

An American View
OF THE
**SOUTH AFRICAN
SITUATION**

How Australasia Might Help
Great Britain

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Author of "World Politics," etc.

C. E. T. Hargrove

Dr. W. J. LEYDS
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NOTE.

The object of the writer of these pages has been to present facts, and to point out evident deductions from those facts, but to state nothing on his own authority. Too often mere personal abuse has taken the place of reason in public discussions of the future of South Africa. The writer trusts that he has avoided this error; while by preserving his anonymity and by leaving the responsibility for statements of fact with official Blue Books and with those who are widely recognized as authorities on the subject, he hopes to gain an impersonal and unbiassed hearing for his views.

AN AMERICAN VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION.

HOW AUSTRALASIA MIGHT HELP GREAT BRITAIN.

It may seem at first sight that the welfare of the British Empire can affect the British people only, and that Americans can in no way be concerned with the situation in South Africa. This view, however, is as superficial as that which sees profit to America in disaster to Great Britain. Looking a little deeper beneath the surface of events, and a little further ahead than the next moment, makes it evident that the English-speaking world is commercially, socially, and politically interdependent. A common language, quick communication, and intimate commercial relations provide a nervous system of extreme sensitiveness. Public opinion in any one part quickly affects the thought of the whole. Action sets up reflex action, and conduct, rightly or wrongly interpreted, is taken as an example, or is used as a pretext, for similar conduct elsewhere. That "whatever really benefits one nation benefits all nations, and whatever really injures one, injures all," is true at least of the United States of America and of that vast conglomerate of peoples, the British Empire.

It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that a citizen of the United States, if he believes that the British Empire would be benefited by adopting some course in South Africa which he sees as the best, is entitled, if only for the sake of his own country, to present his view to the British people. Desiring to do so, he is at once confronted with a difficulty.

At present it is almost impossible to get the people of England to listen to any suggestion that deviates by a hair's-breadth from their preconceived and newspaper-begotten convictions. Owing to their close proximity to

the by no means friendly criticism of the continent of Europe, they are naturally in a hypersensitive condition where South Africa is concerned. They are in the position of a man who has been abused so persistently that he expects abuse and refuses to listen even to his friends, in the belief that they too must necessarily indulge in it.

Fortunately, the people of Australia and New Zealand are, in this respect, more happily situated. They are so far from Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg that they scarcely notice the abuse of those cities. Nor were they entangled personally as were the people of Great Britain, in the events and discussions that led up to the war. Consequently, they are not expectant of abuse or deaf to friendly suggestion. In other words, they are easier to approach than the English of England, from America particularly, seeing that America and Australasia have much in common, politically and otherwise, that England does not share with either.

It is natural, therefore, that an American, wishing to suggest some modification of British policy in South Africa, should prefer to address the people of Australasia, leaving it to them to deal with the suggestion as they see fit. Their influence is immense, and, if they approve the idea, they cannot possibly be suspected of unfriendliness if they, in their turn, submit it to the Government of Great Britain. They have fought and many of them have died in a quarrel that was theirs by adoption only—for the sake of the mother-country. No one can dispute their right to a voice in the settlement. It may even be held that they have more than a right in the matter: that they have a duty. Should they not accept the responsibility of their action in having sent men to fight in this war? Should they not use brains and experience as well as muscle on behalf of the mother-country? They know that their physical strength was needed: is it not reasonable to suppose that their advice, based upon the experience that life in a young and growing country alone provides, is needed also? They have played a leading part in the war. Perhaps, before they can claim to have done their whole duty in the matter, they ought to play a leading part in the settlement after the war.

It is too easy a proceeding to throw all the responsibility upon the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In the past, the Colonial Prime Ministers have managed to satisfy their consciences, and the consciences of their people, by unanimous and wholesale indorsement of everything that the Colonial Secretary has done or has wished

to do in South Africa. This may have saved them the trouble of thinking; it may have elicited a blessing from Downing Street; but whether it be true loyalty is doubtful. Ministers are perfectly well aware that Mr. Chamberlain, no matter what his virtues may be, has not shown actual omniscience concerning Australasia. They have had to correct him, directly and indirectly, more than once. Why should they suppose him to be omniscient when dealing with South Africa? And if it be urged that he ought at least to know more about it than they do, seeing that he has been concerned officially in the matter for years, it may be suggested that non-participants in a dispute are often better able to gauge a situation than those can be whose personal feelings and official acts are interwoven with every thread of it.

The fact is that it is possible to have a splendid loyalty and yet to be wise. In national as in social matters, the blind indorsement of whatever a friend or a parent may do, merely because he does it, is the loyalty of a fool. It hinders the friend instead of helping him.

At the time of writing the war is not over, and if it were, it would be necessary to remember that "every ultimate fact is but the first of a new series." The war, from any point of view, was but a means to an end. That end was the wise settlement of South African affairs. The mere cessation of hostilities cannot secure it. "You can do anything with the point of a bayonet, except sit down on it," said Von Moltke, a soldier of experience; and universal experience has shown that as much depends upon the wisdom of the settlement after a war as upon any number of defeats or victories.

What, then, would be a satisfactory settlement of the South African situation? That seems to be the question with which the people of Australia and New Zealand, like those of England, are now confronted. In order to answer it, the history of South Africa must briefly be reviewed. Of course, what Great Britain has done, what Australasia has done, can in no case be undone; so the action of the past can only be of use to us in so far as it can throw light upon the action of the future. But to that extent and for that purpose it is important to know the facts.

The history of South Africa is known, roughly, to most people. It does not provide agreeable reading for those who would like to believe that Great Britain is an exception to the rule, and that she, alone among nations, can do no wrong. "Truth is the strong thing," however, and it

is best in any case to tell the truth, no matter what inferences we may see fit to draw from it; so in this case it will be best at once to recognize that no one defends the part Great Britain played in her early dealings with the Boers.

The Cape of Good Hope was discovered by the Portuguese. It was colonized by the Dutch in 1652, and later by a number of French Huguenots who had fled from France to Holland after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Dutch held possession until 1795, when, during the Napoleonic wars, it was captured by the British. On the conclusion of peace in 1802 it was restored to Holland. In 1806 it was again captured by Great Britain, and in 1814 it was finally ceded by William of Orange, in part payment of a debt incurred by him during his exile in England. This was done without the consent of the people who had made the Cape their home, though in fairness to William of Orange it should be said that he had no choice in the matter.

This transference of the Cape to Great Britain clearly absolved the Dutch and French residents (who had become one people under the name of Boers—Dutch for “farmers”) from all allegiance to Holland, though it is not so clear that they thereby became bound in allegiance to Great Britain. However that may be, they continued to live in Cape Colony; though not for long.

A series of blunders committed by British statesmen resulted, in 1836, in an exodus of the more enterprising Boers from British territory. They moved north. President Kruger, then a young lad, took part in this movement, generally known as the Great Trek. “It is not a pleasant admission for an Englishman to make,” says Mr. Theal, the English historian of South Africa, “but it is the truth, that it would be difficult to find in any part of the world a people with so much cause to be discontented as the old inhabitants of the Cape Colony for many years” preceding the Great Trek.

In the first place, the missionaries, who were represented in London while the Boers were not, were intent upon the conversion of the blacks, and in order to convert them found it expedient to take their side in all their quarrels with the white population. This brought the missionaries into conflict with the Boers, for the Boer farmers and the blacks were the only occupants of the up-country districts. The missionaries, supported by the Home Government, accused the Boers of cruelty and caused numbers of them to be arrested and tried. For

months the whole colony was in commotion, hundreds of Boers who had not been arrested being subpoenaed as witnesses. The missionaries failed to prove their case. But the Boers were naturally disgusted with their treatment, for they had been put to great expense and had been grossly slandered, and there was no knowing when the same thing might not happen again, particularly as several missionaries had married black women and had constituted themselves the champions of that race.

In the second place, the treatment of the Boers after the release of their slaves had certainly been unjust. Until 1833 slavery was still practised in British Colonies. It was then decided to suppress it. Now in South Africa there were no white "laborers." The blacks supplied the labor. Consequently, the Boer farmers, like the English planters of the West Indies, found themselves face to face with ruin when they heard that they were to be deprived of the only form of labor available to them. But they were promised compensation, and submitted. When the time came they discovered that the compensation, which proved to be much smaller than they had been led to expect, was payable in London! This meant that in most cases the cost of collecting what was due to them would have been greater than the sum they might hope to obtain. They felt they had been cheated.

In the third place, as the Boers saw it, the British Government would neither protect them from the murderous incursions of the natives, nor allow them to protect themselves. In the fourth place, the citizens' Senate was abolished, and the municipal and other functions that had been performed by the Senate were taken over by the Governor and his assistants. It was for these and for similar reasons that a large number of Boers decided to move beyond the sphere of British influence.

Trekking north, they arranged to purchase from Dingaan, the chief of the Zulus who lived in Natal, a large portion of his territory. When the time came for payment, Dingaan murdered their envoys, including Pieter Retief, their leader. The Boer emigrants then fought and defeated the Zulus and settled in Natal.

There they formed themselves into a Republic; founded the town of Pietermaritzburg, and—knowing that the British Government had proposed to leave them alone after they had trekked—concluded that their wanderings were over and that they would thereafter be allowed to live in peace. As soon, however, as it became known in Cape Town that they had occupied a harbor (Durban),

a frigate was sent north to clear them out and to claim Natal as British territory. This was the first time such a claim had been made, so the Boers naturally felt aggrieved. They learned, too, that while they had been fighting for their lives against the Zulus, the British authorities in Cape Town had done everything possible to cut off their supplies of ammunition.

Most of them decided to trek again. Some of them went to what afterward became the Orange Free State, where a few had gone in the first place; others crossed the Vaal River to what afterward became the South African Republic. In their new homes they were alternately let alone and bullied, according to the character and policy of the Colonial Secretary who might happen to be in office. At last, in 1852, the complete and unqualified independence of the Transvaal Boers was formally acknowledged in a treaty known as the Sand River Convention. In 1854 the complete and unqualified independence of the Orange Free State was also acknowledged.

Those who go to an extreme in their hostility to the Boers are apt to ignore the Sand River Convention and to begin their history of South Africa in 1881, when Mr. Gladstone is said to have given the Transvaal its independence. This is done by at least one well-known writer on South African affairs, perhaps the most widely read of any, who, professing to write history, does not mention this Convention. No matter what our conclusions may be, let us be fair in arriving at them. No one can honestly overlook the fact that after much disputation and some fighting, the Orange Free State and Transvaal Boers were acknowledged as separate and independent peoples in 1852 and 1854. There was no suggestion of suzerainty at that time.

For some years after this the Boers and the British were at peace. British policy continued to ebb and flow, at one time expansive, at another contractive; aggressive, and then pacific. But although this may have bewildered the Boers, whose one aim it was to be allowed to live their own lives in their own way, it did not bring them into armed conflict with Great Britain. In 1871, however, a conflict was narrowly avoided.

In 1870 diamonds had been discovered in the southwestern part of the Orange Free State, in the neighborhood of what is now the town of Kimberley. This territory was immediately claimed by Great Britain on behalf of a native chief. The Free State Boers were indignant, but decided that they were too weak to maintain their

rights by force. So in November, 1871, the diamond fields were formally taken over by Great Britain. After this had been done, the chief's claim, on the strength of which the territory had been seized, was submitted to the British Courts in Cape Town, and was found to be fictitious, with neither legal nor moral right to support it. The chief's claim was promptly dismissed: but Great Britain retained the territory. Conscience money was paid subsequently to the extent of £90,000 (for property that not long afterward was turning out £4,000,000 worth of diamonds yearly), and was accepted by the Free State under protest.

The climax of this treatment was reached in 1877, when Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on behalf of Great Britain, annexed the Transvaal Republic in spite of the protests of its President and Government. The Sand River Convention had guaranteed, "in the fullest manner, on the part of the British Government, to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River, the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves without any interference on the part of Her Majesty the Queen's Government, and that no encroachments shall be made by the said Government on the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal River." (Cf. the official copy of the Convention.)

This Convention was violated on the pretext that the Boers were at the mercy of a native chief in the north-east, and that annexation was necessary in order "to rescue" them from the chief's depredations. The fact is that when Shepstone reached Pretoria, this native chief had already sued for peace and had actually paid a fine imposed upon him by the Boers. It has also been claimed that the Transvaal Boers were "rescued" from the Zulus. The fact here is that the Zulu war did not occur for two years after the annexation of the Transvaal, and that even then it was begun, not by the Zulus, but by Sir Bartle Frere. It has also been stated, in excuse for the annexation, that the Transvaal Government was practically non-existent and that there was no money in the treasury. But it has not been claimed that lack of money in the treasury reduced the country to anarchy or made its people any the less honest. "There was practically no crime," we are told. No police, because there was no need for them. It must have been hard on the lawyers: and it is said that the lawyers welcomed annexation!

The truth is, that the violation of the Sand River Convention by the annexation of the Transvaal was quite unwarrantable. It would have been so even if the pre-

texts for it had been justified by the facts; for had Great Britain been moved by humanitarian motives to rescue the Boers from their enemies, she could certainly have done so without annexing their country. As it was, the result was inevitable. The Boers protested; sent deputations to England; but to no effect. Then in 1880, when peaceful means had failed, they rose to recover their independence, which, from their point of view, had been stolen from them, and which, in Mr. Chamberlain's less crude phraseology, had been taken from them "involuntarily," "under a misapprehension of the facts." *

In 1881, after several trivial engagements, including that of Majuba Hill, Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues came to the conclusion that they had been misled as to the feelings of the Boers; that the annexation had been a mistake, and that peace should be made. It was in 1896 that Mr. Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons as quoted above, explained the motives that had actuated the Ministry of which he had been a member. "We believed," he said, "that the annexation of the Transvaal had been made involuntarily by this House under a misapprehension of the facts. The House was told when the annexation was made that the Boers were themselves in favor [of it]. It appeared afterwards that the House had been entirely misinformed, and, under these circumstances, the Government of the day came to the conclusion that the annexation ought to be annulled; and, having come to that conclusion, we did not think it was worthy of a great powerful nation to use its strength to shed further blood and to pursue the war after the object for which the war had been waged had been conceded." The unanimity of the Boers in risking their lives for freedom might indeed have convinced any one that they really desired it. So on March 23d, 1881, terms of peace were agreed to, and were confirmed on August 3d of the same year in what is known as the Pretoria Convention.

But the Boers were not satisfied. They received back only a portion of what they felt had been stolen from them. The independence which had been acknowledged as theirs in the "Convention of Peace" of 1852, and of which they had been deprived illegitimately in 1877, was not restored to them in 1881. Great Britain imposed "reservations and limitations" which left the Transvaal State in a position of galling dependency. A

* In fairness to Mr. Chamberlain it should be stated that he did not intend to accuse the House of Commons of kleptomania.

British Resident was to be appointed, with considerable local power, particularly over the natives; the right was retained to move troops through the State in certain circumstances; and its external relations were to be managed by British diplomatic and consular officers.

Mr. Gladstone was accused of injudicious magnanimity in having restored even the shred of self-government which the Convention allowed; but those who have defended his policy best have retorted that his magnanimity was injudicious only in so far as it was hedged around with limitations and conditions which made his action, not an honorable and generous restitution of what was due, but a totally inadequate compensation, grudgingly paid, for an injury admittedly inflicted. Still, as the Boers recognized that if Britain persisted she could deprive them of what little they had, the Convention was accepted by the Volksraad under protest.

This Convention proved unworkable, and the Transvaalers, with the Convention of 1852—their flag of freedom—ever in mind,* took steps to persuade the British Government to make full restoration of their rights. President Kruger and two other deputies were sent to London with that object in view. They did not wholly succeed, though the new Convention which they entered into, and signed at London on February 27th, 1884, embodied a nearer approach to their original status than had been allowed in the Convention of 1881.

“A Convention between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the South African Republic,” is the title of the London compact. In its Preamble we read: “It is hereby declared that the following articles of a new Convention . . . be substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of 3d August, 1881.” As reference will have to be made later to the wording of this Convention, it need only be said now that on the day on which Lord Derby signed it, he cabled to the acting High Commissioner at the Cape as follows: “Convention signed to-day; the same complete independence in the Transvaal as in the Free State; conduct and control of diplomatic intercourse with foreign Governments conceded; Queen’s final approval of the treaties reserved; delegates appear well satisfied, and there is a cordial feeling between the two Governments” (London *Times*, September 20th, 1899). It should be remembered that the Orange Free State admittedly was a sovereign international state.

* See Note I., p. 56.

The new Convention still fell short of the Convention of 1852, in so far as the South African Republic, under Article IV. of the new treaty, agreed to "conclude no treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free State . . . until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen." In all other respects full restitution was made. Great Britain had a Consul in Pretoria, the South African Republic had a Consul in London, whose positions were recognized officially.

And now followed a period of peace. Old differences were overlooked. The Boers and the British in South Africa began to merge as one people. The rising generation of Boers spoke English as freely as Dutch. Inter-marriages constantly took place. Mr. Rhodes, an Englishman, became the leader of the Africander party in Cape Colony—a large proportion of his supporters being Colonial Boers. In 1890 he was made Premier. It was generally agreed that twenty years of peace and of non-interference by Downing Street might have united South Africa under the British flag.

But in 1886 gold had been discovered near Johannesburg, which had led to a large influx of foreigners into the Transvaal. For years they had worked harmoniously with the Boers. The gold-mining laws were admitted to be the most favorable in the world.* President Kruger was thanked repeatedly by the mining community for favors he went out of his way to confer upon them. Unfortunately, the days of peace did not last for long.

In 1889, Messrs. Rhodes and Beit had obtained from Lord Salisbury's Government the grant of a charter which gave them possession of a vast tract of land, which they called Rhodesia, situated to the north of the Transvaal. The Boers had not forgotten the Sand River Convention of 1852, in which the British Government had declared that "no encroachments shall be made by the said Gov-

* It is worthy of note that the Klondike miners petitioned for the adoption of the Transvaal gold-mining laws. A royalty of 45 per cent. is collected by the British Government on the total output of gold mined in the United Kingdom. There are mines in Ireland and Wales which cannot be worked at a profit for that reason. In Rhodesia, a British possession next door to the Transvaal, in which many of the Johannesburg mining magnates are largely interested, the tax on gold amounts to 35 per cent. of the output, or to "50 per cent. of the net profit of any prospector who finds a purchaser for his claim." In the South African Republic, on the other hand, the tax was only 5 per cent., not on the total output, but on the admitted profits, with a reserved right, never exercised, of a further 2½ per cent. on the gold won from "mynpachts," or mining leases.

ernment on the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal River"—the *southern* boundary of the Transvaal. They believed, and the British Government had admitted, that that Convention had been violated illegitimately by the annexation of 1877. So, from their point of view, the appropriation of Rhodesia by the British seemed equally illegitimate. And when they heard, not long after this, some rather wild talk about "painting the map red" from the Cape to Cairo; about "hastening the process of consolidation," artificially if necessary, it probably made them nervous. Small wonder! There has been wild talk in the United States, from time to time, about Canada, and how improving it would be for the Canadians to be made citizens of a United North America: all of which has probably stiffened the backs of the Canadians, making them more determined than they were before to keep aloof from the States.

In South Africa, however, wild talk was not the end of it. An effort was made to compel the Transvaal "to pool" the receipts from the Johannesburg traffic, fifty per cent. of which, at the expense of the Delagoa Bay and Port Durban traffic, was to go to the Colony of which Mr. Rhodes was Premier. In 1895, this led to the "Drifts" controversy, in the course of which Mr. Rhodes cabled to Mr. Chamberlain that Cape Colony would share in the expense of a war against the South African Republic. Other incidents occurred, of a more or less similar nature, the effect of which was to give rise to the suspicion that Mr. Rhodes was determined to pick a fighting quarrel with the Boer Government, and to force amalgamation at any price.

Mr. Rhodes had not always believed in making South Africa British. There was a time when many of those who are now his followers accused him of wishing to play the part of a South African George Washington. He had openly favored "the elimination of the Imperial factor." His speeches had been full of suggestions such as this: "The Imperial factor which he warned the House last year against, had now been introduced into the country" (*Cape Parliamentary Papers*, July, 1884). Ten years later his ideas had undergone a decided change, if one can judge him by his words and deeds.

Meanwhile more and more gold was being produced in the Transvaal. The immense value of the mines was assured. Deep borings had made it possible to estimate their yield for years to come. And as the output of the mines had increased, the world had begun to hear that

the foreigners in the Transvaal had many grievances, the nature of which will be dealt with later.

The dispute over the "pooling" of the railway traffic had lasted, in one phase or another, throughout the years 1894 and 1895. The incident closed without war; but it soon became evident that powerful influences were at work to provoke a crisis. Johannesburg, the centre of the foreign (Uitlander) population in the Transvaal, showed increasing dissatisfaction with the Boer Government. Every day produced new grievances. Mr. Rhodes, who was still the Premier of Cape Colony, and whose financial interest in the Johannesburg mines was enormous, helped the agitation, as he afterward admitted, by every means in his power.

The result was the Jameson Raid, the object of which was to obtain possession of the country from the Boers, and then to make it, as some wished, an independent Republic under Uitlander control, or, as others wished, to make it British property.

A letter was written by leading Johannesburgers, and left undated, stating that their women and children were in danger, and appealing to Dr. Jameson (who was stationed on the border of the Transvaal, in command of the Rhodesian Mounted Police) to come at once to their rescue. This letter was to have been used in the English newspapers in justification of Dr. Jameson's action, at such time as it might be convenient to undertake the work of rescue. As every one knows, Dr. Jameson led his men into the Transvaal, was defeated, captured, and with his fellow prisoners was sent to England for trial.

As the Transvaal Government would have been within its rights in executing the Raiders, considerable anxiety as to their fate was felt in England. Mr. Chamberlain, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote: "President Kruger's magnanimity, if he were to hand over the prisoners, would be very highly appreciated by me." When President Kruger had done so, Mr. Chamberlain wrote to him personally, saying, "I myself have always felt confidence in your magnanimity, and your Honor may rest confident that I will strictly uphold all the obligations of the London Convention of 1884."

The Raiders were tried in England in the summer of 1896. "They were tried," in the words of the Lord Chief Justice, "for making a war from within the Queen's dominions, upon the dominions of a friendly State." Concerning Mr. Rhodes' share in the matter, the Select Committee of Inquiry appointed by the British Parliament

reported that: "Whatever justification there might have been for action on the part of the people in Johannesburg, there was none for a person in Mr. Rhodes' position in subsidizing, organizing, and stimulating an armed insurrection." Mr. Rhodes soon afterward declared that he would thenceforth use "constitutional methods" to obtain his ends.

No one seriously defends the Raid, however, so no more need now be said about it. One thing may be said in its favor: that apart from the undated letter stating that women and children were in danger, it is free from hypocritical coloring. It was an undisguised attempt at robbery on a big scale, and one prefers the man who says, "I propose to take your land because I want it," to the man who says, "I propose to take your land because it will be good for you"!

After the Raid, Mr. Chamberlain made some very important speeches, which, though often quoted, must again be cited, as their bearing upon subsequent occurrences is vital. This was in 1896, at a time when the grievances of the Uitlanders had been fully ventilated and were as well understood by the speaker as they were in 1899.

There were excitable people who had been infuriated by the failure of the Raid. It became for them a second Majuba, to be avenged. Mr. Chamberlain was called upon to enforce immediately every reform that was demanded by the Uitlanders. Replying to one of these gentlemen in the House of Commons, on April 12th, 1896, he said: "What would be the policy of the honorable member for Sheffield as Colonial Secretary? We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Kruger that unless the reforms which he was specifying were granted by a particular date, the British Government would interfere by force. Then I suppose he would come here, and ask this House for a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000—it does not matter particularly which (laughter)—and would send an army of 10,000 men, at the very least, to force President Kruger to grant reforms in a State in regard to which not only this Government but successive Secretaries of State have pledged themselves repeatedly that they would have nothing to do with its internal affairs. That is the policy of the honorable gentleman. That is not my policy. My policy has been to restore the good feeling which was beginning to be created between the Dutch and the British population."

On another occasion (February 13th, 1896) he said:

"The rights of our action under the Convention are limited to the offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce." And then, "The question is, whether President Kruger will consider that that proposal will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does, he will be perfectly justified in rejecting it."

Finally, on May 8th, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain said:

"In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Kruger, an ultimatum which would have certainly been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war, it would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war, and, as I have pointed out already, it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Kruger, in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, in which Secretaries of State, standing in this place, have repudiated all right of interference—that would be a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise."

Mr. Chamberlain said these things, presumably meant them, and, for a time, apparently acted in accordance with them. Unfortunately, the Transvaal Government could not trust him. At the British Parliamentary Inquiry into the Raid, it was revealed that Miss Flora Shaw, who was a London *Times* correspondent and a friend of Mr. Rhodes', had paid frequent visits to the Colonial Office during the weeks preceding the Raid, and had cabled to Mr. Rhodes on December 17th, 1895, as follows: "Chamberlain sound in case of interference of European powers, but have special reason to believe wishes you must do it immediately." Then, after the Raid, a letter was found, written by Mr. Lionel Phillips, chairman of the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines, to Mr. Wernher, of Messrs. Wernher & Beit. It was dated July 1st, 1894. Sir Henry Loch, referred to in it, was at that time the High Commissioner for South Africa, and was, in that capacity, acting as Mr. Chamberlain's agent.

"Sir H. Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone)," wrote Mr. Phillips, "asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms we had in

Johannesburg, whether the population could hold the place for six days until help could arrive, etc., etc., and stated plainly that if there had been 3,000 rifles and ammunition here he would certainly have come over. He further informed me, in a significant way, that he had prolonged the Swaziland agreement for six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared—as much as to say, if things are safer then we shall actively intervene.”

This and other evidence convinced the Boers that Mr. Chamberlain had been privy to what Mr. Rhodes and the leading Johannesburgers had planned. So the Boers began to arm, in fear of another Raid, a “constitutional” Raid, on a bigger scale. They had been driven some months before, by the threatening attitude of the Uitlanders, to contemplate defensive preparations. Now they realized that action was necessary. They built a fort overlooking Johannesburg, and other forts around Pretoria. Meanwhile, more than ever was said in England, and by Mr. Rhodes’ followers in Cape Colony, about “painting the map red.”

In 1898, Mr. Rhodes’ “all red” party in the Cape Parliament was defeated, and Mr. Schreiner became Prime Minister, as the official head of the Afrianders in the Colony. A Redistribution Bill had been carried by Mr. Rhodes, the effect of which was unexpected, for it gave the Afriander party what promised to be a permanent majority in Cape Colony.

No one questioned the loyalty of the Afrianders at this time. One of the first acts of the Schreiner Ministry was to vote a voluntary subsidy toward the maintenance of the British fleet. A very large number of Afrianders were, and are, British in origin. They are men and women who have made South Africa their home, in contradistinction to those who still look upon England as home; they believe that the internal affairs of South Africa can best be governed by South Africans, although in 1898 they were as anxious as is the average Australasian to preserve the link with the mother-country.

Suppose that some question were to arise in Australia or in New Zealand, turning upon the advisability of the Secretary of State for the Colonies interfering in the internal affairs of either of those countries: Australasians would naturally group themselves into two parties, one favoring interference, the other opposing it. The Jameson Raid and events following it had evolved two such parties in Cape Colony—Mr. Rhodes’ party favoring Im-

perial interference, and the Africander party objecting to it. It was the defeat of Mr. Rhodes' party in 1898, and the firm establishment of the Afrianders in office, that precipitated the crisis in 1899.

It was not long after this victory of the Africander party that Sir Alfred Milner,* Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner, went to England on a visit, and, on his return, inaugurated a policy in direct opposition to Africander sentiment and in reversal of all that Mr. Chamberlain had recommended in the speeches quoted above (pp. 15, 16). The Uitlander agitation was resumed with constantly increasing vehemence. The South African League, an organization consisting of members of the extreme Rhodes party, with headquarters in Cape Town and Johannesburg, began a vigorous campaign against the Transvaal Government and the Afrianders in the Colony, and in support of British domination throughout the whole of South Africa. Everything said or done at League meetings was reported by Sir Alfred Milner, for insertion in British Blue Books, as representative of the loyal South African sentiment. In the Colony the position was this: as the Africander party was in a majority, its opponents could not govern the country themselves, and preferred that it should be governed from Downing Street, rather than by the Afrianders. It will be seen that this attitude provided a serviceable basis for co-operation between Mr. Rhodes' party in Cape Colony and the Uitlanders in the Transvaal.†

In the early part of 1899 a Petition, purporting to be signed by over 21,000 British subjects resident in the Transvaal, was forwarded to Mr. Chamberlain, setting forth their grievances and demanding redress. The authenticity of the majority of these signatures has been questioned; it is known that many of them were obtained under false pretences, and that others were obtained from blacks, although the first demand of the petition was for the franchise, which no one proposed to give to them. But these criticisms are trivial and do not affect the issue.

The issue, as Mr. Chamberlain saw it, had been defined by him most lucidly in the House of Commons on March 20th, 1899, when he was aware of every grievance set forth in the petition. He then said:

* Now Lord Milner, but referred to throughout these pages by his better-known title.

† In certain circumstances, the situation which at that time existed in Cape Colony might be reproduced in Australia.

“There are certain clear cases where we can intervene, and rightly intervene in Transvaal affairs.”

(1) “In the first place we may intervene if there is any breach of the Convention.”

(2) “There is no doubt we should have the usual right of interference if . . . the treatment of British subjects in the Transvaal was of such a nature as would give us the right to interfere as to the treatment of British subjects in France or Germany.”

(3) “Then there is only one other case—the third case . . . we can . . . make friendly recommendations to the Transvaal for the benefit of South Africa generally, and in the interest of peace.”

The first two cases might warrant warlike intervention; the third could not possibly do so.

In conclusion, Mr. Chamberlain, with all the Uitlander grievances in mind, said: “I do not feel at the moment that any case has arisen, which would justify me in taking the very strong action [*i.e.*, ultimatums, etc.] . . . suggested.”

It will now be evident that whether the Uitlander Petition was signed by one or by one hundred thousand British subjects is of no material consequence. Before the British Government could interfere, there would have to be proved some breach of the Convention, or some injury to British subjects such as would warrant active interference as against nations like France and Germany. No such case had arisen, to repeat Mr. Chamberlain's words.* “Friendly recommendation,” as stated in the speech of February 13th, 1896, already quoted, was, even from his point of view, the limit of his power. The circumstances remained the same until Mr. Chamberlain's last despatch before the receipt of the so-called Boer ultimatum; and in that last despatch he assumed the right to dictate, without discussion, the form of government to be adopted by the Boers. What had happened by then to enlarge Mr. Chamberlain's authority?

In the first place, on May 5th, 1899, Sir Alfred Milner had sent a long cable to Mr. Chamberlain describing the Uitlanders as “Helots,” and urging that “some striking proof” of British power should be displayed, and that the British Government should insist upon the re-

* The fact that no complaint of their treatment in the Transvaal had been lodged with their respective Governments by any of the American or German or French Uitlanders, is sufficient evidence, apart from Mr. Chamberlain's admission, that no case had arisen to warrant interference, or even protest, under International Law.

form of the franchise in the Transvaal. The publication of this strongly worded despatch was proof that Mr. Chamberlain indorsed its tone and purpose, and was not unwilling that the British public should share its views. Following upon this, Mr. Chamberlain began to emphasize a claim which he had first put forward in October, 1897, to the effect that Great Britain was "Suzerain" over the South African Republic.

This claim had not been made since the Convention of 1884 had been "substituted" (to use its own wording) for that of 1881. Its sudden assertion in 1897, after the lapse of thirteen years, and the increasing importance that was given to it, came as a surprise to every one. The Preamble of the 1881 Convention, it was urged, still held good over and above the Convention of 1884. Suzerainty was clearly asserted in the Preamble of the 1881 Convention. It was as clearly not asserted in the Convention of 1884.

Upon this claim of suzerainty Mr. Chamberlain was compelled to base his entire procedure until the outbreak of hostilities. To avoid confusing the real issue it is still best to postpone an inquiry into the genuineness of the Uitlanders' grievances. Even granting their complete genuineness, it followed that, because the facts neither warranted his interference under International Law, nor justified action under the terms of the 1884 Convention, as he himself had admitted, Mr. Chamberlain's right to make "friendly recommendations" concerning the internal policy and administration of the South African Republic depended solely upon the legitimacy of his claim to suzerain authority. Without suzerainty, he had no more right to make so much as "friendly" recommendations, than the Czar of Russia has a right to make such recommendations in regard to the franchise or mining laws of Australia.

And, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chamberlain's claim was disproved absolutely. Based as it was upon the assertion that the Preamble of the 1881 Convention held good over and above the Convention of 1884, it collapsed at once when it was shown that Lord Derby, at that time Colonial Minister, had deliberately struck out the Preamble to the 1881 Convention, when he sent a printed copy of that Convention, duly corrected, for signature by the Transvaal delegates in 1884.*

* "If we turn to the Blue-book, we find that Lord Derby, in preparing the treaty [of 1884], took a copy of the Convention of 1881, and wrote in his own hand at the top, 'Passages enclosed with a

This means that the Transvaal Government would have been perfectly within their rights if they had refused to entertain so much as a suggestion concerning the internal administration of their country.

Instead, however, of adhering to their rights, they listened, discussed, conceded, begged an arbitration of the question at issue, were refused, were pushed with further demands, were told (August 26th, 1899) that "the sands are running down in the glass"; were told, after Sir Alfred Milner had declared that the reform of the franchise would "strike straight at the root of the evil," and when all seemed settled accordingly, "that there are other matters of difference between the two governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration"; were told, finally (September 8th), that unless they conceded Mr. Chamberlain's demands—for by this time "suzerainty" had quite outgrown the limits of "friendly recommendation"—"Her Majesty's Government must reserve to themselves the right to reconsider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement." Then it was that the British Reserves were called out, that troops were poured into South Africa, and that, when Mr. Chamberlain's ultimatum had been withheld for a month, during which time regiment after regiment had sailed, the Boers, in despair, issued (October 9th) their ultimatum—a last appeal for arbitration, and for the withdrawal of British troops from their borders.

This, briefly, is the history of those long months from May to October, 1899. In the words of Mr. Andrew Carnegie (certainly no enemy of Great Britain's): "The war party made much of President Kruger's so-called ultimatum, but the wonder is not that this was issued, but that it was so long delayed. War was practically declared when Britain began the movement of large bodies of troops toward the borders of the Orange Free State, and to points which hemmed the Transvaal in" (*North American Review*, December, 1899).

But still, as has been said already, what has been done cannot be undone. We have to face facts as they are;

black line are to be omitted.' Looking down the page (the facsimile is given in the Blue-book, C. 950), we find a line drawn round the whole preamble and round the only other two references to suzerainty. In the second place, the new Convention is furnished with a new preamble. Has a Convention with two preambles ever been heard of . . . ?" (*The War and Its Causes*, by G. P. Gooch).

not as they were, or might be. Before dealing with present conditions and future prospects, however, some old ground yet remains to be cleared.

It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the Bloemfontein Conference, or of the endless despatches in which, on the plea of suzerainty, proposals, and then demands, were made, modified, accepted, enlarged. On August 19th and 21st, the Transvaal Government offered concessions—subject to three conditions, the object of which was to insure peace in the future—that were acknowledged to be more liberal than those first asked by Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein. The conditions were that the British Government would consent:

(1) "In future not to interfere in internal affairs of the South African Republic."

(2) "Not to insist further on its assertion of existence of suzerainty."

(3) "That arbitration (from which foreign elements, other than the Orange Free State, are to be excluded) will be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme has become law."

The first two conditions were simply a request, which in other circumstances would have been superfluous, that Mr. Chamberlain would abide by his promise: "I will strictly uphold all the obligations of the London Convention of 1884." The third condition was equally reasonable, for, in deference to Mr. Chamberlain's objection to the interference of foreigners, which arbitration had at first suggested, the Transvaal Government, some time earlier, had informed Mr. Conyngham Greene, the British Consul at Pretoria, that (in the latter's own words) they were "willing that we should have any of our own judges or lawyers, English or Colonial, to represent us, and that the president or umpire should be equally English, Colonial, or Boer."

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to the Transvaal Government's concessions was the famous Highbury speech (August 26th), in which he said that the sands were running down in the hour-glass, and the further despatch of August 28th, already quoted, in which he stated, in effect, that "other matters," not defined, except that they were "not proper subjects for reference to arbitration," were held in reserve for settlement at his pleasure. As this proved to the Boers that the more they conceded, the more was demanded of them, it is not surprising that they despaired of a peaceful settlement. What troubled them particularly, and what struck many onlookers as un-

fortunately significant, was Mr. Chamberlain's categorical and persistent refusal to allow, on any terms, the questions at issue to be submitted to arbitration.*

Sir Alfred Milner took but little pains to conceal his desire for war. In a moment of uneasiness lest a peaceful settlement might be arranged—perhaps in spite of the Colonial Secretary—by the British Ministry, he cabled to Mr. Chamberlain at the end of August, 1899, that: "*British South Africa is prepared for extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in order to see the vindication of British authority. A prolongation of negotiations and indecisive results is dreaded, and I fear there will be a strong reaction of feeling against the policy of Her Majesty's Government if matters drag.*"

President Kruger, to preserve peace, was prepared to concede everything but the independence of his country. For that only was he prepared to fight and was the Free State prepared to join forces with him.

On that issue the Free State did join forces with him. After the Raid a treaty had been entered into between the two Republics for their mutual defence. If for no other reason, President Steyn of the Free State would probably have felt bound to assist the Transvaal in this crisis. But there were other reasons. In the course of the negotiations Mr. Chamberlain had claimed that Great Britain was paramount over "the *two* Republics." It at once became evident to President Steyn that the independence of the Free State, until then unquestioned, was also at stake, and that this claim was the thin end of the wedge which, once the Transvaal were conquered, would be forced in to complete the process of Anglicizing the map of South Africa.

In addition, then, to the solemn obligation assumed in their treaty with the Transvaal, the Free Staters, as they understood the situation, had every reason to believe that sooner or later they would be obliged, either to submit to British domination, or to fight for their freedom. They decided to throw in their lot at once with the Transvaal.

But both Republics wanted peace. It is best to be just, and it is not just to hold them responsible for the war. Too often, as a last attempt to excuse the present situation, those who defend Mr. Chamberlain's policy have said, "Well, the Boers began it." The big boy who is

* In reporting the result of the Bloemfontein Conference, Sir Alfred Milner had written: "The question of arbitration . . . I think is the matter that interests the President most."

caught fighting a small one, and who defends himself in this way, as a rule has a very guilty conscience. In the best of circumstances it is not a strong line of defence, and in the case under consideration it is no defence at all. For all that the Boers did was to state in their last despatch that if more troops were poured into South Africa, onto their borders, they would be obliged to accept this as a hostile act. Mr. Andrew Carnegie, as an impartial observer and acknowledged friend of Great Britain's, has already been quoted on this subject. Ex-President Benjamin Harrison, a good President and a good lawyer, declared shortly before his death, that "in Texas, when one of the parties to an acrimonious, oral discussion announces that the discussion is ended and that he will now take such measures as seem to him to be more effective, and accompanies this declaration by a movement of his right hand in the direction of his hip pocket, *he* is accounted to have begun the war. If the other gets out his weapon first and kills the gentleman whose hand is moving toward his hip pocket, it is, not only in the popular judgment, but in law, self-defence. The Boers did not seek war with Great Britain" (*North American Review*, March, 1901). Ex-President Grover Cleveland, of the opposite party, another good President and lawyer, expressed the same opinion. And they undoubtedly expressed the verdict of history.

What the verdict of history will be on the subject of the Uitlanders' grievances, cannot be doubted either. Of course there were grievances. Any Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-Celt) may be relied upon to have grievances. Is he ever satisfied, between elections, with the Government under which he lives? New York follows Berlin and Hamburg as the third largest German city in the world. Germans living in New York have been known to complain bitterly about the alleged corruption of some of its officials—"that they could not get anything done without bribing some one to do it." But they would be sorry for themselves if they were to petition the Kaiser to insist upon the redress of their grievances!

As for corruption in the Transvaal, if Boer officials, high or low, were one-hundredth part as corrupt as has been asserted, how was it that the Uitlanders, with millions to draw upon, could not buy such legislation as they wanted? It is certain that this grievance, like all the others, was grossly exaggerated. Much was said, but, except in the case of the subordinate officials of Johannesburg, nothing was proved.

Bitter complaints were made of over-taxation, and yet, according to the "Financial Statement delivered by the Treasurer of the Cape of Good Hope," in August, 1899, the tariff was much higher in Cape Colony than in the Transvaal; and in the Transvaal by far the greater part of the revenue was derived from the tariff. Then the royalty on the output from the mines, as has been shown already (see footnote on p. 12), was ten times greater in Rhodesia and nearly ten times greater in Great Britain than it was in the Transvaal, where it was, indeed, the lowest in the world. Finally, the Uitlanders had no income tax to pay. They were not so badly off. In the year of the Petition (1898) forty-five of the Rand gold-mining companies paid out in dividends no less than £5,089,785—an average of 25 per cent. on their share capital!

Much was heard about the Dynamite Monopoly, but at the worst this was a form of indirect taxation, the total product of which did not raise the tax on gold to one-half what it was in Rhodesia; while in any case, Mr. Lionel Phillips, on behalf of the Chamber of Mines, himself had suggested in 1894 that the price of dynamite should be fixed at 90s. a case—or at 15s. a case more than the current price since 1897!

"Only Dutch taught in the schools," was another favorite complaint against the Transvaal Government, though, as a matter of fact, they did more to assist the education of foreigners than any other Government in the world. There were four State schools in which the sole medium of education was English. There were eight State schools in which the medium for English children was English, and for Dutch children, Dutch. Yearly subsidies were granted to six other schools, not State schools, in which the sole medium was English. While the Government, through the Education Department, declared itself willing at all times to provide English education on the gold-fields for any community that applied for it (*War in South Africa*, by J. A. Hobson, p. 38). Considering that the large majority of English-speaking residents lived in one city, Johannesburg, these figures mean a good deal. They certainly dispose of the complaint, "Only Dutch taught in the schools."

Last, but not least, there was the Franchise. Ex-President Harrison dismissed this grievance as follows: "Suffrage," he wrote, "was only another form of assault in the interest of British domination"; and his opinion is amply borne out by Mr. Phillips, who, as chairman of

the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines, must have been in a position to know the feelings of his fellow-Uitlanders, and who wrote privately to Mr. Beit, on June 10th, 1894: "As to the franchise, I do not think many people care a fig about it" (*Transvaal Green Book*, No. 2, of 1896); and again, on June 16th: "I may say here that, as you of course know, I had no desire for political rights, and believe, as a whole, that the community is not ambitious in this respect."

The answer of the Boers to all these complaints, which they believed were made for international purposes, was very much to the point. You admit, they said to the Uitlanders, that you came here to make your fortunes as quickly as possible and then to return to your own homes. You succeed in making fortunes, or at least much larger incomes than you could make elsewhere. But we did not compel you to come here. We do not compel you to stay. And if you do not like to make fortunes in the conditions which our country and our laws provide, why not leave at once?

There was one grievance, however—the most serious of any from the point of view of the mine-owners—which is particularly worth considering, as it bears upon one of the ways in which Australasia might help Great Britain with experience and advice. This was the complaint of the mine-owners that wages in the Transvaal were too high, and that, under the Boer Government, they could not be reduced. The Uitlanders wanted to compel the natives to work in the mines, and at a fixed wage. Mr. Rudd, of the Consolidated Goldfields, argued: "If under the cry of civilization we in Egypt lately mowed down 10,000 or 20,000 Dervishes with Maxims, surely it cannot be considered a hardship to compel the natives in South Africa to give three months in the year to do a little honest work." Mr. Albu, of Albu & Co., in his evidence before the Industrial Commission, after urging that a native should never be paid more wages than would enable him to save £5 a year at the most, was asked:

"Are you of opinion that the wages paid to (white) miners at the present moment are abnormal?"

"In some instances they are abnormal," he replied.

"Is there any chance of getting these abnormal wages reduced now that there are so many out of work?"

"Certainly there is: I think the white laborers are prepared to accept the lesser of two evils. *If we close*

down the mines a lot of white laborers will be thrown out of employment" (Hobson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 235, 236).

The Transvaal Government limited the employment of natives in the mines, in order to secure as much work as possible for white laborers. Consequently the mine-owners, compelled to employ more white labor than seemed to them desirable in view of its higher cost (and who were unable to bribe the Transvaal Government to change the law as they wished), determined to upset the Government and to run things to suit themselves.

That they have succeeded (with the help of Australasia) is shown by the following Reuter cable, which appeared in London newspapers on May 22d, 1901:

"Pretoria, May 21st.—The various mining and financial houses of the Rand have combined to form a company for the regulation and control of native labor supply for the mines *by means, inter alia, of Government assistance* and the acquisition of concessions and privileges from the native chiefs and other authorities. It is proposed also to combine other businesses either directly or indirectly connected with native labor. [This means, as at Kimberley, the "compound system" and the ruin of the small shop-keepers.] Subscribers will deal only through the agency of the company, which is expected to operate on a great scale."

This would seem to be contrary to Australasian ideas of justice and of sound policy. Yet Australasia has helped to bring it about—and it is said that responsibility follows action.

So much for the grievances. We see how one of them has been redressed. And in truth, with the highest wages in the world and the largest profits, the Uitlanders did not seem to be so dreadfully oppressed. This perhaps accounts for Mr. Chamberlain's prompt change of ground on the outbreak of the war. Instead of defending his policy, as he had done until then, as necessary for the protection of the "Helots" of Johannesburg, he declared that a Great Conspiracy had been hatched by the Dutch of South Africa to drive the British, figuratively speaking, into the sea. It was asserted that the Boers had been arming for years with this object in view. Everything Mr. Chamberlain had done he now justified on that ground.

Here again the facts were against him. The Boers had armed after the Jameson Raid, when they had become convinced, for reasons already given, that Mr. Chamberlain himself had designs on their liberty. The

Transvaal Budgets from 1893 to 1898 show the following military expenditure:

1893.....	£19,340
1894.....	28,158
1895.....	87,304
1896 (after the Raid).....	495,618
1897.....	396,384
1898.....	357,225

Thus, from 1893 to 1895, inclusive, the total expenditure on munitions of war was only £134,802; while from 1896 to 1898, inclusive, after the Jameson Raid, it amounted to £5,249,227. The total expenditure of the Transvaal Government, for all purposes, in 1893 was only £500,559; in 1894, it was only £528,526. In 1896, after the Raid, it sprang up to £2,007,372, and in 1897 it was £1,793,279. In other words, the expenditure on armaments in the year following the Raid was nearly as large as the total expenditure in the year preceding it.

But an extract from a report by the British Intelligence Department, entitled *Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South Africa*, prepared many months before the war, and found in Natal after its occupation by the Boers, is conclusive evidence on this point. "Of the enormous quantity of rifles now in possession of the South African Republic only some 13,500 Martini-Henry rifles were in the country before the Jameson Raid. . . . In January, 1896, the strength of the Staats Artillery was 9 officers and 100 men, though only 70 men were actually doing duty" (quoted by A. M. S. Methuen in *Peace or War in South Africa*).

The Boers had armed, but not for purposes of offence. They had armed to defend themselves against what many of them expected—an official in place of an *ex officio* raid. Captain Younghusband, who visited Pretoria in 1896 for the *London Times*, makes the same statement: "One attempt," he said, "had been made to take their country from them; they were thoroughly convinced that the attempt would be renewed at some future date; so the Boers were determined to be thoroughly on their guard the second time" (*South Africa of To-day*, p. 101).

The only evidence ever adduced in support of the Great Conspiracy theory would not have been listened to in a court of law, and was so weak a reed to lean on that it is sufficient in itself to discredit the accusation. It was this: a Mr. Theodore Schreiner, a supporter of Mr. Rhodes, stated that in conversation with Mr. Reitz, then a judge of the Orange Free State, "between seventeen and

eighteen years ago," Mr. Reitz had given him to understand, not explicitly but by implication, that it was the aim of the Afrianders to expel the British flag from South Africa. So then: seventeen or more years after this conversation was alleged to have taken place, it was suddenly heard of, for the first time, when Mr. Reitz was not in a position to give his version of it, and was used by Mr. Chamberlain's supporters as proof that the war was necessary in order to nip this seventeen-year-old conspiracy in the bud! Since then, not a single fact has been brought forward to bolster up the case. A large number of private letters and cables to and from Dr. Leyds and President Kruger were found at Pretoria and have been published, and yet no evidence.*

Certainly, if the Boers had ever conceived a hope of conquest, events during the early part of the war would have quickened it. And yet, in January, 1900, at a time when they believed they were winning all along the line, we find President Kruger writing as follows:

"God in His goodness and mercy has so far given us the victory. From the bottom of my heart I believe that the manifest valor of Her Majesty's troops and their superiority in number over our forces will always count as nothing in the eyes of God, for I humbly trust that God knows that our cause is just, and that for that reason He will continue to protect us even unto the end. Being firmly fixed in this faith, I do not hesitate to express my deep pain for the loss of valuable lives on both sides which we daily see. I have prayed, and again repeatedly prayed, for light and leading, and can find no other light on the ground of God's word than that we must continue to fight for right and justice and trust that God will let right be done to us. How He will do it I do not know. It may be that, in His own time, He will raise the veil of misunderstandings and wrong statements that have blinded the eyes of many, who, although justice is dear to them, still wrongly judge us. It may be that, even now, His hand shall stay the slaughter, by making it clear to them who are our enemies that we desire little. That we do desire little can easily be proved. The accusation has been made against us that we are carrying on a war of conquest, and that a great conspiracy has existed for a long time, the object of which is to exclude Her Majesty's authority from this part of the world. If this was our object, the events of the last months should encourage us to go on with our endeavors. The simple

* See Note II., p. 56.

truth, however, is that this accusation is false, and that we have no such aim or desire. *One thing, and one thing only, we desire, and that is to be left alone. This we can prove.* Up to the last moment we have declared our willingness to submit to arbitration all points in dispute between Her Majesty's Government and our Government. We were willing to stand by the Convention of London [1884], which regulated the relations between the two nations. We had the fullest confidence, not only in the abstract justice of our cause, but also in our legal right, and yet our offer was refused. Then, for the first time, it became clear to us that Conventions were useless, and that we must fight for our freedom or become slaves, and it is our independence that we desire, that and nothing more—our unlimited [unqualified] independence." Then he went on to say that they would make peace at once if the British Government would recognize their independence.

"With us," the President continued, "the only question is one of freedom or of death. It must be so. If we lived to be subdued, our children would be slaves. If we die for our freedom, then our children can draw the greatest advantage from our example." Finally: "If they [the British people], after having considered the facts, with God's help determine that we do not deserve to be subdued, then I hope and trust, in the name of that God whose mercy is unending and whose justice is inexorable, they will have the moral courage immediately to make an end of this war, independent of all worldly considerations, and trusting only in the blessing which follows all good and noble deeds, and the progress of their mighty empire in justice and peace" (translated from the Dutch in British Blue Book, Cd. 261).

Hardly the words of an ambitious, successful conspirator! Written shortly after the battles of Magersfontein, Stormberg, Colenso, and Spion Kopje, at a time when it seemed to the Boers, and to others too, that Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking might be theirs at any moment, they prove that President Kruger, even then, was willing to withdraw from British territory and to abandon all the advantages he had gained, on the sole condition that the independence of his country would be recognized.

It was doubtless realized by many that the Great Conspiracy theory would not bear serious investigation, for, quickly following its promulgation, a new charge was brought against the Boers, which found ready credence in England, and which soon raised the feelings of the Brit-

ish people to boiling-point. This new charge may be summarized as "Boer Atrocities."

Again it becomes necessary to face facts, if the conduct of the future is to be wiser than that of the past. And the fact is that many alleged Boer atrocities were deliberately concocted in order to affect public opinion in Great Britain and in the Colonies, and that others were grossly exaggerated for the same purpose. *The Times of Natal* boldly justified this policy.

"Franchise, paramountcy, and so forth," it said, "have been all very useful in the evolutionary process of education. But before we shall have finished we have to reach that point when home [and Australasian] opinion shall have come into line with opinion in Natal, as to the necessity for a clean sweep of the present order of things in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and of the Bond in Cape Colony. To do this there is but little cause now to harp upon old well-worn grievances. Those have already become fairly well understood at home. The best object-lessons we can now employ are those atrocities to our women and children . . . if they [a section of the British people] require atrocities to assist their comprehension of facts, and to disarm their opposition, so be it. *It should not now be difficult to supply the necessary chapter of horrors to strike the imagination even of these good people*" (Hobson, *loc. cit.*, p. 227).

Innumerable instances of this practice could be given. On the outbreak of hostilities the most absurd stories were cabled, as, for example, that one Uitlander, when leaving the Transvaal, had been flogged to death by the Boers. Some days later he appeared in Cape Town—unharmcd in any way. Another instance is to be found in a London cable to a Melbourne paper (quoted in *The Psychology of Jingoism*). The cable was headed: "Boer Desecration and Burning of Churches." "The Boers in Northern Natal," it stated, "before evacuating Newcastle and Dundee, defiled and desecrated the Catholic churches in those towns, and finally set fire to the buildings." Not a word of truth in it! But papers that supplied the British public with details of the imaginary massacre of the Pekin legations could be relied upon to supply, both before and during the war, "the necessary chapter of horrors" in the way of Boer atrocities.

It is notoriously difficult to overtake and to counteract a lie when it has passed into general circulation. Even now, after such men as Dr. Conan Doyle, the author, have protested against "patriotic slander," it is currently

believed and asserted that the Boers are "treacherous," "brutal," "savage," "dirty," "uncivilized" ruffians—to take adjectives at random from leading English papers. Americans, at least, have reason to look with suspicion upon this wholesale condemnation of the Boers, for during their War of Independence they were accused by the Tory Ministry of that day, in the official *Gazette*, of having scalped the wounded! It was also widely asserted that poisoned bullets had been found in the pouches of the American rebels—falsely asserted, of course. In the case of the Boers, one cannot do better than cite Dr. Doyle as witness, for he was in South Africa during the war, and no one can accuse him of being anything but an ardent supporter of Mr. Chamberlain's policy.

"The Boers," says Dr. Doyle, "have been the cheap victims of a great deal of cheap slander in the Press. The men who have seen most of the Boers in the field are the most generous in estimating their character. That the white flag was hoisted by the Boers as a cold-blooded device for luring our men into the open is an absolute calumny." Elsewhere he says: "These people were as near akin to us as any race which is not our own. They were of the same Frisian stock which peopled our own shores. In habit of mind, in religion, in respect for law, they were as ourselves. Brave, too, they were, and hospitable, with those sporting instincts which are dear to the Anglo-Celtic race. There was no people in the world who had more qualities which we might admire, and not the least of them was that love of independence which it is our proudest boast that we have encouraged in others as well as exercised ourselves. . . . Could we have such men as willing fellow-citizens, they are worth more than all the gold-mines of their country."

Truly, nothing is to be gained by slandering them. Mr. Chamberlain's party plunged into war in the belief that the Boers were cowards, and that, as stated by a British General in South Africa, 10,000 British troops could march to Pretoria practically without opposition. To abide by the old misconceptions is to repeat the same errors, and that is the very thing to be avoided.*

It now becomes necessary briefly to consider the policy which led up to the events already summarized and to subsequent events which remain to be reviewed.

When Mr. Chamberlain came into office as Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1895, a very simple and di-

* See Note III., p. 57, in regard to the Boer treatment of the natives.

rect line of policy was open to him in dealing with the South African Republic. This was to abide by the Convention and to trust to the *vis medicatrix nature*—the healing power of time and nature—to cure such troubles as existed. It would have been a long, slow game to play; but so far as the Boers were concerned, it is certain that, if left to themselves, they would have become more and more Anglicized, less and less fearful of British aggression. The end of it would have been a voluntary confederation of English-speaking South African States, somewhat on the lines of the Australian Commonwealth. Every real authority on South African history, and on the character and tendencies of its peoples, is agreed on that.

This was probably Mr. Chamberlain's view, officially at least, when he first came into office. He knew that a former Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, assisted by Mr. J. A. Froude, had tried to hasten the natural development and had only succeeded in retarding it. Mr. Rhodes, however, then Prime Minister of Cape Colony, did not see fit to play the waiting game. He helped to organize the Raid, and seems to have entangled Mr. Chamberlain, unofficially, in his schemes.

Mr. Rhodes' sole object may have been to add to the dominions of Great Britain; or, on the other hand, as most Afrianders are convinced, he may have been actuated by a desire to precipitate the federation of South Africa in order to relieve himself of his Rhodesian responsibilities. He and his friends had sunk millions of money in those Northern territories; there was no prospect of substantial returns during their lifetime; interest on the Chartered Company's huge debt and on that of the Rhodesian railways was pressing for payment; and the only way of avoiding collapse, upon this hypothesis, was to force the hand of the British Government to compel federation and *the pooling of the South African State and railway debts*. Mr. Rhodes' most recent speech at Buluwayo, in which he strongly urged that the States and Colonies of South Africa should be federated at once, before the Transvaal and so-called Orange River Colony have been granted self-government, and regardless of the wishes of Natal and Cape Colony, certainly harmonizes with this interpretation of his conduct.

However that may be, while Mr. Rhodes, after the Raid, merely declared that he would thereafter use "constitutional means" to achieve his ends, Mr. Chamberlain seems to have reverted to his earlier and safer

view—to the view that Mr. Rhodes himself had held before the organization of the heavily indebted Chartered Company. Mr. Chamberlain did not go so far as to advocate “the elimination of the Imperial factor,” as Mr. Rhodes had formerly done; but, as has been shown, to some extent, in speeches already quoted, he laid it down that it was the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to live on friendly terms with the Boers, to co-operate with them so far as possible, and, to use his own words (March 28th, 1897), “to reconcile and to persuade to live together in peace and good-will two races whose common interests are immeasurably greater than any differences which may unfortunately exist.” “In South Africa,” he had said (April 22d, 1896), “two races, the English and the Dutch, have to live together. At the present time, and probably for many years to come, the Dutch are in the majority, and it is therefore the duty of every statesman, of every well-wisher of South Africa, to do all in his power to maintain amicable relations between the two races. In our own Cape Colony the Dutch also are in a majority. There are tens of thousands of Dutchmen in the Cape Colony who are just as loyal [1896] to the throne and to the British connection as, let me say, our French Canadian fellow-subjects in the Dominion of Canada. At the same time these Dutch fellow-subjects of ours very naturally feel that they are of the same blood as the Dutchmen in the two neighboring Republics, and they sympathize with their compatriots whenever they think that they are to be subject, or are likely to be subject, to any injustice or to the arbitrary exercise of force.”

Waiving Mr. Chamberlain’s error in calling the Afrianders “Dutchmen” (they are no more Dutch than the average Britisher is Frisian), the policy suggested by his words has been approved by every one who, with an intimate knowledge of South Africa, has spoken unselfishly on its behalf and on behalf of the British Empire. “What South Africa needs is rest, and not a surgical operation,” said the acting Governor of Cape Colony, Gen. Sir William Butler, to the annoyance of Sir Alfred Milner, not many months before the war. “Moderation and patience—everlasting patience—in fact, patience seemed to him to solve almost every question in South Africa,” said the present Prime Minister of Cape Colony, Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, in an unusually enlightened moment in April, 1897.

But this did not suit Mr. Rhodes, and, unfortunately, it did not for long suit Sir Alfred Milner. Possibly, too,

even without his subordinate's assistance, Mr. Chamberlain came to the conclusion that if any great and striking end were to be attained during his tenure of office, it would be necessary to force the pace in South Africa. It must require considerable personal and political unselfishness to leave to one's successors in office the profit and honor of a policy inaugurated by one's self.

It matters little, however, whether Mr. Chamberlain or Sir Alfred Milner was responsible for the change of policy. The essential fact is that after Sir Alfred Milner's visit to England in 1898, their policy changed abruptly, as already shown. They defied experience. They ignored the failure of Sir C. Metcalfe in Canada, who, as Governor, could only see in two rival political parties the opposition of rebels to loyalists. They forgot the success of Sir C. Metcalfe's successor, Lord Elgin, whose creed it was that "incessant watchfulness and some dexterity" were needed to prevent Governors "from falling into the *néant* of mock sovereignty or into the dirt and confusion of local factions" (H. E. Egerton's *History of British Colonial Policy*, p. 306). In Cape Colony, Sir Alfred Milner became the violent partisan of one faction; the hated opponent of the other. Even in peaceful Australasia this would be taken as a danger signal! In South Africa, in the face of history, and in spite of Mr. Chamberlain's own utterances, the British Colonial Secretary and the British Governor, between them, tried to drive the Boers instead of trying to lead them; tried to frighten and bully them instead of trying to conciliate and win them; refused arbitration instead of suggesting it; played upon race feeling and embittered it instead of reconciling "two races whose common interests are immeasurably greater than any differences which may unfortunately exist." And they have continued this policy down to the present day. It has at least been a bold experiment.

The war was its first outcome; and the war in itself suggests a very serious condemnation of the policy that led up to it. Twenty-one thousand Uitlanders, it was alleged, signed the petition for the redress of their grievances (see p. 18). British official returns show that in the process of redressing these grievances, three times that number of British soldiers had been incapacitated up to the end of April, 1901.

On the basis of the average figures from January to April, 1901, should the war continue until April, 1902, 5,048 British soldiers (including Colonials) will by then

have been killed in action; 1,828 will have died of their wounds; 13,345 will have died of disease—making 20,221 deaths in all; while, on the same basis, 68,562 invalids will by then have been sent back to England as unfit for further service. Total casualties by April, 1902, including some 700 “missing”: 89,483 men.

From a practical point of view this is very poor business; one Britisher dead and three Britishers crippled in order to redress the rather trivial grievances of one Uitlander. And if it be taken for granted that the object of the war, even in the first place, was not to redress grievances but to obtain possession of the country, it still seems that 89,483 casualties, and by April, 1902, considerably over £222,000,000, is an outrageously extravagant price to pay for it.* Uitlander controversialists used to state that there were only 20,000 voters in the Transvaal. Surely, if the Boers were such “corrupt,” “greedy,” “unpatriotic” people as they were said to be, very much less than £10,000 a head would have bought both them and their country, and without the sacrifice of a single British life! When one stops, too, to consider the fact that even at this price the country will not be “freehold,” but will be held on “lease,” as it were, conditionally upon the maintenance there of a standing army of some 40,000 men, it becomes clear that Mr. Chamberlain’s policy of coercion, even if successful in all other respects, can hardly inspire people with confidence in his ability to obtain results either cheaply or quickly.

His policy has certainly had a fair trial. Since the outbreak of the war—one of its first results—Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner have continued it, and their followers have pursued it, with undeviating logic and persistence. It has been stated that in pursuance of this policy, and on the principle of making a country a desert and calling it peace, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic have been devastated. While it is not easy to get at all the facts, certain facts have been admitted. British official returns show that an immense and as yet uncounted number of farms have been destroyed, and that in a large number of cases this has been done, not as punishment for any military or civil offence, but for the sole reason that the owners of these farms, citizens of the Free State and Transvaal, have been fighting, as they would put it, in defence of their country against the invading British. Even General De Wet’s

* Up till April 1st, 1901, the war had cost about £120,000,000, and was costing about £2,000,000 per week.

farm and homestead were destroyed in this way, in spite of the invariable kindness he has shown to British prisoners.

This destruction of farms and homesteads and water-dams was begun early in the war, in December, 1899, when a force under Colonel Babington, operating from Modder River Camp, made a raid into the Free State, and, without seeing any of the enemy or being fired upon, destroyed all the farms they came across. President Kruger naturally protested against this departure from the rules of civilized warfare, but in vain.

So vigorously was the policy of intimidation carried out in this respect, that even the London *St. James' Gazette*, ardent as it has been in the support of Lord Salisbury's Ministry, and bitter as it has been in its denunciation of the Boers, felt called upon to make the following protest, all the more striking for its guarded moderation:

"It will not be supposed that it is with any feeling but one of deep regret that we proclaim our opinion that the return of buildings burnt in South Africa which was published on Tuesday reveals the fact that in no inconsiderable number of cases measures have been taken which cannot be justified by any canon of civilized warfare" (May 16th, 1901).*

Racial animosity against the Boers had been inflamed to such an extent for the purpose of provoking war, that it became almost insane in its intensity after war had commenced. As an example of this feeling, which Sir Alfred Milner and the newspapers which he inspired most certainly did nothing to discourage, the action of a member of the Cape Colony Legislative Council is significant. He was, of course, a vehement supporter of Mr. Chamberlain's policy, and did not hesitate to carry it to its logical conclusion. The following extract from an anti-Boer Cape Town paper tells the tale:

"MATJESFONTEIN, May 23d [1900]. (From our correspondent.) Before the Dukes [Cape Town volunteers] left here for the front Mr. Logan armed them with a Maxim, with the following result: 'From Col. Spence Douglas to Hon. Logan, Matjesfontein. May 22d. Your Maxim was in action yesterday, and did excellent work. Much obliged to you for all your kindness to me and the regiment. Hope all well with you.' This brought the following reply from Mr. Logan: 'Exceedingly glad that gun has been of use. *Will pay men using*

* See Note IV., p. 58, in regard to the use in this connection of the names of the American Generals Grant and Sherman.

it one pound for every rebel they shoot, but will deduct twenty-five per cent. for all prisoners taken.'"

Leading London papers such as *The Daily Telegraph* showed the same spirit. ". . . The proclamation of a specific date after which every armed burgher should be treated as a rebel and shot would be productive of nothing but good," it said on October 17th, 1900.

The sentiments of thousands of Mr. Chamberlain's followers were voiced by *The Indian Planters' Gazette*. "Not only should the Boer be slain," it declared, "but slain with the same ruthlessness that they slay a plague-infected rat. Exeter Hall may shriek, but blood there will be and plenty of it, and the more the better. The Boer resistance will further this plan, and enable us to find the excuse that Imperial Great Britain is fiercely anxious for—the excuse to blot the Boers out as a nation, to turn their land into a vast shambles, and remove their name from the muster-roll of South Africa."

Distinguished authors have followed suit, if they have not actually given the lead in this matter. Among others, with entire honesty and with almost boyish *abandon*, Mr. Rudyard Kipling has used his brilliant imagination as a teller of stories, in indictments of the Boers and of the Colonial Africanders. An Africander, he tells us in his *Science of Rebellion in Africa*, an ex-Minister of Queen Victoria, wore a red flower in his buttonhole the day after Her Majesty's death was announced. He does not give the name of the ex-Minister; he does not say who saw that terrible buttonhole—but upon this story he bases a pamphlet containing a series of similar charges, concluding with the amiable suggestion that the Africanders, like plague-infected rats, should be made "unhappy by means of poison, broken glass, creosote, and carbolic acid."

The treatment of Mr. Albert Cartwright was typical of another application of the policy of Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner. Mr. Cartwright, an Englishman, the editor of *The South African News* of Cape Town, belonged to the party which Mr. Rhodes had once led and which does not believe in the interference of Downing Street in South African affairs. The question had been raised in the London *Times* as to whether Lord Kitchener had given verbal orders that Boer prisoners should be shot. Mr. Cartwright took over what *The Times* had published, word for word, and, without in any way committing himself to the accusation, called upon the authorities to inquire into it. For this perfectly legitimate proceeding

Mr. Cartwright was sentenced to a year's imprisonment. "Seditious libel" his action was called; the action of *The Times*, identically the same, was not even criticised. The prosecution was nothing but a pretext for an attempt to silence local criticism. Mr. Malan, another Cape Town editor, was similarly treated. Every one who, in the past, has admired "British justice," must wish sincerely that such proceedings could be wiped off the record.

Still another application of the policy inaugurated by Mr. Chamberlain is to be found in the treatment of those Boer women and children whose husbands and fathers were still "on commando." For these women and children were at one time put on half rations, while the wives and children of those Boers who had surrendered were put on full rations! In America this was looked upon as a most extraordinary proceeding. It was General Weyler's system of "concentrating" the rebel Cubans that provoked the war with Spain. It was known that Lord Kitchener had adopted a similar system in South Africa, which seemed bad enough, but when Mr. Brodrick, the British Secretary of State for War, made this further admission, as above, in the House of Commons in May, 1901, one began to speculate as to what would be the climax of such a policy.

The climax was reached—one must hope it was reached—shortly afterward, when some Africanders of Cape Colony, who had joined the Boer forces and who had afterward been captured, were shot to death as rebels; when, as at Craddock, other prominent Africanders, suspected of disloyalty, were forced to witness such executions. "The making of political martyrs is the last insanity of statesmanship," says a well-known supporter of Mr. Chamberlain, when commenting upon the execution at Slagter's Nek of five of the Africander rebels who were condemned in 1816 for taking up arms against the British. Strange that he should be able to see this through the distance of eighty years, and yet be unable to see it face to face!

But to condemn this policy and its application, on grounds of sentiment, would be foolish. In considering it, one test only need be applied: that is, whether or not its results are likely to prove beneficial to Great Britain and the British Empire. If that seems likely, it would be waste of time to urge its discontinuance; if it seems unlikely, some other policy should be suggested.

There can be but little difference of opinion in regard

to the proper aim of whatever policy may be followed. Its object must be the permanent settlement of South African affairs upon a basis of peace and prosperity. Granted that no policy can achieve that end wholly, it remains none the less true that the nearer that end can be approached the better it will be for South Africa and for the Empire as a whole.

Keeping that end in view, and taking Mr. Chamberlain's policy into consideration, one is forcibly reminded of the fact that great as are the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon race, whether found in England, America, or elsewhere, these virtues have their inevitable obverse side. "Every good quality has its own defect," and one of the defects of Anglo-Saxondom (whether British or American) is its lack of imagination. It is almost impossible for the average Anglo-Saxon to put himself mentally in the place of a foreigner—to imagine what he would think and feel and do, if in that other's place. Consequently, he is apt to believe that he has a monopoly of patriotism, of love of liberty, and so forth, and that the particular sort of government which he is able to supply must necessarily be best for others, seeing that it is best for him. Many Americans, rightly proud of their flag, and believing that liberty and prosperity are guaranteed to those who live under it, would be prepared to argue that Great Britain would be benefited immensely if she could be incorporated as a State or even as a dependency of the American Union. So, to many Britishers, it seems that the Boers are obstinately blind not to recognize that the British flag and Government are universal blessings, to be prayed for rather than to be rejected. They cannot realize that the Boers have very much the same feelings and very much the same ideas that they have, and that, if they stood in the place of the Boers to-day, they too would be unwilling to submit to foreign rule.

Suppose that Australia were to be conquered by Germany. Suppose that Germany were to promise that if Australians would conduct themselves obediently and submissively for a period of years, that then the Downing Street of Berlin would grant them some sort of local self-government, of a highly improved pattern, under the beneficent shadow of the German flag; would Australians accept such a promise with joy and gratitude? Suppose, further, that in the course of the war of conquest, money recompenses had been promised, without rebuke, for every Australian killed by German troops (on Mr. Logan's system); suppose that farms had been burned

for no other reason than that their Australian owners were taking a leading part in the defence of their country; suppose, in short, that the Australians felt, with or even without reason, that Germany, in pursuing a policy of intimidation, had behaved abominably in her conduct of the war—would this make them any more inclined to submit to German rule?

It may be said that there is no parallel between this hypothetical case and the case of Great Britain in South Africa. Perhaps not, from a British point of view. *But how about the Boer point of view?* That is the question. And is it too much to ask the reader to imagine himself, deliberately, in the place of a Boer? If he will do so he will probably realize that he and his people would not submit if it took them years to regain their freedom. They might make temporary submission, for lack of ammunition or of food, but they would seize the first chance to rise in rebellion, again and again if necessary, to win back what had been taken from them.

Would an Australian or a New Zealander bring up his children to love and respect a Government that had treated him and his forebears as the British Government has treated the Boers? Would he wish his children to trust to the friendliness of a race, so many members of which had avowed their desire to treat him as "a plague-infected rat"—in those or in other terms? Would he, from a wider point of view, wish to see his children grow up as the conquered subjects of a foreign power, knowing, as he would know, that the penalty would be degeneration, such as the Hindus of India, the fellaheen of Egypt, and all other races that have submitted to the conqueror, have undergone? Would he not wish to say with President Kruger: "With us the only question is one of freedom or of death: If we lived to be subdued, our children would be slaves. If we die for our freedom, then our children can draw the greatest advantage from our example"?

The Boers are familiar with every detail of their history. They remember the terms of the Sand River Convention. They know that Mr. Chamberlain's assertion of "suzerainty" was made in direct repudiation of the facts. They know how the war was provoked. They never believed it was waged for anything but conquest, and they know now that Great Britain's avowed object is the subjection and possession of their country. Every one of them has lost relatives and friends in the war. Most of them have been ruined financially, with stock

confiscated if not with homestead burned. All of them know of the shooting—not in the heat of battle, but in cold blood—of Colonial Africander “rebels,” whose crime was their desire to help the Republics against overwhelming odds; and they know, too, and are cheered by the knowledge, that the forefathers of many among them fought an uphill fight against Spain for eighty years, before they won their freedom.* They will not forget these things; nor will their children. Why should they? Would you? †

But not only have the Boers of the Republics been made a thousandfold more bitter against Great Britain than they have ever been before; the loyalty of the entire Africander population of the Colonies has been alienated. Many Colonial Africanders who were devotedly loyal to the British throne before the war, men who were the first among Colonists to vote money for the support of the British Navy, are now rebels at heart, if not in deed; and numbers of them are of British birth!

What will be the result? What will these people do if Mr. Chamberlain’s policy is continued? It has been shown already that common sense supplies the answer to these questions. The war has created an Africander nation. Old jealousies, such as formerly existed between some Colonies in Australia, have been swept away by mutual suffering, and the Boers of the Republics and the Africander Colonists have become, in thought, what they ought always to have been: one people. If the policy of coercing them be continued, as it must so long as the Republics are kept subject to Great Britain, the Africanders everywhere, already united in feeling, will seize the first available opportunity to unite in action as well, and will do so in order to throw off British rule. This is one of the reasons why some of those who know South Africa best, and who are by no means inimical to Great Britain, have declared that it would be better and happier for the Empire if the Boers could win their fight now, rather than that it should have to be fought out all over again at some future date. Sooner or later, these people have said, the Africanders are certain to win. Great Britain can afford to lose now, they have added; later on she may not be able to afford it. The reasons put forward for this rather remarkable opinion are worth considering.

First of all, it is said, if Great Britain went to war to

* See Note V., p. 58, for the policy of Alva in Holland.

† See Note VI., p. 59, in regard to the history and treatment of the French Canadians.

maintain her prestige in South Africa, she was ill-advised to do so. Many Africanders in Cape Colony were as thoroughly convinced as the most optimistic of British Generals that ten thousand British troops would be sufficient to overcome the Boer resistance. What have these Africanders and the world in general learned? That in July, 1901, after nearly two years' fighting, over two hundred thousand British troops are required to keep from six to twelve thousand Boers from obtaining the upper hand throughout South Africa. From six to twelve thousand Boers without artillery! The logical inference is that, if, at some future date, Great Britain were at war with Russia, or were obliged to send large detachments to India or elsewhere, the same number of Boers that are now in the field, opposed to a quarter the present number of British troops, would practically command the situation.

Further, it is said, once peace is concluded it will be necessary to allow the majority of Boer prisoners, now in exile, to return to South Africa. This will at least double the number of Boer fighting men. Finally, to suppose that in the event of war with Russia, England could afford to keep 50,000 seasoned troops in South Africa, is to over-estimate immensely what actually would be possible. After garrisoning Cape Town and Durban, she would probably have to abandon the rest of the country until the conclusion of her other war. If that were done, every Africander in Cape Colony and Natal would join the Republican forces. This would raise their total to twice the number that have at any time been in the field against Great Britain during the present struggle, while they would have the further advantage of the help of whatever power Great Britain might be fighting elsewhere.

It may not have been merely sympathy with the American rebels that led Charles Fox, during the American War of Independence, to express the hope that his country would be defeated. Fox was a patriot, and he probably foresaw that if Britain crushed the Americans in that war, and tried to hold their continent by force, it would involve her in some such disaster, later on, as to us seems likely to befall her in South Africa if she now proves victorious there. This likelihood of ultimate disaster in the event of a preliminary British triumph seems to have been appreciated, to some extent at least, by Mr. Chamberlain in 1896, though his subsequent conduct showed such entire ignorance of the character of the

Boers that with the help of Sir Alfred Milner he probably came to the conclusion that they would collapse under intimidation after the fashion of Egyptian fellaheen. He has perhaps learned differently since then. But he does not yet understand South Africa; he clings to the hope of achieving two impossibilities and of redeeming the situation thereby.

The first impossibility is the disarmament of the Boers. He has captured their artillery, destroyed their forts, and may be able to deprive them of their Mausers. But how little this really means he does not seem to realize. It is with the rifle that the Boer fights; and every Boer will own a rifle and a sufficient quantity of ammunition three years after peace has been concluded. If Germany were to conquer Australia and were to disarm its population, is it not certain that somehow or other Australians would again possess themselves of arms? In South Africa it could be done far more easily than in Australia: for German territory lies on one side of Cape Colony; the Congo Free State is within easy reach of the Transvaal on the west, and Portuguese territory touches it on the east. Natives pass to and fro across frontiers of immense length, and could convey innumerable rifles without difficulty. Traders of all nationalities would supply them.

Apart from any detailed argument of that kind, however, Mr. Chamberlain, whatever his power, cannot suppress a natural law, and it is certainly a law of human nature that *demand creates supply*. There are prohibition States in America, but one has yet to hear of a State in which any quantity of alcohol cannot be obtained! So, also, the Boer demand for rifles would inevitably create their supply.

The second impossibility upon the achievement of which Mr. Chamberlain depends, is the artificial planting of British families throughout the Free State and Transvaal for the purpose of outnumbering the Boers. In other words, he hopes to convert the existing Dutch majority into a minority, so that in the event of the Boers rising they could be suppressed by British residents.

Past experience all over the world has proved that military settlements generally require more protection than they are themselves able to provide; while experience in South Africa has proved that, only so long as they are allowed to draw rations from the Government, can British families be induced to live on the farms allotted to them.

They leave as soon as rations are stopped. Some go to Australia; some to America; while many return "home." A few, on leaving the country, the solitude of which appalls them, drift into the small towns, and manage to scrape a living as artisans or as traders. If ten thousand families were to be sent out, it is doubtful whether more than two per cent. of them—two hundred in all—would remain on the land assigned to them. If, instead of exporting families, unmarried men among the British militiamen and volunteers are induced to remain in South Africa, while unmarried women are sent out from England as prospective wives, the result will be the same.

Mr. Chamberlain seems, too, to share the delusion of some of his predecessors at Downing Street, that any one, even without experience, can be a farmer or a pastoralist. Australians and New Zealanders will know that this is not the case, and that even those among the British volunteers who have had experience of farming at home—a very small percentage at best—will find themselves utterly at sea among new conditions, in such a country as South Africa, where agriculture and grazing present greater difficulties than in any other inhabited part of the globe. It stands to reason also that the venturesome spirits who would undertake such work would leave the country at any moment if some new gold-field or other equal attraction were to be presented in America or Australasia; while, on the other hand, the Boers would remain in "ons land" in spite of any temptation to leave it.

Nor will increased activity at the Johannesburg mines create an increased demand for white labor. That has already been shown (p. 27). It is the object of the mine-owners to cut down the employment of white men to the lowest possible limit. They have already made arrangements to do so.

But here again, as in the case of disarming the Boers, Mr. Chamberlain proposes to override a law of nature; and this it is that really makes his plan impossible. The law of natural selection has proved that the Boer is the fittest to survive in the country districts of South Africa. The Britisher has proved himself the fittest to survive in the towns; but, because there is practically no manufacturing population, unless he is occupied in connection with the mines he is dependent upon the Boers for business even in the towns. Moreover, since the war the Afrianders in Cape Colony have formed trading associations of their own and have begun to employ Germans and other foreigners to manage these associations for them,

so as to avoid dealing with English firms. It is evident, therefore, in view of all these circumstances, that British newcomers will find it almost impossible to make a living. Consequently, they will not remain in South Africa. No newcomer will stay in a country when he knows that other countries promise him a better living and more congenial surroundings. And as Australia is within easy reach of Cape Town, one of the first results of any large exportation to South Africa of British families would be a flooding of the Australian labor market with people whose small resources would already have been exhausted.

It should now be evident that the results of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of intimidation and conquest, even if, in themselves, considered so far satisfactory, have been obtained at unwarrantable cost, and that, should all the Boers surrender and their country be subjugated, this result will not be permanent, but is likely to be nullified at still greater cost to Great Britain within a comparatively short time.

Prince Bismarck foretold that South Africa would be the ruin of England, and if his prophecy is fulfilled it will be due in large measure to Mr. Chamberlain. Whatever share Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Rhodes and his associates had in provoking war, most people will admit that Mr. Chamberlain, if he had wished to do so, could have counteracted their efforts. Therefore, in the last analysis, it may be held that he is responsible both for South Africa's chaotic present and for what promises to be, from a British point of view, its disastrous future. But this blunder should really surprise no one. Without the least offensiveness it may be said that while Mr. Chamberlain is a very clever politician, he is not a statesman. Primarily he is a business man, and by carrying his business ability into politics he has achieved a remarkable and well-deserved success.

The distinction between a politician and a statesman has often been drawn. The politician looks forward to to-morrow, or to the next General Election at furthest. The statesman never loses sight of the welfare of future generations. Believing that a principle is, among other things, another name for a far-sighted expediency, the statesman can afford to take his stand upon a basis of principle. This is something that the politician cannot afford to do, even if he have the power to look far enough ahead. Instead of basing his action upon a far-sighted expediency—upon sound principle—

he jumps at the short-sighted expediency and stakes everything upon a quick and big return. This may be justifiable in the case of a business man who sees his chance to make a fortune rapidly and then to retire—leaving his reputation behind him as a thing of no further consequence. It can never be justifiable, however, in the case of a General who has been ordered to make a move in a plan for a long campaign, and who, in the hope of winning some immediate triumph, upsets the plan and compromises the army of which his division is only a part. Still less can it be justifiable in the case of a statesman.

Yet that is what Mr. Chamberlain did: entrusted by the nation with the supervision of South African affairs, but, as a Minister of the Crown, responsible for England's welfare generally, he weakened her position in China, in Persia, in Eastern Europe, and in the hearts of the American people (if that counts for anything),* in the hope of achieving a triumph for his department and for his party. Even then, in order to achieve this triumph—and he did achieve it in so far as "Khaki" won the last General Election—he sacrificed South Africa and compromised the Empire as a whole.

Not that he did this deliberately, or that he is to be blamed for what he did. One may readily grant his entire conscientiousness and his sincere faith in his policy. It is not even necessary to suppose that he was influenced by personal ambition. As a business man, whose experience had taught him that neither he nor his fellow business men were influenced by sentiment, he inferred that the Boers, really the least business-like of people, would not be affected by it either; and that, instead of facing overwhelming odds, they would offer much the same sort of fight that a small manufacturer might put up against a powerful Trust—recognizing the hopelessness of his position and submitting to be swallowed by the Trust on promise of an appointment as local manager with a small but assured salary. History proves that sentiment plays a much more important part in the affairs of nations than cool, calculating reason; but this is difficult for a certain type of business man, such as Mr. Chamberlain, to realize, and quite impossible for a bureaucrat like Sir Alfred Milner, with his experience of Egypt to mislead him.

Both these men believed that the end would justify the

* See Note] VII., p. 60, for American opinion in regard to the South African war.

means, and that right and wrong, as recognized between individuals, did not need consideration in matters of national policy. It is necessary to suppose this, and to credit them with sincerity, in order to account for their use, against the Boers, of methods that would have disgraced an unscrupulous attorney in the narrower sphere of commerce.

But they are not the only would-be statesmen who have done this, at almost unbearable cost to the nation they honestly believed they were benefiting. Omitting other instances, the Government of the United States, before and after the annexation of Texas, pursued the same tactics when dealing with Mexico. General U. S. Grant, that least sentimental of men, speaks of this in his *Personal Memoirs* (Chapter II.) in a way that bears directly upon the present situation in South Africa. "Generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation [of Texas] was consummated or not; but not so all of them. For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war [with Mexico], which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. It was an instance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. . . . The Southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war. Nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times."

From this higher point of view, taken by General Grant, it would follow that merely because the British Government has outraged justice in South Africa; merely because the policy pursued there was based, not upon principle, but upon bluff and sharp practice, nothing but disaster can result until the wrong done has been set right.

Is it not significant that Mr. Chamberlain's policy has in no instance been defended on moral grounds? Many ministers of the Gospel have defended it, but they have done so as disciples of the God of War, not as exponents of common, much less of Christian morality. Their cry has been "Avenge Majuba," not "Do right that good may come." Some of them have kept sufficiently unruffled to realize the crudity of the "Avenge Majuba" cry, and have, therefore, fallen back for their line of defence upon a perversion of Darwin's theories—the same Darwin whom the Church reviled as a nineteenth-century Anti-Christ.

Not only ministers of the Gospel, but many other excellent people whose acquaintance with science has been scraped hastily, when searching for some verbal bomb to throw at the Boers, have talked about the "inevitable," about "civilization," and about "the survival of the fittest," as if these words alone explained the South African situation and excused the Chamberlain policy. They are like the famous old woman who, on her death-bed, kept muttering to herself that blessed word "Mesopotamia"; she did not know what it meant, but she found it very comforting.

Great Britain, they said, as the "fittest" and most "civilized" power in South Africa, was bound to overcome and to subjugate every other power there; it was "inevitable." But if they had read some scientific textbook they would have learned that it is one of the daily achievements of science to control the tendencies of Nature, and that these tendencies are inevitable in their action only so long as Nature is untamed. In other words, if they will grant that the British Government belonged to the sphere of untamed Nature, and was beyond the control of reason, science, ethics, or any other humanizing factor, their position is tenable; but not otherwise.

In the second place, they assume a good deal in placing the "civilization" of gambling, drinking Johannesburg above that of the pastoral Boer. A civilized environment is that which best promotes the physical, mental, and moral development of the individual. Johannesburg promoted the development of financial cunning. Its best friends could make no higher claim for it, and would readily admit that the many Johannesburgers who undoubtedly possessed higher qualities than this did so in spite of their environment, not because of it. On the other hand, Dr. Conan Doyle has already been cited as showing what manner of men the Boer environment produced. The "civilizing" excuse is based upon a fallacy, however, and needs no special criticism. It is based upon the idea that the environment which is best for the physical, mental, and moral development of one man must necessarily be best for other men; as if there were one universal standard of civilization. People who reason in this way are equal to feeding sheep on mutton chops and beer.

In the third place, if these defenders of the faith had studied the writings of such men as Herbert Spencer and Professor Huxley, they would have learned that "the survival of the fittest" does not always mean the survival

of the strongest. A point is reached in human evolution at which, unless man adopts the "social habits" and takes part in the "ethical process" of development, he ceases to progress. The same is true of nations. Evolution is universal; but while the "cosmic" process, with its brute struggle, is the means of growth up to a certain point, once that point is passed the cosmic is superseded by the ethical process, which then becomes the means of growth and of survival in the struggle for existence. So, if these would-be vindicators of Mr. Chamberlain's policy do not care to admit that Great Britain is still in the wild-beast stage of existence, their appeal to science really tells overwhelmingly against them; for it shows that, in so far as the South African war is concerned, the action of the present British Ministry is not progressive, but retrogressive. Which, by the way, happens to be the opinion of Mr. Herbert Spencer, as he has frequently stated—perhaps one of the numerous facts which have escaped the notice of these pseudo-scientific clergy and their friends.

Other excellent people, equally well meaning, who find themselves unable to defend the proceedings which led up to the war, argue that, once begun, the affair must be "seen through to the end." They seem to forget that two wrongs can never make one right. If a rich man has begun a lawsuit against a poor man, believing that justice is on his own side, and then finds out, before the case is finished, that he has been mistaken and that the poor man is in the right, the wise and honorable course to follow is not to use his superior means in order to finish crushing the poor man, but to withdraw the suit and voluntarily to recompense his opponent for the injury he has inflicted upon him. That would be the right thing to do, and because right, it would also be wise. There is no real distinction between what is right and what is wise. A sense of right may be intuitive, but, failing intuition, it is merely another name for far-seeing wisdom. In the case suggested, the rich man might well realize that a poor man, crushed and ruined, knowing that he has not received justice, is apt to do desperate things, and that self-preservation as well as honor makes the right course the wise one. It would make no difference if the poor man, in all respects except in the case at issue, had behaved like a scoundrel. No one will pretend that scoundrels should be treated with less *justice* than the ordinarily well-behaved.

So, then, in the case of the Boers, if it be impossible

to overcome the prejudice created against them, and if the average Britisher is rooted in the belief that they are scoundrels, should he, on that account, think less of breaking his promise to them than if he thought well of them? Surely not! Then why not follow the same train of reasoning and conduct as is so evidently the wisest in the case of the rich man and the poor?

It is customary, at this time, for those who believe that the Boers are in the right, but that the British Government is implacable, to suggest some kind of compromise as a way out of the difficulty. Such people realize fully that Mr. Chamberlain's policy must continue to prove disastrous. Looking for alternative policies, they see that compromise would be possible, but fail to see that, in a sense, it would be worse than a continuance of hostilities. It would merely postpone the settlement. Mr. Gladstone's arrangement in 1881 was a compromise, and it settled nothing. No compromise between national independence and subjection, between national life and death, can be satisfactory. Reverting to the hypothetical case of the poor man and the rich, it would be useless for the latter to offer half a crown as recompense for one hundred pounds' worth of damage. It would be adding insult to injury. Nor will the Boers feel grateful for some measure of municipal self-government, or for a minority voice in some council appointed by the British Crown. They will be satisfied with nothing less than that which would satisfy Australians in similar circumstances: namely, the restoration of their independence.* And that, as the right solution of the problem with which Mr. Chamberlain has dealt so wrongly, is the only practicable alternative to the folly of coercion.

As most of the Boers have come to the conclusion that the possession of the Johannesburg gold-fields has brought them little else but trouble, it is quite likely that they would be willing to sell them to Great Britain for a sum sufficient to repair the damage done to their homes. But the one thing certain is, that if the Boers are deprived of their national independence, nothing can save the British Empire: trouble in South Africa will prove to be its ruin, and Prince Bismarck's prophecy will be fulfilled. As Mr. F. C. Selous, the South African hunter and explorer, has said: "No method of settlement can bring about a *permanent* peace in South Africa which does not give the Transvaal and the Orange Free State

* See Note VIII., p. 61, for the opinion and decision of the Colonial Africanders on this subject.

is due; and loyalty is due, not to the Colonial Secretary, but to the King and to the Empire.

Individual Australasians may think that they cannot exert any influence in England; but they can, through their representatives in Parliament. Their representatives are as much open to reason as any one; and it is probable that with a little verbal or written encouragement from constituents, many of them would be glad to do what Pitt, Burke, Fox, and others did for England during the American war. That such help should come from the Australian Commonwealth and from New Zealand, instead of from England, is quite in keeping with modern developments.

Naturally, it is the first duty of New Zealand members of Parliament to look after the interests of New Zealand, and of Federal members to look after the interests of the Commonwealth. But they surely owe it to the Empire to accept the responsibility of what they have already done, and to see, also, that the support they have given is not used for purposes other than those originally intended. Surely, too, it should be evident that Mr. Chamberlain's policy in South Africa threatens the internal independence of all self-governing Colonies. Once the Colonial Secretary is accepted as the sole arbiter of disputes between himself and an alleged subordinate State or Colony, in matters arising out of the interpretation of its Constitution, and affecting its internal affairs, he becomes the absolute dictator of its destiny. It was the manifest injustice of this arrangement, which gave one of the parties to a dispute the power to act as judge and to dictate a decision, that finally compelled the Transvaal Government to go to war. If the situation before the outbreak of hostilities had not been deliberately obscured, and if racial passion had not been invoked to conceal the real issues, the self-governing Colonies of the Empire would have supported the legal contention of the Transvaal. They would have seen that one of the fundamental questions at issue was whether the British Empire is to be kept together by force, or by the bonds of affection and mutual self-interest. Rome centralized a continent in a city; sacrificed civil freedom to military dominion; relied upon force—and failed. The wiser among British statesmen have sought to avoid these errors. They have seen that to make the bonds that bind an Empire together elastic, so that under strain they will stretch, is better than to make those bonds so rigid that under strain they will snap. They have seen that it is

better to make the parts of an Empire independent—"self-moving"—that there may be true interdependence between them, and that each may have the vitality which the subject—"moved"—state cannot have. These wiser British statesmen were fighting the fight of all the Colonies.

For these reasons it would seem that not only for the sake of the Empire, but directly for the sake of their own Colonies, every effort should be made by Australasians to alter the attitude of the British Government. If, as the result of pressure by the rank and file of voters, resolutions were passed by the New Zealand and Commonwealth Parliaments, setting forth the facts, giving the logical deductions from those facts, and urging a practical reversal of the present South African policy, it would do more than any other thing to change public opinion in Great Britain, to save South Africa for the Empire, and to save the Empire for the world.

NOTES.

NOTE I.

(From p. 11.)

SAND RIVER CONVENTION.

On November 14th, 1883, the Transvaal delegates, then in London, wrote to Lord Derby as follows: "Her Majesty's Government would entirely mistake the feelings of our people should they suppose that either the present or the coming generation can ever rest in satisfaction unless the Sand River Convention be again recognized as the historical basis of the new arrangement."

NOTE II.

(From p. 29.)

A GREAT CONSPIRACY.

The Right Hon. James Bryce, the historian, has stated that "there is not, so far as one can ascertain from any evidence yet produced, the slightest foundation for the allegation, so assiduously propagated in England, that there was any general conspiracy of the Colonial Dutch, or that there existed the smallest risk of any unprovoked attack by them, or by the Free State, or by the Transvaal itself, upon the power of England."

In connection with the alleged seventeen-year-old conversation between Mr. Reitz and the Mr. Schreiner referred to in the text, it is noteworthy that not very long after it is supposed to have occurred, Mr. Reitz was offered the Presidency of the Orange Free State. Instead of jumping at the opportunity to further the growth of his budding conspiracy against England, Mr. Reitz wrote to an Englishman, Sir George Grey, and urged him to accept the position in his stead (Milne's *Life of a Pro-Consul*, pp. 126, 127). "I did not see my way to regard the offer," said Sir George Grey, "but the making of it manifested a beautiful trait in Mr. Reitz's character. How many men, being tendered the highest post that their country could confer, would have turned to another, asking 'Will you accept it?'" This was certainly not the action of a man who was plotting against Great Britain.

NOTE III.

(From p. 32.)

BOER TREATMENT OF THE NATIVES.

It was almost amusing to notice the indignation with which some of the Uitlanders and the advocates of Imperial interference in South Africa accused the Boers of ill-treating the natives. The readers of English newspapers, whose passions had to be inflamed against the Boers, were informed that in Johannesburg and in Pretoria the blacks were compelled to walk on the roads, not being allowed the use of the pavements. The English press also emphasized the fact, with due exclamations of horror, that the blacks who worked in the mines of Johannesburg were obliged, by the regulations of the Transvaal Government, to wear badges on their arms—"emblems of servitude." But the people who were led by these statements to believe that the Boers ill-treated the natives, were not informed that in Natal, a British Colony next door to the Transvaal, and in many parts of Cape Colony also, exactly the same rules were enforced. Nor were they informed that the Uitlander refugees in Cape Town, some of whom had inspired these complaints originally, protested bitterly that Cape Town was not a fit place for a white man to live in, because blacks were allowed the free use of the sidewalks and occasionally jostled the Uitlander into the road! Nor, finally, were these people informed that in many parts of the United States the Polish laborers are obliged to wear badges with numbers on them, for the excellent reason that, as in the case of the blacks, their names are hopelessly unpronounceable.

To accuse the Boers of ill-treating the natives is an old and well-worn slander. The fact that in the Sand River Convention the Transvaalers promised not to allow slavery, has been cited to prove that they wanted to allow it. Years before, the Volksraad of the earlier Boer Republic of Natal had written to Sir George Napier: "A long and sad experience has sufficiently convinced us of the injury, loss, and dearth of slave labor, so that neither slavery nor the slave trade will ever be permitted among us." The promise in the Sand River Convention was exacted as a sop to the missionaries.

That the only native newspaper in South Africa, published and edited by the pure-blooded Fingo, Jabavo, not in the Transvaal but in Cape Colony, should have upheld the justice of the Boer cause in this war, seems to have escaped the notice of the anti-Boer press. Also the well-known fact (Cf. *Theals' History*) that when the Boers first occupied the Transvaal, there were practically no natives there—only a few wretched remnants of tribes, living in inaccessible mountains, all the rest having been exterminated by the Zulus, who had made murderous rushes through the country without occupying it; and that, after the Boers had governed it for some fifty years, the immigration of natives into the country from all parts of South Africa, including British territory, had been so great, that over seven hundred thousand of them were then living there. They had gone there of their own free will and accord; they were at liberty to leave if they wished to do so. They would not have stayed, and there could not have been this enormous increase, if they had been treated badly.

To use the words of Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons in 1881 (before so many English newspapers had fallen into the habit of suppressing facts which do not suit their policy): "They appeared to be under the impression that the Boers in the Transvaal were fierce and unjust aggressors, and that they dispossessed the natives of their territory, and brutally ill-treated them afterwards. He wished honorable members would read the papers before they came to this rash and inconsiderate conclusion. The absolute reverse of this was the fact." (Quoted by A. M. S. Methuen, in *Peace or War in South Africa*.)

NOTE IV.

(From p. 37.)

ALLEGED AMERICAN PRECEDENT.

The Daily Mail of London declared in its issue of May 16th, 1901, that the American General Grant ordered that the Shenandoah Valley should be reduced "to a barren waste," and that his subordinate, Sheridan, wrote, "I have destroyed over two thousand farms filled with wheat and hay and farming implements." As against this, it said, what are the six hundred farms and hovels that (officially) have been destroyed in the Boer States? Mr. Chamberlain, in the House of Commons, similarly excused his approval of what had been done.

What General Sheridan actually wrote was, not that he had destroyed over two thousand "farms," but: "I have destroyed over two thousand *barns* filled with wheat" (see Bigelow's *Principles of Strategy*, p. 148). In his instructions (August 16th, 1864) to his subordinate, General Tarbert, Sheridan ordered: "No houses will be burned."

What General Grant ordered and wrote was: "In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley . . . it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed destroy. *It is not desirable that buildings should be destroyed — they should rather be protected*" (Sheridan's *Memoirs*, Vol. I., p. 464, quoted in *Daily News*).

Comment is not necessary.

NOTE V.

(From p. 42.)

SPAIN AND HOLLAND.

As an instance of the way in which history repeats itself, the following extracts from Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic* (Part III., Chapter IX.) are of considerable value.

A proclamation by Alva, dated July 26th, 1573, addressed to the people of Holland, reveals the very spirit of Imperialism:

"Ye are well aware that the King [of Spain] has, over and over again, manifested his willingness to receive his children, in however forlorn a condition the prodigals might return.

His Majesty assures you once more that your sins, however black they may have been, shall be forgiven and forgotten in the plenitude of royal kindness, if you repent and return in season to His Majesty's embrace. Notwithstanding your manifold crimes, His Majesty still seeks, like a hen calling her chickens, to gather you all under the parental wing. The King hereby warns you once more, therefore, to place yourselves in his royal hands, and not to wait for his rage, cruelty, and fury, and the approach of his army."

At a time when Holland ran red with the blood he had shed, blood, not of men only, but of women and children too, Alva, as Governor, "took occasion also to read a lecture to the party of conciliation in Madrid, whose counsels, as he believed, his sovereign was beginning to heed. Nothing, he maintained, could be more senseless than the idea of pardon and clemency. This had been sufficiently proved by recent events. It was easy for people at a distance to talk about gentleness, but those upon the spot knew better. *Gentleness had produced nothing*, so far [he had not only shot rebel prisoners, but had burned many of them to death]; violence alone could succeed in future. 'Let Your Majesty,' he said, 'be disabused of the impression, that with kindness anything can be done with these people. Already have matters reached such a point that many of those born in the country, who have hitherto advocated clemency, are now undeceived, and acknowledge their mistake.'" Then he adds: "Your Majesty may be certain that no man on earth desires the path of clemency more than I do."

NOTE VI.

(From p. 43.)

THE FRENCH CANADIANS.

It has been argued that because the French Canadians submitted to British rule, and because their descendants are more or less loyal subjects of the British Crown to-day, the Boers may likewise be expected to submit. No one who knows the history of Canada would venture on that argument. Before the conquest of French Canada by Great Britain, most Frenchmen living there had been the slaves of the local Governors. Government *corvées*, enforced military service, and the complete absence of political rights had been the lightest of their burdens. They were not "Canadians"; they had no sense of an independent national life; they had never had any experience of self-government. The conquest of Canada meant for them a change of masters; no more. They submitted because submission had been for them and their ancestors a law of being. The Boers, on the other hand, have never really acknowledged any master except their God. Their Government belonged to them; not they to their Government.

And in Canada Great Britain pursued a policy that has already been reversed in South Africa. No attempt was made to introduce English laws, and, to quote an authority, the British provincial Governors received "the most precise and express orders to forbid any insult to be addressed towards

the language, dress, fashions, customs, or religion of the French inhabitants."

Even then it should be remembered that the French in Canada did rise against British rule, though not until seventy-four years after the signing of the Treaty of Paris which had made French Canada British. There is an entry in the diary of Lord Macaulay, an independent onlooker, in regard to the suppression of this rebellion, which is especially significant to-day in view of the treatment of the so-called rebel Africanders:

"The Canadian insurrection seems to be entirely crushed," he wrote. "I fear that the victorious caste will not be satisfied without punishments so rigorous as would dishonor the English Government in the eyes of all Europe, and in our own eyes ten years hence. . . . The Duke of Cumberland ['Butcher Cumberland'] in Scotland did only what all England was clamoring for; but all England changed its mind, and the Duke became unpopular for yielding to the cry which was set up in a moment of fear and resentment. . . . The savage language of some of the newspapers, both in Canada and London, makes me doubt whether we are so far beyond the detestable Carlists and Christinos of Spain as I had hoped" (Trevelyan's *Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*, Chapter VII., under date December 22d, 1838).

NOTE VII.

(From p. 47.)

AMERICAN OPINION OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Every effort has been made by Mr. Chamberlain's supporters in England to create an impression that American public opinion favors the policy of intimidation in South Africa. "Only the Irish and foreign element favor the Boers," it has been said. This is not true.

The statements of no four men are more fairly representative of the best, unofficial American thought on the subject of the South African war than those of ex-President Harrison (now dead), ex-President Cleveland, William D. Howells, and Mark Twain. The opinions of the ex-Presidents have already been quoted. Mr. Howells does not appear to have written anything dealing expressly with the subject, but his opinion is well known, and in *The North American Review* for February, 1901, he refers to "the present effort of certain British politicians to destroy two free Republics in the interest of certain British speculators."

Mark Twain's friendship for England is indisputable; he knows South Africa; and this is his summary of Mr. Chamberlain's policy:

"Mr. Chamberlain manufactures a war out of materials so inadequate and so fanciful that they make the boxes grieve and the gallery laugh, and he tries hard to persuade himself that it isn't purely a private raid for cash, but has a sort of dim, vague respectability about it somewhere, if he could only find the spot; and that, by and by, he can scour the flag clean again after he has finished dragging it through the mud, and make it shine and flash in the vault of heaven once more as it

had shone and flashed there a thousand years in the world's respect until he laid his unfaithful hand upon it. It is bad play—bad." His review of the facts in *More Tramps Abroad*, written during his visit to South Africa, shows that he has studied the subject carefully.

Such Americans as the four just named are not anti-British. It is they and their kind who for years past have kept in check the animosity that a large section of their people has always harbored against Great Britain. They know that the South African war has added fuel to the flame of that old animosity, and, in this case, instead of being able to check it, they feel obliged to join in the denunciation of what Mr. Chamberlain is doing.

The consequence is that the friendship for Great Britain that had been growing slowly in America since the war with Spain, has been strained vitally. Officially, of course, the most cordial relations exist; and so far as the New York Stock Exchange is concerned, intimately connected as it is with that of London, the feeling may be reckoned in dollars and cents and be placed to the "pro" side of the British column. But the New York Stock Exchange does not represent the people; and the great mass of the people, unable to differentiate between Mr. Chamberlain and the nation he temporarily represents, see in the action of Great Britain but another example of "British oppression of the weak and suppression of liberty." If they go further than this and presume to throw stones at the British people for what is now being done in Britain's name, it shows them more forgetful of their own history than one would wish them to be. Neither country can afford to throw stones at the other—and, in any case, only the unthinking throw stones. But to present facts and to suggest consequences is a very different proceeding and may be helpful. If some unbiassed and friendly Englishman, familiar with the facts, were to criticise the present foreign policy of the United States, his opinion would be received with interest by all intelligent Americans.

NOTE VIII.

(From p. 51.)

OPINION AND DECISION OF THE COLONIAL AFRICANDERS.

The resolutions passed by the People's Congress held at Graaff-Reinet, Cape Colony, on May 31st, 1900, and indorsed some months later by the People's Congress held at Worcester, Cape Colony, are a clear statement of what the Colonial Africanders think of the present situation, and of the settlement they are pledged to work for in order to secure peace for South Africa in the future:

FIRST RESOLUTION: Whereas at the last General Election in Cape Colony the Africanders proved that they constitute the majority of Cape Colonists; and whereas the war and the events leading up to the war have unified the ranks of Africanderdom, and have thereby increased the Africander vote since the last General Election; and whereas we, assembled in Congress from nearly all the districts in the Colony, are well acquainted with the opinions of our Africander neighbors

and know that we speak on their behalf as well as on our own. Therefore be it resolved that all resolutions to be passed by this Congress will represent, on the matters dealt with, the opinions of the majority of Cape Colonists.

SECOND RESOLUTION: Be it resolved that it is the opinion of the majority of Cape Colonists that the chief and most immediate cause of this war was the unwarrantable and intolerable interference, by the British Ministry at London, in the internal affairs of the South African Republic.

THIRD RESOLUTION: Be it further resolved that assistant causes known to us were (1) the violation of our Constitutional rights as Cape Colonists in having the advice, wishes, and experience of our Parliamentary representatives and of the Colonial Ministers of the Crown ignored and overruled by the London Colonial Office and its agents; (2) the gross and often deliberate misrepresentations by the Jingo press concerning the affairs and peoples of South Africa; (3) the enormous difficulty of acquainting the British people with the real facts of the South African situation in view of the many powerful influences at work to mislead them.

FOURTH RESOLUTION: Whereas, were the two South African Republics now to be definitely annexed after the repeated declarations by Her Majesty's Ministers, both before and during the early part of the war, that their policy in no way threatened the independence of the Republics, nothing but the restoration of their independence could restore the confidence of the majority of Cape Colonists in British good government and in British justice and honor; and whereas, were the Republics to be annexed, the majority of Cape Colonists would feel themselves bound morally to work unceasingly by every right and lawful means for the restoration of independence to the Republics, and to make that end their first political object; and whereas, from our knowledge of the history and character of the citizens of the Republics we are convinced that they would never become the willing subjects of the Empire, but would seize any and every opportunity which might offer itself to recover their independence, possibly by force of arms, once they were to be deprived of it; and whereas, instead of the annexation of the Republics tending to promote the welfare of their people as has been claimed, it would, if successfully maintained for any long period, tend to degrade those people and their offspring, seeing that the servitude of a self-governing State is as demoralizing to its people as the more direct form of personal slavery; and whereas, as the annexation of the Republics by Great Britain would be as great a wrong morally as the theft by a rich man of a poor man's hard-won savings, and whereas on that general ground alone it is not believable that permanent good could result from such a policy,

Therefore be it resolved that we, on behalf of the majority of Cape Colonists, do hereby declare our solemn and profound conviction that the annexation of the two South African Republics would be disastrous to the peace and welfare of South Africa and of the Empire as a whole.

FIFTH RESOLUTION: Be it resolved that it is the opinion of the people in Congress here assembled that a settlement of the South African situation on the following basis would prove a blessing to South Africa and to the Empire, namely, that the two Republics should have their unqualified independence;

that the Colonies should have the right to enter into treaties of obligatory arbitration with the Republics for the settlement of all disputes affecting the internal affairs of the South African Continent; that this Colony, and any other Colony so desiring it, should have a voice in the selection of its Governor; be it further resolved that a settlement on the above basis would make the majority of the people who have made South Africa their home the warm friends and staunch allies of the British Empire, and that in no other way known to us can that end now be attained; be it further resolved that such a settlement would make it as unnecessary for the Republics as for the Empire to maintain standing military forces in South Africa, seeing that the independence of the Republics would no longer be threatened, and that, in the event of a foreign invasion of British South African territory, the citizens of the Republics as well as the Colonists would be prepared to repel the attack. Be it further resolved that although we are well aware that such a settlement would not be approved at the present moment by the majority of English people, we yet hope that before it is too late they will become convinced of its wisdom.

SIXTH RESOLUTION: Be it resolved that we do hereby approve and adopt the Petition to the People of Great Britain and Ireland, commonly known as the People's Petition.

The Petition referred to in the sixth resolution had already been signed by over forty thousand British subjects in Cape Colony, and was signed subsequently by many more. It read as follows:

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, BRITISH SUBJECTS, NOW RESIDING IN THE COLONY OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, ASK YOU, THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, TO HEAR US.

In all that follows we state our heartfelt conviction, having every reason to believe that we also express the conviction of the majority of the white people who have made South Africa their home.

You were led into the war which you are now waging against the two South African Republics in ignorance of vital facts and by means of misleading statements.

You were led to believe that the Boers would not fight; that they were cowards. Experience has shown that in this respect you were misled. You were led to believe that they were brutal and inhuman. Experience has proved the contrary. You were led to believe innumerable other things against them, which experience would also prove to be false. We feel justified, therefore, in asking you to take our local experience into account.

Our experience makes us certain that, even if you succeed in conquering these people, you can never subjugate them. They will never become contented subjects of the Empire. Their cry is: "Liberty or Death!" They are fighting as only men can fight who are fighting for their homes, who are convinced that their cause is just, and that for that reason God will give them freedom in the end.

It has been said that the Republics are waging a war of conquest, and that you are bound to resist their aggression. We deny that conquest is or ever has been their aim; we assert that when they assumed the aggressive they did so in

self-defence. Their independence was threatened, and they knew it. Your Government now openly declares its determination to deprive them of their independence, and thus proves that the fear of the Republics was well founded.

Freedom is all they ask. Freedom is their only aim. They want "to be let alone": to be free as you are free. We hold that, if ever nations have done so, these two Republics have proved themselves worthy to be free.

To deprive them of their freedom would not only be unjust; it would be a hideous and almost irremediable blunder. The war itself was unnecessary. It has already filled South Africa with ruin and despair. We know that it is day by day driving a large number of your fellow subjects nearer to desperation. Only one thing could be worse than the war, and that is the step which your Government now aspires to take.

We, for our part, believing that South Africa can never be at peace and can never enjoy a true prosperity until the Republics are free, can only *pledge ourselves henceforth to work unceasingly for their freedom* by every legal and right means; but we know that the decision must rest ultimately with you, the people of Great Britain and Ireland, and we therefore appeal to you to grant the Republics, in the name of Justice and for the sake of South Africa and the Empire, the freedom which they ask, and which we most solemnly believe they deserve.