8.

The Dynamics of Reform & Revolt in Current South Africa

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LECTURE TWO:

The Dynamics of Reform: Co-optive Domination — Sharing Power Without Losing Any
IDASA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

This series of papers is being published by IDASA as part of its contribution to the struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa. The first six papers formed part of the proceedings of the first national conference organized by IDASA in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on 8—9 May, 1987. The next three papers were presented by Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert as the (guest) Tanner Lecturer at Brasenose College, Oxford University, during October/November 1987. Other papers are drawn from a variety of sources. The full series, available from IDASA, is listed on the last page.
A great deal of confusion continues to surround the idea of "reform" in the present South African context. There is no point in arguing whether there has been change/reform or not. Of course there has. But how do we assess its significance? There is truth in the assertion of Government spokesmen that at the moment that they introduced more reforms away from the Apartheid/ Separate Development policy than ever in the history of National Party Government, they experienced the severest pressure and hostility from inside and outside the country. But this is so because with the reforms the realization has crystallized that the South African State is prepared to "negotiate", "broaden democracy", "dismantle Apartheid", i.e. "reform" but only on its terms.

The tricameral Parliament is the continuing manifestation of this kind of logic. Nothing precipitated domestic, and subsequently international, revolt against South African Government reforms more than its implementation. It more than anything else demonstrated that those in control of the State were prepared to adjust, "soften" and sophisticate the entrenchment of white minority domination, but not get rid of it. It brought some of those who are not white a little closer to the centre of power, whilst showing them how far away they are going to remain from it.

There is nothing fundamentally new in the thinking which accompanied the shift from a racist Westminster to a multi-racial tricameral system of Parliament. At the heart of it was the idea that racial groups could be accommodated as pre-determined political entities into a South African political system. Within the logic of Apartheid-Separate Development the shift was certainly new, if not all that fundamental. Until 1983 the idea was that a National Party Government could unilaterally partition racial groups away from the political centre and so preserve white "self-determination" or domination. No one can sensibly deny the reality of racial or ethnic groups in South Africa, but the National Party government has seized on this reality to determine that every South African individual shall participate in politics only as a member of a racial or ethnic group. If one asks "Why?", it is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is done so that Afrikaner Nationalists, as the largest white ethnic group, can dominate the political system as part of a racial minority. Whatever P W Botha has in mind in the nature of reform, as the embodiments of the present Afrikaner Nationalist leadership, he certainly does not see an alternative where he and/or his party will not be firmly in political control of South Africa. And when he talks about negotiation, he certainly has no intention of talking himself, or his successor, out of a job.

This is the crux of the matter. On this issue, different agendas for "reform", "negotiation", "broadening democracy" and "transferring power" find their origin. That is why opposing groups very often use the same concepts with completely different meanings. As for those who dominate in South Africa, they are prepared to adjust the domination, but not to abolish it — this is their so-called "bottom line" for reform, whereas those who oppose domination demand the abolition of it before accepting the validity-legitimacy of reform. That is why the overwhelming response to the reform programme of the Government has been revolt — both domestically and internationally. The intersection between reform and revolt has trapped South Africa into a process of violent evolution which threatens to ravage its human and natural resources.

A simple question needs to be answered: If the above is true, why reform at all? The conventional response to this question tends to identify various sources of pressure which in a sense "forced" the South African state to bring about certain reforms: international action, domestic political reaction, urbanization, etc. No doubt these factors played an important part in influencing the National Party Government's actions, but these pressures have always been present in stronger or weaker form. In fact, Verwoerd's response to these pressures was precisely to shift the policy of Apartheid to Separate Development. This policy shift must rank as one of the massive attempts at social engineering of the 20th Century. It was done to maintain or preserve "white minority self-determination" in South Africa and to free it from the accusation of racial domination. The shift from Separate Development to Reform is pre-occupied with exactly the same problem. Again and in the final analysis "reform" is necessary to preserve "white self-determination" and again it is intended to bring about a situation "where no one group must be in a position to dominate another or others".

However, the scope and tempo of reform cannot be adequately understood in terms of a particular factor or group of factors supposedly influencing it or intended to bring it about, e.g. sanctions, armed struggle, township unrest, diplomatic pressures, etc. To the extent that this is done, it is easy to understand why reforms thus far are dismissed as "sham", "cosmetic", "too little, too late", etc. The pattern and tempo of reform has to be understood in terms of how the white minority has defined its security interests, reshaped the security system and co-ordinated the whole state bureaucracy to deal with any conceivable threat to its interests. In the process, it has developed a vast empire of patronage in which a diversity of clients has a very real vested interest in maintaining the South African state. In fact, without the compliance of a substantial number of people who are not white, white minority domination would be in very real difficulty indeed. Reform is intended to extend this system of patronage and thereby strengthen the security of the state as defined by the white minority in control. Security and reform go hand in hand, but it is only if one understands the priority that security interests enjoy, that some of the confusion surrounding the reform programme can be cleared up. It is almost impossible to make sense of the constitutional programme of the National Party Government if it is viewed on its own as a "rational" or "reasonable" response to pressures for reform from, say the ANC, UDF, EPG, Inkatha or even white liberals. However, viewed against the background of the National Security Management System developed by the Botha Government, the constitutional programme interlocks quite efficiently with the Security system. It is true that P W Botha has "reformed" Apartheid and Separate Development more than any other National Party leader before him. What is not often appreciated is how extensively he reshaped the security system of South Africa and the South African State Bureaucracy which made it possible to bring about those reforms, but also limited him and those
around him in how far those reforms could go. A brief analysis of the development of the security system will deepen our understanding of the reform programme and also why it is almost inevitably bound up with continuing revolt.

Before 1948, i.e. before National Party rule, conventional military policy was based on the assumption that there was a clear identity of interests between South Africa and the West. As during the two World Wars and even the Korean War, it was accepted that in any major international conflict South Africa would side with the West. But as Apartheid became official policy and South Africa became increasingly isolated, the defence planners began to accept that the West was embarrassed to be seen having South Africa as an ally. Gradually the West was depicted as hostile to the security interests of South Africa and later even as an unwitting ally of Soviet expansionism which coveted South Africa as a "strategic jewel" of great importance. Cut off from arms supply because of an international embargo as well as facing increasing diplomatic isolation, security planners turned to domestic resources to reshape the security system, firstly in the area of armaments provision, and secondly in terms of manpower. Politically this refocusing of the security system involved a massive propaganda campaign to sell the "total onslaught".

Before this became the major preoccupation of the security planners, the bureaucracy involved with security/intelligence matters went through various changes as definitions and perceptions of security matters changed. From 1948-1963 there was a Special Branch of the Police that had to focus on any internal security threat. The Security Police came into being in 1963 under General van den Bergh, a close confidante of John Vorster. A Directorate of Military Intelligence came into being in 1964 and a State Security Committee had to co-ordinate Intelligence gathering and prevent overlapping as far as possible between Military Intelligence and the Security Police. There was always an uneasy relationship between these two branches of the intelligence community and in 1969 a Bureau of State Security (BOSS) was created under the same General van den Bergh with the following terms of reference:

1. "Investigate all matters affecting the security of the State, to correlate and evaluate the information collected and, where necessary, to inform and advise the Government, interested Government departments and other bodies in regard thereto; and
2. perform such other functions and responsibilities as may be determined from time to time."

At this stage, there were actually three departments involved with security/intelligence matters: the Security Police, Military Intelligence and the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). Bureaucratic envy, one-upmanship and overlapping remained a problem. John Vorster appointed Justice H J Potgieter to head a Commission of Inquiry. He recommended the creation of a State Security Council which came into effect through the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act (No. 64 of 1972) with the following terms of reference:

1. "The formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic and the manner in which such policy or strategy shall be implemented and executed;
2. A policy to combat any particular threat to the security of the Republic (and) ... to determine intelligence priorities."

The SSC broadened the basis of interaction between professionals and politicians on security matters. It also enabled P W Botha, as Minister of Defence, to have a greater say in security matters and to try to limit the influence of General van den Bergh of BOSS with whom he had a personally hostile relationship. Botha was also intensely jealous of any encroachment on military matters and, given the wide scope of BOSS's terms of reference, it was almost inevitable that clashes of interests would arise. Van den Bergh had the inside track with Prime Minister John Vorster, and therefore his view on security matters tended to prevail. In any case, Vorster gave Van den Bergh almost carte blanche in this respect. Van den Bergh, together with Dr Connie Mulder, Minister of Information and the most likely successor to Vorster, embarked on an aggressive campaign to sell South Africa (i.e. Separate Development) to the international community and to Africa. For this they established a number of secret funds unaccountable to Parliament. One such source was within the Department of Defence, much to the discomfort of PW Botha. Botha's view on the security interests of the RSA differed quite sharply from those of Van den Bergh and Mulder. Instead of "selling Separate Development" to an unwilling outside world, South Africa should be preparing itself for the "total onslaught".

Botha and his top Generals, particularly Magnus Malan (later to become Minister of Defence himself), were profoundly influenced by the work of General Andre Baufre, a French militarist who wrote about his experiences in World War 2 and the War in Indo-China. Baufre wrote about the need for a "total strategy" in order to cope with a "total war". This book also formed the basis of lectures at the Joint Defence College and became required reading for "red stream" staff officers in civil military relations. Botha's thinking on the issue of "total onslaught", and which remains unchanged even today, is reflected in his introduction to the Defence White Paper tabled in Parliament in 1973:

"The RSA is a target for international communism and its cohorts -- leftists, activists, exaggerated humanitarianism, permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies. In addition, the RSA has been singled out as a special target for the by-products of their ideologies such as black radicalism, exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed against us on the basis of double standards. "It is against this global background that the Government is developing its policy. Traditionally, a country's policy structure comprises three basic elements -- internal policy, foreign policy and defence policy. The last is determined by the preceding two, but these in turn cannot be developed properly unless they are sustained by a sound and adequate defence policy. These basic elements must therefore be closely co-ordinated and integrated; this is of vital importance, particularly in the present international climate which is typified by total strategy and which obliges us to face the onslaught of monolithic organisations which are in absolute control of all the means available to their states."

From the outset, Botha's idea (shared by all his top officers) of a "total strategy" to cope with "the total onslaught" drew no distinction between defence/security interests and domestic and foreign policy. The 1977 White Paper on Defence tabled in Parliament fully developed the
idea of a total National Strategy. It recommended that the State Security Council (SSC) should be assisted by a permanent work committee drawn from a dozen or more State Departments. Within the ambit of a total national strategy, the White Paper identified certain goals for the State. These included:

- the orderly development and maintenance of the body politic;
- the preservation of the identity, dignity, the right to self-determination and the integrity of all population groups;
- the identification, prevention and countering of revolution, subversion and any other form of unconstitutional action;
- the maintenance of a sound balance of military power in relation to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa;
- aiming for the greatest possible measure of economic and social development, and the maximum self-sufficiency;
- the creation of friendly relations and political and economic co-operation with the states of Southern Africa; and
- planning the total national strategy at Government level for co-ordinated action between all Government departments, Government institutions and other authorities to counter the multi-dimensional onslaught against the RSA in the ideological, military, economic, social, psychological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields."

From 1948 to 1979, almost 30 years of National Party rule, the changes in the internal security structures were the result of a long and convoluted interaction between the various security intelligence agencies in South Africa. There was confusion about goals and functions, overlapping and interdepartmental rivalry. However, ever since P W Botha took over as Minister of Defence in 1966, he was determined to make the South African Defence Force militarily strong and self-sufficient. He responded to the arms embargo by developing Armscor into an impressive arms exporting industry — one of the ten largest in the world. His defence philosophy encompassed both foreign and regional policy and reached far into most aspects of domestic policy. It was Botha who masterminded the military intervention into Angola in 1974-75, thus sacrificing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and introducing a policy of destabilization for neighbouring states. And long before he became Prime Minister, he argued tirelessly for a national “total strategy” to ward off the “total onslaught”. It is fascinating to speculate on what would have happened to the ideology of “total strategy/total onslaught” if Dr Connie Mulder and General Van den Bergh had not been eliminated from security/intelligence influence as a result of the so-called Information Scandal from 1974 to 1979. Until then, Botha was not considered a very serious contender for the position of Prime Minister. When Vorster resigned, Connie Mulder seemed earmarked for the position. The “Information Scandal” revealed a massive misappropriation of secret funds. Mulder and Van den Bergh were deeply implicated and even Vorster came out of it with deep political scars. Botha and his supporters moved swiftly; the caucus of the National Party elected him to succeed Vorster and it was not long before Mulder, Van den Bergh and Vorster were out of the picture. For the first time, P W Botha was in a position to implement his security policy without any other departmental competitors or strong personalities to challenge him. He lost no time — he promised “clean administration” and a rationalization of the civil service. But the country, as well as the State bureaucracy, had to be educated on the “total onslaught” as well.

In the White Paper on Defence in 1979 (the year that P W Botha became Prime Minister), it was bluntly stated that “the total onslaught as is being waged against South Africa” required “highly co-ordinated action” if it was to be successfully counteracted.9

The following year, General Magnus Malan, who was soon to move from being a professional soldier to Minister of Defence in the Botha Cabinet, spoke at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria, and said:

“The design of a total onslaught, masterfully controlled by Russia, robs the intended victim of the luxury of preparation from mobilization to conventional warfare. The RSA realised the necessity of a state of continued preparedness to cope with the onslaught on its power bases. For this a total strategy is necessary, because a total onslaught against the RSA can only be overcome by a co-ordinated application of all the means at the RSA’s disposal.”

In a special series of articles in Paratus, the official Defence Force magazine widely distributed to conscripts, Permanent Force members and all arms of the civil service, the SADF argued the need for “total involvement” because: “the enemies of the RSA will eventually try to deliver the coup de grace by means of a conventional onslaught from one or more of the neighbouring states... This onslaught would include maritime action and be accompanied by large-scale internal unrest. The USSR is for this reason using the so-called threat that South Africa’s military potential holds for its neighbouring states as an excuse to supply huge quantities of arms to those countries. This build up also includes the gradual increase in involvement by Soviet-bloc military personnel as well as the development of those countries’ infrastructure for war.”

Notice again how the description of the “total onslaught/total strategy” interaction involved co-ordinated action in the areas of international, regional and domestic policy. The period 1979-87 saw the militarization of the South African society on an unprecedented scale. The 1982 Defence White Paper sets, as one of the goals of the SADF, the policy of militarizing the entire society; “It is policy that all population groups be involved in defending the RSA. This means the representation of all population groups in the SADF, in other words, a Defence Force of the People for the People.”

There already existed an Indian and Cape Coloured Corps and the idea was to establish battalions in each of the so-called National States. There is no compulsory conscription for those who are not white, but the SADF has no difficulty in recruiting more than the required volunteers that it can accommodate. It is important to realize that the “total involvement” of other population groups in the defence of the RSA also serves as a powerful rationale for “dismantling Apartheid” and legitimizing “reform”.

One of the first things Botha did when he became Prime Minister was to reduce the number of Cabinet Committees and to co-ordinate their agendas. One of them, the State Security Council, was elevated into a position of special prominence. It enjoyed Statutory recognition and Botha, as Prime Minister, was its Chairman. In terms of its scope of activities a National Security Management System was
adopted on 16 August 1979. The NSMS has created a formidable apparatus, drawing together officials and politicians who wield extraordinary power and influence in South Africa. Not only has it effected a very high degree of coordination in the civil service; it has also induced a much higher degree of efficiency in coping with perceived security threats, and has infused in a new generation of public servants and other beneficiaries of State patronage an awareness of "total onslaught" and a commitment to "total strategy" as a means of coping with it.

The NSMS is deployed on the central, regional and local level of State Administration.

(a) THE CENTRAL LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION

On this level, there are five major components:

1. the CABINET: which together with the President forms the link between political and security interests.

2. the STATE SECURITY COUNCIL: It has the State President (formerly the Prime Minister) as Chairman, and includes the Senior Minister in the Cabinet, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Police as well as the Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS has replaced BOSS in the meantime), the Chief of the SADF, the Commissioner of the South African Police, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of Justice. Additional members can be co-opted as circumstances may require.

   The SSC meets every fortnight before the Cabinet and oversees security and intelligence matters. The State President then reports to the Cabinet on such matters.

3. A PERMANENT WORKING COMMITTEE: It consists of the Heads of Departments represented on the SSC as well as the Chairmen of the other Cabinet Committees.

   Its functions are to meet every fortnight before the SSC meets to discuss the agenda of the SSC and to make recommendations on advice of the SSC to the Cabinet.

4. THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SSC: consists entirely of civil servants (approximately 100) who serve there, either permanently or on secondment. The representation from Government Departments is: 11% Foreign Affairs; 1% Prison Services, 11% Security Police, 5% Railway Police, 16% SADF and 56% NIS, (i.e. 89% of the representation comes from security/intelligence agencies.)

   The Secretariat has four branches:

   (i) The Administrative Branch whose functions are self-evident.

   (ii) The National Intelligence Interpretation Branch: it has to provide intelligence reports and interpret national intelligence.

   (iii) The Strategic Communication Branch: its main task is to devise strategies to counteract negative propaganda and to promote positive propaganda.

   (iv) The Strategy Branch: it formulates "total strategies" and co-ordinates policies of interdepartmental committees.

5. INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEES: The Departments involved are: Manpower, Security Services, Civil Defence, Transport, National Supplies and Resources, Government Funding, National Economy, Telecommunications and Electrical Power Supply, Service & Technology, Community Services, Culture, Political Affairs.

   These interdepartmental committees are the key to the Strategy Branch of the Secretariat. They provide departmental strategies which the Strategy Branch of the Secretariat co-ordinates into a "total strategy" to deal with an overall security threat.

(b) THE REGIONAL LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION

On this level there are twelve Joint Management Centres located conveniently at the 12 SADF command headquarters in Durban, Kimberley, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Oudtshoorn, Walvis Bay, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Potchefstroom, Pietersburg, Nelspruit. Eventually it is intended to let them correspond to the nine economic development regions that have been identified. Each JMC consists of between 40 to 60 officials drawn from Government Departments with an "interest in the activities of the JMC" and each JMC has three Standing Committees.

(i) A Joint Intelligence Standing Committee (GIK) — It has to evaluate intelligence reports in the region.

(ii) A Constitutional, Economic & Social Standing Committee (SEMKOM) — It has to formulate joint strategies on a regional level to counteract security threats identified by the JIC (GIK).

(iii) A Communications Standing Committee (KOMKOM) — It disseminates accurate information (propaganda) or disinforms opponents.

(Notice how the three standing committees dovetail in terms of functions on a regional level with the functions of the three branches of the Secretariat on the central level.)

Each JMC has an executive which consists of the Chairman of the JMC (in all cases so far it is a Brigadier of the SADF or SAP) and the Chairman of the three Standing Committees.

The formal terms of reference of the JMC's are: "... to ensure the necessary co-ordination on security matters at regional and local levels through the Departments concerned" but as General Piet van der Westhuizen, current Secretary-General of the SSC put it, the JMC's are the eyes and ears of the NSMS and they monitor the implementation of total strategies. Their prime objective is "the lowering of the revolutionary climate; the prevention/defusing of unrest, and combating terrorism and other revolutionary actions."

The JMC's bring together in one organization all the top officials in the respective regions and they also control formidable executive powers. The total strategy applied to "external onslaught" at least provides the civil service and army with the fiction that this is in the interest of all South Africans and is therefore "non-political action". However, countering the "internal onslaught" or "lowering the revolutionary climate" brings the organs of State into direct political controversy which destroys any pretence at political neutrality. The South African State becomes both the agent for "reform" to meet the onslaught as well as the source of counter-revolutionary action to undermine it.

If those who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of reform are also part of "the total onslaught", it is not difficult to see how reform and revolt are inextricably linked to one another.

(c) THE LOCAL LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION

On this level, there are 60 Sub-Management Centres corresponding roughly to the 57 Regional Service Councils that have been delimited and a further 350 Mini...
Management Centres covering most of the towns of the RSA. It is on the local level of the NSMS administration that civilians become involved in the “total strategy” for the first time. Leading local personalities or office-bearers of local interest groups are co-opted onto these Management Centres and their activities co-ordinated into strategies defined by the JMC’s at the regional and professional level of the NSMS. Activities at the local level can cover a wide range of activities which relate to security and intelligence matters: civil defence, emergency action, anti-terrorist training, first aid, distress relief action, etc.

In tracing how the security interests of the RSA as defined by those in control of the State have changed over time, one is able to see how it became possible to abandon key aspects of Apartheid/Separate Development in favour of a “Total Onslaught/Total Strategy” alternative. The National Party Government under P W Botha shifted from pro-actively motivating whites in favour of Apartheid/Separate Development, as was the case under Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd and Vorster, to reactively motivating them against the “Total Onslaught”. That is why the values of security and stability have begun to lose their instrumental character and have become ends in themselves. The NSMS of the P W Botha era provides the policy framework within which the resources of the South African State are organized in a “total strategy” to combat “the threat”.

Any person or movement that questions the State’s perceptions of “the threat” is defined as part of it and, similarly, those who resist being co-opted into the “total strategy” become defined as its legitimate targets. It is an ideology with a built-in self-fulfilling logic. As long as the right of those who define “the onslaught” and “manage the strategy” is not questioned or threatened, they will tolerate, even encourage “reform”, the “broadening of democracy” and “negotiation”. The moment it is questioned, even by implication, as happened during the EPG and Howe visits, National Party Government spokesmen use concepts such as “suicide”, “surrender”, “chaos”, “disintegration”, to conjure up alternative possibilities to their own continued control. The propaganda import is obvious — if a future strategy could lead to “suicide”, or some apocalyptic equivalent, the continued costs of the present one remain bearable. Divergent, even hostile interest groups find themselves somehow trapped into arguing within this propaganda framework — from right-wing racists to businessmen — even to some liberal newspaper editors. The morality and logic which argue that the fight for survival respects no rules are perfectly compatible with the argument: “better the devil you know, than the one you don’t”. It is in this ideological context that the South African state’s international, regional and domestic policies have to be understood. Actions of the Government which “normally” don’t make sense become coherent, e.g. the raid on neighbouring territories during the EPG visit and whilst Reagan and Thatcher were fighting desperate rearguard actions against sanctions. The EPG, Reagan, Thatcher and Howe all came with the same message: dismantle Apartheid, release political prisoners, unban organisations and negotiate. The obvious question: “What is to be negotiated once Apartheid has been dismantled?”, was answered by P W Botha at the 1986 Transvaal Congress of the National Party when he accused “the outside world of confusing reform with surrender”. Similarly, the South African State’s regional policy does not hesitate to defy convention, use sub-terfuge, lies and uncomplicated force if it serves the “total strategy” in its fight against “the onslaught”.

The NSMS is the policy which gives effect to the ideology of Total Strategy vs Total Onslaught. It also destroys any pretence at neutrality or non-partisanship. The idea of a neutral civil service loyally and disinterestedly serving whichever Government happened to be in power, was still a strong tradition when the National Party took over in 1948. However, as Afrikaner nationalism consolidated itself and the civil service became the major channel of Afrikaner economic mobility, the partisan nature of the State bureaucracy became increasingly evident. Furthermore, new and vast bureaucracies were created in order to give effect to what was essentially a party political doctrine, i.e. Apartheid and Separate Development. With the implementation of a “total strategy”, which draws on “all the available resources” to meet “the onslaught” no competing and especially, contradictory, ideologies or political programmes can be tolerated. Thus, P W Botha, by redefining the security interests of the South African State, has given it a coherence and unity of purpose which it has not had before; it has developed a common ideology, a common set of goals and strategies and an overall policy in terms of which to implement them. Every State structure including Parliament, Homeland Governments, “Independent States” and neighbouring countries are subservient to the goals and logic of the “total strategy”. Even “reform”.

On the domestic front, the crisp issue of “reform” is how to jettison Apartheid/Separate Development without losing control and still mobilize enough support for “the total strategy”. Constitutionally the response has been a massive and sustained erosion of accountable politics in favour of co-optive decision-making. At the central and key points, the control that the white minority has, ensures that its will cannot be challenged by popular rejection. The quid pro quo for co-optive control has been a multi-racialize political participation. As the 1986 White Paper on Defence made clear, whites alone cannot implement the “total strategy”. The other population groups have to make their contribution as well. At present the South African State is planning to regulate this contribution in the constitutional area. It appears that what they have in mind is a multi-racial constitution making provision for the group representation of homeland, urban and rural blacks, as well as Coloureds, Asians and Whites, with the white minority at the apex of control.

Those in control have no objections to popular elections, provided they occur within structures determined by them and provided at the vital areas of decision-making no headcount will determine the outcome where the Government’s own representation is in the minority. This pattern of representation is evident in the tricameral Parliament, the Regional Services Councils, the MEC’s of the former Provincial Councils and in the latest development, the National Council, which provides for elected blacks outside the Homeland and Independent territories. The overall structure could very well be a quasi-representative multi-racial autocracy with the white minority in firm control over political decision-making and national security. For propaganda purposes it will be presented as a Government of National Unity — the South African people’s response to “the total onslaught”; whilst conceding that it may not be perfect, it is South Africa’s unique way of responding to a unique problem and is preferable to what would happen
under a "one-man-one-vote ANC and Communist controlled State".

The viability of this system of co-optive domination will depend primarily on two things: the South African State's continuing power of patronage and a sufficient degree of co-operation from other population groups to make the system work. It is important to realise that co-optive domination does not depend on legitimacy and/or majority support to work (too often people tend to think that by demonstrating the illegitimacy of a regime they have also predicted its collapse); it simply needs enough people to participate in order to make the system work. This is where the battle is raging at its fiercest in urban black communities. The South African State is determined to find "good", "responsible", "peace-loving" blacks, and townships are torn between co-operating and rejecting any form of collaboration. Almost every aspect of black community life has become politicized so that everyday normal activities/issues become topics of heated debate. It appears to be slowly crystallizing into an ideological division between a multi-racial autocracy vs a non-racial or "socialist democracy". By defining those who argue or struggle for a popular democracy based on the free association of individuals as subversive, the South African State has brought the "total onslaught" into the domestic arena. Its own counter-strategy is to offer multi-racial patronage as part and parcel of its "reform" programme. That is why the State's reform programme has to be accompanied by a massive extension of coercion or repression. For the State to allow genuine accountable politics, it would have to face the risk of popular rejection of its whole "total strategy" and eventually of the position of minority domination for the whites. As PW Botha has so bluntly stated to the British Foreign Minister: "This could be political suicide."

The constitutional reform package which thus dovetails with the NSMS depends on co-optive participation at various levels of civilian government:

(a) At the CENTRAL LEVEL
(i) A federation of States between South Africa and the TBVC countries;
(ii) A National Council consisting of nine black representatives elected in each of the nine economic regions delimited by the State. Representatives from the Homeland Governments as well as the State President, a few Cabinet Ministers and nine others nominated by the State President.

(b) At the REGIONAL LEVEL:
(i) MEC's of the former Provincial Council;
(ii) Nine Electoral divisions for blacks from the nine economic development areas;
(iii) Homeland areas.

(c) At the LOCAL LEVEL:
(i) Regional Service Councils;
(ii) Local Governments
(iii) Management Committees.

At each level an element of the NSMS is at hand to coordinate security strategies with political reform programmes. The State is determined to channel all forms of political participation into these pre-determined co-optive structures and then to "negotiate" further constitutional developments. Any dissent that tries to manifest itself outside of these structures is treated as an unwitting or willing agent of the "total onslaught" and can expect the full force of the State's repressive measures to act against it. It is against this background that one has to understand the structures, organisations and strategies for resistance, opposition or revolt and assess their chances of success. This is what the final talk is all about.

Notes:
9. Much of the detailed information on the structure of the NSMS depends on the unpublished thesis for a MA degree in Political Science by: J Selke: The Total Onslaught and the Total Strategy, UCT, 1986, Chapter III.

IDASA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

2. Democracy and Law, Advocate Arthur Chaskalson, national director, Legal Resources Centre.
5. Democracy and the Church. Prof J W. de Gruchy, professor of Christian studies, University of Cape Town.
11. Their Perception of the "South African" Problem. Irina Filatova (doctor of science in history, Moscow State University).
12. South Africa as seen by Russian and Soviet People, and Their Perception of the "South African" Problem. Irina Filatova (doctor of science in history, Moscow State University).
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