Finance

- R7 500 --> upwards (depends on how much of the house is provided)
- more money required - therefore number of sites less than in first category.
- no initial private financial institution involvement.

(d) Tenure : long term security necessary for 'consolidation'

(e) Process of delivery

- serviced sites by developers/state/community trust/small builder
- lots of responsibility on the individual
- participation has to be organised
- mainly self-build or small builder activity


(f) Consequences

- Relative '*freedom to build*'
- Peripheral location --> same problems as site and service
- Less social prejudice because formal housing is in process
- Some form of permanent house is possible
- Poor quality of house means that little profit can be derived from sale

- More direct benefits to economy --> building materials are used and labour employed.

(iii) **LOW DENSITY COMPLETED HOUSES**

DIAGRAM 4



(a) **Type of housing**

- Single house on plot - to - semi detached houses - to - single storey row houses
- Complete house on own plot, freestanding or joined to neighbour, double or single storey
- sites between 100 - 200 sq metres.

(b) **Location**

on the periphery or suburbs - because still require fair amount of land

(c) **Cost/Finance**

- Cost from R25 000 --> upwards (depending on size, quality, location)

- Requires large amount of money therefore reduced width (therefore more depth)
- Private sector can be more easily mobilised thereby increasing width
- Subsidy necessary to be affordable for more people

(d) Tenure

Form of tenure (rental, freehold etc.) is not critical except if short term cost recovery is required whereupon freehold tenure becomes necessary

(e) Process of Delivery


- sites and housing to be developed by private developers state/community trusts
- relatively little choice in design, unless users involved early. This is because mass supply is cost effective

(f) Consequences

- Lots of resources required - time, money, labour, materials
- More difficult to administer than site and service
- Shape and size not very flexible - costly to modify or expand
- Only 15 - 20 % of African people can afford this type of housing without subsidy
- Location in suburbs - somewhat better than periphery
- Can be sold relatively easily
- If do not require high levels of subsidy could have larger benefit to economy - materials, labour, consumer goods.

(iv) COMPLETE HIGH DENSITY HOUSING

DIAGRAM 5



(a) Type of housing

- Double storey row houses and/or four storey walk ups
- Occupy small amounts of land
- Complete units with some self-help finishing possible
- great range of options - bachelor units 3 - 4 bedrooms

(b) Location : suburbs or inner city - because high density

(c) Cost/Finance

- R25 000 for very small units - ranging upwards
- Large amount of money required initially - less width
- Private sector financing possible
- Subsidy required to be affordable to poor people - which may in part be balanced by creating a more compact city and so reducing transport subsidies, also resulting in better use of existing facilities.

(d) Tenure : appropriate for rental, co-operatives or private freehold ownership

(e) **Process of Delivery**


- sites and housing developed by developers/state/possibly community trusts
- participation is necessary but must be organised
- relatively little choice in design, unless users involved early
- many units have to be built together

(f) **Consequences**

- inner city location means better access to work and facilities
- inner city location means more efficient use of resources and existing services and facilities
- possible noise, privacy, traffic implications
- design of units is critical
- can be sold immediately depending on tenure.

(v) **MULTI-STOREY FLATS**

DIAGRAM 6



(a) **Type of housing**

- Multi-storey flats - requiring high technology such as lifts
- many units on small piece of land
- no direct access to ground

- range of units possible - bachelor to 3 - 4 bedrooms
- (b) **Location : inner city because of high density**
- (c) **Cost/Finance**
- cost of units R30 000 upwards
 - very large amounts of money required for one building
 - private sector institutions could be involved
 - subsidy necessary to make affordable to more people
- (d) **Tenure : range of options possible : rental to individual or collective ownership (sectional title)**
- (e) **Process of Delivery**
- site and housing developed by developers/state/possibly community trusts
 - limited input of users in design due to sophistication
- (f) **Consequences**
- huge requirement of resources - labour, materials, technology, time
 - city centre location with all benefits - many people housed - get benefits
 - negative consequences for poor and for families
 - reliance on technology could be long term problem - maintenance costs are high
 - noise, traffic, privacy, pollution implications
 - can be bought and sold depending on form of tenure.

4. Discussion of the issues

(a) Approaching squatting as a human issue

Throughout this report we have emphasized that squatting is not simply a technical problem, but a distinctly human issue involving intergroup conflicts, misunderstandings and distorted perceptions. Yet authorities have largely approached squatting as if it were a purely technical problem involving the physical identification and planning of sites. In each case where a technician approach has been adopted, the human dimensions of the issue have come to the fore to frustrate the efforts of bureaucrats and technicians.

Clearly no headway will be made with the issue of squatting until its distinctly human dimensions are addressed and due recognition is given to the conflict inherent in the relationship between squatters and established communities.

(b) The importance of process

Human problems do not easily lend themselves to simple and straight forward one-off interventions, but rather require a continuing process of intervention and interaction. Both the problems and solutions of the squatting issue are intimately tied up with social changes that require profound transformations in personal meanings, attitudes and orientations. Such changes require more than a simple intellectual reorientation. In other words, people require more than rational, or even scientific, arguments and data in order to change their understandings and approaches to specific issues. Chin and Benne (1969:43) state that "intelligence is social, rather than narrowly individual", and that people "...are guided in their action by socially funded and communicated meanings, norms and institutions, in brief by a normative culture." According to them, people are guided at the personal level by "internalized meanings, habits and values" (p. 43). Chin and Benne believe that changes in the patterns of action/practice therefore occur not only in the rational informational equipment of people, but (at the personal level) also in habits and values. They continue: "...at the socio-cultural level, changes are alterations in normative structures and in institutionalized roles and relationships, as well as in cognitive and perceptual orientations" (Chin & Benne, 1969:43).

Research, training and action should be integrated in the solution of human issues, in "a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action, and fact-finding about the result of the action". People need to participate in their own education if they are to be educated at all, and education involves a normative change, as well as a cognitive and perceptual change (Chin & Benne, 1969:43-4).

At a practical level, we have argued that a simple housing package is unattainable due to financial and other constraints. The provision of services and improvements in housing conditions should also be approached in an incremental and process-orientated way. Thus solutions can be found that are both appropriate and enjoy the support/confidence of the public, rather than attempting to meet all physical needs at once, which in all likelihood will result in disappointment and even resistance.

(c) Responsibility for squatting

Among the changes that will have to take place in order to address the problems of squatting effectively, are the orientations of people towards the squatting phenomenon, including their sense of responsibility towards shack settlements.

We have shown in some detail in the early chapters of this report that squatting in the Hottentots Holland Basin is not simply a result of urbanization, but of a severe housing shortage and the consequences of apartheid policies. This has some clear implications for the moral responsibility of formal communities towards squatters.

Squatters in the Hottentots Holland Basin are not simply outsiders who have appeared from elsewhere to make demands on the resources of the community, but for the most part have been living in the Basin for several years and have been supplying their labour to a variety of employers. Some of them lived on farms or in domestic servant's quarters which they were forced to vacate for a variety of reasons. Others lived in hostels, often without their families and under the most appalling circumstances. Still others were forced to abandon accommodation in formal housing and backyard rooms which were unacceptably overcrowded or unaffordable. (See Chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed analysis of the causes of squatting.) In many respects therefore it was the community which failed to provide them with adequate accommodation and which therefore bears at least a degree of responsibility for their plight.

The moral responsibilities of host communities to shack settlements can also be traced in more specific terms. In Chapter 4, for example, we showed that the troublesome anomaly of shack settlements arising alongside high-income housing was not purely a product of the arbitrariness of squatting. Instead this anomaly can be traced to applications of the Group Areas Act which created an artificial preponderance of high-income housing in the area and failed to make sufficient provision for low-income housing. As a result there are few sites for low income housing in the area and property owners who live near squatter settlements find that their property values are falling.

Until formal residents are able to understand these complex relationships with the past, they will continue to regard squatters as intruders who have no

claim on the resources of the community and for whom they have no responsibility.

(d) The positive features of shack dwelling

A related issue is associated with the negative ways in which shack dwelling is regarded - what we called the *stigma of squatting* in Chapter 4. Thus far the tendency among formal residents has been to see shack dwelling in purely negative terms. This need not always be the case. While squatting currently makes enormous demands on formal communities, it should be borne in mind that shack dwelling also provides a creative solution to a number of severe social issues, not least of which is the national housing crisis.¹

Through squatting, shack dwellers provide themselves with a form of shelter which (notwithstanding its inadequacies) could not be provided by any other source. These shack settlements often provide access to job markets which would otherwise be inaccessible, and, no matter how disorganized and unsightly they might appear to some formal residents, furnish their residents with a minimum of security, stability, sense of community, and a basis for family life.² To some extent squatting has also retarded the social disintegration of South African society, because **without** squatting there may well have been higher levels of political instability, violence, crime and disorder in the country.

(e) The need for a national and sub-regional policy with clear goals

The need for a clear policy at national, regional and sub-regional levels is undisputed. As indicated in Chapter 7, a national policy is needed to give direction to lower-tier governments on how to deal with the problems in their area through accommodation (instead of restrictive approaches such as forced removals). Without a clear policy, authorities at all levels are able to shift the "blame" upwards, downwards and across by claiming that it is not their res-

¹ Some people may see squatting as a means of exerting pressure on formal housing channels rather than as a solution, but we believe, based on our research in the Basin, that such an assumption is without foundation for the study area.

² We also need to ask the question - how much more would squatters have done (or do in the future) under the same physical circumstances but with legal tenure, in terms of investing in housing.

possibility. The converse of this is that authorities are not prepared to take responsibility for the problem, because then all other authorities may hold them responsible. While we would argue that decisions should be taken at a local level, we appreciate the dilemma of local authorities in the Basin in not being able to take the initiative. Rather than sit back and wait for direction and even imposition of plans from above, we argue that the authorities in the Basin should be proactive and engaging. In other words, they should together (and in close consultation with the communities at large) formulate plans and guidelines that can be pushed upwards as part of the process of defining a national policy on informal housing.

(f) The need for decision-making at the local level

Although national and provincial authorities clearly have a key role to play in helping local communities find solutions to the problems of squatting, major decisions that affect the lives of people on the local level should be taken on the local level. The failure of provincial and national government attempts to identify a site for an informal settlement in the Hottentots Holland Basin provides a clear example of how displacing decisions from the local to a higher level are doomed to failure.

In Chapter 7 it was indicated that local initiatives such as neighbourhood forums can contribute a great deal toward resolving conflicts. In this regard the formal communities have a vital role to play in setting the ball rolling.

(g) The need for public participation

Not only is it necessary for major decisions to be taken at the local level, but extensive consultation and participation of all relevant communities is required. While the difficulties of the squatting dilemma have prompted officials at all levels to despair of democratic and participatory solutions, the alternative of public ignorance, hidden agendas and forced decisions has been shown to be a dead end. In various parts of the country including the Hottentots Holland Basin, civic interests have shown that they will not tolerate decisions that are imposed upon them.

The importance of public participation lies not only in its function as a means for allowing democratic decision-making, but also as a tool for educating the public. Through civic participation and negotiations with competing inter-

ests, members of the public become informed in a meaningful way, and are made aware of the complexities of the situation, the needs, interests and positions of other parties, and the advantages of compromise. Public participation is of course not an easy option, but the alternative is to keep people in the dark which creates rumours and suspicions, encourages emotional responses, and generally leads to a hardening of positions.

The neighbourhood forums can also play an important role in ensuring that public participation is maintained at acceptable levels.

(h) Decentralizing solutions to the issues of squatting

In order for participation to succeed, it will be necessary to create more room for both choices and compromises. A key element in creating greater space for local level choices and compromises is to allow for the decentralization of solutions. What is meant by this is that instead of creating one large informal settlement, a number of smaller, and by implication more manageable, settlements should be created in various parts of the Basin.

There are a number of reasons why a decentralized solution is more likely to succeed than a centralized solution.

Firstly, while centralizing squatters on one site has the supposed advantage of restricting the issue to only one area, it blatantly offends people's sense of equity in that it forces a single segment of the formal community to accept the responsibility for or bear the consequences of squatting. Underlying the durability/persistence of the NIMBY-syndrome is a fundamental moral understanding of what is right and just, namely that one section of a community should not be forced to bear the brunt of the problems of the whole community. Such an understanding is at the basis of the objection of farmers and small-holders in the vicinity of the Waterkloof shack settlement, as it is of the Strand Municipality.

Secondly, it was clear from our qualitative findings, that the larger squatter settlements are, the more threateningly they are perceived. Thus as the largest of the settlements, Waterkloof appeared to be regarded as the most threatening of all the settlements in the Basin. Formal residents appeared to regard the smaller settlements as far less threatening and often entered these

settlements in search of casual labourers. Even the issue of falling property values on account of the proximity of squatters appeared to be somewhat less contentious in relation to smaller settlements such as Remhoogte and Ambulance Park than with respect to the larger settlements. On the whole therefore smaller settlements would be regarded as less threatening, provided that an appropriate degree of control is exercised over the growth of such settlements.

A third but related point is that it is easier for internal leaders to control smaller settlements. Such settlements are generally less alienating to their inhabitants, allow for a greater sense of community and consensus among their residents, and facilitate compliance with both internal and external community norms. As the Moss Report (1990:35) pointed out, the forced grouping of people in a large and heterogeneous settlement can cause large-scale social disruption, as the example of the Cape Flats so vividly illustrates. It is also more difficult for criminal or anti-social elements to find refuge in small settlements, or to indulge in activities that offend against the general norms of the community.

Fourthly, it will be easier to integrate a number of smaller settlements into the broader community than one large settlement. Squatter settlements are largely a "problem" to more established communities because they are not integrated into the broader community, since they stand out as different or even alien. A single large settlement lends itself to the stereotyping, stigmatization and labelling of informal settlers as "bad", "criminal", "anti-social" etc. because it increases the isolation/insulation of the settlement from the rest of the community. Smaller settlements would also facilitate greater contact between formal and informal residents not only by making these settlements more physically accessible, but also by spreading responsibility for shack dwellers more evenly and reducing the challenges to a more manageable scale.

Fifthly, we have argued that the populations of shack settlements in the Hottentots Holland Basin include a broad range of different types of people who originate from different places, have very different reasons for squatting and therefore very different aspirations and expectations. It would therefore be very difficult to accommodate this diversity of people within a single area. Shack dwellers and their support organizations place a high premium on freedom of

choice as a democratic right, but catering for such choice could not only serve the interests of the shack dwellers, but also those of the formal communities, as the Moss Report (1990:36) attests:

One of the greatest guarantees of social harmony and prosperity lies encumbered within the opportunity created for people to exercise their own choice of where to live. Such a choice must, however, take place within the orderly scheme of things and in such a way that established interests are also served.

Finally, allowing freedom of choice would considerably facilitate negotiations between the shack dwellers and the formal residents and their authorities. Even if it were possible to get neighbouring formal communities to accept a single site for all or most of the squatters in the Basin - and all indications are that this is highly unlikely within the current emotionally charged situation in South Africa - the squatters themselves would still have to be persuaded to move to this new site.

Evidence from both the local and international contexts indicate that there are formidable obstacles in the way of relocating squatter settlements to new sites. From the international experience discussed by, among others, Laquian (1981), it is clear that resettlement attempts very often fail in spite of considerable show of force by the governments who almost inevitably have to give in eventually to the demands of the squatters to legalize the settlements. Similar examples are found in South Africa, and one of the best known cases is that of Cross Roads on the Cape Flats.

This applies in particular to the larger settlements of the Hottentots Holland Basin. In our discussions with both leaders and residents of the shack settlements, it became clear that there was considerable resistance to the possibility of being moved to a new site. This was particularly apparent in relation to the larger settlements like Waterkloof and Sun City.

Moreover, the identification of a single site to which all squatters would have to move is inevitably coercive because it excludes all possibilities of choice. As South Africa's whole history of forced removals vividly illustrates, coercion usually has the effect of galvanizing resistance in communities. Even where a substantial percentage of people are in favour of a move, the presence of others who oppose such a move is likely to lead to resistance of the whole community

in the interests of group unity and cohesion.

Allowing a choice between different sites would completely transform the situation from an inflexible and coercive one to a more flexible and open situation which would allow considerably greater scope for negotiation and creative solutions to what has become an intractable problem. This applies not only to squatters, but also to formal residents.

Allowing greater freedom of choice not only removes the coercion implied in a single site, but also allows greater flexibility and sensitivity to planning. For example, it opens up the possibility of implementing different types of settlement and upgrading schemes which cater not only to the different needs and preferences of squatters, but also to those of the neighbourhoods within which the settlements are located. Finding a fit between the divergent interests of squatters and formal residents is therefore considerably simplified.

In relation to Waterkloof, the most controversial of the squatter settlements in the Basin, for example, the current fixation with a single settlement has resulted in an impasse where both the current and the future or potential neighbours of these shack dwellers refuse to accept them. Under these circumstances, no compromise is possible and the different interests are forced to adopt increasingly inflexible positions because the loser stands to lose everything. In other words, the strategy of identifying a single site forces the situation into a zero-sum (or winner-takes-all) conflict.

The strategy of adopting the principle of several sites admits the possibility of increasing the range of compromises. In relation to Waterkloof, for example, the option would be not simply to remove this settlement or leave it where it is, but to reduce it to a more manageable size. At the same time work could begin on upgrading the settlement that remains, screening off views of the settlement that are considered unsightly, and improving relationships between squatters and non-squatters in the area.

Similarly, while the Strand municipality has indicated on several occasions that it may be prepared to accept responsibility for some of the squatters in the Basin, it is deadset against accepting responsibility for all the squatters in the area. The possibilities for a compromise in which the Strand might accept a part

of the Waterkloof squatters establishing themselves on the site identified by the Department of Provincial Affairs and Planning seem good. The exact proportion of squatters to be established on this site would of course have to be negotiated, but our figures on the distribution of workplaces of squatters from the relevant communities could serve as a guideline. The same may be said of Somerset West, Sir Lowrys Pass, and Gordons Bay.

5. Objections

Given the heated nature of the squatter dispute and the current climate of political uncertainty and change, it is unlikely that any suggestion aimed at addressing this problem will meet with general approval. Until now all proposals that have been submitted have met with vehement rejection from at least one of the parties involved, and there is no reason why this report should be an exception.

Although our proposals may not be accepted immediately, we believe they are ideally suited to the context of change which South Africa has entered. The process of change in South Africa has irrevocably demonstrated that proposals which at one time were unthinkable, can become acceptable in relatively short periods of time and be implemented with enthusiasm. The emphasis we have placed on long-term processes rather than one-off products are ideally suited to the shifting attitudes and conditions within a context of rapid change. So too are the emphases on democratic procedures, addressing the interests of all the parties involved, educating and informing people, seeking flexible and creative compromises, and spreading the burdens of change.

However, as our approach throughout this research project has been actively to seek out criticisms of our findings and recommendations, we would like to conclude this report by anticipating some the objections that may be raised to our suggestions. Our list of possible objections could never be comprehensive, but may answer some of the questions raised in people's minds:

- **Would not the creation of several sites increase the costs of squatting by multiplying the problems?** Rather than thinking in terms of multiplying the problems, our approach should be seen as breaking up a problem (which has largely proved insoluble) into smaller, more manageable problems. We also propose spreading or sharing the burden of the problem among many, rather than leaving an unfortunate few to bear this burden.
- **Would not allowing squatters greater choice and attempting to accommodate them only serve to attract more squatters?** While it is difficult to predict patterns of growth of squatter settlements, there are several indications that adopting a more accommodating approach to squatters will *not* lead to unmanageable growth of the settlements. As the formal communities have not yet succeeded in displacing squatters from the Basin and are unlikely to be able to do so in the future given the absence of a legal mechanism such as influx control, the alternative is simply to do nothing. As jobs in the area are limited, the labour market may act as a restraint on in-migration to the area. It would also be possible to enter into agreement with squatter leaders about the sizes of their settlements. Furthermore, the more stable informal settlements become, the more likely it is that they will resist the influx of outsiders into their areas.
- **Smaller settlements are likely to be more expensive to service, especially if they are distant from existing settlements.** This will depend upon the nature of the economies of scale involved, in other words where the specific sites are located and how they are planned. It is true that unit costs are higher for new sites which are isolated and separate from existing service infrastructures. However, there is no reason to believe that small settlements which are fully integrated into existing service infrastructure networks will be more expensive than one newly developed large site. In fact, the smaller settlements may well prove to be cheaper, particularly if existing spare capacities can be utilized.

In addition to this, an appreciation of the true costs (regardless of

who bears them) should be borne in mind. A single site that moves people further from their place of work may well prove to be more expensive when the additional transport costs and associated lower productivity are taken into account. Smaller sites which allow people to live nearer to their place of work may well be less expensive for these reasons.

- **Formal residents are just as likely to resist the establishment of smaller settlements in their areas as they have resisted the establishment of large settlements.** As we have pointed out, smaller settlements tend to be less threatening than large settlements. Residents would have to be educated about squatters and this may take some time. In the interim it may be possible to utilize sites which are less controversial, such as those which are near existing low-cost housing (as in the site identified in the Strand) or sites that are still in the process of being developed for settlement. It is also possible to tailor informal settlements to suit the areas where they will be located and to plan for the screening of such settlements.

- **Will not the breaking up of large settlements into smaller communities be perceived by squatter interests as a threat to squatter safety and leadership, and the internal cohesion of communities?** When one takes into account the negative perceptions shack dwellers probably have of all resettlement attempts, it would be logical to expect them to be sceptical about such initiatives as well. By breaking up communities, their leadership structures are interfered with. This also happens when people from different smaller settlements are grouped together in a single large settlement. New leaders will have to be elected.

By breaking up settlements one disrupts their internal cohesion and this may cause a great deal of uncertainty and even isolation during the first number of weeks. They may also feel threatened by the idea of having to settle in small numbers, because that may make them vulnerable and may expose them to the potential antagonism of the people already living in that neighbourhood,

some of whom who may not want them there.

These are some of the risks that the shack dwellers will have to take. If it is thought that they will have little difficulty in deciding what would be best for them, and that some decisions can be made on their behalf, the people who believe that should think again. The authorities would have to prepare themselves for a period of negotiation and exchange of information on the options that may be available to the squatters. Certain squatters have much to lose and should be given sufficient time to make their decisions.

On the positive side, however, it should be understood that when people are given a choice, they can weigh up all the factors that are at stake and make informed decisions. For example, they can weigh up the disadvantage of the destruction of group cohesion or the lack of safety found in numbers against the advantage of the closer proximity to their work or the benefit of having a variety of settlement types (and therefore opportunities) to choose from.

- **Will the solutions that are produced at the micro level not adversely affect solutions that may be introduced from the macro level?** It may be argued that preempting policy direction from the top will worsen the situation in the Basin. In other words, it may be thought that it is not in the interests of the local residents to take it upon themselves to solve a problem of national importance. Also, it may be believed that solutions at a micro level could be undermined by incompatible solutions (or a lack of solutions) at the macro level. While this may be true, it would seem unwise to continue avoiding the issues at stake here. *Ultimately the squatting issue of the Hottentots Holland Basin is a problem that will have to be addressed within the Basin.* In addition to this, pressure cannot be brought to bear at a macro level if solutions are not at least being sought at the micro level. It is only through arriving at micro-level solutions that any effective pressure can be brought to bear on the solutions that are offered at the macro level.

Concluding remarks

It has been our privilege to be associated with the people of the Basin during the past 18 months.

We are convinced that if people really want to work together and search for common solutions, there is little chance of failure. We trust that this study will contribute to this search for solutions to the problems in the Basin.

Direct intervention

Direct intervention involves active interference. Examples of strategies (i.e. planning options) that are important here are the replanning and servicing of existing squatter areas (i.e. *in situ* upgrading projects), provision of sites and services (i.e. site-and-service projects), low-cost rental housing (i.e. public housing projects). These three strategies are discussed in detail below. A fourth strategic option, namely migration control (i.e. a closed-city policy), is also discussed briefly to round off the picture.

(a) *In situ* upgrading projects

This type of direct intervention entails the legalization of an existing squatter area, the replanning of the area to make room for individual plots and roads, and the provision of (affordable and therefore often rudimentary) essential services such as water and sanitation. It usually entails the resettlement of some

or all of the households² in order to make room for these roads and services. The advantages and disadvantages of this planning option are as follows:

Advantages

- People can, generally speaking, stay where they are, which means that community cohesion remains intact.
- Current investments in housing and "plots" (for the greater part) remain intact.
- Current business investments, contacts and clientele of people operating businesses in the settlement are not threatened, but limitations on the size of the settlement may prevent expansion because the market is limited to its present size.
- At least rudimentary services are provided, with the resultant improvement in living conditions.
- Legality of tenure is ensured, and people can no longer be threatened with eviction.
- There are not *new* formal neighbours wanting to impose too restrictive standards to keep people out (because they are already there).
- The current leadership of the settlement may remain intact.
- It is not necessary for the residents to get used to new leaders, new neighbours, new transportation or other new / unfamiliar things.

²In the so-called *roll-over approach* all the households in the settlement are resettled once. This may be a fair approach since all households are affected in the same way, but it is a relatively costly method which may not always be necessary nor advisable. Very often only a small portion of the families have to be resettled (see for example Turner, 1980:254-258), but the practical problem with this approach is that there are the unfortunate few households who have to be moved. The selection of the "unfortunate few" (households) can be a problem, but if the upgrading is fully supported by the shack dwellers themselves (which should be regarded as a prerequisite for any successful upgrading), the selection procedure can usually be left to the people to sort out among themselves in the fairest possible way.

Disadvantages

- Land for the settlement may have to be purchased from a current owner, and these costs may be recovered from residents.
- Although the provision of bulk services may be subsidized, residents may have to pay part of the initial costs.
- Certain settlements may be so small or so distant from existing services that the provision of bulk services will be extremely costly to the residents.
- Residents may have to pay in full for the consumption of services.
- Internal roads may have to be provided, and this means that certain residents' houses may have to be moved.
- Existing discontent about the presence of shack dwellers near formal communities will not easily be resolved.
- For authorities to accept this option, the leaders may have to agree to a size restriction (i.e. that after the settlement has reached a certain size, further in-migration may have to be prevented).
- For formal neighbours to accept this option, the leaders of the shack dwellers may have to agree to:
 - (i) certain minimum standards for housing quality (i.e. that after a negotiated period of time, all houses not conforming to the negotiated standards may have to be removed) or to ways and means of "screening off" unsightly structures from the public eye.
 - (ii) certain requirements concerning conduct (e.g. on matters such as rubbish dumping, nuisance, crime, etc.).
- Planning of the upgraded settlement may be inhibited by existing structures.

(b) Site-and-service projects

In site-and-service projects a vacant piece of land is usually developed by providing roads and other essential services. Plots in the project are usually provided free of charge to qualifying poor families but they are normally expected to pay for the services they consume. As in the case of *in situ* upgrading, people erect their shacks on the plot until such time as they have acquired enough money to upgrade or otherwise improve the dwelling.

Advantages

- At least rudimentary services are provided, with the resultant improvement in living conditions.
- Since the location of the site-and-service project is planned in a proactive manner, the chances are better that bulk services to the new settlement can be provided at economic rates.
- Planning of the new settlement will probably not be inhibited by existing structures.
- Since building takes place from scratch, there may be a greater choice in terms of the types and quality of houses being erected.
- Since site-and-service projects are often larger than existing squatter settlements, those wishing to operate businesses in the new settlement have a potentially larger market.
- Legality (i.e. security) of tenure is obtained, and people can no longer be threatened with eviction because of trespassing and/or squatting (except in the case of a *transit camp*³ from where people may have to be removed again).

Disadvantages

- People have to move, which means that community cohesion is most probably disrupted.
- Current investments in housing and "plots" are partly destroyed.
- The current business interests of the people to be resettled may be threatened.
- The new formal neighbours may want to impose too restrictive standards to keep people out.
- People will have to get used to new neighbours, new transportation schedules and other new/unfamiliar things.
- Land for new settlement may have to be purchased from the current owner, and these costs may have to be recovered from residents.
- Although the provision of bulk services may be subsidized, residents will probably have to pay at least part of the initial costs.

³See Section 6(1) of the *Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 (Act No. 52 of 1951)* for a description of the term "transit camp".

- Residents may have to pay in full for the consumption of services.
- The costs of moving may have to be borne by the people themselves (unless they are being moved to a transit camp, in which case the authorities should pay for the costs of removal).
- The costs of rebuilding the house in the new locality will probably have to be borne by the people themselves (unless they are being resettled in a transit camp, in which case the authorities should be willing to pay for the costs of reconstruction).
- New leaderships may have to be established in the new settlement, and this may cause some disruption.
- For authorities to accept this option, the leaders may have to agree to a size restriction (i.e. that after a certain size, further in-migration may have to be prevented).
- For the new formal neighbours to accept this option, the current squatter leaders involved may have to agree in advance to:
 - (i) certain minimum standards for housing quality (i.e. that after a negotiated period of time, all houses not conforming to the negotiated standards may have to be removed) or to ways and means of "screening off" unsightly structures from the public eye, and/or
 - (ii) certain requirements concerning conduct (e.g. on matters such as rubbish dumping, nuisance, crime, etc.).
- If the new site is a transit camp, people may be asked to move again (to a permanent place) in future.

(c) Public housing projects

In public housing schemes the emphasis is on the provision of mass formal rental accommodation for lower-income families. This planning option presupposes a major reallocation of scarce economic resources to increase the housing stock and improve the housing infrastructure. Soweto, Atteridgeville and Mamelodi (PWV area), Mangaung (Bloemfontein), Langa and Nyanga (Cape Peninsula), New Brighton and Zwide (Port Elizabeth), Mdantsane (near East London), and Umlazi and KwaMashu (Durban) are examples of massive public housing projects which were aimed at alleviating housing shortages - particularly for lower-income families - in South Africa's largest cities.



People in shacks generally prefer this type of housing alternative, but as indicated by Tomlinson (1990), public housing does not have a satisfactory track record. From the literature on the subject it is clear that public housing may have many advantages but it generally has numerous disadvantages as well.

Advantages

- Good housing and services are provided, with the resultant major improvement in living conditions.
- Since the location of the public housing project is planned in a pro-active manner and the project will probably accommodate a large number of families, the chances are good that bulk services can be provided at economic rates to the new residents.
- Legality (i.e. security) of tenure is obtained, and people can no longer be threatened with eviction because of trespassing and/or squatting.

Disadvantages

- People have to move, which means that community cohesion is most probably disrupted.
- Current investments in housing and "plots" are destroyed.

- Public housing has generally been a numerical failure and this will probably also be the case here: "Fiscal constraints would ensure that an insufficient number of houses would be constructed", and "in the resulting allocative scramble, it would be naive to think that the poor would benefit" (Tomlinson 1990: 86).
- Since building costs must be kept low, there is probably no great choice in terms of the type and quality of apartments and/or houses being erected, and even then the relatively high standards may still result in the new units not being affordable to the vast majority of the poor who currently occupy shacks (see also Section 4).
- Since public housing projects are often subjected to greater control, those wishing to operate businesses in the new project may find it very difficult to do so (in spite of a potentially larger market than in the shack settlement).
- The current business interests of the people to be resettled may be threatened.
- People will have to get used to new neighbours, new transportation schedules and other new/unfamiliar things.
- Land for the public housing project may have to be purchased from the current owner, and these costs may have to be recovered from residents.
- Although the provision of bulk services may be subsidized, residents will probably have to pay at least part of the initial costs.
- Residents may have to pay in full for the consumption of services.
- The costs of moving may have to be borne by the people themselves.
- New leaderships may have to be established in the new setting, and this may cause some disruption.

(d) Migration control and closed-city policies⁴

Up to June 1986 South Africa pursued a policy of (racially based) migration control which, among other things, attempted to prevent people from entering

⁴Although migration control and closed-city policies are probably not acceptable to our society in general, some people may still believe that they may represent viable "planning options". It is for this reason only that we give some attention to these "options".

the urban areas in search of better opportunities. Prior to its abolition on 1 July 1986, this policy had been evaluated by the Human Sciences Research Council and the Urban Foundation, and in the light of experience elsewhere in the world, had been found to be generally ineffective and morally, economically, socially and politically unjustifiable.

The problems with closed-city policies are that their implementation is extremely costly and that they have not been successfully implemented anywhere - with the possible exception of the People's Republic of China. Research has shown how these attempts failed in Jakarta (Indonesia), Manila (Philippines) and Eastern Europe. The South African President's Council (*South Africa*, 1985) also indicated to what extent influx control had failed in this country and how costly the attempts to implement the policy had been.

The conclusion that is reached from the above is that migration controls and closed-city policies are not viable planning options. The emphasis should therefore be on pro-active urban accommodation strategies.

Conclusions

From the above discussion it should be clear that each of the four planning/policy options mentioned above has a number of important disadvantages. To us as researchers the advantages of *in situ* upgrading seem to outweigh the disadvantages. The same cannot necessarily be said for the other three options. It should, however, be remembered that each settlement has unique circumstances. This means that these general principles do not necessarily apply to every one of the remaining squatter settlements in the Basin. Resettlement may, therefore, have to be considered in some cases.

In that event the residents concerned may feel obliged to prolong their resistance against any such proposed resettlement, particularly if they do not fully accept the *intended destination* of the resettlement action. Such a prolonged resistance may have a number of advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered.

Advantages

- People can, in principle, stay where they are, which means that community cohesion remains intact.

- Current investments in housing and "plots" (for the greater part) remain intact.
- The current leadership of the settlement may remain intact.
- It will not be necessary for the residents to get used to new leaders, new neighbours, new transportation or other new / unfamiliar things.
- Since the land for the settlement may not have to be purchased from a current owner, such costs will not be recovered from the residents.
- Since no services are provided, residents are not liable to pay for the consumption of services.
- Since they do not move to formal housing, residents may see this as a possible way of resisting the payment of rent.
- Since internal roads are not provided, no houses have to be moved.
- There are not *new* formal neighbours wanting to impose too restrictive standards to keep people out (i.e. they are already there).
- There may be confidence among the residents that if they prolonged the resistance long enough, they may eventually be recognized by the authorities (particularly in view of the fact that a more "empathetic" regime is expected to be taking over power at the national level in the foreseeable future).

Disadvantages

- Legality of tenure is not ensured, and the people constantly face the threat of eviction.
- In spite of changes in the national regime, the people may eventually be forced to move anyway, because their legality of tenure cannot be ensured.
- Not even the most rudimentary services are provided, with the result that there is no improvement in the living conditions.
- To enable the formal neighbours to be somewhat accommodating with respect to this option, the leaders may have to agree to some unpopular measures **while they have no strong bargaining platform**:
 - certain minimum standards for housing quality (i.e. that after a negotiated period of time, all houses not conforming to the negotiated standards may have to be removed) or to ways and means of "screening off" unsightly structures from the public eye, and/or
 - certain requirements concerning conduct (e.g. on matters such as rubbish dumping, nuisance, crime, etc.).

These conclusions point to the need for planning to be undertaken in close collaboration with the people concerned and for providing everyone with all the available information.