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BECHUANALAND.

BY A

MEMBER

OF THE

CAPE LEGISLATURE.

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I.

THE traditions of African Natives are, as a general rule, to be received with caution ; but there seems to be ground for believing that the Barolong Tribe were led by MOROLONG southward, from a far distant country. Under the Chieftainship of MABUA, fourth in descent from MOROLONG, the tribe reached the Molopo River, and they continued to occupy territory in the neighbourhood of that river until their dispersal by hordes of blood-thirsty Zulus, who in the time of MOSELEKATSE invaded the Barolong country, and carried fire and sword amongst the less warlike Barolong tribe.

One portion of the defeated tribe under MOROKO settled at Thaba Nchu ; another portion under TAOANE, father of MONTSIOA, like that under MACHABI, appear to have led a wandering life until, hearing of MOROKO'S settlement at Thaba Nchu, they also took up their abode in what is now the Orange Free State, where they were resident in 1836, when the Emigrant Boers entered that country. After the successful attack made by MOSELEKATSE upon the Emigrant Boers, under the brave Commandant HENDRICK POTGIETER, the Barolong tribe befriended the Boers by providing them with draft oxen in place of those swept off by the victorious Zulus, and, subsequently, when a Boer Commando was despatched against MOSELEKATSE the Barolong alliance with the Boers was maintained. The warlike operations carried on by the Boers against MOSELEKATSE resulted in the total defeat of "the old lion of the north," who was driven far northward towards the Zambesi, and the Barolong country having thus been reconquered, the Boers in return for the aid given them by the Barolong tribe restored TAOANE to the possession of land in the former Barolong country. MOROKO remained at Thaba Nchu, and MACHABI took up his abode at Mooi River until such time as land could be found for him under the arrangement

made with the Boers. In 1849 TAOANE died, and from the date of MONTSIOA'S succession disputes constantly arose as to the boundary between the Boer territory and the country claimed for Barolong occupation. The Boers appear to have at all times claimed sovereignty over the Barolong territory as theirs by right of conquest (*a*) and to have alleged that the occupation of it by the tribe was merely permissive. In 1852 MONTSIOA having been called upon as a vassal to give assistance to the Boers against SECHELE, declined. Whereupon he was required to surrender himself unconditionally, but rather than do so he and his immediate followers abandoned their village and fled from the country then occupied by them. Some of the leading men, notably MONTSIOA'S brother MOLEMA, with a considerable number of the tribe, however, soon returned to the Barolong territory, and MOLEMA continued to live at Mafeking. MONTSIOA never seems to have recognized any right on the part of the Boers to deal with his country. There is in existence a letter written by him to the Landdrost of Poteschefstroom, dated March 25th, 1870, wherein he complains that taxes have been demanded of his people by an official of the South African Republic, and says, "If there is not soon made an end of this lawless matter I shall be obliged to hand it over to Her Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, Sir P. E. WODEHOUSE, with the earnest request to arbitrate between me and my most noble allies." Into the merits of the claims to the Barolong territory set up at various times by the Transvaal Government, the validity or otherwise of the KEATE Award, and the effect of the action taken by President BURGERS in 1876, when MONTSIOA was still living at Moshening, in GASSITSIWE'S country, in endeavouring to secure the annexation of the Barolong territory to the Transvaal, it is unnecessary to enter. The boundary line defined by the recent Convention of London marks the limit of the territory of the Republic. The provisions of that Convention also indicate the Chiefs whose territories fall within the Republic. ✓ The rival claims of MONTSIOA and his brother MOSHETTE to the paramountcy—although otherwise of little

(*a*) Mr. KRUGER'S evidence. Report of Transvaal Royal Commission, page 41.

importance—have a considerable bearing upon the events which happened prior to the Convention of Pretoria in 1881, and between that time and the establishment of the British Protectorate in Bechuanaland. Therefore it is necessary to point out that MOSHETTE is an elder brother of MONTSIOA, and that notwithstanding the preference given to MONTSIOA by official reports, native law would point to MOSHETTE as the tribal Chief (a). In answer to Sir H. DE VILLIERS the following evidence was given by Lieut.-Colonel MOYSEY before the Transvaal Royal Commission (b):—

“Q. You say that MONTSIOA is the Chief of the Barolongs?

A. I say he is looked up to as Chief by most.

Q. Who is the Paramount Chief by virtue of native custom and native right?

A. I go by what I see in the Bloemhof Arbitration Blue-book, and there MOSHETTE is mentioned as Paramount Chief, and that he was born so.

Q. So that if any one has a right to COETSEB'S farms by virtue of the Barolong occupation it is MOSHETTE and not MONTSIOA?

A. I do not recognize the rights of any Chief to them; I only recognize the rights of the Barolongs.

Q. MONTSIOA, has he rights then?

A. Not in his own person.

Q. MONTSIOA has no right to be where he is at all in any part where he is at present?

A. The attitude taken by MONTSIOA is that the country is Barolong country, and the business has to be settled between him and MOSHETTE, and between him and the Republic.”

KEBALEPILE, son of MONTSIOA, also gave the following evidence before the Royal Commission:—

“Q. Does MONTSIOA claim to be over MACHABI and MOSHETTE?

A. No, he does not claim any jurisdiction over them. In their father's time this tribe separated, and it has been separated

(a) MOSHETTE'S Statement. Appendix B.

(b) Report of Transvaal Royal Commission, page 80.

ever since. There are five divisions of the Barolong tribe. **MONTSIOA** is the third and **MOSHETTE** is the second.

Q. Who is the first?

A. **MICATSIWE**.

Q. Where does he live?


A. At **Moroquane**. He is the head of the Barolongs. **MOROKO** is fourth in the Free State, and **MACHABI** is the fifth at **Polfontein**."

The objections to **MOSHETTE**'s claim as against **MONTSIOA**'s would appear to be difficult to sustain. It is attempted to invalidate **MOSHETTE**'s undoubted right arising from birth by showing that he was at one time a servant to a Boer, and by asserting that his right to the paramountcy has never been recognized by the tribe, but whatever be the value of the respective claims to the paramount Chieftainship it is clear, first, that **MOSHETTE** and **MONTSIOA** were both placed outside the boundary of the South African Republic by the Convention of Pretoria in 1881; secondly, that neither Chief was then brought under British or any other protection; thirdly, that until the date of the Convention of London, February 27th, 1884, when part of **MOSHETTE**'s territory was incorporated with the territory of the South African Republic, that Chief and **MONTSIOA** were in all respects independent, and capable of making peace or war; and, fourthly, that until the establishment of the British protectorate—if that protectorate was ever formally established—**MONTSIOA** continued to be an independent Chief and Her Majesty's Imperial Government had no title to repudiate or set aside any act done by him.

According to tribal tradition a destitute Bechuana tribe came under Barolong protection during the Chieftainship of **MOKHOPE** or **MAKOBI**, tenth Chief in succession from **MOROLONG**. That tribe remained subject to successive Barolong Chiefs for a lengthened period, but finally they escaped from thralldom and pressed downward to the Orange River, where they became fish-eaters (**Batlaping**). Whether this is or is not the true history of the **Batlaping** tribe may be an open question, but undoubtedly a numerous **Batlaping** people have for a considerable period been found in the neighbourhood of the **Harts**, **Vaal** and **Orange Rivers**. From the **Batlaping** Chief **MOLEHABANE** is descended

MANKOROANE, whose name has long been prominent in Native history in Africa. The right to the paramountcy claimed by MANKORANE can no more be supported than the right of MONTSIOA to the Barolong paramountcy. The table hereunder shows the succession from MOLEHABANE:—

MOLEHABANE.



In 1878 military operations were undertaken against BOTLASITSE by the Government of Griqualand West, then a Crown Colony. That Chief having been surrendered by MANKOROANE was imprisoned and deposed from his Chieftainship—on what authority it is difficult to say—and MANKOROANE seems to have been recognised from that time by the Griqualand West Government as paramount Chief of the Batlaping tribe. It will thus be seen that the Batlaping as well as the Barolong tribes are really indebted for their possession of Bechuanaland to the Boers who drove out MOSELEKATSE, while under the fostering care of British statesmen and their advisers the boundary line of Bechuanaland as defined by the KEATE Award has been gradually encroached upon, especially by the Conventions of Pretoria and London (a).

According to the evidence of Mr. KRUGER, now State President of the South African Republic, given before the Transvaal Royal Commission in 1881 (b), MASSOUW was Chief of the Korannas at Mamusa at the time when the Boers drove back the cruel Zulus. In Mr. KRUGER'S words "His (MASSOUW'S)

(a) Map—page 45, Blue-book [C. 3947].

(b) Report of Transvaal Royal Commission, page 41.

chief town is Mamusa; they had not left the country, but MOSELEKATSE was hunting them down in all directions, and they fled to the bush for protection. That was the only nation that MOSELEKATSE had not utterly destroyed; they were still left in the country when in the year 1840 the whites came to Potschefstroom to the Mooi River." Mr. KRUGER'S evidence sufficiently shows how absurd is the claim to superiority over MASSOUW'S Korannas made by the Batlaping tribe (a).

II.

A RECORD of events in Bechuanaland from 1870 to 1881 cannot be a pleasant subject for the contemplation of any British statesman. From 1881 to the establishment of the British protectorate the record is, if possible, worse. The natives looked to Her Majesty the Queen as the greatest of all Sovereigns; they continually appealed to her representatives to bring them under the protection of the British flag, but the invariable answer was that additional responsibilities, especially those involving pecuniary expenditure, could not be undertaken by the Imperial Government. On May 4th, 1874, MONTSIOA wrote to Mr. SOUTHEY, Lieutenant Governor of Griqualand West, a letter from which the following is an extract:—"I wish, great Chief, that you would ask the great Queen of England to take me and my people to be her subjects and to take my country to be hers." Of the desire of MONTSIOA to be taken under British protection there can be no doubt, although it must be said that in the letter referred to he betrays such anxiety to secure certain valuable fountains and arable lands as to lead to the suspicion that his object was not merely to come under British rule. MONTSIOA'S request was not acceded to. In 1878 MANKOROANE sent a petition to the Administrator of Griqualand West, requesting to be taken under the rule of the British Government, and with reference to that petition the Administrator wrote to Colonel

(a) Notes of interview with MANKOROANE. Appendix A.

WARREN (now Major-General Sir CHARLES WARREN) as follows:—"I telegraphed to the Governor, but have received no instructions from him, but he fully approves of the occupation of the country till some definite arrangements can be made as to whether it should be annexed or be a protectorate. One thing is, I think, quite certain : that it will never be left again to the state of anarchy which prevailed there before." The Administrator was too sanguine. Mr. AGENOR DAUMAS was appointed Government Agent with MANKOROANE, Mr. C. C. KING was appointed Government Agent with MATHLABANE, and these appointments seem to have been thought sufficient for all useful purposes, and to have satisfied the official conscience. The duties of MESSRS. KING and DAUMAS, according to a memorandum written by Lieut.-Col. MOYSEY on the subject, dated November 4th, 1881, "appear to have been to watch and advise the natives on the Griqualand border in the interests of that province, and also to restrain the Transvaal Boers and Batlaping Natives from mutual aggression while the KEATE Award question remained undecided." As soon, however, as Messrs. DAUMAS and KING proposed to interfere in the inter-tribal hostilities of 1881 between MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE, by accompanying the Chiefs with whom they were stationed upon an expedition, in the words of Mr. DAUMAS, "to the seat of war to enforce order" (a), alarm was taken at the risk of involving Her Majesty's Government in proceedings beyond the border of the Cape Colony; and the following telegram (b) was sent by Sir HERCULES ROBINSON, in his capacity as High Commissioner, on the advice of his Ministers, under date November 14th, 1881, to the Civil Commissioner, Kimberley:—"Instruct Messrs. KING and DAUMAS to inform the Chiefs to whom they have been accredited *that in consequence of the final definition of the Transvaal boundary the Government does not intend to continue to maintain representatives outside the Colonial frontier, and that arrangements will shortly be made for the withdrawal of these officers.* The Chiefs should at the same time be informed that I trust the friendly relations

(a) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 99.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 106.

that have hitherto characterized their intercourse with the Government may always be maintained." The services of Messrs. KING and DAUMAS were subsequently dispensed with, and every vestige of British protection was thereby openly withdrawn from Bechuanaland. It is submitted that the policy of retreat then decided upon by Her Majesty's Imperial Government, following closely upon the remarkable Convention of Pretoria, has mainly led to the troubles in Bechuanaland. The dismissal of Messrs KING and DAUMAS—who had been guilty of a "glaring violation of duty" in egging on hostilities and in taking part personally in the native warfare—was undoubtedly necessary, but some other arrangement might have been made, and if MANKOROANE and MONTSIOA had been—as has been represented—faithful allies of the British Crown, it may fairly be asked why did Her Majesty's Imperial Government then retire from Bechuanaland leaving the natives a prey to war, although MONTSIOA, as shown by his letter to Sir EVELYN WOOD, dated 19th October, 1881, was begging for Imperial interference, the words of the Chief being (a) "I apply once more to your Excellency to see whether the English Government intend to have the Convention carried out?" Any show of action, even at that late period, the appointment of a competent officer to represent Her Majesty's Imperial Government on the frontier of Bechuanaland, in the room of Messrs. KING and DAUMAS, and the expenditure of a few hundred pounds in supporting that officer, would have solved all difficulties, prevented encroachments, restored the prestige of the British Government amongst the natives, and saved the British taxpayer from enormous expenditure on warlike operations. "Too late" is the legend written over the grave of Imperial policy and prestige in Bechuanaland. But stay, something was done. At the instance of the British Resident, Pretoria, Captain NOURSE was despatched on the hopeless errand of endeavouring to make peace between the belligerent Chiefs, while abstaining "from any conduct or utterances which could in any way compromise the action of the

(a) Blue-book [C. 2098], page 99.

British Government" (a). The result is given in a telegram to the High Commissioner, dated 14th November, 1881 (b). "Captain NOURSE returned from mission. Arrived too late to prevent hostilities or to influence Chiefs to pacific settlement. In spite of all his efforts both still refuse peace or even armistice Captain NOURSE saw about 26 Boers assisting MOSHETTE in defiance of Commandant GREEF's written order. They plead they are poor and took service as Volunteers under MOSHETTE." The hostilities between the rival Barolong Chiefs, MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE, undoubtedly originated in a dispute concerning the paramountcy "and the right to certain lands claimed by both parties" (c). During the period of office of President BURGERS and under his authority that section of the Barolong tribe which followed MACHABI removed from the Mooi River to Polfontein, which by the KEATE Award was placed outside—but by the Convention of Pretoria inside—the boundary of the Transvaal Republic. MOLEMA, who then resided at Maffeking, MONTSIOA being still at Moshening, appears to have objected, but without success, to any occupation of Polfontein by MACHABI's people. Subsequently some of MACHABI's people moved to Rietfontein in the Barolong country, close to the boundary line as now defined by the Convention of London. The circumstances under which that settlement took place are in dispute, MONTSIOA alleging that the occupation was merely on sufferance, and that he was entitled when he thought proper to evict the people. On February 5th, 1881, a meeting was held at Rietfontein, at which MONTSIOA, MOSHETTE, MACHABI and other Chiefs attended for the purpose of discussing the hostilities in the Transvaal between the British Government and the Boers. MOSHETTE and MACHABI expressed their inclination to take the side of the Boers, MOSHETTE saying, wisely perhaps, that "he would belong to those who got the best of it," while MONTSIOA insisted on standing by the English. The discussion appears to have become heated, and MONTSIOA, irritated at not having his

(a) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 125.

(b) *Ibid*, page 107.

(c) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 44. Letter of Major BULLER to Sir E. WOOD, dated 25th May, 1881.



own way, gave notice to MACHABI's people to leave Rietfontein. MONTSIOA's account of the origin of the war is as follows (a):—

“The first time the war broke out it was through MACHABI's people. They came to me and asked my permission to live in my country, and after that they commenced by stealing my horses. I tried to recover my horse, but they took them and sold them to the Boers. . . . This was at the time that the British Government was fighting the Transvaal Boers. After that they commenced reaping my corn, and they told me afterwards that the corn belonged to them. . . . Before the first war started they fired on my people in the gardens. They sent me a message that the gardens belonged no more to me, that it was their garden, and that they should cut the crops. That was the first commencement of the war.” The story told by the people of MOSHETTE and MACHABI is that the dispute as to the land had been amicably arranged, and that in token of the settlement MOSHETTE had sent, as a peace-offering, a white ox to MONTSIOA, who accepted it, and accordingly the people thought there would be no war, when, without notice or provocation, MONTSIOA attacked the village at Rietfontein before daylight, while the inhabitants were yet asleep, committed great slaughter of men, women and children, and burnt the town (b). MONTSIOA denies that atrocities were committed by him, and alleges that only one woman was shot, but the evidence certainly tells against him. ANDRIES MACHABI furnished to Major BULLER the names of twelve women who had been killed (c), and stated that when the survivors went back to see what loss had been sustained amongst the men, they “found six of them skinned, and one, my (ANDRIES MACHABI's) brother STOFFEL, with his heart cut out.” Whoever may have been the aggressor it is clear that, according to MONTSIOA's own admission, hostilities against him were not incited by white men (d). On hearing of the attack on Rietfontein, which took place on May 2nd, 1881, MOSHETTE determined

(a) Notes of interview with MONTSIOA. Appendix C.

(b) Statement of JOHAN MOSEPELE, a native teacher. Appendix D.

(c) Blue-book [C. 3098], p. 36.

(d) Notes of interview with MONTSIOA. Appendix C.

to assist MACHABI and prepared for war, but in the meantime Major BULLER, Rifle Brigade, and Mr. P. J. JOUBERT had been appointed to proceed to the scene of hostilities for the purpose of endeavouring to make peace. Through their efforts the belligerents were induced to promise to keep the peace till the decision of the Transvaal Royal Commission as to MONTSIOA'S claim to the disputed country should be given, MOSHETTE saying, "I was ready for war, but the coming of this Commission changes my plans, therefore I will now remain quiet and not break the law." The claim made by MONTSIOA at this time was "to abide by the KEATE Award," and, consequently, it included not only the country occupied by MACHABI'S people but land in the KEATE Award territory claimed by the Transvaal Republic upon which white farmers had settled. For the protection of the interests of these farms a Boer commando under Mr. CRONJE, said to number from 60 to 80, assembled at Lichtenburg on receiving the news of the attack on Rietfontein, and moved as far as the eye of the Molopo to a point on the borders of the KEATE Award territory, but on receiving an assurance from the Field-cornet that there was no danger of an attack on the white population they immediately dispersed. Another commando under Mr. SNYMAN moved to one of the farms then in dispute under the KEATE Award, Vleifontein, upon which the village of Rooi Grond or Roode Grond is now situated, but they also dispersed almost immediately. Major BULLER in his report expresses a suspicion that these Boers were acting under orders to be ready to help MOSHETTE. There is no evidence whatever to support that suspicion, and under all the circumstances it is far more probable that the Boers assembled merely for self protection in case of war spreading. MONTSIOA'S own statement before Major BULLER and Mr. JOUBERT as to the commandos assembled at this time exonerates the Boers from blame. That statement was as follows:—"I confess before you two Captains that Mr. VILJOEN took the two commandos away when I asked him. The last commando is that which came after the fight with MACHABI. I have heard that the leader of that commando was Mr. CRONJE. That commando was called back by JAN VILJOEN, Mr. SNYMAN and Mr. ROEDENS, who said there was

no war with the whites." Major BULLER and Mr. JOUBERT having succeeded in effecting a temporary arrangement, the eyes of all MONTSIOA'S and MOSHETTE'S people were turned towards the Royal Commission then sitting in the Transvaal, to which the natives looked for a settlement of the long disputed boundary and land questions. They were doomed to bitter disappointment. KEBALEPILE, son of MONTSIOA, attended before the Royal Commission on July 13th, 1881, and stated that he wanted "to listen to what the Royal Commission say" that "KEATE'S words must be left strong" and that he wanted "to be protected by the Queen." He was informed that "the Royal Commission will lay down a line between MONTSIOA and the Boers, and that line must be observed," at which he expressed satisfaction, but nowhere is any record to be found of any decision upon the question referred to the Royal Commission in accordance with the arrangement made by Major BULLER and Mr. JOUBERT in which MONTSIOA, MOSHETTE and MACHABI were interested. A boundary line was undoubtedly fixed by the Convention whereby both MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE were placed outside the South African Republic as independent Chiefs, but nothing whatever was done to secure the safety of MONTSIOA from subsequent attack by MOSHETTE, to settle amicably the dispute between these Chiefs, or to throw the protecting ægis of British authority round the tribes excluded from the jurisdiction of the South African Republic. To the credit of the Boer representatives and afterwards of the Government of the Republic be it said that they continued to point out the danger arising from placing the border natives outside any civilized government. Their representations were supposed to have sprung from interested motives, and it was thought sufficient for Her Majesty's Imperial Government to exclude the territories of MONTSIOA, MOSHETTE, MANKOROANE and MASSOUW from the Republic, and then to leave the Chiefs to their own devices. Her Majesty's Imperial Government and their officers appear indeed to have been so anxious to shake off all connexion with the Republic and its frontier, and to retire from the country after the unhappy reverses sustained by the British troops, that the faithful native allies of the Queen were forgotten and the

duties of the British Government towards the native tribes ignored. According to the despatch of Sir HERCULES ROBINSON to Lord KIMBERLEY, dated August 4th, 1881 (a), so deeply were Her Majesty's Commissioners impressed with a sense of the general feeling of anxiety amongst the natives at what they considered to be their desertion, "that they (the Commissioners) considered it to be their duty to convey to the representatives of the Transvaal Burghers *some expression of opinion and some words of advice* regarding a question of which none can exceed the importance in this country." What an opportunity was presented at this time for giving some protection to the allies of England if not for asserting the proud position claimed for the Queen as the Great Protector of the native races! The disputes between MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE and any similar disputes might have been adjudicated upon to the satisfaction of the natives, a trustworthy officer might have been appointed to watch frontier interests, the boundaries between tribes might have been settled instead of leaving everything in doubt and disorder, and the prestige of the British Empire in South Africa might still have been preserved. Instead, however, of discharging that obvious duty Her Majesty's Imperial Government rested content with the information that the Royal Commission had conveyed "to the representatives of the Transvaal Burghers *some expression of opinion and some words of advice.*" The obstacle to any definite action might probably be found in the disinclination of the British taxpayer to expend a small sum in discharging the legitimate functions of the Empire, although he is now ready to vote millions for unnecessary warlike operations. The facts disclosed in the despatch of Sir EVELYN WOOD to Lord KIMBERLEY, dated August 17th, 1881 (b), must excite strange feelings in the minds of white men of every nationality in South Africa. "I returned," says Sir EVELYN, "to Pretoria on the 1st August. The following day a meeting of some fifty of the Transvaal Native Chiefs or their representatives, attended by about a thousand followers, took place to hear a statement of His Excellency Sir HERCULES ROBINSON of the reasons for our leaving

(a) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 65.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 79.

the Transvaal, and of what the consequent arrangements were to be. This statement had been printed in the Setuana language, and the translation was read out to the people by the Rev. Mr. MOFFAT, the late Native Commissioner to the Barolong Chiefs After Mr. MOFFAT had translated the clauses of the Convention, the Royal Commission at once retired, and the Chiefs then deputed Mr. MOFFAT to appeal to the Royal Commission for permission to address it on the subject of their being, as they stated, handed over to the Boer Government without their concurrence and against their inclination. *The President* (Sir H. ROBINSON) *decided it was not desirable or expedient under the circumstances that they should be given a hearing, and next day most of them left.* Those who have been accustomed to criticize severely the native policy of the Cape Colony will do well to reflect carefully upon this and upon the events of the past four years generally before again wishing to transfer to Her Majesty's Imperial Government the control of native races in South Africa. The bare definition of a boundary line between the Native territories and the South African Republic was—as might have been anticipated—of little value to MONTSIOA or MOSHETTE, whose cause of quarrel had not been removed, and the result was that these Chiefs—who by the Convention had been rendered independent, and who had been left without protection or advice—were enabled again to indulge in their favourite pastime, war and to recommence their unhappy hostilities. They soon availed themselves of an opportunity. MOSHETTE appears to have been the first to renew the contest. In a statement made in the presence of Captain NOURSE on November 3rd, 1881, and described by that officer as “open and frank”—MOSHETTE said “MONTSIOA, you attacked me in the night, and killed 71 of my people, and 12 women were killed and burnt in the huts, and 4 were wounded, and I was compelled to punish such murders. After that came PIET JOUBERT and Major BULLER, and they said to me, MOSHETTE, you must not make war, and I listened. They said that the Royal Commission had sent them, and that I could speak and say what I have to say. And I spoke for two hours. MONTSIOA spoke for two days; I only spoke a short time, and not much. I got no answer

as to what they decided. I asked General JOUBERT and Major BULLER to give me an answer, and I got none. I again asked Commandant GREEP, how is my case going on, as I have not got an answer. I again asked General JOUBERT, am I to get an answer or not? This happened in Pretoria. I then said I will give my case over to an agent (Mr. PRELLER). After that I waited five days, until the Royal Commission broke up. I could not get an answer. I then said I could get no answer, and determined to use my own laws, and then I made war with MONTSIOA, and that is the cause of this war." The renewal of hostilities occurred in September, 1881. According to MONT-SIOA'S statement (a) MOSHETTE first marched to Polfontein in the Transvaal, "thence to Rooi Grond in the Transvaal, thence he crossed the line and attacked MONTSIOA at Sehuba, where being defeated he fled into the Transvaal. All cattle taken went into the Transvaal." The object of MONTSIOA in making this statement—and that object is prominent in every statement made by him—clearly was to enlist support from Her Majesty's Government by showing that the sympathy of the South African Republic was with MOSHETTE, and that the territory of the South African Republic was allowed to be used as a base of operations against MONTSIOA. Unprejudiced persons acquainted with native warfare will, however, pause before coming to the conclusion that although MOSHETTE was defeated and obliged to fly from destruction, he succeeded in carrying off into the Transvaal the cattle of his victorious foe. Whatever may have been their sympathies, which in all probability were with MOSHETTE for a like reason to that which induced British sympathy to be given to MONTSIOA, no satisfactory evidence can be procured to connect the Government of the South African Republic with aiding MOSHETTE in his hostilities against MONTSIOA. The fact that the boundary line of the Republic runs almost through the centre of the site of the village of Roci Grond is sufficient to show how difficult it is for any Government to keep such a boundary neutral during long and desultory native warfare. On the other hand there is ample evi-

(a) Blue-book [C. 3486], page 75.

dence to prove that the Government of the South African Republic did everything in its power to prevent a conflict. A proclamation was issued forbidding the subjects of the Republic to take part in the hostilities or to incite the tribes to war, and MACHABI was warned "that in case war should exist between MOSHETTE and MONTSIOA, you must not go beyond the boundary line to meddle in the matter." Nothing in the nature of a Foreign Enlistment Act appears to have been in force in the Republic, and, consequently, there was nothing to prevent any subject of that Republic from legally offering his services as a mercenary soldier to any independent belligerent power. Enlistment as a mercenary soldier is not *per se* objectionable. Persons of very refined feelings might object to a system which encourages such enlistment under any circumstances, but it must be remembered that England has furnished to Foreign Powers in time of war many brave soldiers of fortune, and that the Cape Colony is indebted to a German Legion not only for gallant soldiers in time of warfare but for admirable colonists in time of peace. For the employment of white men in the intertribal Barolong warfare the responsibility rests with MONTSIOA. So brave and efficient were the whites who supported him—conspicuous amongst them for bravery and loyalty to his Chief being the late Mr. BETHELL—that it either occurred to MOSHETTE or was suggested to him that his defeat was certain unless he also obtained the services of well-armed white men. MOSHETTE'S statement as to the employment of mercenaries, or "freebooters" as they are now styled, is as follows:—

(a) "I had no white men when the war started. The white men joined me to get loot. The white men offered their services; I did not call for them. I promised the first volunteers cattle, they having asked for it. With regard to any subsequent arrangements I should like to speak in the presence of those concerned in such arrangements." Another version is that MOSHETTE sent out notices calling for volunteers, but it is quite immaterial to discuss whether the mercenaries or freebooters were called for by MOSHETTE or volunteered their services.

Their services were undoubtedly accepted by MOSHETTE, the reward being, according to express agreement, a share of the conquered land and loot. At the time of Captain NOURSE's mission to the scene of hostilities in November, 1881, about twenty-six white men were assisting MOSHETTE. The Government of the South African Republic, through Commandant GREEF, had in vain endeavoured to persuade these men to leave MOSHETTE's laager, and it is difficult to see how they could have been forced to leave. The reasons for refusal, as appearing in official reports, are, after all, not discreditable, being based on a disinclination to break a promise. Amongst others who made statements was HENDRICK SCHOEMAN, who said (a):—"I did not think that I should do wrong, or that I should do anything not in favour of my Government, if I hired myself as a volunteer, because Bushmen, Kafirs and Englishmen have got the right to hire themselves. And I did not think that I should not have the right, because I suffered great damage by the late war, when I with my four children were in commando. And all my crops are gone, and because there is no living for me, or a very poor one, I and my son JOHANNES SCHOEMAN volunteered to MOSHETTE, and we cannot withdraw our presence." CHARLES WEBER stated:—"Because I have suffered damage by MONTSIOA when he always kept his commando on the border. I was obliged to shift from my farm, and I lost £300 also. I was obliged to hire myself to MOSHETTE with my three sons as volunteers." MICHAEL BALSSEN stated:—"MONTSIOA caused me damage to the extent of £50. To get a living for myself and my father I volunteered to MOSHETTE and cannot break my word." A. VAN DER WESTHUYSEN stated:—"I lost my crops on the 'Rooi Grond' because I had to take to my heels, because MONTSIOA always kept armed commandos in the neighbourhood." At this stage arises the question:—Had MOSHETTE, an independent Chief having lawful power to make war and peace, the right to raise a mercenary force to assist him in his operations against MONTSIOA, also an independent Chief, neither belligerent being bound in any way to

(a) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 128.

consult any Foreign Power in making alliances or treaties? The answer must be in the affirmative, and it is equally clear that if any arrangement has been entered into by which provision is made for settling mercenaries employed by MOSHETTE upon land ceded to that Chief by lawful treaty, such arrangement ought not to be set aside. It is said that MOSHETTE's volunteers were merely "land and cattle thieves," who, without having had any quarrel with MONTSIOA, served against him merely for loot. Any argument based upon the absence of direct cause of quarrel would apply to service in every war with which the Sovereign of the volunteers was not connected. No one for a moment imagines that WILLOUGHBY now bravely fighting at the head of the Malagasy forces has any cause of quarrel with France. But, in any case, it must be borne in mind that MONTSIOA's aggressive and treacherous attack on Rietfontein brought so much disquietude upon the border that the Frontier Boers were in most instances unable to pursue their avocations and were brought to the verge of ruin thereby. Here, as at almost every stage of the Bechuanaland difficulty, South African Colonists will ask why did not Her Majesty's Imperial Government come to the rescue of MONTSIOA when they were informed that MOSHETTE was gathering a white force, and why should they now attempt to set aside engagements entered into by MONTSIOA when an independent belligerent? Captain NOURSE's mission having failed, the matter was dismissed by Her Majesty's Imperial Government with an intimation from Sir H. ROBINSON to Mr. HUDSON, dated September 5th, 1881 (*a*), that Captain NOURSE appeared to have acted judiciously, "and I can only regret that his endeavours to allay the ill-feeling existing between the Barolong tribes have not been more successful." Strict neutrality and non-intervention now became the order of the day. MANKOROANE—whose acts will be dealt with separately—having with the assistance of white men made an unprovoked attack upon MASSOUW, was worsted, and thereupon he sent an urgent application to the Colonial Government of which Sir THOMAS SCANLEN was the head for leave to purchase ammunition. The

(*a*) Blue-book [C. 3098], page 138.

answer, under date January 5th, 1882, was "MANKOROANE'S application cannot be acceded to. As already intimated, the Government desire to preserve strict neutrality. His Excellency the High Commissioner concurs in this decision." In January, 1882, Captain NOURSE was again despatched by Mr. HUDSON to the Transvaal south-western border. He reported that no amicable understanding could be arrived at, that hostilities were rapidly spreading, and that MOSHETTE had laid waste MONTSIOA'S territory, except his head station, with the aid of white volunteers—whose number had increased to about eighty—serving under a written agreement "that for their services they are to receive half the booty and all MONTSIOA'S ground south of the Molopo River should they succeed in expelling him." With reference to Captain NOURSE'S report, Sir H. ROBINSON informed Lord KIMBERLEY by telegraph on the 10th February, 1882 (a), that "the Transvaal Government is evidently powerless to restrain the Burghers who chose to leave their territory, and so MONTSIOA and MANKOROANE, who have always been our firm friends and allies, are in danger of extinction." MONTSIOA being about this time hard-pressed, sent Mr. BETHELL, his accredited agent, to Kimberley for the purpose of buying ammunition (b) and "to request the aid of Her Majesty's Government against these freebooters, or to receive permission to raise in Kimberley a force of police," to be paid by the Chief, to defend his border. Mr. BETHELL was informed by telegram from the High Commissioner, dated February 9th, 1882, that the Transvaal Government was being urged to insist on the neutrality of their territory and subjects, and that he could not have leave to buy ammunition or to raise a force. The Civil Commissioner was at the same time directed to "give him a copy of our proclamation," meaning a neutrality proclamation published in the Cape Colony. MOSHETTE'S success—which led to Mr. BETHELL'S journey to Kimberley—was brought about by the aid of the white volunteers or mercenaries whom that Chief had attracted in considerable numbers to his standard by entering into agreements with them, as he lawfully might do, "to

(a) Blue-book [C. 3381], pages 5 and 34.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 33.

give them half the booty and a farm each in MONTSIOA's country."

(a) Her Majesty's Imperial Government, knowing of these agreements, stood quietly by and did not establish any protectorate or give any help. The Transvaal Government, as appears from a telegram sent by Sir H. ROBINSON to Lord KIMBERLEY on March 19th, 1882, were, on the contrary, alive to the gravity of the situation (b). They stated that "if things continue as at present country will become depopulated," and they proposed "as remedy extension of State boundary so as to include all Kaffirs formerly under the Republic and others now desirous to enjoy its protection." They added "that British Government must at once effect peace, if necessary by force, or consent to State doing so, which it could do with little trouble." They finally urged "immediate action, as not a day to be lost." The proposal appears to have been fair, but distrust of the Transvaal Government seems unnecessarily to have crept into the minds of Her Majesty's advisers. Sir H. ROBINSON advised Lord KIMBERLEY that "as far as I can judge at present, I think Convention boundary should be maintained. It is admitted that quietness within State border is secured; and I think that quarrels between independent native tribes outside afford no sufficient grounds for annexation The best policy for both Cape and Transvaal to pursue is to protect a well-defined boundary line, punish promptly and severely any inroads, and leave independent native tribes outside to settle for themselves their own differences." The meaning of that advice, of course, was—let MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE fight out their differences, let them get what assistance they like and enter into such alliances and treaties within their respective territories as they like, but let neighbouring Governments use their best efforts to prevent raids from neutral territory. The Transvaal cannot be blamed for endeavouring at this juncture to place frontier affairs on some satisfactory basis. Continued native warfare on the border was highly injurious to the Republic, and great irritation was being caused by the demands of the Government upon its frontier burghers for service as border guards. As

(a) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 47.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 53.

the State Secretary wrote to the British Resident: "It is to be feared that the wars outside our frontier may last very long, and thereby great and heavy expense will be incurred by the maintaining of the guards on the border." The warfare between **MONTSIOA** and **MOSHETTE** was, however, allowed to drag on until **MONTSIOA**, after a long contest, was crushed to the ground by means of the assistance given to **MOSHETTE** by his mercenaries. Complaints have been made of the hiring of these mercenaries, but the true state of the case is given by **Mr. JOUBERT** in his report to the Triumvirate (*a*), dated April 28th, 1882, wherein he says "that **MONTSIOA** and **MANKOROANE** were the attacking parties, they who now complain of the hiring of white volunteers by their opponents and who were the first to bring it into practice, and their complaints are now only made because they, **MANKOROANE** and **MONTSIOA**, now find out that their 'pupils surpass their masters.'" (The defeat of **MONTSIOA** resulted in a treaty of peace entered into on 24th October, 1882 (*b*).) **MONTSIOA** seems to have been at first unwilling to sign that treaty, but so strongly was he urged by his people—who were unable to hold out any longer—that he finally gave way, and, after discussion of the clauses, the document was executed subject to the expunging of certain of the original conditions. The grave question which will now be discussed in every household in South Africa is the following—was that treaty validly entered into, and is Her Majesty's Imperial Government justified in sending an army into **MONTSIOA**'s country for the purpose of defeating the provisions of a duly executed treaty? At the date of the execution of that treaty **MONTSIOA** was perfectly independent, Her Majesty's Imperial Government had no jurisdiction over the Chief and had no title to interfere with any of his arrangements. Their power was limited to the right conferred by the Convention of Pretoria to require the Transvaal Government "to adhere to the boundaries defined in the first article of the Convention" and "to do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any encroachments upon lands beyond the said State." The best evidence on this subject is to

(*a*) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 137.

(*b*) Treaty. Appendix F.

be found in a telegraphic despatch sent to Lord KIMBERLEY by Sir H. ROBINSON a few months before the execution of the treaty, that is to say, on August 6th, 1882, "I propose to instruct HUDSON to visit Taungs on his return journey and to *inform Chiefs that being independent they are free to make what arrangements they think fit between themselves, and that if they choose they can give land to the freebooters, but that the proposed intervention of Transvaal Government outside the State cannot be permitted*: it would be inconsistent with the Convention, the terms of which, including the boundary line, must be strictly adhered to. Do you approve?" A treaty (a) had just then been concluded under which MANKOROANE lost the greater part of his country, which under the name of "Stellaland" was transferred to white volunteers or "freebooters," who were in precisely the same position as the volunteers of MOSHETTE. The execution of the treaty between MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE having been brought officially to the notice of Lord DERBY, no attempt was made to set up the case that the treaty was wholly invalid. In fact Lord DERBY had no legal power to place a veto upon any of the clauses save such as were repugnant to the Convention of Pretoria. In his despatch to Sir H. ROBINSON, dated January 27th, 1883, Lord DERBY requested that the Transvaal Government should be informed that a copy of the treaty had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government, "and that the cession clauses which it contains and others providing for the exercise within the territories of MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE of jurisdiction by the Transvaal Government cannot be recognized as valid." Not a word was said regarding the clauses containing terms in which the Transvaal Government was not interested, and it is clear that Lord DERBY meant to nullify only that portion of the treaty which made cession of land or jurisdiction to the Transvaal Government. He had no power to interfere with the portion which related to MONTSIOA, MOSHETTE, and those deriving title under them. By the 16th Article of that treaty all land lying to the north or north-west of a given line were for the future to belong to MONTSIOA, and all lying to the south

(a) Treaty between MANKOROANE and MASSOUW. Appendix E.

or south-west to MOSHETTE. By the 9th Article provision is made as follows:—"Grounds which have been promised by the two parties, or either of them, to his or their hired white volunteers are hereby certainly and distinctly secured and awarded to the said volunteers, and by consequence are hereby fully acknowledged by both parties." This was quite in accordance with Sir H. ROBINSON'S view above referred to, that independent Chiefs "are free to make what arrangements they think fit between themselves, and that if they choose they can give land to the freebooters, but the proposed intervention of the Transvaal Government outside the State cannot be permitted." Moreover a similar arrangement as to Stellaland agreed upon a few months previously had not been challenged, and since the establishment of the Protectorate it has been expressly recognized by Her Majesty's Imperial Government. On March 1st, 1883, Her Majesty's Government, as appears from the despatch of Lord DERBY to Sir H. ROBINSON of that date, were still opposed to the establishment of British jurisdiction in Bechuanaland. Prior to the date of that despatch, that is to say, on January 20th, 1883, the SCANLEN Ministry had been requested by Sir H. ROBINSON to say whether they were prepared to entertain a proposal for "the appointment of a Joint Commission, composed of representatives of the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, who would arrange for a division of the disturbed territory and for its annexation to their respective countries," or to entertain "any proposal contemplating an extension of the present northern boundary of the Colony, with a view to the incorporation of any portion of the disturbed area." The reply was that neither proposal could be entertained. A minute of Sir H. ROBINSON to the SCANLEN Ministry, dated 14th March, 1883, discloses a remarkable suggestion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who after "admitting that the Chiefs MONTSIOA and MANKOROANE have special claims through former services and promises" expresses the willingness of Her Majesty's Government "to give them and others moderate allowances if, when driven out of their country, they can be located in British territory!" Information was also asked as to whether there was land within the Cape Colony upon which the Chiefs could be located.

Mr. MERRIMAN very properly declined to entertain such an extraordinary proposal. It therefore seems to be conclusively proved that after what has occurred objection cannot now be taken by Her Majesty's Imperial Government to the treaty of October, 1882, or to the benefits given thereby to the victorious Chief and his white volunteers, provided the treaty was duly obtained and provided it was not after signature cancelled by consent of parties or waived. In the first place, then, is there any evidence that the treaty was obtained by duress, fraud, or in any other unfair manner? It is said that it was extorted from MONTSIOA "with the pistol at his head." Every defeated belligerent who to avoid destruction accepts terms of peace does so "with the pistol at his head." Denmark, after the refusal of Great Britain to give her material assistance, was obliged to accept harsh terms from the stronger German Powers in 1864, but no one would dream of contending that the treaty of peace then made could be repudiated by Denmark on the ground that she was in dire straits when she entered into it. MONTSIOA's statement of the circumstances to Mr. RUTHERFOORD, contained in that gentleman's report to the British Resident, Pretoria, dated December 26th, 1882 (a), gives the Chief's version and proves that there was no extortion. According to that statement—which it may be safely presumed gave the view most favourable to MONTSIOA—Commandant SNYMAN, who was in command of the Transvaal Border Guard, came to Maffeking as a mediator bringing a letter from MOSHETTE "to make peace." MONTSIOA said to SNYMAN that if he took away the Boer, that is the volunteer, laager, he would consider with his Council what to do. SNYMAN said "he would report at the laager and come back." He did not come back then but wrote to say the Chief must decide at once. MONTSIOA replied "the fighting must go on if time is not given to consider." What followed may be given in MONTSIOA's words:—"We fought hard during that month and part of next. SNYMAN had said if I wished to make peace at any time I must let him know. After much fighting STEPHEN left for Pretoria to see

(a) Blue-book [C. 3486], page 59.

the British Resident. Before STEPHEN left the Boers had made schansen and forts round my station. While STEPHEN was away my sons represented to me that we must think of peace as we were very short of ammunition and food, and the people were starving and dying every day from sickness." The Chief, who is a man of dogged determination, refused to listen to his sons hoping that the British Government would come to his aid, but finally he acceded to the urgent appeals of his people and of his children, the latter saying that "the English Government knew all about it, but we are left here shut up and helpless." MONTSIOA accordingly wrote to Mr. SNYMAN as follows:— "By these we, I and my Councillors, agree to call you in to hear what I and my Councillors say, for you have said that I can call upon you at any time I thought it necessary to call you, whether by day or by night. Now you must be so good as to come to me on the receipt of this letter." Mr. SNYMAN—whose *bona fides* there is no reason to doubt—having arrived, he sent to MONTSIOA a draft of a letter giving him (SNYMAN) full authority "for the establishing of a peace and closing of the war now going on between BAROLONG, Captain MOSHETTE and ourselves." This the Chief signed, as he alleges, "much against my will, under very strong pressure from my sons and my people." Mr. SNYMAN thereupon made an armistice, which was to last until October 24th, the date of the treaty. MONTSIOA now attempts to set up the case that although he executed the treaty he did not know its contents (a). In doing so he is undoubtedly acting dishonestly. He admits that two clauses of the treaty were expunged because of his refusal to agree to them, and inquiry made by any unprejudiced person will confirm upon other grounds the conclusion that MONTSIOA well knew the contents of the treaty. A counterpart was delivered to him at the time, and as there were persons who read both Dutch and English at his station, it is too much to ask that such a story should be believed as that a shrewd man like MONTSIOA and an intelligent English speaking native like ISRAEL MOLEMA—who signed as a witness—were ignorant of the conditions of the treaty. Mr. RUTHERFOORD

(a) Notes of Interview with MONTSIOA. Appendix C.

in his report to the British Resident, Pretoria, dated November 22nd, 1882, does not allege that the treaty was signed in ignorance of the contents. Mr. RUTHERFOORD'S statement is that "against the Old Chief's will, and under the dire pressure of circumstances and insistence of his sons, he had consented to a peace and to the surrender of a large tract of country; he says about 75 miles long by 40 broad for farms for volunteers." A respectable white trader at Maffeking, who knows all the circumstances and who is strongly pro-Barolong in his views, admitted in a recent conversation on the subject that there could be no question as to the validity of the treaty of October, 1882, and stated that in candour he was obliged to say that the volunteers mentioned in that treaty were fairly entitled to the land claimed by them. The translation of MONTSIOA'S counterpart of the treaty made by Mr. RUTHERFOORD, and published in Blue-Book [C. 3486], page 71, sets forth that the treaty was signed subject to "the omission and supersession of Articles 3 (17) and 19." The introduction of 17 in brackets bears a suspicious appearance, especially as that is the article which defines the land to "be given to the volunteers of both sides." The counterpart of the treaty in the possession of the Bestuur of Land Goshen clearly shows that only Articles 3 and 19 were superseded, there being no indication whatever of any erasure. When a request was recently made that the counterpart in possession of the natives should be exhibited for inspection that request was not complied with, the people at Maffeking asserting that the Chief had the document, while MONTSIOA when subsequently questioned as stoutly insisted that it was at Maffeking. Without inspection of the treaty it is impossible to say definitely whether there is evidence on the face of the treaty to lead to the belief that a forgery has been committed, but the disinclination of the natives to produce the document after having been informed of the reason for the wish to inspect it furnishes ground for suspecting that they have tampered with the treaty. An additional reason for coming to the conclusion that there has been a clumsy attempt at fraud by MONTSIOA'S people is that if it had been really intended at the time of signature to deprive the white

volunteers of their rights to land, the 9th Article, which secures those rights, would also have been expunged. The supersession or non-supersession of Article 17 in no way affects the merits of the general question, for even if that article had been expunged the land therein described would belong to MOSHETTE—and not to MONTSIOA—under Articles 14, 15 and 16. Reference is made to the variation between the counterparts merely for the purpose of suggesting a test of the value of MONTSIOA's evidence on the treaty question generally. Irrespective, however, of any doubts as to the veracity of the natives which might be caused by any suspicion that they have tampered with their counterpart, the conclusion must be forced upon every impartial inquirer, after consideration of all the circumstances, that the treaty of October 24th, 1882, was duly entered into, and that MONTSIOA should be held to be bound by it unless he can show that after execution it was cancelled or waived. The arguments in support of the invalidity of the treaty are, first, that MONTSIOA after its execution repudiated it; and, secondly, that as possession of the land was not actually taken by the volunteers, and the provisions of Clauses 10 and 11 were not complied with by beaconing off the farms within the time limited, the whole treaty became null and void. The first contention is certainly unsound. One party to an engagement cannot be allowed to repudiate it at his pleasure, and it is not to be tolerated that MONTSIOA should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongful act in refusing to abide by his engagements. With regard to the other contention, it is clear that even if there were default in appointing a Commission to beacon off farms within a limited period, such default could not render the whole treaty a nullity and restore to MONTSIOA land within clearly defined boundaries which in any case he had given up to MOSHETTE. The real question is one of fact. Is it true that the white volunteers or freebooters as well as MOSHETTE abandoned their claims, and that all parties, including MONTSIOA, looked upon the treaty as a dead letter? The evidence goes entirely the other way. On November 24th, 1882, Mr. (BETWELL—an adventurous young Englishman, brave as a lion, who had married a native woman and settled down at Maffeking,

where he became the Agent and Chief Adviser of MONTSIOA—wrote to Mr. GEY a letter of which the following is a translation :—

Maffeking, Nov. 24th, 1882.

To Mr. N. GEY.

Sir,—According to (treaty of) peace made between MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE, we see that the volunteers of both Captains have to get farms inside the new line. My people ask me in what manner and when the farms will be got, so I write you this note to ask a reply on those two points.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) C. BETHELL.

This letter was evidently written in consequence of the volunteers having commenced on November 30th, 1882, to beacon off the land reserved to them by the treaty, after having sent a message to say that MONTSIOA must send some men on his part to beacon off the new line, which the Chief is said to have refused to do. According to Mr. RUTHERFOORD's report of December 26th, 1882, the volunteers: "had also sent word they intended establishing a pound near the line, and that any station cattle coming beyond the beacons would be impounded."

On December 23rd, 1882, Mr. BETHELL again wrote to Mr. GEY as follows :—

Maffeking, Dec. 23rd, 1882.

Mr. N. GEY.

Sir,—I have the honour to send you the names of the white volunteers of MONTSIOA who have to get farms according to the treaty of peace. I have not yet heard in what manner the farms are to be divided and when the survey will be ready, and I shall be glad to hear upon those two points.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) C. BETHELL.

That letter contained the following enclosure :—

List of names of MONTSIOA's white volunteers.

1. C. BETHELL (5 farms, self and four substitutes).
2. WALKER.
3. A. GEELMAN.
4. H. C. JOHNSTON.
5. W. ORR.

6. H. FAULKNER.
7. EMMENESS.
8. FRED. COWLEY.
9. E. CHRISTOPHER.
10. A. E. ROWE.
11. GEORGE LUITNAR.
12. P. AUSTEN.
13. F. WILLIAMSON.

The reason for addressing Mr. GEY was that, after the execution of the treaty of peace of October, 1882, a provisional Government or Committee of Management had been established by MOSHETTE'S volunteers under authority of that Chief for the administration of the Government of that portion of the conquered territory to which the white volunteers were entitled. Mr. GEY was selected as Chairman of the Bestuur, and before him, in that capacity, Mr. BETHELL, Mr. WALKER, and several others who had fought for MONTSIOA as volunteers, took the following oath of allegiance to the provisional Government on February 1st, 1883, at Fort William within the conquered territory:—

“OATH OF ALLEGIANCE.”

We solemnly promise and swear allegiance to the people and the laws of this territory as citizens and subjects, and that we will obey the authorities placed over and generally aim at nothing but the maintenance of law, justice and order, and to promote and cause to flourish the welfare and independence of country and people, that is, the white population.

Thus done at Fort Willem, the 1st February, 1883.

[Here follow the Signatures.]

Sworn before me,

N. C. GEY VAN PITTIUS,
Chairman of the Bestuur.

In the face of such evidence it requires some courage to maintain that the treaty of October, 1882, was never acted upon, and that no proprietary rights were ever asserted by the volunteers prior to the establishment of the British Protectorate. A provisional Government was appointed in the territory given to the white volunteers under it, possession of at all events part of that territory, if not all, was held by the white volunteers, beacons were set up and notice was given to MONTSIOA that any

cattle of his trespassing on the land set apart for the volunteers would be impounded. Application was made to the provisional Government by MONTSIOA's trusty adviser and others for land under the provisions of the treaty, a village was proposed to be laid out, and many other acts were done showing that the treaty was never repudiated. On April 10th, 1883, Mr. BETHELL wrote as follows:—

To the Government of Land Goshen.

GENTLEMEN,—I beg to enclose a tender for measuring and surveying the town Pittius, according to the plan displayed in the office at Fort Willem. In case my tender should be accepted by the Government I shall be prepared to begin the survey at once, and have no doubt that it would be completed in twenty days. Should the Government settle to make the town at Selere's station I should submit a plan somewhat different to that hanging in the office, as more suitable to the nature of the ground.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) C. BETHELL.

There can be no more convincing proof than this that the residents at Maffeking considered the treaty to be binding at that date. Selere's Station, or as it is otherwise written Salir's, is portion of the country assigned to the white volunteers by the treaty which it is now sought to ignore. As to MOSHETTE'S waiver of the treaty, no evidence is forthcoming, although possibly that Chief might at some time have endeavoured to discredit the claims of some of his volunteers in the hope of benefiting himself. In fact, as Mr. HUDSON states in his letter to Sir. H. ROBINSON, dated June 9th, 1883, there was at that time a secret understanding between MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE, the object being to get rid of the claims of the volunteers and then divide the country. Another reason has been advanced by a few people to justify the repudiation by Her Majesty's Imperial Government of the treaty of October, 1882. It is contended that by attacking MONTSIOA after the establishment of the British Protectorate and by refusing to recognize Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner, all persons who had acquired rights under that treaty forfeited such rights and their titles to land. Forfeiture of land for high treason, sedition, or public tumult, is not

known to the Colonial law, and its introduction into South Africa would be a novelty, but, in any case, forfeiture should undoubtedly not be insisted upon till after due trial, and innocent men should not be made to suffer equally with guilty. The history of the attack referred to will be given hereafter, and upon it a judgment can be formed as to the amount of blame to be attached to the conduct of the volunteers. Upon this subject the action of Her Majesty's Government in Stellaland—where forfeiture was never hinted at—is important. Under all the circumstances the refusal of Her Majesty's Government at so remote a date to acknowledge the treaty of October 24th, 1882, after having so often declined to interfere with the engagements of independent Chiefs, and after having expressly decided against a proposal “to clear the freebooters out of the territories belonging to MANKOROANE and MONTSIOA by force,” will rightly or wrongly be looked upon by many of the most loyal of the Queen's subjects in South Africa as a harsh proceeding, especially in the case of *bonâ-fide* purchasers for value from those who acquired rights under that treaty, and it will be said that the Great British Nation which has abided so faithfully by its own treaties ought not to create in South Africa a precedent for so dangerous a practice as the repudiation of engagements entered into by persons competent to contract.

III.

DURING May, 1883, matters appear to have remained *in statu quo*, to use the words of the British Resident, Pretoria (*a*), in telegraphing to Sir H. ROBINSON on 2nd May. But another storm was brewing. Cattle thefts by MONTSIOA's people from the Transvaal farmers began to increase, and MONTSIOA went in person amongst “all the Chiefs of the North and West and formed a confederation of twelve Chiefs,” intending, as stated by Mr. BETHELL in a telegram to the Private Secretary to the

(a) Blue-book [C. 3686], page 72.

High Commissioner, dated June 5th, 1883, "next month to drive out freebooters from MONTSIOA's country and Stellaland." (a) Proof is thus furnished of a deliberate plot amongst Native Chiefs to drive the volunteers out of Land Goshen and Stellaland, and to deprive them of the land reserved to them by the treaties between MONTSIOA and MOSHETTE and between MANKOROANE and MASSOUW. The firmness of the SCANLEN Ministry in refusing to allow Mr. BETHELL to purchase ammunition for the purpose contemplated by MONTSIOA and his fellow Chiefs had much to say to breaking the combination so formed. A letter written to MONTSIOA by the British Resident, Pretoria, at this time shows what that officer thought of the origin of the hostilities which led to the loss of portion of the Barolong and Batlaping Countries. Mr. HUDSON truly said "it is clear to me that the quarrels between MOSHETTE and yourself and again between MASSOUW and MANKOROANE originated and led to all troubles, damages and losses to which you have been subject for some time past." About the end of September or beginning of October, 1883, a deputation from the Transvaal State left Cape Town *en route* to England, with a view to discussing with Her Majesty's Imperial Government a proposed revision of the Convention of Pretoria. In the meantime the only complaint from Land Goshen appears to have been made by Mr. FRANCIS, a trader, who represented to the British Resident, Pretoria, that a quantity of arms and ammunition belonging to him had been forcibly seized and confiscated by the Bestuur of Land Goshen (b). With reference to that complaint Mr. HUDSON wrote to Sir H. ROBINSON as follows:—"I must confess that I do not see what Mr. FRANCIS was doing in that disturbed country with such a quantity of arms and ammunition, nor are his explanations thereon satisfactory at present." The fact was that MONTSIOA's people were continually being incited by white men to attack the inhabitants of Land Goshen, and the sale of arms and ammunition to the natives had become a profitable business.

In November, 1883, the negotiations between the Transvaal

(a) Blue-book [C. 3686], page 96.

(b) *Ibid*, page 59.

Deputation and Lord Derby relative to the proposed revision of the Convention of Pretoria commenced, and on February 27th, 1884, the Convention of London was signed. By the boundary determined by that Convention portion of MOSHETTE'S country was thrown into the South African Republic, the line running on the east side of the road from Lotlakane (Rietfontein) to Kunana (MOSHETTE'S station) until the garden grounds of that station are reached, thence skirting Kunana so as to include it and all its garden ground but no more in the South African Republic. The village of Lotlakane (Rietfontein) and all its garden ground were left outside the South African Republic. The line continued to run as before through the ground laid out for the village of "Roode Grond" or "Rooi Grond," now called "Heliopolis."

IV.

THE first article of the Convention of London defines what shall be Transvaal territory, but nothing is said as to the ownership of or claims to the land on the western side of the boundary, unless any inference can be drawn from the vague statement that Lotlakane is left in "native territory," or from Article 2, which provides that Her Majesty's Government "will, if necessary, appoint Commissioners in the native territories on the eastern and western border of the South African Republic to maintain order and prevent encroachments." Consequently the revision of the boundary line left untouched all rights lawfully existing against or in favour of MONTSIOA and MANKOROANE under their respective treaties; but even if the Convention had contained a provision setting aside such rights that provision would have been *ultra vires* as regards Land Goshen, inasmuch as it is quite clear that neither Her Majesty's Imperial Government nor the South African Republic had any authority from MONTSIOA, or from the Bestuur of Land Goshen, to deal with their respective rights and liabilities. No one appears even to have had any authority to represent MOSHETTE, who prote-ts

strongly against a boundary line having been made without his consent which places portion of his country within the South African Republic and portion within the British Protectorate. His own words are (a):—"What makes my heart sore is the ignorance in which I have been kept of the arrangements under the Convention. I would have been satisfied if I had been informed and consulted. I wish to be independent of both Governments, but to be on friendly terms." It certainly appears to be a hardship that gentlemen assembled in London should dispose of the country of an independent Chief in his absence and without his lawful authority. It is also difficult to see how a Protectorate could have been established over the grazing ground of MOSHETTE or over Stellaland, then under its own Government, without due cession of the territories having been made by the governing bodies. If Land Goshen had been duly acquired by MOSHETTE or by the Bestuur as representing the volunteers under the treaty of October 24th, 1882, the sufficiency of the action of Mr. MACKENZIE in merely giving informal notice as Deputy Commissioner of the declaration of a Protectorate, without having obtained formally the consent of all parties to such Protectorate, would seem to be open to doubt. Cessions from MANKOROANE and MONTSIOA alone did not justify the establishment of a Protectorate over land which had passed from under the sovereignty of those Chiefs to MASSOUW and to MOSHETTE, or which had been ceded to the Governments of Stellaland or Land Goshen. Original titles to farms in Stellaland and Land Goshen have actually been issued in the names of MASSOUW and MOSHETTE respectively. In any case if the treaty of October, 1882, be valid it would be only equitable that the land should pass under the Protectorate burthened with any rights affecting it. A most important fact in connection with the establishment of the Protectorate is that, as was distinctly pointed out to Mr. MACKENZIE by Sir H. ROBINSON on April 14th, the treaties made by him with MANKOROANE and MONTSIOA would have no legal effect until Her Majesty by Order in Council had signified to what extent she would avail of

(a) Notes of Interview with MOSHETTE. Appendix B.

them. No such Order seems to have been issued. The appointment of Mr. MACKENZIE as Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland—which can be discussed more conveniently and fully in connection with MANKOROANE'S country and the affairs of Stellaland—had a most important bearing upon the course of events in the Barolong territory. Mr. MACKENZIE appears to have been appointed on February 21st, 1884, and on his arrival in the Cape Colony a Commission was issued to him, dated April 12th, 1884. That Commission was very vague, but in a letter of instructions from Sir H. ROBINSON of the same date liberty was accorded to Mr. MACKENZIE “to leave the present European population of Stellaland in possession of their lands” if he should so decide, but His Excellency added that “the case of persons laying claim to the so-called Land of Goshen would appear to differ materially from that of the present European population of Stellaland. The farms assigned to MOSHETTE'S volunteers in MONTSIOA'S country have never been inspected, surveyed, occupied, or improved. *Moreover the territory left to the Chief MONTSIOA by the new Convention is so limited that no portion of it could be well alienated, and you may find yourself obliged to order the ejection of the persons trespassing at Rooi Grond.*” It is clear that at that time Sir H. ROBINSON was not well-informed either as to the nature and extent of the Barolong country or as to the events which followed the signature of the treaty of October, 1882. Leaving claims to farms altogether out of the question, if the treaty of October, 1882, was valid, the sovereignty over Land Goshen became vested in MOSHETTE, to whom the land, described by definite boundaries and beaconed off, was duly ceded, and from that Chief Mr. MACKENZIE seems not to have obtained a formal cession of land or jurisdiction. It will thus be seen that grave doubt exists as to whether the British Protectorate over Land Goshen has ever been lawfully declared, and as to whether Mr. MACKENZIE had power to eject the Rooi Grond farmers under any circumstances, especially in view of the non-existence of any Order by Her Majesty in Council availing herself of the advantages of any cession of jurisdiction by MONTSIOA. The appointment of Mr. MACKENZIE and the hope created thereby of recovering that portion of their territory conquered by MOSHETTE infused

new vigour into the people of MONTSIOA, and the result was that Mr. BETHELL, taking advantage of the absence of the greater number of the inhabitants of Land Goshen at the wedding of one of their number, mustered a Barolong force, and having attacked Roode Grond on May 12th, 1884, drove back the people, burnt down all the houses upon the western side of the Convention line, destroyed the furniture therein, and left the families of the absent Burghers houseless. When this outrage was committed Mr. MACKENZIE was in Southern Bechuanaland.

The contention set up on behalf of MONTSIOA, based it would seem on the view taken by Sir H. ROBINSON in his letter of instructions to Mr. MACKENZIE, then was that the establishment of the new Convention line had the effect of giving him all the country on the western side absolutely free from any claim on the part of MOSHETTE and his volunteers, and he wrote a letter on May 15th, 1884, addressed to the volunteers in these terms:—
 “After writing many letters, on Monday I went to Rooi Grond and put you over the line with gentleness and destroyed some of your houses. I now write to tell you that if you go back to live in my country I shall come in anger and not only destroy your houses but bind your people and take your goods. So listen to my words for they are the last ones, and go away from my country.” The inhabitants of Roode Grond accepted the challenge and retaliated by sending out a commando some days afterwards. In the usual manner of native warfare cattle were captured on several occasions, and such captures have been made the foundation of charges of cattle stealing which have been freely made against the Roode Grond people. At this critical juncture Mr. MACKENZIE arrived at Maffeking, and on May 22nd, 1884, he obtained from MONTSIOA a treaty or cession of jurisdiction to the Queen. That is, therefore, assumed to have been the date upon which, if at all, the Protectorate was legally established. Having obtained the treaty or cession alluded to, Mr. MACKENZIE—with whom the Government of Land Goshen appear to have declined an interview—addressed a public notice, without date, to the Europeans residing at Roode Grond that in terms of his Commission and by virtue of that treaty he thereby declared the whole of the Barolong

country "to be under the protection, jurisdiction and authority of Her Majesty the Queen." Mr. MACKENZIE fell into the same error which others did in supposing that the Government of Land Goshen or the "Commandant-General" at that time represented the inhabitants. If he had insisted on visiting the people he would have thought differently. The notice contained also the following peculiar intimation:—"I have also to intimate that the Chief MOSHETTE, by documents in my possession in so far as his own and his people's rights are concerned, consents to and desires the establishment of Her Majesty's authority in the Barolong country aforesaid." As already stated MOSHETTE never made formal cession of his territory or jurisdiction, and the only ground for Mr. MACKENZIE's intimation was a letter signed by MOSHETTE, dated May 19th, 1884, wherein he says: "You went away without understanding my views. I have since come to a decision concerning the treaty between the Queen and MANKOROANE and MONTSIOA. I also am in it." Another extract will show what his meaning was. "Why then," continued MOSHETTE, "should the boundary line go to the west of me and I remain outside Bechuanaland?" What MOSHETTE wanted was to get back the portion of his country which the Convention line threw into the Transvaal Republic, in which event the wily chief would become "a child of the Queen," but he never intended to cede, and did not cede, his jurisdiction to Mr. MACKENZIE, and he never executed any treaty or cession as MONTSIOA did. From the public notice referred to it would appear as if Mr. MACKENZIE had wisely decided to acknowledge rights of Europeans to land within the Barolong country. Later information clearly shows that to have been Mr. MACKENZIE's original intention, for, as said by his great champion the *Graham's Town Journal* on January 3rd, 1885, "he proposed that the 'original volunteers' in Stellaland and Goshen, namely, the freebooters who came in 1882 at the invitation of the Chiefs and long before the Protectorate was proclaimed, should retain their lands." At all events, in May, 1884, Mr. MACKENZIE requested "all persons residing or desiring to reside at Rooi Grond or elsewhere in the Barolong country" to lodge their titles or

copies thereof "at Maffeking, on or before Tuesday next, the 27th instant." The time limited was far too short under the circumstances, and the mode of giving notice was ineffective, but as soon as the matter came to the knowledge of certain of MOSHETTE'S volunteers they respectfully requested Mr. MACKENZIE to take no further steps respecting them till they had consulted MOSHETTE, whom they described as their Chief. According to Mr. MACKENZIE'S report to Sir H. ROBINSON, dated May 30th, 1884, the bearer of the request from the volunteers "explained that a considerable number of volunteers were anxious to come under the Colonial Government or under the British Government but that they wished first to consult MOSHETTE (a). I showed him MOSHETTE'S first letter to me, which showed that he was anxious on his own account to be under the Queen. After seeing that letter he expressed his intention of agitating for the signing of a memorial by the volunteers, concerning which I felt all I could say was that it would receive due consideration." No better opportunity for an amicable settlement could have been offered. If a similar opportunity had been offered to Mr. RHODES he would have made a peaceful arrangement within a few hours. Mr. MACKENZIE, unfortunately, failed to grasp the situation. If he had then realized as his supporters now do that the white people considered—rightly or wrongly—that the treaty of October, 1882, was binding, and if, encouraged by the information—which now is proved to have been correct—that "a considerable number of volunteers" were anxious for British rule, he had boldly gone amongst the people, smarting as they were under the outrage of May 12th, although their ruined dwellings might according to Mr. MACKENZIE "come under the designation of huts rather than houses," if he had discussed the situation with them, acquired information as to those entitled to land under the treaty of 1882 and as to those who subsequently purchased, satisfied himself as to the validity or invalidity of that treaty, and spoken firmly but kindly to persons of whom he would have found many worthy of sympathy, the question would have been then and there settled for ever with honour to the

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 39.

British Crown. Instead of so doing Mr. MACKENZIE—who seems to have suddenly changed his mind and decided to set the Roode Grond people at defiance and to ignore their claims under the treaty in question—appointed Mr. WRIGHT, a clerk to a Law Agent at Zeerust, to be Assistant Deputy Commissioner, and hurriedly left on May 31st, 1884, for the purpose of acquiring paper cessions from Native Chiefs in Western Bechuanaland, on his way to his former station at Kuruman. The lost opportunity will cost the British taxpayer dearly. The result of leaving the point of danger at the most critical moment would have been apparent to any one except, perhaps, a worthy gentleman unaccustomed to the ways of the world who had recently taken to politics like Mr. MACKENZIE. What was the consequence? The volunteers, looking with suspicion upon Mr. MACKENZIE, who failed even to rebuke the raiders upon Roode Grond on May 12th, continued to assert the claims which they insisted they had to the land ceded by the treaty of October, 1882. On June 10th, 1884, Mr. WRIGHT wrote to Mr. MACKENZIE—then on his useful journey—as follows:—“GEY is calling his men together and intends reaping all the lands on the south of the river which he says were ceded to him by the Peace Convention of October, 1882. They begin their work to-morrow. They have very kindly sent a verbal message to the effect that anyone having a garden in the tract of country spoken of will be allowed to reap it provided he acknowledges that he has sown on the ground of whoever may have the title deeds of the farm on which the garden is situated, and pay a reasonable rent for the same.” The Anti-Boer and partisan character of all Mr. WRIGHT’S correspondence shows how unfitted he was for a delicate post requiring great impartiality and patience. If the highly coloured reports of the occurrences about this time are carefully examined, the true position will be found to have been as follows:—The inhabitants of Roode Grond claimed portion of MONTSIOA’S country by a treaty which they believed to be valid. MONTSIOA’S people aggressively attacked the claimants on May 12th, burning their houses and destroying their property, and the Roode Grond people thereupon retaliated, and having in turn attacked their assailants, made captures of

cattle. Subsequently the white men, in the assertion of their title to land which they claimed to be theirs as of right, proceeded to reap the crops growing thereon, the natives resisted, and several slight engagements were fought in which the Roode Grond people lost several men. In all these engagements some white men fought on the native side, and at one at least the following were present:—Messrs. BETHELL, WALKER, WRIGHT, ROWLANDS, NICHOLSON and FRANKLIN. The presence in the field of Mr. WRIGHT, who was then filling the office of Deputy Assistant Commissioner, seems unaccountable, especially as he appears to have done nothing to keep the natives back. Evidence of this is furnished by a passage in a letter from one of the whites who fought on MONTSIOA's side to Mr. MACKENZIE, from which the following is an extract:—"Had he (WRIGHT) attempted to keep the people away from the gardens or persuade them not to defend their lands, that attempt would certainly have been ineffectual." It has been shown again and again that the validity of the treaty of October, 1882, has at all times been the question at issue and that concession on that point would have brought about quietude. Out of the contest regarding that treaty every fight and every capture of cattle arose. As appears from Mr. WRIGHT's letter to Mr. MACKENZIE, dated June 14th, 1884, on his having an interview with Mr. GEY regarding the action of the Roode Grond people in claiming the crops growing on the disputed ground, everything turned on the treaty, GEY saying "We hold by the treaty of peace ceding to us the country," while WRIGHT urged "that the treaty was a conditional one, and that as the condition that the Transvaal Government should exercise jurisdiction over the country had not been carried out the treaty had lapsed. It would have been much more judicious on Mr. WRIGHT's part to have brought the question of the treaty prominently before Her Majesty's Imperial Government for decision at that time, and to have used his best efforts to restrain the natives from fighting pending a decision as to the treaty, instead of going into action with one of the combatant parties. The conduct of the Roode Grond burghers in asserting their claim to the disputed land, by reaping

the crops under protection of an armed force, may be thought to have been reprehensible, but it must be remembered that the only law in existence in the Barolong country at that time was the law of force. There was nothing to be gained by appealing to the Deputy Commissioner, who had not a single policeman at his back and who was unable or unwilling, as already stated, to keep the natives in check. For these reasons blame must not too readily be cast upon the Roode Grond people for endeavouring to protect what they believed to have been their rights. Desultory warfare continued until a signal defeat of MONTSIOA's people occurred on July 31st, 1884 (a). According to Mr. MACKENZIE's telegraphic report to Sir H. ROBINSON, received on August 6th, 1884, the Roode Grond people captured a large quantity of cattle in the Bangwaketse (GASSITSIWE'S) country, and "on the 31st this force or part of it came past the station with the cattle; the intention was evidently to draw the people out, and it was successful. The portion with the cattle was driven back after a desperate fight, but the remainder, which was in reserve, and the 80 men from Rooi Grond, turned the Barolong's flank with the result that MONTSIOA has lost about 100 men, including BETHELL and WALKER. The Boer loss was heavy, over 30." This was the death blow to MONTSIOA's hopes. He had lost his bravest officer and most steadfast friend, Mr. BETHELL, and Maffeking was closely invested by his enemies. An incorrect statement has been made in the House of Commons relative to the position occupied by Mr. BETHELL at the time of his death. It was said that he was a British police officer, leading a native police force. Mr. MACKENZIE, who—it is supposed with the view of setting a thief to catch a thief—had previously appointed a notorious leader of cattle thieves to be an officer of British police, wished to give Mr. BETHELL the appointment of a police officer, but Sir H. ROBINSON wisely objected. It would scarcely have been judicious to appoint MONTSIOA's fighting Commandant to be a police officer, and, accordingly, Sir H. ROBINSON telegraphed to Mr. MACKENZIE on July 30th, 1884 (b), "As to BETHELL'S

(a) Blue-book [C. 4213], page 34.

(b) Blue-book [C. 4213], page 12.

appointment, the more I think of it, the more ill-judged does it appear to me to be at present. I have told Major LOWE I cannot approve of it; at all events until I have conferred with you personally on the subject." When Mr. BETHELL was shot he was serving with MONTSIOA's fighting commando, and he was never in command of any police force. The shooting of Mr. BETHELL as he lay wounded was a deplorable occurrence. The Roode Grond burghers openly denounce the act and every one in South Africa regrets it. His corpse was not treated with indignity as has been alleged. The delay in the burial of the body arose from a mistake made as to the terms of an exchange of bodies between the combatants, and, finally, the remains were enclosed in a coffin and decently interred. The capture of Mr. WRIGHT by artifice and his subsequent imprisonment cannot be defended, but the wholesale charges of cattle-stealing and garden-robbing made against the Roode Grond people are based on nothing more than the capture of cattle in what was taken on both sides to be war, and the assertion of right to the gardens under the treaty of October, 1882, by reaping the crops standing thereon. As admitted by Mr. WRIGHT notice was given before reaping the crops that any native who had planted in the garden ground might reap his crop provided he acknowledged the title of the person to whom the farm upon which the garden ground stood had been allotted under the treaty. Other gross charges of deliberate murder and outrage will be found to have their origin mostly in hearsay and to be generally incapable of proof. The investment of Maffeking was continued, and hostilities were still proceeding when Mr. RHODES, who succeeded Mr. MACKENZIE as Deputy Commissioner on August 25th, 1884, visited Land Goshen. He was accompanied by Mr. JOUBERT, who had been appointed by the Transvaal Government to act in concert with Mr. RHODES and to endeavour to effect a peaceful settlement. Mr. RHODES's demands appear to have required entire withdrawal from the Barolong country including the portion alleged to have been ceded to the volunteers under the treaty of October, 1882, which was alone sufficient to ensure their rejection. The demands of the burghers with regard to MONTSIOA were equally objectionable to

Mr. RHODES, and a request of the Deputy Commissioner that an armistice should be granted for 14 days having been refused, he left after giving warning that hostilities were being carried on against a protected subject of the Queen. It may be argued that the Roode Grond people were to some extent justified in declining to grant a prolonged armistice which might have enabled MONTSIOA again to defy them, especially as there was no law established in the country, ~~and~~ no police available, and no protection to any one except that given by the rifle; but nothing can be sufficient excuse for the refusal to recognize Mr. RHODES as Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner, ~~and~~ for the style of correspondence indulged in. There is good reason, however, to believe that the hostility shown to Mr. RHODES was confined to a few persons, and that, if Mr. RHODES had been able to secure a meeting with the general body of the inhabitants, he would have met with an excellent reception. After Mr. RHODES's departure, MONTSIOA being no longer able to hold out sued for peace and asked Mr. JOUBERT to intervene as mediator. The result was that an agreement of peace was entered into on August 30th, 1884, between MOSHETTE, as Barolong Chief, and the Government of Land Goshen, as representing the white population thereof, of the one part, and MONTSIOA of the other part, whereby MONTSIOA was deprived of all his country except the town of Maffeking and ten farms of 6,000 acres each. The Transvaal Government subsequently issued a Proclamation annexing the country conditionally to the Republic, but upon disallowance by Her Majesty's Imperial Government that Proclamation was at once withdrawn. The Transvaal Government was undoubtedly wrong in issuing a Proclamation annexing even conditionally a country under British protection, and, therefore, the Cape Ministry—when asked for their views—expressed to Her Majesty's Imperial Government in their Minute of September 23rd, 1884, the opinion that in view of German annexation and other encroachments calculated to shut in the Colony, decisive measures should be taken for the maintenance of British authority in South Africa, and that the Convention of London should be maintained. The prompt and frank withdrawal by the Transvaal Government

upon
 of the objectionable Proclamation left the Convention of London intact and vindicated the authority of the British Crown, and, therefore, the Cape Ministry reverted to the position which they occupied before the integrity of the Convention was threatened. Their policy had consistently been to endeavour to annex the country included within the Protectorate to the Cape Colony, and thereby while securing Colonial trade interests to relieve the British taxpayer of a grievous burden. To secure annexation much care was requisite. Many, if not a majority, of the inhabitants of the Protectorate would have preferred that the country should be annexed to the Transvaal, and the circumstances of the country proposed to be annexed were such as to necessitate a considerable expenditure by the Colony in excess of the total revenue for years to come, which of course would render annexation unpopular with many of the members of the Colonial Legislature. As, however, the Cape Colony had some interest in keeping the trade route to the interior open, as a great majority of the inhabitants of Stellaland had shown a desire to be annexed to the Colony in preference to being subject to the direct control of Her Majesty's Imperial Government, and as the Colonial Government deemed it to be their duty to assist cordially in relieving Her Majesty's Imperial Government as soon as possible of responsibilities undertaken partly in Colonial interests, annexation not only of Bechuanaland but of the country westward was made a question of Ministerial policy. The means by which annexation was to be effected might under the circumstances have been safely left to the discretion of the Colonial Government as representing the Colonial taxpayer, who was about to take upon himself the burthen of annexation. To the Cape Ministry it appeared that the best way to secure annexation would be to effect a peaceful settlement of the difficulties in Stellaland and in the Barolong country. An Imperial officer of great judgment like Mr. RHODES appears to have taken the same view, and instead of giving way to the somewhat prevalent war fever he met the difficulty in Stellaland like a wise statesman by conciliation. In the Barolong country there was ample land for all purposes. To restore a tribe of no great force of character and possessing

little energy to a large country which they never fully occupied, and never properly worked, as Mr. MACKENZIE seems to have been directed to do by his Letter of Instructions, would have met with no favour in any quarter. If, on the other hand, it had been thought sufficient to provide for the wants of the natives generally, there would have remained a large tract for the occupation of white persons, whose settlement would be of value to the Colony generally by developing its resources and opening up trade, while the settlers would contribute something to the expenses of government. To give up the bulk of the country to natives who did not require it would be unfair to the Colony. If that were done the natives would get the benefit of an expensive form of government, of police protection, of educational grants and other advantages, without giving any adequate return by way of revenue or development. As the land would by annexation become the property of the Queen in Her Colonial Government, and as the cost of government would for the future be defrayed by the Colony, it was assuredly not unfair to request that the Colonial Ministry should be allowed before annexation to effect a peaceful settlement of the land question in a manner just to the Colony as well as to the natives. Their intention was to provide for the natives land far in excess of their requirements, to respect the rights, if any, of white men who had settled in the country, and to dispose of the residue according to law or as Parliament might decide. Accordingly the Colonial Government requested the permission of Her Majesty's Imperial Government to some of their number proceeding to the Protectorate with a view to endeavouring to make a peaceful arrangement. They urged strongly the risk of danger to the peace of South Africa by the prosecution of warlike operations for the purpose of driving out a few white settlers—who claimed a right to the land occupied by them—and restoring at that late period MONTSIOA's people to land not only of much greater extent than that required by them but which there was ground for thinking the tribe had lost in warfare. They pointed out the great expenditure likely to be incurred in military operations which were really unnecessary. They warned Her Majesty's Imperial Government that the clearing of all white men indiscriminately out of Land

Goshen would necessitate the retention in the country of a large armed force, and that the fear of complications and of incurring military expenditure greater than the resources of the Colony could bear would render doubtful the passage through Parliament of any proposal to annex the territory. His Excellency Sir H. ROBINSON thought differently, and expressed his views strongly. In his telegraphic despatch to Lord DERBY, dated October 17th, 1884, His Excellency fell into an error in thinking "a change seems to have come over Ministers in the last week." The position of Ministers all through was quite consistent. The "recent encroachments" referred to in their Minute of September 23rd, 1884, were not the occupation of farms by MOSHETTE'S volunteers in Land Goshen: a question described by Mr. RHODES at an interview with Mr. JOUBERT as "a small matter" (a). The encroachments referred to were such as German annexation and the proposed annexation of Land Goshen by the Transvaal Government under its proclamation. The Cape Ministry expressed the opinion that in view of territorial encroachments by other Powers British authority should be asserted and the Convention of London maintained, but they never hinted that the maintenance of British authority in South Africa required the presence of a large armed force at the expense of the Imperial Exchequer to drive out a few mercenaries who had settled in Land Goshen on the strength of a treaty of peace, and a few other persons—excellent settlers—who had expended their all in the *bona fide* purchase of land acquired under that treaty. But it was impossible to resist a determination which began to show itself in many quarters to awaken "the sleeping sword of war" in South Africa. A mischievous and unfounded suggestion was industriously propagated by interested politicians to the effect that the Dutch population of South Africa were disloyal. Meetings were held at which "Rule Britannia" was sung with great fervour, especially by gentlemen whose names will be found to be not unconnected with the receipt of some of the vast expenditure on war now rapidly going on. Amid loud protestations of loyalty to

(a) Blue-book [C. 4213], page 114.

the Queen—for which there was no necessity in a Colony where English and Dutch are devoted to their Sovereign—the warning voice of Her Majesty's Ministers in the Cape Colony was not heeded. The advice of the Responsible Ministry of the Cape Colony, who represent the views of the majority of the constituents of the Colony and who are responsible for the well-being of Her Majesty's faithful subjects in that portion of her dominions, was disregarded by Her Majesty's Imperial Government in favour of the platform statements of Opposition orators. The view taken by the Colonial Ministry will be seen by reference to their Minute to His Excellency Sir H. ROBINSON, dated October 13th, 1884, wherein they state that the Convention of London having been upheld the situation was restored to the condition in which it existed on July 26th, when they laid before Her Majesty's Imperial Government the conditions upon which they were willing to propose to Parliament to annex the Protectorate. They add that "in the interests of the Empire as well as of the Dependency Ministers are of opinion that questions intimately affecting the future welfare of Her Majesty's subjects residing in the Colony can be best settled by the Ministry and Parliament of the Colony. In accordance with this opinion, and with an earnest desire to avert bloodshed and avoid the creation of race bitterness and national jealousies, Ministers desire that the assent of Her Majesty's Government should be obtained to such members of the Colonial Ministry as may be determined upon proceeding to the protected territory for the purpose of communicating with its inhabitants and endeavouring to restore order and effect a peaceful settlement without the intervention of any armed force. Ministers submit this proposal in the firm belief that their advances will be met in a friendly spirit not only by the inhabitants of the Protectorate but by the people of the neighbouring States, and they deem it their duty to leave no effort untried having for its object the prevention of a collision between sections of the European race in South Africa." The intention of the Cape Government was thereby clearly disclosed. Their intention was to meet the Roode Grond people in a conciliatory manner, to endeavour to arrive at a similar settlement to that arrived at in Stellaland under similar circumstances by Her Majesty's

Imperial Representative, and then to save the Imperial Exchequer the expenditure of even one farthing by relieving them of the burthen of the Protectorate for ever. Strangely enough, an offer so favourable to the interests of the British public was received at first rather coldly. The view taken by the Imperial Government seems to have been that there was no middle course between forcible expulsion of all white men in Barolong territory and abandonment of the Protectorate, while the Cape Ministry—looking to the probabilities of annexation and the titles claimed by white settlers in the country—thought it would be wiser to give ample land to the natives, to avoid ill-feeling and complications amongst the whites by recognizing rights to land which certainly had some foundation, to compel all other settlers to leave, and then to annex the territory.

The divergence in views was stated to be as follows by the Cape Ministry in a Minute to His Excellency the Governor on October 17th, 1884:—"His Excellency is of opinion that there can be no satisfactory settlement arrived at without resort to arms, while Ministers are of opinion that British authority can be upheld and Colonial rights secured by permitting them to take the course they have proposed towards a peaceful solution of this difficult question." It will be for the public to judge whether the subsequent correspondence between His Excellency the Governor as representative of Her Majesty's Imperial Government and the Cape Ministry showed any desire to be guided by the Responsible Advisers of the Crown in the Cape Colony, or any wish to promote harmony of action. Lord DERBY certainly stated that Her Majesty's Government attached much importance to working in harmony with the Colonial Government, but the warnings of the latter continued to be unheeded. Finally, on October 31st, 1884, Her Majesty's Imperial Government while expressing their pleasure at the intervention of the Colonial Government decided—against the advice of the Colonial Government—that military preparations were to be proceeded with although active operations were not to be commenced whilst Ministers were endeavouring to effect a peaceful settlement. The decision so arrived at meant nothing more and nothing less than an expensive military

expedition to Bechuanaland under any circumstances. Receipt of the news that Major-General Sir CHARLES WARREN had left England with a large Military Staff was quite enough to cause noisy opposition from speculators to any settlement effected by the Cape Ministry, to induce the false cry to be raised "Let us not have another ROBERTS fiasco," and to destroy the chances of peaceful annexation. The Cape Ministry were placed by the action of the Home Government in a difficult position, but so anxious were they to secure annexation as the only true mode of settlement that they determined to proceed to Bechuana'and in the hope of effecting a settlement. They wished to have their hands free, but conditions were imposed upon them which may be gathered from Lord DERBY's telegraphic despatch received on October 23rd. "Her Majesty's Government approve of their (Ministers) making an attempt if they will be prepared on their settlement being approved to accept responsibility of control over MANKOROANE and MONTSIOA's country. Any agreement they make of course must be subject to approval of Her Majesty's Government, and it will be essential that all white men leave MONTSIOA's location except such as Her Majesty's Government on recommendation of High Commissioner may specially grant permission to remain, and that ample land shall be secured to MONTSIOA's people. Before any farms may be granted to white men, if any land is so granted, fair rent to be paid to MONTSIOA." In reply the Cape Ministers stated: As set forth in Sir H. ROBINSON's telegram to Lord DERBY of October 24th, 1884, that they were prepared "to proceed to Protectorate and endeavour to make best arrangements possible, consistent with just recognition of the rights and claims of all parties, the terms to be subject to approval of Her Majesty's Government after consideration of their report. Ministers add that Parliament has not authorized them to accept responsibility for control of country, consequently, they are not in a position to accept conditions laid down in a message, *but they think that if their mission be successful they will be able to submit proposals for government of country pending annexation which will be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.*" On October 30th, 1884, Lord DERBY finally stated that he was glad Ministers should intervene, and added, "Your definition of

MONTSIOA'S location seems to be sufficient. *Such grazing lands as well as garden lands as may be required for tribe should be secured to them at meeting of Parliament. Need not be fixed just now.*" The definition of MONTSIOA'S location given by Sir H. ROBINSON was "the garden ground and grazing lands of which the Chief and his tribe were in the undisturbed possession in May last, when they were formally taken under British protection." Events have shown that it would have been more satisfactory if Her Majesty's Imperial Government had candidly said that they distrusted the Cape Ministry, and that although they permitted Cape Ministers to proceed to Bechuana-land they had no intention of acceding to any settlement arrived at. Under these depressing circumstances the Premier and Treasurer of the Colony undertook their thankless mission.

V.


THE affairs of Stellaland are closely connected with those of Land Goshen, and there is throughout complete similarity in the circumstances. War between MASSOUW and MANKOROANE originated with the latter, who according to the statement of Captain NOURSE in his telegram to Sir H. ROBINSON, dated February 9th, 1882 (a), "is entirely to blame for its commencement. MASSOUW is acting in exactly the same way as MOSHETTE, and derives great assistance from the Transvaal State. Both Chiefs are actively employing white men to fight for them. MASSOUW is raising 300 Boers to receive half booty and a farm each in MANKOROANE'S territory should they drive him off it." MASSOUW placed the true state of the case before Captain NOURSE when he said (b) "I wish to explain to you that MANKOROANE had a large number of white men (Englishmen) fighting for him. These men are volunteers from the Diamond Fields. . . . I also hear that MANKOROANE has

(a) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 34.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 49.


Montsioa's Country as occupied
previous to War 1882.....

Ground given to Montsioa
after Peace of 1882.....



— Table of Distances. —

| | |
|--|---------|
| Mafeking to Israels..... | 6 Miles |
| • • Sannies..... | 11 " |
| • • Jan Masibi..... | 23 " |
| • • Pietzani..... | 35 " |
| • • Boundary (Junct. of Molopo & Spruit)..... | 46 " |
| • • Sehuba..... | 6 " |
| • • Saliris..... | 8 " |
| • • Buurman's Drift..... | 9 " |
| • • N.W. Boundary..... | 24 " |
| • • Moshette's Town..... | 42 " |



sent to the Fields to raise more men ; so I have also given orders to raise volunteers, Boers." MASSOUW further stated that war had been made upon him "because I assisted MOSHETTE with men to fight against MONTSIOA." MANKOROANE took up the same position as MONTSIOA did, that is to say, that he was English and Anti-Boer, and that the Transvaal was at the bottom of the disturbances. "During the war between the English and Boers," said MANKOROANE (a) to Captain N'OURSE, on February 4th, 1882, "DAVID MASSOUW and ROCHOEM, although my subjects, sided against me and wished to assist the Boers. . . . I have always been a faithful and humble ally of the British Government not only in words but in acts. The petty Chiefs now in rebellion, viz., ROCHOEM, DAVID MASSOUW, MOKJALAHADE and MOSHETTE, are against me, they are also being excited and put up to fighting against me by the Boers whose object is to get my country, being dissatisfied with the terms of the Convention." On March 20th, 1882, MANKOROANE complained to Major LOWE (b) that "the Boers are helping their friends, and I am the friend of the English, but have no help from my friends." Just as in MONTSIOA's case, MANKOROANE continued to implore the British Government to save him, but in vain. Strict neutrality should be preserved. Complaints were made in the same manner as by MONTSIOA that the Transvaal Government did nothing to check their subjects from crossing the border. According to Mr. HUDSON's statement to Sir H. ROBINSON in a telegram received on June 2nd, 1882, "No really efficient action is taken by field-cornets to prevent Boers passing and re-passing." The policy of looking to the Transvaal Government to do everything was of little utility. Indeed, it was hardly fair to expect ^{that} a long boundary line such as that running from Ramatlabama southward could be so carefully watched as to prevent small parties of men from crossing and re-crossing. On June 9th BAREKI, Chief of the Batlaros, whose country lay to the westward of MANKOROANE's, craved the aid of the British Government, but Sir H. ROBINSON, whose hands were of course tied, was unable to accede to the request or

(a) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 50.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3381], page 85.

to do more than inform the applicant that he did not understand him to imply that he based "his request for intervention on anything but the friendly sentiments which Her Majesty's Government has always entertained towards you." The result of MANKOROANE's ill-advised hostilities might have easily been foretold. Through the aid of white volunteers that Chief was—like MONTSIOA—crushed to the ground. On July 26th, 1882, a treaty of peace was entered into when MANKOROANE—like MONTSIOA under similar circumstances—lost the greater portion of the country over which he claimed chieftainship, including his valuable "ploughing lands between De Gaap and the Moroquane Range running in a direct line from Taungs to the latter range about thirty-five miles and extending westward into Stellaland about twenty-five miles" (a). The terms of peace are referred to in Sir H. ROBINSON's telegraphic despatch to Lord KIMBERLEY, dated August 6th, 1882 (b), as follows:—"Chiefs to be independent; a Commission to define boundaries between them and to assign farms of 4,000 acres to each of MASSOUW's freebooting volunteers, presumably from MANKOROANE's country; any differences between Commissioners as to boundaries or later between Chiefs and their subjects to be settled by Government of South African Republic, whose decision is to be final. *Both sides agree never to call in protection of any Government but that of South African Republic, under whose protection they state they will be safe and unmolested, and request that no other Government will interfere. These terms are substantially those proposed by KRUGER to HUDSON, and have obviously been dictated by the freebooters.* MANKOROANE has reluctantly accepted them being compelled he says by dire necessity to do so," MONTSIOA reluctantly signed a treaty under the compulsion of dire necessity, its terms are said to have been dictated by "freebooters," the protection of the South African Republic was invoked, and farms were assigned to the volunteers who aided his foe. If the circumstances under which the latter treaty was obtained were such as now to justify its being ignored, why not ignore MAN

(a) Notes of interview with MANKOROANE. Appendix A.

(b) Blue-book [C. 3419], page 24.

KOROANE'S treaty? Mr. MACKENZIE takes up a logical position when he says "Begin *de novo*," but, however logical, it is not a safe position, and few will agree with him especially in view of his own action in Stellaland. Many contend, equally logically, that both treaties should be respected. Her Majesty's Imperial Government have wisely decided to recognize MANKOROANE'S treaty and all rights to land—about 400 or 500 farms—acquired by white volunteers or freebooters under it, and, if they had gone one step further and recognized the rights of MOSHETTE'S volunteers under the treaty of October, 1882, amounting only to about 140 farms, the British taxpayer would not have been called upon to pay one shilling for a Bechuanaland expedition, he would not incur the risk of having that remote country thrown on his hands for the future, and the Cape Colony would not have its position endangered by revulsion of feeling in England. In December, 1882, the boundary line between MASSOUW and MANKOROANE provided for by the treaty was beaconsed off, and the Chairman of the line inspectors gave notice of the position of the beacons to MANKOROANE, who was not present. On January 16th, 1883, MASSOUW issued a Proclamation declaring the line fixed by the inspectors to be the boundary line for the future, and on January 18th, 1883, the Chairman of the Bestuur or Provisional Committee of Management nominated by the volunteers was appointed to be Administrator of the territory with power to issue the requisite land titles, to govern the country by civilized laws, and to proclaim it under the title of Stellaland (a). The farms were disposed of by lottery on February 27th, 1883. As occurred in MONTSIOA'S case, MANKOROANE soon grew dissatisfied, and in the same way tried to repudiate his treaty. In his petition to Sir H. ROBINSON (b) dated February 3rd, 1883, he complained "that the men calling themselves 'MASSOUW'S volunteers' have appropriated nearly the whole of my territory and have beaconsed off a boundary line, surveyed a township called Vryburg, and are now beaconsing off the country into farms; they have established a Government called 'Stellaland State,' and are

(a) Treaty, &c. Appendix

(b) Blue-book [C. 3686], page 16.

levying taxes upon traders and others. . . . The country remaining to me, as beaoned off by them, is much too small for my people and I shall be compelled under these circumstances to fight again unless I obtain some assistance from Her Majesty's Government, which I humbly crave." He further described the new Stellaland Government as "composed of freebooters who have stolen my country. On February 15th, 1884, Sir H. ROBINSON made a request to the SCANLEN Ministry for the loan of some of the border police "for the purpose of maintaining order in Bechuanaland," to which Mr MERRIMAN replied "that the force under Major LOWE is so small, and so occupied in police duties that they are unable to comply with the request for its employment over the border in measures which, if undertaken by Colonial forces in the present state of information, would be entirely misunderstood and might cause prejudicial complications." On February 22nd, 1883, the Secretary of State for the Colonies suddenly woke up to the necessity of doing something. A Minute to Ministers dated February 22nd, 1883, transmitted a copy of a telegram from the Colonial Office inquiring whether the Colonial Government "will give all facilities if Her Majesty's Government organize a police force against British subjects and deserters in the Bechuana country." This was a case with a vengeance of attempting to "lock the stable door after the steed had been stolen." The absurdity of organizing a police force after MANKOROANE had been deprived of the bulk of his country would have been apparent to anyone except a political RIP VAN WINKLE during whose sleep Stellaland had been established. The SCANLEN Ministry of course agreed to grant facilities, but they properly pointed out that the course proposed would be practically valueless "unless Her Majesty's Government is prepared to assume the responsibility of maintaining a Protectorate in Bechuanaland." The next plan which suggested itself to Her Majesty's Government was that already mentioned of making "moderate allowances" to MONTSIOA and MANKOROANE when they should be "driven out of their country" (a). On March 30th, 1883, MAN-

(a) Blue-book [C. 3686], page 52.

KOROANE again applied to Sir H. ROBINSON for assistance, saying "Should your Excellency grant me 2,000 Martini-Henrys, with the ammunition thereof, I would be in a position to protect my people and country, and I would most willingly either return them to the Government, after ejecting the freebooters, paying for the ammunition which may have been expended, or else buy both the guns and the ammunition from the Government" The Chief appears still to have looked upon his treaty with MASSOUW as a dead letter, for when Colonel FERREIRA—who was employed by the Transvaal Government to arrest any Transvaal burghers causing disturbances on the border—informed MANKOROANE that there was some difficulty in acceding to a request of his as Mr. VAN NIEKERK objected, MANKOROANE coolly said "Mr. NIEKERK is the Administrator of that portion of my country which DAVID MASSOUW's volunteers have proclaimed Stellaland State, and a Transvaal burgher; therefore one of those who should have been arrested as a disturber of the peace in my country." Finally in his despatch to Lord DERBY (a) dated May 26th, 1883, Sir. H. ROBINSON laid down four courses open to Her Majesty's Government with regard to Bechuanaland. The first was "To clear the freebooters out of the territories belonging to MANKOROANE and MASSOUW by force," but as His Excellency added "Her Majesty's Government have, however, already decided against this course." Surely, after so positive an abandonment of any intention to upset the titles of the volunteers of MOSHETTE and MASSOUW it would be unjust after the lapse of more than a year and a half to disregard claims under the respective treaties, especially in cases where *bonâ fide* purchases of rights have been made. As soon as it became known that a Conference was to be held in London to discuss the proposed revision of the Convention of Pretoria, MANKOROANE telegraphed in October, 1883, to the Acting Governor, Lieut.-General the Honourable LEICESTER SMYTH, asking first to be allowed to attend the Conference, and afterwards, "that Her Majesty's Government would permit the Rev.

(a). Blue-book [C. 3686], page 70.

Mr. MACKENZIE to represent his interest." Lord DERBY answered as follows on October 26th, 1883:—"Inform MANKOROANE I readily consent to hear MACKENZIE on any point affecting his interests, but MANKOROANE cannot be formally admitted to or represented at any Conference here." Whether Mr. MACKENZIE's subsequent appointment as Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland—after his identifying himself as a partisan of one of the most important parties—was judicious may be open to doubt. But Mr. MACKENZIE was appointed. The announcement of his appointment was not received with satisfaction in the Cape Colony. It was thought by many persons having a thorough knowledge of South African affairs and of the character of the people to be an ill-judged appointment and the harbinger of trouble. Against Mr. MACKENZIE personally not a word could or can be said. He was and is a man of great earnestness and great honesty, but it is doubtful whether gentlemen whose lives have previously been devoted to missionary labour are best calculated to deal with political complications, especially if those complications arise out of affairs connected with the people amongst whom they have laboured as missionaries and of whom they are the advocates. The *Cape Argus*—which, if not the official organ of the SCANLEN Ministry then in office, strenuously supported them—censured the appointment on February 25th, 1884, in the following language:—"When in Sir BARTLE FRERE'S days there were missionaries who made themselves the keenest of partisans on his side we protested in no measured terms. . . . The Boers and their sympathisers can scarcely be blamed if they regard Mr. MACKENZIE as a self-seeking schemer who went to England and stirred up political agitation to be crowned by the bestowal of an important political appointment upon himself." *Het Volksblad*, a thorough-going supporter of the SCANLEN Ministry, expressed the following opinion:—"It is difficult to imagine what diplomatic design Lord DERBY can have had in making such an appointment, except that of riding rough-shod over public opinion here. That he can have consulted the authorities in this country is impossible; indeed we have good reason to believe that everything was done by them to avert the mistake which had been made. It is, however, the

old story: those on the spot who are most interested and most capable of judging are passed by and discredited. Moreover even if Mr. MACKENZIE was not known to have prejudged the case as he has done, the simple fact that he is a missionary would surely be enough to disqualify him for the political office to which he has been appointed." Subsequent events brought about no change in public opinion. During the debate on the resolutions relating to Bechuanaland in the House of Assembly in July, 1884, both sides agreed in condemnation of Mr. MACKENZIE's appointment. From the Opposition side Mr. MERRIMAN, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works in the SCANLEN Ministry, stated that "the idea that black and white men could live together in that territory was killed the moment Mr. MACKENZIE was appointed there," and Mr. LEONARD, Attorney-General in the SCANLEN Ministry, pointed out that whatever disturbances there were in Bechuanaland "were in consequence of dissatisfaction on the part of the white people with the rule of Mr. MACKENZIE." From the Ministerial side the Premier (Mr. UPINGTON) said "that the weight of evidence went to show that the position of Mr. MACKENZIE in Bechuanaland was not a satisfactory one; and it would be to the advantage and peace of South Africa if arrangements could be made for a Colonial officer to be placed in that territory pending the annexation of it to the Cape." During the early months of 1884 the state of MANKOROANE's country was very bad. The Batlapings were continually stealing from the people of Stellaland and from MASSOUW and other natives, and they claimed crops which they had sown within Stellaland, but — exactly as in Land Goshen — the Stellaland people refused to let them reap the crops. MASSOUW became so irritated at the stealing from his people that he sent out a commando on the 13th March to attack MANKOROANE, but through the interference of Mr. VAN NIEKERK, Administrator of Stellaland, a conflict was avoided. For this service Mr. VAN NIEKERK was thanked by Lord DERBY. Captain BOWER, R.N., the Imperial Secretary, was about this time sent on a mission of inquiry into Bechuanaland,

and in his telegram to the High Commissioner (a) dated March 14th, 1884, so far from denouncing the "freebooters" as murderers and land thieves he stated that "in Stellaland the Europeans are quiet and orderly, awaiting events. I have everywhere been treated with the greatest respect and confidence." Telegraphing on March 24th, 1884, Captain BOWER said that Mr. NIEKERK deserved "great credit for the loyal way in which he has maintained his engagement despite the very great provocation he has received." To show how dangerous it is to give credence to loose charges against the Europeans settled in Bechuanaland, it is only necessary to turn to Captain BOWER's official report (b) dated April 3rd, 1884, wherein he admits how agreeably disappointed he was with regard to Vryburg, which he had expected to find "a den of freebooters and brigands," and his further report, dated April 7th, 1884, in which he states that "the present inhabitants of Stellaland appear to me to be a respectable class, quite equal to the ordinary class of Colonial farmers." It may be said that Captain BOWER's reports were framed with an object, and that, therefore, too much reliance should not be placed upon them; the policy of Her Majesty's Government then being to conciliate the people of Stellaland, and by detaching their sympathies from the people of Land Goshen to isolate the latter to such an extent as to keep them quiet until the Colonial Parliament should agree to annex the country. But in fact Captain BOWER's estimate of the people, the bulk of whom at that time were "freebooters" or volunteers, was not pitched too highly. If Captain BOWER had protracted his visit although it entailed the uncomfortable consequences of "sleeping only four nights in bed," and had devoted as much attention to the affairs of Land Goshen as to those of Stellaland, he might have been able to give Her Majesty's Imperial Government valuable advice. A short conversation with MONTSIOA seems to have enabled Captain BOWER to arrive at the astounding conclusion that "the territory left to MONTSIOA by the Convention is barely sufficient to provide sustenance for his large tribe and the cattle belonging to them," and that it

(a) Blue-book [C. 4036], page 27.

(b) Blue-book [C. 4036], page 34.

seemed "to be clearly impossible to grant a single farm out of the small territory which is now reserved to MONTSIOA" to anyone much less to the freebooters "whose claim moreover is on MOSHETTE and not MONTSIOA." Captain BOWER was also enabled to report, probably from inspection through a field-glass, that the people of Land Goshen "appear to be a very different stamp to the Stellalanders." The gallant gentleman "did not visit their laager, or town, as they call it" (a). As might have been apprehended the announcement of Mr. MACKENZIE'S appointment caused great dissatisfaction amongst the people of Stellaland. A numerous signed petition was presented to the Legislative Assembly of the Cape Colony reflecting severely on Mr. MACKENZIE, and praying for annexation to the Cape Colony. Mr. C. G. BODENSTEIN, Chairman of the National Committee, wrote Sir H. ROBINSON, on April 8th, 1884, to the effect that "the inhabitants of Stellaland have unanimously decided, on account of the general discontent that prevails with regard to the appointment of the British Resident for Bechuanaland, to petition the Cape Parliament for annexation to that Colony." Mr. VAN NIEKERK, Administrator of Stellaland—a thoroughly honest man—also addressed a letter to the members of the Colonial Legislature urging the necessity for annexation to the Cape Colony, although frankly admitting that "I cannot and will not deny that it was my intention as Administrator of Stellaland to form an independent State in this part of the country . . . or, in case of failure, to have it form a portion of the South African Republic." Mr. MACKENZIE arrived at Taungs, the residence of MANKOROANE, on April 30th, 1884. MANKOROANE at once threw himself into the arms of Mr. MACKENZIE, thinking—misguided man—that the change in the system of Government would restore to him something of what he had lost. He was so courteous as even to desire Mr. MACKENZIE to save himself the trouble of a tour to MONTSIOA'S country, "saying that he would call every one to Taungs." Mr. MACKENZIE'S estimate of the native character will be found in his despatch to Sir H. ROBINSON (b), dated 14th May, 1884, in

(a) Blue-book [C. 4036], page 45.

(b) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 14.

which he says:—"I learned that his (MANKOROANE'S) object was really tribal aggrandizement by means of my influence, he having already spoken of this meeting and said that it would then be seen who were the enemies of MANKOROANE if they stayed away from the meeting. Of course this is only what might have been expected of a Chief; but there is no reason why we should aid him in such a policy." On May 9th, 1884, after his arrival at Vryburg, the seat of Government in Stellaland, Mr. MACKENZIE read his Commission and announced that "Her Majesty was pleased to exercise her authority over Bechuanaland," but the Administrator, Mr. VAN NIEKERK appears to have thought that something more formal should have been done, and asked if the country had been proclaimed, to which Mr. MACKENZIE replied (a) "You asked me if I had proclaimed the country, and I said no; a Proclamation is of a certain form and in a certain way." The Administrator then put the question:—"Must I understand that by reading his Commission Mr. MACKENZIE takes over the country as British territory and as part of Bechuanaland?" The reply made by Mr. MACKENZIE was:—"That is the fact." Subsequently Mr. MACKENZIE, "in the Queen's name" imposed on Mr. VAN NIEKERK, "the head of the people of Stellaland—subject to acceptance by the latter gentleman—the responsibility of the temporary management of this district until its affairs are finally settled," appointed him "to take into his charge and be responsible for all documents, moneys and things belonging to and connected with the Government of Stellaland," left the continuance or discontinuance of heads of departments likewise in Mr. VAN NIEKERK'S hands, and commended "the people and the country to the grace and mercy of GOD." Jealousies and difficulties soon arose. Questions were put as to land titles, the debt of Stellaland, and the necessity for Mr. VAN NIEKERK taking the oath of allegiance. The result was that Mr. MACKENZIE, to use his own words, went "the length of promising farms to the original volunteers or due compensation

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 28.

in land or money." He also stated that "the incoming Government is pledged to meet the debts of the old one," and pointed out that "Mr. VAN NIEKERK now holds office with your consent in the name of the Queen, whose servant he is henceforth" (a). All Mr. MACKENZIE'S promises and concessions were insufficient. He was still merely able to say "Something had been done in the right direction . . . and the full establishment of the new Government is now, I hope, merely a question of time." He could only hope that the general public meeting of the burghers would authorize Mr. VAN NIEKERK to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen. Mr. MACKENZIE'S hopes were not realised. At the general meeting of burghers held on May 20th, 1884, the following resolution was carried by a large majority:—"That seeing that the people of Stellaland have addressed a petition to the Cape Parliament praying for annexation to the Cape Colony they are in honour bound to wait until they have received a reply to the said petition." So late as July 6th, 1884, affairs remained so unsettled that Sir H. ROBINSON was obliged to say to Mr. MACKENZIE:—"I cannot see what would be gained by our discussing details of Vryburg Government till we know whether Stellalanders mean to come under us." Mr. MACKENZIE about that time had taken up a position of hostility to the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony and was urging on Sir H. ROBINSON a shadowy system of territorial government and a proposal for the establishment of a reserve force of one thousand volunteers who should be "Christian Citizens" entering into the "true knightly spirit" of the undertaking and who would be "the right class of occupants for vacant farms in native territories" (b). That would have been going perilously close to the establishment of a regiment of "Christian freebooters," and it did not commend itself to Sir H. ROBINSON, who seems to have begun at last to suspect Mr. MACKENZIE'S judgment. He declined to approve of a suggestion made by Mr. MACKENZIE that he should leave Bechuanaland for Cape Town, on the ground that Mr. MACKENZIE should remain at his post whilst

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 22.

(b) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 56.

the country was in the state it then was, and he added "your reserve scheme appears to me to be wholly impracticable. You are under a complete delusion if you think you can obtain any help at present from either the Government, the Parliament, or the public opinion of the Colony." A warning was also given to Mr. MACKENZIE not to "further increase Civil Establishments without the authority of Her Majesty's Government," and he was told that "if Stellaland comes under us, of course any expenditure on that community must be borne ^{by} itself. This should be clearly understood from the first." The tightening of the purse-strings at this time seems to have been caused by the disinclination shown by the Colonial Ministry to fix the Colony with responsibility for expenditure in Bechuanaland before annexation, for as Sir H. ROBINSON telegraphed (a), with a touch of sadness, to Mr. MACKENZIE, "There is little prospect, I am afraid, of any contribution towards the expenses of Bechuanaland from this Colony." The same economical reason probably led to a request of Sir H. ROBINSON that Mr. MACKENZIE would let him know how he contemplated paying "for the Assistant Commissioners with MONTSIOA and MANKOROANE, and what chance there is of raising revenue from those Chiefs." When Mr. MACKENZIE left Stellaland in May for Maffeking, he "left matters in a transitional state" (b) "instead of making certain of the secure establishment of British jurisdiction and, on his return, he was obliged again to meet the people. A resolution was passed by the Volks' Committee on June 27th, 1884, to the effect that in the event of the Cape Parliament declining to comply with the prayer of the petition for annexation the points already discussed with Mr. MACKENZIE at Vryburg should be submitted to him [for his ratification, and that, upon such ratification, the Administrator, Mr. VAN NIEKERK, should be advised to take the oath of office within a given time. Being under the impression—from information received from Cape Town—that annexation would not be assented to by the Cape Parliament, a deputation of the Volks' Committee on July 4th, 1884, discussed the points referred to with Mr. MACKENZIE, who

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 79.

(b) Blue-book, [C. 4194], page 113.

confirmed what he had previously stated regarding land titles and the debt. Mr. VAN NIEKERK, however, declined to accept the position offered to him and to take the oath of allegiance, and matters became so critical that Mr. MACKENZIE came to the conclusion that a police force of two hundred men would be necessary at once. He also made a request for the services of "the most Christian, broadest-minded, Dutch-speaking business man as Assistant Commissioner and Landdrost of Vryburg." Sir H. ROBINSON now fairly lost patience, and his replies to Mr. MACKENZIE became more peremptory and marked with some severity. On July 12th, 1884, His Excellency said: "I cannot ask Her Majesty's Government to sanction any further expenditure until I have received definite replies to the points referred to in my telegrams of 6th, 8th and 10th. I require to know the precise position in Stellaland. Are they with us or against us, or or neutral Her Majesty's Government have no intention of fighting Stellalanders. If they had, a thousand men would not be sufficient. For what purpose, then, do you require another 100 police? and where would you locate them? The expenditure which you have already undertaken, irrespective of Stellaland, will not be less than £40,000 for the first year, and you have said no word as yet about revenue. If the present police were doubled, as you suggest, the expenditure for the first year would not be far short of £80,000, and to expect the Imperial Government to expend this merely for the purpose of checking cattle stealing is simply preposterous. All MANKOROANE'S and MONTSIOA'S cattle are not worth one year's proposed expenditure." The rebuke was very severe, but Mr. MACKENZIE may derive some balm to his wounded feelings from contemplating the lavish war expenditure now being incurred, of which one year's interest alone will probably far exceed the total cost of his proposed police force. Resolutions submitted by the Colonial Ministry in favour of negotiating with Her Majesty's Imperial Government with a view of annexing Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony having passed both branches of the Legislature a tempting opportunity presented itself of evading the paltry money question and attempting to throw upon the Cape Colony the

onus of dealing with the debt in connection with annexation. That opportunity was greedily seized by Her Majesty's Imperial Government, and accordingly Sir H. ROBINSON—acting, of course, on instructions—in announcing on the 19th July, 1884, to Mr. MACKENZIE the passage of the resolution proposed by the Cape Ministry—added that “you will of course take care that during transitional stage any expenditure on Stellaland is met by itself. Under altered circumstances neither assets nor liabilities need be taken over by Imperial Government” (a). The feeling which dictated so unworthy an attempt on the part of Her Majesty's Imperial Government cannot but be resented by Colonists of every nationality and disapproved of everywhere. Mr. MACKENZIE in answer to that portion of the telegram of Sir H. ROBINSON which relates to current expenditure replied that he could not shirk money responsibilities even for a time, and stated that he thought of “continuing the issue of Stellaland ‘good-fors’ for current expenses of Government here, endorsing them myself while here.” On July 25th, 1884, Sir H. ROBINSON declined without the express authority of Her Majesty's Government to “sanction the payment from Imperial funds of outstanding obligations of Stellaland Republic or of the ‘good-fors’ which you propose issuing for current expenses of Government I do not think Her Majesty's Government will approve the promise you have made.” Mr. MACKENZIE continued to contend against the proposed repudiation and wrote to Sir H. ROBINSON on August 1st, 1884, as follows:—“It was of the very essence of the settlement which I have been endeavouring to carry through here that Her Majesty's Government should take up the pecuniary responsibilities of those whom we succeeded. Either drive them out, or take over public affairs from their hands—these were our alternatives. The latter was chosen and I think very wisely.” Notwithstanding all that was urged Her Majesty's Imperial Government adhered to the position taken up by them, and, consequently, much Imperial Government paper in the shape of dishonoured “good-fors” countersigned by Mr. MACKENZIE and issued in payment of the current ex-

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 127.

penses of Government under him can now be obtained in Stellaland by speculative persons at any price they may wish to offer. During the month of July, 1884, difficulties increased in Stellaland. The Volks' Committee according to Mr. MACKENZIE's letter of August 1st, 1884, deposed Mr. VAN NIEKERK from office and Mr. VAN NIEKERK and his party deposed the Volks' Committee. Mr. MACKENZIE called a public meeting at Vryburg on July 21st, 1883, at which he gave Mr. VAN NIEKERK an intimation to attend. Mr. VAN NIEKERK, who undoubtedly represented the great majority of the inhabitants, declined to attend, and thereupon Mr. MACKENZIE unwisely identified himself with the other party and either carried away by an ill-founded belief of the strength of his supporters or thinking that something decisive should be done he actually hoisted the British flag. The hopes of the party which egged Mr. MACKENZIE on to this step now rose high. A Select Committee elected by the Volks' Committee acted as his advisers, for which service it was arranged that the members should be "paid for such days as they sit for the transaction of public business," and police and other appointments were eagerly sought for. The act of hoisting the British flag was certain to be looked upon as injudicious by Sir H. ROBINSON, from whom indeed a telegraphic message to Mr. MACKENZIE on the subject appears to have been in transit at the time. In that message His Excellency said:—"Touching what you say in your note of the 22nd just received as to hoisting English flag at some future time, I think it right to warn you that you would not be warranted in taking such a step. Hoisting the British flag is technically the symbol of the assumption of sovereignty. Bechuanaland is only a native territory under a British Protectorate, and you are not justified in altering the status without the express sanction of Her Majesty's Government." On the previous day, July 29th, 1884, Sir H. ROBINSON had received information from Mr. RHODES of a "row at Vryburg on attempt to hoist British flag" which probably alarmed His Excellency and, when added to the effect of Mr. MACKENZIE having identified himself with the party opposed to Mr. VAN NIEKERK as well as to other subjects of disagreement such as the "good-for" ques-

tion, the proposed "preposterous" expenditure upon police, and the establishment of a native force without authority to do so, led to such loss of confidence in Mr. MACKENZIE as to cause the despatch of the following strong telegram to him:—"Nothing could justify you in taking on yourself the responsibility of involving us in a conflict between the two parties. The consequences would be disastrous throughout South Africa. I find it so difficult to understand precise position that I wish you to come down here at once to confer with me about it as you proposed a short time ago. I have asked Mr. RHODES to proceed from Kimberley to Vryburg as he is authorized to act as Deputy Commissioner in your absence." The facts recorded above show that Mr. GLADSTONE was under a misapprehension when he recently stated in the House of Commons that Mr. MACKENZIE had been recalled solely because the Cape Ministry asked for it. The Right Honourable Gentleman, if he had known the facts, would then have said that Mr. MACKENZIE was recalled not because of any advice given by the Colonial Ministry but because Sir H. ROBINSON distrusted him. It must not be thought, however, that the Cape Ministry of which Mr. UPINGTON was then the head were anxious for Mr. MACKENZIE'S retention in Bechuanaland, on the contrary they were desirous to see Mr. MACKENZIE replaced by a Colonial officer possessing the confidence of the people, and in a Minute to Sir H. ROBINSON, dated July 26th, 1884, they expressed the opinion, in connection with the terms under which they proposed to submit the question of annexation for the consideration of the Cape Parliament, that "Mr. MACKENZIE, Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland, does not command the confidence of a large and influential portion of the population, and his retention in office is not calculated to promote the interests of peace." That opinion was not acted upon. In fact the proposed terms of annexation were looked upon with disfavour, and the advice of the Cape Ministry in relation to Bechuanaland was declined unless liability for a share in unlimited expenditure in that country was admitted. Subsequently, on July 30th, 1884, the Cape Ministry—who were still not responsible in Bechuanaland matters for advice as a Ministry—again urged in a Minute

to Sir H. ROBINSON "that in their opinion the most serious if not the only obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Protectorate is the continuance in the office of Deputy Commissioner of Mr. MACKENZIE, who is not only an unpopular but an injudicious officer." Before its receipt Sir H. ROBINSON had—as already pointed out—formed his own opinion of Mr. MACKENZIE'S capabilities and had despatched a telegram recalling him. This is shown by His Excellency's reply to the latter Minute of the Cape Ministry in which he begged "to inform Ministers that *prior to the receipt of the Minute he had telegraphed to Mr. Mackenzie directing him to come to Cape Town to confer with him* as to the position in Bechuanaland." Mr. RHODES was really the adviser of Sir H. ROBINSON in this matter, Captain BOWER having telegraphed to him on July 29th, 1884, after receipt of the telegram from Mr. RHODES giving news of the "row" at Vryburg (a):—"Do you think MACKENZIE may be safely left in Stellaland?" to which Mr. RHODES replied on July 30th—the date of the message recalling Mr. MACKENZIE—"Consider MACKENZIE'S presence at Vryburg likely to cause disturbance. He is opposed by large party."

The Cape Ministry although anxious for Mr. MACKENZIE'S recall were thus in no way responsible for it. Mr. MACKENZIE'S recall was quickly followed by his resignation, upon which Her Majesty's Imperial Government showed their appreciation of his services by granting him three months' salary as a gratuity. On Mr. RHODES'S arrival in Stellaland he at once saw the true state of affairs. He reported to Sir H. ROBINSON that "the town section accepted MACKENZIE but NIEKERK has a large majority with him and has proclaimed a separate Government at Hart's River. . . . I am not without hope, but will have to go on entirely different lines to MACKENZIE." In his telegram to Sir H. ROBINSON, dated August 7th, 1884, Mr. RHODES observed:—"My policy, if it can be called one, is contained in a few words, viz., to try and effect a reconciliation with the NIEKERK party and obtain their co-operation in dealing

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 15.

with the people at Rooi Grond or at least their neutrality.

I know exactly the object I am working for, to stop if possible a collision between our police and the Boers and prevent a general war, which must necessitate British troops and the revival in an intensified form of the old race feelings which I am still in hopes are gradually dying out." Sagacity, patience, and a disposition to conciliate on the part of the Deputy Commissioner were now requisite in Bechuanaland. Much has been made of the so-called "invasion" of the Protectorate by the Rooie Grond people in retaliating upon MONTSIOA for the outrage committed by his people in May, but if ever there was a state of war it existed in Stellaland after the establishment of the Protectorate during the months of July, August, and early days of September, 1884. A large meeting was held on July 30th, 1884, at which it was declared that without consent of the burghers no one had a right to hand over the country, that the people would "only adhere to their Memorial for annexation to the Cape Colony," and that they would "never subject themselves to the Rev. JOHN MACKENZIE." It was also resolved that a "Court of Military Officers" be established and that steps be taken "to prosecute before the aforesaid Court for high treason every inhabitant of Stellaland who shall associate himself with Mr. MACKENZIE in our political affairs, and deal with him according to law." The hostility shown to the Queen's representative at Rooie Grond was not greater than this. A notice, dated July 31st, 1884, was issued by the Government of the Republic of Stellaland summoning all landowners to an armed meeting at Losasa, the farm of Mr. P. VAN VREEDEN, Senior, for purpose of recovering all stolen cattle from MANKOROANE, or, as said by Mr. RHODES, for the purpose of "restoring their original Government, occupying Vryburg, and marching on Taungs to recover the stolen cattle," and a warning was given that persons who did not comply with the notice would "have their ground confiscated." What a "fools' paradise" Mr. MACKENZIE was living in when he penned the despatch to Sir H. ROBINSON, dated the day after the above notice was issued, in which he congratulated himself on "the result of patient contact with the people," and said that the

people some time ago "were stimulated in their Memorial to the Cape Colony by the fear of the Imperial Government, they now openly and collectively express the desire to be under that Government As they hoisted the flag amid hearty cheers, I thought here is the answer to all the unjust and silly remarks which have been recently made in Cape Town about 'eliminating' the Imperial factor from Bechuanaland, and especially concerning myself as a breeder of strife." Mr. MACKENZIE put forth "the tender leaves of hope" on the 28th, on the 29th he bore "his blushing honours thick upon him" as the British flag waved proudly over him and the prayer "offered by one of themselves in Dutch" "was still ringing in his ears, but on the 30th comes "the killing frost" of Sir H. ROBINSON'S telegram of recall.

"And—when he thinks, good easy man, full surely
His greatness is a ripening—nips his root
And then he falls.

There was good ground for Mr. RHODES'S statement to Sir H. ROBINSON in his telegram of August 7th, 1884, that "the whole Bechuana question looks serious," and he rightly observed that MANKOROANE'S object was to bring about a collision so that with the assistance of the British Government he might regain possession of Stellaland. MONTSIOA'S object in May was precisely the same. Mr. RHODES—evidently as a protection to his reputation—now asked for the assistance of Captain BOWER, the Imperial Secretary, and peace was secured pending annexation to the Cape Colony by the joint efforts of these gentlemen, who according to some adopted a just and conciliatory policy but who according to others succeeded by conceding everything to armed rebels and freebooters. Their position was one of great difficulty. Captain BOWER telegraphed to Sir H. ROBINSON on August 27th, 1884, that "Mr. RHODES did not overstate the case when he reported that the Boers were rabid. There are about 300 or 400 men here now, and a large section of them are very unreasonable and violent, their object being war at any price." At this time Mr. RHODES was at Roode Grond, and, in his absence, Captain BOWER—who appears to have been in some personal danger—offered, as representing

Her Majesty's Imperial Government, terms which embraced the repudiation of all Mr. MACKENZIE's acts, the recognition of all land titles issued by the Stellaland Government and continuance of the Stellaland Government pending annexation to the Cape Colony subject to the Imperial Protectorate." The offer remained in suspense till the arrival of Messrs. RHODES and JOUBERT, when after three days' discussion an agreement was arrived at on September 8th, 1884, and the armed men forming one of the contracting bodies dispersed. Those who speak of MONTSIOA's treaty with MOSHETTE in 1882 as having been forced from him with "the pistol at his head" will do well to bear in mind the circumstances under which the agreement of September 8th, 1884, was signed (a). Captain BOWER—who seems to "have been great^{ly} embarrassed by" the fact that the British flag was flying at Vryburg—magnanimously accepted joint responsibility with Mr. RHODES for the agreement and pointed out in his report to Sir H. Robinson, dated 18th September, 1884 (b), that through his foresight in arranging amongst other things "for the abandonment of Vryburg" where the British flag had been raised, the immediate consequences "of the rejection of the terms would not have been in a military sense disastrous." Persons not belonging to either Her Majesty's land or sea forces might possibly say that there might be disaster otherwise than in a military sense. It was clearly seen by Mr. RHODES that the wisest course would be to meet the people half way although they were freebooters and in rebellion, according to Captain BOWER's telegrams, and to accede to their demands. Events have shown that it would have been equally wise to have adopted the same course in Land Goshen. The agreement of September 8th, 1884, provided *inter alia*, first, for the cancellation of all Mr. MACKENZIE's acts with the Volks' Committee and of all his proclamations; secondly, for the continuance of the Stellaland Government pending annexation to the Cape Colony, recognizing, however, Her Majesty's Protectorate after the period of three months and subject to the condition that all Executive acts must be taken with the consent of the Commissioner of Bechuanaland; thirdly,

(a) Blue-book [C. 4213], page 81.

(b) *Ibid*, page 129.

for the recognition of all titles to land issued by the Government of Stellaland; and fourthly, for the appointment of Commissioners for certain purposes. The people of Stellaland having practically had independence conceded to them pending annexation to the Cape Colony quietly awaited the meeting of the Colonial Parliament. They continued to be governed by Mr. VAN NIEKERK's administration without the shadow of any control by Her Majesty's Imperial Government.

VI.

SUCH was the condition of Stellaland and Land Goshen respectively when the Cape Ministers, Mr. UPINGTON and Mr. SPRIGG, proceeded in November, 1884, to Bechuanaland for the purpose of endeavouring to bring about, with the consent of all concerned, annexation to the Cape Colony, and, thereby, first, to satisfy the wishes of Her Majesty's Imperial Government, who were desirous for annexation, and, secondly, to secure the trade route to the interior on that side of the continent. In the Batlaping country they found the natives on the look out for some opportunity to regain what they had lost. News of the likelihood of troops arriving from England had unsettled them notwithstanding the fact that Mr. RHODES had impressed upon MANKOROANE that there was no hope of his getting back any of the country which he had lost. From the Batlapings, however, no real danger was or is to be apprehended. They are a wretched race, bound to deteriorate even further. In Stellaland it was found that the people were everywhere in favour of the annexation of the territory to the Cape Colony. Many persons stated that they would have preferred to be subjects of the Transvaal Government, but seeing that such a course was out of the question they were ready to come under the Queen in her Colonial Government. The suggestion of direct Imperial rule over the country as a Crown Colony was received with dismay, and it is clear that no such system of government can

ever work satisfactorily in Stellaland. Disturbances must be the result. On arrival in Land Goshen the Cape Ministers found exactly the same condition of things to be in existence as in Stellaland. *There was not a semblance of a Protectorate or of Imperial authority.* The Barolong tribe were occupying a certain portion of the country, and they were in friendly intercourse with the Europeans who occupied portions of the residue

In the same way as in Stellaland there was a Government established under Mr. N. C. GEY VAN PITTIUS as Administrator or Chairman of the Bestuur, dwellings were being built at Rode Grond and elsewhere, and several farmers were—as stated by Captain BOWER in speaking of Stellaland—gradually developing the resources of the country.” Although no croquet ground was visible the Imperial Secretary might have noticed “well-dressed young ladies” and “heard the sound of a piano.” It has been inconsiderately said that the Cape Ministers should not either personally or by agency have had any communication with people like the inhabitants of Land Goshen. It would appear to be sufficient answer, at all events in moments of calmness, to point out that when it is proposed to effect an object by means of amicable settlement there must be communication with those with whom it is proposed to enter into arrangements. That was undoubtedly the view taken by Her Majesty’s Imperial Government when they authorized Captain BOWER, the Imperial Secretary, to offer favourable terms to the Stellaland burghers, who—on Captain BOWER’s own admission—threatened his life and who were ready to march upon the seat of Government of the Protectorate. The Cape Ministers had no such compulsion exercised upon them. Not only were they received with the greatest respect by the Bestuur and people of Land Goshen but they were enabled to dictate their own terms—as they always intended to do—and they would not have tolerated the presence of armed men at the signature of their conditions. But, further, the people found in Land Goshen were far from being “murderers and thieves” as described by fiery orators wholly ignorant of the character of the people and the circumstances of the country. So far back as June 14th, 1884, as stated by Mr. MACKENZIE’S anonymous correspondent already

quoted from (a), "many of the original "Vrijwilligers" (Volunteers) had sold their farms," and such of them as continued to reside in the country were men against whose reputation nothing could be said except that they had taken service as mercenary soldiers. The purchasers of land from such of the volunteers as have disposed of their rights are men who would make excellent settlers. The number of people then resident in Land Goshen was not and is not now great, the farms distributed amongst the volunteers by lottery not having been generally occupied in consequence of the disturbed state of Bechuanaland. The case of Stellaland was and is entirely parallel, the farms drawn by the volunteers in the Stellaland Lottery not being even yet fully occupied notwithstanding that personal occupation is required by the agreements. Under the conditions imposed upon them by Her Majesty's Imperial Government it was necessary for the Cape Ministers to secure to the Barolong tribe the land of which they were in the undisturbed possession in May last, when the British Protectorate was established according to Sir H. ROBINSON'S definition of MONTSIOA'S location, or to secure to MONTSIOA and his tribe ample garden and grazing ground as more correctly required by Lord DERBY, and accordingly they first proceeded to inform themselves upon this subject, with the result that the natives were found to have been hemmed in at the time of the establishment of the Protectorate and to have been actually in the undisturbed possession of nothing south of the Molopo River. The Cape Ministers were, however, desirous to secure ample land for the tribe as required by Lord DERBY, and they determined not to adhere to the strict letter of the definition of Sir H. ROBINSON, but rather to follow what they knew to be its spirit, and to insist on MONTSIOA'S people getting much more than the strict letter of that definition would give them. With that object in view the Cape Ministers inquired closely into the extent of the population and into the pursuits of the people. They found the people to be far less numerous than has been stated in official reports. Captain HARREL fixed the number of MONTSIOA'S people in 1880 at 12,500, of whom

(a) Blue-book [C. 4194], page 63.

2,500 were adult males. As the natives have no knowledge of numbers any estimate of population based upon statements of numbers made by them must be conjectural, and it is clear that Captain HARREL's estimate was too high. Careful inquiry led the Cape Ministers to conclude that the total population, including the slaves of the tribe, would be highly estimated at 4,000. Intermixture of GASSITSIWE's people with MONTSIOA's, when for the purpose of grazing their herds they came together, may sometimes cause a false estimate to be made of the number of MONTSIOA's people. They are slave-holding pastoral natives, of no high type, owning large herds of cattle but doing next to nothing in the way of cultivating the soil. If the Barolong territory is left in their hands it will not pay a tithe of the cost of government. The only people who really can make anything of the country for many years to come are Colonial pioneer farmers such as those now beginning to locate themselves in Stellaland, who will be willing to gradually develop so remote a country and be content with small pecuniary returns while undergoing great privations. The finding of water by boring would probably make a great change in the country, but the distance from a central market will long be a drawback. Emancipation of the Vaal-pens slaves of the Barolong tribe—which of course must now take place—will probably be very distasteful to that tribe, and it ought to be clearly understood that the emancipation is intended to be effective. It should be a mere paper emancipation, and if no person is appointed to look after the serfs, and if no means of living is provided for them, they are certain to continue in serfdom. Portion of the land now occupied by MONTSIOA should be taken from him and given to the emancipated slaves. It would be interesting to know whether Her Majesty's Imperial Government was aware of the continuance of slavery under the Queen's Protectorate in Bechuanaland. In the settlement of the disputed land question MONTSIOA was, of course, entitled to be first heard, but, on sending for him, he was said to be visiting his cattle posts, although his exact whereabouts was unknown. Messengers were said by his people to have been despatched for the purpose of recalling him, but that statement was afterwards found to be

untrue. MONTSIOA not having appeared, the Cape Ministers, from inquiry made amongst the chief men of the Barolong tribe and otherwise as well as from personal observation, came to the conclusion that the natives would have land beyond their requirements if they were secured in the possession of the garden and grazing grounds at Maffeking, Sehuba and Saliris Stations with ample grazing ground to the north of the Molopo River, but lest MONTSIOA should not care to resume occupation of Saliris Station or of his own former station at Sehuba provision was made for granting him other land along the Molopo River or elsewhere as he might point out. It is now clear that MONTSIOA like MANKOROANE had determined, on the advice of white men, to agree to nothing as soon as he heard that troops were about to leave England. One of the members of the Cape Ministry (Mr. UPINGTON) having visited Gassitsiwe at Kanye, for the purpose of entering into treaty arrangements with that Chief having for their object the maintenance of an open trade route and securing a right of cession of sovereignty to Her Majesty the Queen prior to that of any other Power, found MONTSIOA staying at that station. In a conference with the chief (a) he was informed by the Minister who addressed him that the Cape Ministry "are only too anxious to give him good terms if he will only meet us. Our present proposal is to reinstate him in possession of the land at Sehuba, Maffeking and Saliris with ample grazing ground on the north bank of the river. That is far more than he was in the undisturbed possession of when the British Protectorate was established, and I cannot help thinking it is an excellent settlement for him." In answer to that statement an European gentleman, who, with another, had been admitted to the conference as the Chief's advisers at the request of MONTSIOA, said "I should think so. Would he be a British subject?" The reply was as follows:—"Yes! We desire to give him all the land he may reasonably require, and Mr. SPRIGG is at present at Maffeking awaiting MONTSIOA to go into matters with him, and he will be greatly disappointed at his not being there."

(a) Notes of an interview with GASSITSIWE and MONTSIOA. Appendix.

Whereupon the same gentleman who had previously spoken on behalf of MONTSIOA said "He has been sent away." At a subsequent part of the conversation Mr. UPINGTON said:—"MONTSIOA apparently positively refuses to take any part in a settlement until armed men are placed in his country. If he thinks that he will obtain the assistance of British troops under such circumstances I must tell him that in my opinion he is much mistaken. The British public will not favour a man who refuses to discuss a fair settlement Tell MONTSIOA that notes are being taken of all that is now occurring, that everything will appear in official documents, and if he shows no inclination to meet me I am inclined to think that not a soldier will come here and the British public will view his conduct with great dissatisfaction. I have come to this remote country, at great personal inconvenience, to do my best for him, and I want him to come down to his own station, and in the presence of his own people to show me what land he requires. Finally, I wish it to be conveyed to MONTSIOA that I have come to his country to get as much land as possible for him. I have succeeded in getting back for him far more land than was given to him by his own solemn treaty. White people regard their treaty arrangements, and strictly speaking MONTSIOA might be bound by his. Certainly MONTSIOA has not strengthened his case by not meeting me fairly with regard to this matter. A meeting of the Goshenites has been called for the 28th instant, and I wished him to come face to face with them, to speak out his mind openly, and to tell me what he wanted, as I wished to make a good settlement for him. It is for him now to say whether he will be present or whether he will not. I shall then be in a position to say where his beacons will be placed, so that the good intentions of the Queen in his favour may be carried out. After that I hope he will keep his people from stealing and see that they maintain peace. A Government officer will be appointed to whom he can always apply whenever he wants redress for any wrong done to him and for advice when he is in any difficulty. As soon as we can make arrangements we shall also have a police force to secure the keeping of the peace by every man

whether white or black." At a later stage the following question was put to MONTSIOA:—"Now let us have a decided answer. Let it be yes or no. Is MONTSIOA coming down to help us in effecting the settlement?" The reply was:—"If my wagon comes I will try to come down." Thereupon the Cape Minister said:—"MONTSIOA will understand that a meeting is to be held on Friday to discuss the arrangement as signed by the Bestuur of Goshen. On Saturday I will be prepared to go over the ground with MONTSIOA, getting him to show me what land will be sufficient for his people. If MONTSIOA is sincere in wishing for a settlement he will be there on that day." Notwithstanding his promise MONTSIOA did not appear on the day named. There can be now no doubt that certain white advisers—not being the gentlemen present at Kanye—for their own purposes induced him to avoid taking part in the settlement by buoying him up with the hope that Her Majesty's troops were marching into the country with the object of placing him in the position he occupied previously to the Treaty of October, 1882. The Cape Ministers having clearly laid down to the people of Land Goshen that the direction of Her Majesty's Imperial Government must be obeyed and having satisfied themselves as to the land required by the natives, had then to deal with the residue which, if there were no claim to it, would become waste Crown lands upon annexation to the Cape Colony. They proceeded, in effect, to demand their titles from persons who made claim to that land. It was pointed out that a number of persons, about 140, claimed title under the treaty entered into between MOSHETTE and MONTSIOA on October 24th, 1882. The Cape Ministers having considered all the circumstances in connection with that treaty and having before them the precedent of the treaty between MASSOUW and MAN-KOROANE and the complete acceptance of it by Her Majesty's Imperial Government, could not honestly refuse to acknowledge the validity of titles acquired under the treaty between MOSHETTE and MONTSIOA, and accordingly by this second condition they agreed to respect "all rights to land enjoyed by white settlers under grant or transfer before the formal establishment of the British Protectorate . . . in the same manner as arranged

in Stellaland between Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner and the inhabitants of that territory." The treaty made in August, 1884, at the instance of Mr. JOUBERT they declined to recognize as a valid document. It had been entered into when the country was under British protection and was therefore null and void. Mr. JOUBERT seems to have acted as mediator simply for the purpose of saving MONTSIOA from annihilation, and he appears never to have attached any value to the treaty. But although the latter treaty was not recognized it appeared that many persons—in the main respectable farmers who had taken no part in the hostilities—had purchased farms in the honest belief that the vendors who acquired under the latter treaty had a good title. For those people there was necessarily some sympathy, and, as they were as good settlers as could be found, the Cape Ministers¹⁷⁵ agreed to appoint a Commission to investigate their claims and make provision for them subject to the consent of Parliament. The rest of the vacant country was to become waste Crown lands. The debt question was left entirely open, and pending the establishment of a fixed form of government it was provided—following the lines of the Stellaland settlement—that a Colonial Officer should administer the affairs of the Government in conjunction with the Bestuur, but no act should be valid till approved by that officer. Could a fairer settlement have been made? The natives obtained ample land, and as the Colony was about to annex the territory the residue after providing for the natives ought to have been left to the disposal of the Colonial Government responsible to the Colonial Parliament. Her Majesty's Imperial Government, once the natives were provided for, ought certainly not to have interfered with the actions of the Colonial Government in dealing with the land in view of annexation. If the Colonial Government had disposed improperly of lands which should have become waste Crown lands of the Colony the Colonial Parliament would have censured them. The Colonial Ministers endeavoured with the good wishes of Her Majesty's Imperial Government to effect a settlement, without bloodshed, which would give ample land to the natives and be likely to relieve Her Majesty's Government of responsibility by securing annexation. In this they were successful notwithstanding

ing great opposition from several persons including Mr. GEX VAN PITTIUS, who honestly expressed his desire to be under the Transvaal Government. They succeeded in getting the people of Land Goshen to agree to annexation to the Colony on terms which were fair to all parties. But what was the result? Hesitation on the part of Her Majesty's Imperial Government to assent to a settlement which would have relieved them of the Protectorate while securing the country for ever to the British Crown. The Colonial Government would have been enabled also by alliances with the Chiefs northward—for which all arrangements had been made—to secure open trade routes to the Zambesi and thereby to check any attempts by Foreign Powers to block the road to the interior. The grave questions now are—why did not Her Majesty's Imperial Government abide by the action of those most interested: the Colonial Government? Why has a force been sent into a remote part of South Africa where no enemy is likely to be encountered, at a probable expense of some millions? Is it for the purpose of defeating the rights of a few white men and breaking the treaty of October, 1882? What course does Her Majesty's Imperial Government intend to pursue when Major-General Sir CHARLES WARREN and his troops have occupied the Land of Goshen without opposition? If the object is to make an armed demonstration in South Africa for the purpose of showing the great European Powers that England is determined to uphold her position on this Continent, the policy is intelligible; but the responsible Ministry of the Colony might fairly say that the object should have been communicated to them so that they may be able to counteract any false impressions created amongst the people as to the object of that demonstration. But the object cannot possibly have been to have a military parade for the purpose above suggested. What, then, is it? Is it an armed demonstration against the Transvaal based upon any impression that the Transvaal Government is determined to crush British influence in South Africa? If so, Her Majesty's Imperial Government are ill-advised. The Transvaal Government has more than enough to do to look after its internal affairs. If that Republic ever had any intention to

block the trade of the Cape Colony that intention does not now exist, and unless the effect of the military expedition under Sir CHARLES WARREN should be to renew ill-feeling there is reason to believe that confederation of the South African States under the British flag would not be distasteful to a large number of the people of the Transvaal. If, however, the inhabitants of the Republic are now driven into the arms of Germany, English statesmen, led away by heated speeches at political meetings which do not represent true popular feeling, will have themselves to thank for it. The truth seems to be that Her Majesty's Imperial Government have all through this unfortunate business not been well advised as to public feeling in the Cape Colony. It would now appear that they were left under the false impression that the Cape Ministerial settlement would not meet with the approval of the Colonial Legislature, and that if it were disapproved by Her Majesty's Imperial Government annexation would still be safe. The settlement proposed by the Cape Ministers has been opposed in the Cape Colony mainly by two sections: drowning politicians opposed to the Ministry who were only too desirous to grasp at any straw, and persons anxious in a time of mercantile depression for expenditure on war who looked forward with avidity to the advent of troops. The cry at the great majority of anti-Ministerial meetings held, especially in the Eastern Districts, ultimately became one which Her Majesty's Imperial Government would not have cared to hear. It was "No annexation. Let the Imperial troops come into Bechuanaland and remain there." The result of the joint action of the two classes mentioned was much mob clamour, and Her Majesty's Imperial Government appear—not for the first time—to have mistaken the noise of packed meetings for the popular voice of the Colony. The leading speakers at those meetings were persons well-known to be opposed in politics to the present Cape Ministry, which alone ought to have induced Her Majesty's Imperial Government to pause before arriving at the conclusion that the settlement come to did not meet with the assent of the Colony. The other influences referred to were in action also as was well shown in the case of a leading politician and merchant in Port

Elizabeth who having heatedly denounced at a public meeting the Ministerial settlement and called for military force to maintain British honour rushed to Cape Town to endeavour to secure war contracts. To such persons acceptance of the Cape Ministerial settlement would have been a blow. Everything possible was done to prevent excitement from cooling down and to keep up feeling in England. A telegram was despatched containing a perverted report of a speech made by the Cape Premier at the conclusion of the Cape Ministerial settlement. Words were imputed to Mr. UPINGTON which were never used by him, but the maintenance of the war excitement was indispensable. Her Majesty's Imperial Government ought certainly to have known that a public meeting at Cape Town got up for the occasion or a public meeting at Kimberley—at which many were likely to attend who knew nothing of the Bechuanaland question—did not represent the true feeling of South African Colonists. Already the change in feeling amongst those who attended public meetings on this subject is very great, but unfortunately for the British taxpayer his hard-earned money has either gone or is fast going. The objection taken by a section of the public to the settlement arrived at by the Cape Ministry was at first a general objection to the entire settlement, but on calm consideration of the several clauses the objections finally resolved themselves in most cases into an objection to the constitution of the Land Commission. Some persons thought that one of the Commissioners should have been a nominee of the Imperial Government. As the settlement was one affecting the Cape Colony which was proposing to annex the country rather than Her Majesty's Imperial Government which was about to be relieved of it, it is difficult to see what interest Her Majesty's Government would have in the few cases to be decided by the Land Commission, and in fact no objection has been taken by that Government. In any case Mr. VAN NIEKERK, as Administrator of Stellaland under the British Protectorate, recognized as such by the Queen, was thoroughly suitable to the office of President of the Land Commission. He is moreover a gentleman in every way worthy of confidence as will be borne out by Mr. RHODES, Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner, and not only has he received the thanks of

Lord DERBY for his efforts in the cause of law and order in Stellaland but during the negotiations carried on by the Imperial Secretary with the burghers in August, 1884, he gave valuable aid to that officer and, to use Captain BOWER's words, worked "very earnestly for a peaceful settlement." The appointment of President of the Land Commission was forced by the Cape Ministers upon Mr. VAN NIEKERK, who more than once asked to be relieved on the ground that his business arrangements would be interfered with by the performance of his duty as Land Commissioner in Land Goshen. The Cape Ministers, having acquired much confidence in Mr. VAN NIEKERK from the loyal aid given by him in the efforts which were being made to bring Land Goshen under the British Crown as part of the Colony, and knowing how well acquainted Mr. VAN NIEKERK was with the subject, urged upon him so strongly to accept the appointment that he finally consented. If Her Majesty's Imperial Government had the slightest objection to the proposed Land Commission a re-arrangement could readily have been made. No such objection has ever been taken. In fact Her Majesty's Imperial Government have shown that they are willing that the disposal of the surplus land after providing for MONTSIOA's people should be reserved for the consideration of the Colonial Parliament, a course which, under any circumstances, was rendered necessary by the Cape Ministerial settlement having been made subject to the approval of the Cape Parliament. The desire of Her Majesty's Imperial Government that Major-General Sir CHARLES WARREN—in whose judgment the Colonial Ministry have great confidence—should act as Her Majesty's Representative in Bechuanaland pending the establishment of a definite form of government there would also have been readily acceded to by the Cape Ministry. Consequently, the only points upon which there could possibly be any issue between the Imperial and Colonial Governments are, first, the amount of land to be given to the Barolong tribe, and, secondly, the validity of the treaty of October 24th, 1882. The first of these points may be at once disposed of. The Cape Ministry were just as desirous as the Imperial Government to deal generously with MONTSIOA, and if that Chief—acting under

bad advice—had not kept aloof and if he had shown any reason why he should have had more land than that allotted to him, his desires would have been gladly acceded to; but it must be clear to everyone that the interests of the Cape Colony—which was about to undertake by annexation a serious pecuniary burden—must be carefully guarded, and that a small tribe of natives could not be allowed unnecessarily to occupy land of no value to them. The only way in which the Barolong country can ever be developed or rendered useful to any Government will be by the introduction of white settlers, and if the natives are now to be allowed to re-occupy more country than they require, to acquire control over the water, which is very scarce, and to oust white men from everything but dry farms, the country will not be worth governing and no Colonial Ministry can advise the Cape Legislature to agree to annexation under such circumstances. While holding these views the Cape Ministry have always desired that ample land should be provided for the sustenance of the natives, so that practically there is entire agreement upon this subject. The only question, therefore, upon which there seems to be any conflict of opinion between Her Majesty's Imperial Government and the Cape Ministry is with regard to the validity of the treaty of October 24th, 1882, and surely the British public could not have any knowledge of the true state of affairs when they agreed to send an expensive military force to Land Goshen through an arid country—where in time of drought it is difficult to travel—for the purpose of enforcing the cancellation of that treaty. The issue involves the disposal of 140 farms of which the quitrent, at the usual rate in that country £1 10s. per annum, would be £210 a year! It was fairly said on a recent occasion by a writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette* that the honour of the British flag is not to be estimated by the price of the bunting, but is it not somewhat ludicrous to speak of the honour to the British flag being affected by the disposal of 140 farms to mercenaries under a treaty between native Chiefs? Surely the British public must see that it would have been better to have left this wretched business in the hands of the Colonial Government, who would have secured the natives in

possession of sufficient land and then by annexation have relieved the British taxpayer of great and unnecessary expense, introduced good government, and kept open the trade routes to the interior. What will be the result of the Bechuanaland Expedition and what are likely to be the consequences of what is now being done are questions which will present themselves to the minds of many people. Major-General Sir CHARLES WARREN having wisely given notice to the people of Stellaland that he has no intention whatever of interfering with their rights under the settlement effected with them he will be enabled to enter Land Goshen without firing a shot. On arriving in that country he will find but a handful of men in occupation of land, as in the disturbed condition of the country there has not been any general occupation by those to whom defined farms have been allotted. Most of those who claim to be entitled to land now live elsewhere, some at great distances. He will find possibly that some of the white farmers are men who hold titles acquired by *bonâ fide* purchase from volunteers who obtained grants under the treaty of October 24th, 1882. A deputation of orderly people will probably wait upon him to urge the claims of white men to land. If he refuses to acknowledge any claims and insists upon every white man leaving the territory his order will be at once obeyed. He will then replace MONTSIOA in possession of the whole of his country or some part thereof according to the view taken by him of what the Barolong tribe were in the "undisturbed possession in May last when the British Protectorate was formally established or of what will give ample garden and grazing land to the tribe." But, what next? If Sir CHARLES WARREN'S settlement should be the same as that of the Colonial Government, or if it should differ only on matters which might otherwise have been amicably arranged, the expenditure upon the Expedition will be wanton waste. If, on the other hand, the settlement should differ much from that of the Cape Ministry and if that Ministry should command a majority in Parliament and should in the discharge of their duty to the Colony decline to propose annexation, Her Majesty's Imperial Government must be prepared to govern Bechuanaland as a Crown Colony for the future. The question may, therefore, be again asked—would it perhaps not have been better to have

placed a little confidence in the Colonial Ministry, even although it should be, as has been lately said in a leading English print, "a Boer Ministry," and to have allowed the matter to be arranged by annexation. According to the system of Constitutional Government which the Cape Colony enjoys under a Sovereign—who possesses no more loyal or true hearted subjects than the Dutch Boers of that Colony—the opinions of even "a Boer Ministry" are deserving of some weight as representing the views of the majority in Parliament as well as of the greater portion of the population. The steps taken by the Cape Ministry towards effecting annexation were dictated by a sincere desire to aid Her Majesty's Imperial Government. From a party point of view it would have been safer to have declined to propose annexation and to have allowed the affairs of the country to remain in the hands of Her Majesty's Imperial Government. Many of the supporters of the Cape Ministry in Parliament hesitated about incurring further responsibilities, and a certain section of the inhabitants of towns especially in the Eastern districts were and are altogether opposed to annexation and cherish the hope that Her Majesty's Imperial Government will be obliged to establish a Crown Colony in Bechuanaland and to occupy the country with a large force. At Graham's Town for instance a strong feeling was aroused against the mission of the Cape Ministers to Bechuanaland on the ground that it might lead to annexation instead of to the establishment of direct Imperial control. There is much to be said in favour of that view. The maintenance of a strong administration backed by a sufficient military force in North Bechuanaland, the annexation of or establishment of a Protectorate over the country spreading northward towards the Zambesi including Lake Ngami, Matabileland, and the country occupied by GASSITSIWE, SECHELE, KHAME, and other Chiefs, the appointment of Residents with the Chiefs, and a general activity in asserting British influence in that part of South Africa, would be hailed with delight. Has the statesman yet arisen in England who will grapple with this question? The expenditure would be heavy but the results would be magnificent. The advance of Foreign Powers would be checked, the natives would be saved from encroachments, and

British trade would expand. It is to be feared, however, that there is little, if any, hope of such a proposal being carried into effect. If it were tried the British taxpayer would soon begin to complain of the expense. Entering the region of practical politics it will be abundantly clear that annexation to the Cape Colony would have been the true solution of a difficult question. Why then have Her Majesty's Imperial Government done their utmost to shipwreck annexation by not following the lines laid down by the Colonial Ministry? Why have they placed that Ministry in such a position as to necessitate either a breach of their settlement with the people of Land Goshen or a reversal of the action of Sir CHARLES WARREN in case his settlement should differ from that of the Cape Ministers? A material variance between Sir CHARLES WARREN'S settlement and that made by the Cape Ministers must necessarily lead to one of two things:—Refusal on the part of the Cape Parliament to annex, or, in case annexation be proposed, abandonment by the Responsible Ministers of the Crown in the Colony of their own settlement, or the reversal by Parliament of that of Sir CHARLES WARREN. In their dealing with the Cape Ministerial settlement there is reason to apprehend that Her Majesty's Imperial Government have once more misinterpreted public opinion in the Cape Colony. There is not the slightest fear of danger to British authority arising from disloyalty amongst the Dutch population within the Colony, or from aggression on the part of the Transvaal. President KRUGER has acted with perfect fairness all through the negotiations carried on in Bechuanaland by the Cape Ministers. At the request of the Transvaal Government Mr. SCHOEMAN, one of the Transvaal Native Commissioners, cordially aided the Cape Ministers with his advice and the exercise of his influence, and the conclusion must be arrived at by every person who takes the trouble to inform himself upon the subject that neither the people nor the Government of the Transvaal have any intention to make aggressive encroachments on the Cape Colony or to lower British influence in South Africa. Unfortunately

there are some persons in South Africa who have a bitter hatred of the Dutch and who are still anxious to see what they describe as "the stain of Amajuba" wiped out, and there is also a section of the Dutch whose antipathy to Englishmen is equally bitter, but the combined sections represent only a small minority of South African colonists who as a body sincerely desire that the unhappy events of the Transvaal war should be forgotten and that persons of every nationality should for the future live in harmony under the Great British Empire. The reason for recently raising a cry of "British influence in danger" is not apparent. Dutch and English colonists were living side by side on terms of friendly intercourse, the Africander Bond was scarcely heard of, friendly relations existed with the neighbouring States, and the Colony was recovering from a period of depression. Politicians out of place seem to have started the game, and once afoot many noisy huntsmen were found to pursue it in expectation of a hunter's ordinary reward. The alleged atrocities in Land Goshen were eagerly seized upon as a means of striking at the Transvaal and of getting Imperial troops into the country "to show the Dutchman what we can do." The Dutch population of South Africa are perfectly well aware of the might of England. Moreover they are not traitors to the Crown. In fact the only treason in the Colony appears to be to be "that ugly treason of mistrust" of the Dutch population felt by a small minority. Her Majesty's Imperial Government played into the hands of this noisy party, believing, it would seem, that their utterances were to be relied upon. Have they even now realized how grossly they have been deceived? If not, it may be worth the while of Her Majesty's Imperial Government to reflect whether it is not just possible that the Cape Colony may be as loyal as London and to know that there is a large English party in the Colony who sympathize with their Dutch neighbours, who know their worth and their loyalty, and who willingly act with them for the common weal. Is it proposed to create a second Ireland in South Africa and to range rival nationalities in hostile camps? Ill-advised speeches in the House of Commons, based upon ignorance,

ill-advised speeches in the Colony, based upon prejudice or unworthy motives, ill-advised anti-colonial action on the part of Her Majesty's Imperial Government, such as operated during the Basuto war, and general want of sympathy with the Colony would, if anything could, have long since shattered the loyalty of the Dutch of the Cape Colony, but despite everything they have continued to hold as they do to-day their allegiance to the Queen of England as something sacred. It has been often petulantly said—what is it that Cape Colonists require? What do they complain of? They require nothing from their heavily burdened mother country except her sympathetic assistance in what can alone be effected by her as head of the Empire. The vast majority of Cape Colonists look upon the war expenditure now being incurred as simply plunder of the British taxpayer, they feel that England is being wronged by imposing such unnecessary expenditure upon her. They fear that everything will recoil upon the Colony, and that England sick of money expenditure will become more and more distrustful of everything South African and take less interest in South African affairs than ever. They, there^{fore} upon, desire it to be clearly understood that they have not sought for war and that the expenditure has been incurred against their wish and the wish of the Ministry of the Colony. The Cape Colony defends its extensive frontiers and it is no longer dependent upon Her Majesty's troops for aid. Cape Colonists thoroughly realize the difficulties of the mother country and so far from seeking to impose burthens upon her they would flock to her standard for her defence at the slightest sound of danger. Their complaint is that but little sympathy is shown them in their struggles to advance in a young country and that when they ask, for example, for what of right was their heritage, the preservation to them of a territory—without one farthing of expense to England—like Namaqualand and Damaraland, where their interests were great, their fair request was refused with coldness and the interests of a Foreign Power favoured. The narrative of events in Bechuanaland now concluded contains dark chapters for which happily the

Cape Colony is not responsible. If in commenting upon what has occurred and is now occurring and if in drawing attention to the weakness of the Colonial policy of Her Majesty's Imperial Government it has been necessary to use strong terms, let this be

excuse:—

“ . . . Be Kent unmannerly,
When Lear is mad.”

APPENDIX A.

INTERVIEW AT TAUNGS, ON THE 11TH NOVEMBER, 1884, BETWEEN MESSRS. UPINGTON AND SPRIGG AND MANKOROANE, SON OF MOLALE. MAJOR STANLEY LOWE WAS PRESENT.

(INTERPRETER: MR. JOSEPH MCCARTHY.)

It appeared that Mankoroane had not his Chief Councillors with him. It was, however, explained that those in his company were men who usually attended him, one being his Interpreter.

Mankoroane.—Before the Bloemhof Arbitration the line between myself and the Boers extended from the Vaal River to Makwassa's Spruit. Since then Colonel Moysey made the line on the Harts River at Mamusa. Since that line I have no proper knowledge of where the line runs at the present moment. The line between myself and Montsica after leaving the Harts River runs midway between the two saltpans, leaving one within my country. The most northerly point was a bush called Mohohochwo, thence along the main road to Kunana, from thence to Setlagole, thence to Maseti, thence to Kudonkgwe, thence to Genes, thence to the river called the Moshwaing lower down, thence it takes that river down to a place called Chuhe on the borders of the Kalahari Desert, thence to a place called Madebing on the road from Kuruman to Kheis on the Molopo River in the Kalahari Desert, from Madebing to a point on the east range of Langeberg close to Gobatse where Toto now lives—thence along the Langeberg to the Orange River. All this country was subject to me and my father, and in the latter's time was occupied by our people; but several tribes from time to time fled in there for protection, and my father allowed them to remain. Had they, at the time, assumed any rights as Chiefs in his country, he would have at once driven them out. I was a youth of about 14 or thereabouts when these people came into my father's country. It was before circumcision. The descendants of these people are the Batlaros and the Kunana Barolongs (under Moshette) and the Maroquain Barolongs, who formerly were in my country, but who have now gone over to Maroquain. The leaders or headmen of these tribes are:—

- (i.) At Kunana—Moshette.
- (ii.) At Maroquain—No man has been appointed since the death of Bomoquane.
- (iii.) Of the Batlaros—Toto and Bareki—Bareki is the elder, but Toto is the headman.

The Kalahari Desert to the westward of the Langeberg was occupied by Bosjesmen and Korannas. To my knowledge there never were any of the Bechuana tribe beyond the Langeberg. The Batlaros, when they fled to our country, came from Kheis and Lahutotong in the desert. The Barolongs fled from the Mooi River where they had been under the Transvaal Boers, to Thaba Nchu, and thence into my country.

The Barolong country now occupied by Montsica was the original Barolong country. The Barolongs were driven from it by Moselekatse, and they took refuge at Thaba Nchu, whence they returned to their original country. Montsica's people never were under the Transvaal Boers. The Moselekatse were eventually driven out of the original Barolong country by raids made by a Koranna Chief named John Bloem, and afterwards we heard that the Boers had driven them further back. After these raids Bloem used to return to his own country near Barkly, and then the Barolongs re-occupied it.

Massouw's Korannas were originally wanderers who shifted about from one place to another, following the course of the Vaal River till they came to Mamusa. My uncle Mahoura left Taungs and went to Mamusa immediately after the Korannas occupied it. Whereupon they left and trekked into the Transvaal to a place called Logaga. My uncle's cattle did not thrive well at Mamusa so he returned to Taungs, and when the country was left unoccupied the Korannas returned to it. They submitted to my uncle's rule and he allowed them to remain.

According to our laws the country actually belongs to the tribe. No person is entitled to any specific land. I have no right to alienate any portion of the country. Our law is that where a person is given garden ground he is allowed to remain there, but everything else belongs to the tribe generally.

According to our law there can be no absolute grants of land, but with the consent of the people strangers might be allowed to occupy land in our country. As soon as that occupation ceases the land reverts to the tribe. Once a stranger is allowed to occupy land his right is respected as if he were a member of the tribe.

I will be very glad to have Magistrates and police in my country when the boundaries are properly settled, but at present I do not know what I have, and until a settlement is arrived at I do not wish to say anything. I have always wished to come under the Queen's Government, but at the present moment I cannot understand how having asked the Queen's protection I have not been treated well.

The Interpreter (McCarthy) explained that Mankoroane's main grievance was the loss of the ploughing lands between De Gaap and the Maroquane range, running in a direct line from Taungs to the latter range about 35 miles, and extending westward into Stellaland about 25 miles.

APPENDIX B.

INTERVIEW, AT KUNANA, ON THE 16TH NOVEMBER, 1884, BETWEEN MESSRS. UPINGTON AND SPRIGG, AND MOSHETTE AND HIS COUNCILLORS.

Premier.—Moshette, are you satisfied with the boundary line?

Moshette.—No; it has not been pointed out to me. Mr. Mackenzie pointed it out to me as going through my village, and I am dissatisfied because that is not the way for me to be treated. I should prefer that the whole of my country was under one Government. The only line I am satisfied with is Colonel Moyses's line.

The new line as declared by the Convention of February, 1884, was then explained to Moshette by Mr. Upington.

Moshette.—Is it the way of the white people that because I am a Bechuana I was not consulted?

Premier.—I understood that you had given yourself over to the Transvaal, who could speak for you?

Moshette.—Everyone who comes here gives me a different version of affairs. According to the Native law everybody interested must be consulted. I think that a friend should always be consulted.

Mr. Upington explained the laws of the whites and the position of a subject of the Government.

Moshette.—I find that whites and Boers are all alike and despise the black man. The black men are only game.

Premier.—Suppose you and I were settling the question to-day. What line would you like?

Moshette.—Colonel Moysey's only. I was independent under my own Government but was friends to English and Boers. I have seen nothing since but the white people running about my country.

Premier.—The Queen's Government has no desire to take one inch of your country or to cause you any wrong whatever if you only live at peace and keep your people from doing anything that is wrong.

Moshette.—My people do nothing wrong that I know of. They wish for nothing belonging to other parts. What makes my heart sore is the ignorance in which I have been kept of the arrangements under the Convention. I would have been satisfied had I been informed and consulted. I wish to be independent of both Governments, but to be on friendly terms.

Premier.—You need fear nothing of the Colonial Government as long as your people behave themselves and keep within their boundary.

Moshette.—I can guarantee that none of my people will go over the border and rob beyond it. Mr. Wörsing would know how I behaved.

Premier.—Would Moshette like to have a Magistrate here?

Moshette.—No; I do not require any Government officer here. I should like to be simply as I was before. I guarantee the conduct of my own people.

Premier.—Are you at peace with Montsioa?

Moshette.—Yes!

Premier.—When did you make peace?

Moshette.—Last year. By that peace I got none of Montsioa's country.

Premier.—Are you satisfied with the boundary with Montsioa?

Moshette.—I should not like to answer that question except in the presence of Montsioa. I am afraid to commit myself by saying what is untrue. I cannot say that I shall be satisfied until I know what Montsioa wants. You are not killing me alone but Montsioa also. I should like to return to the position God gave me. I am the Chief of the Barolongs. Montsioa is my younger brother, but being my brother, and of my tribe, I do not like him to be destroyed. We are the sons of one woman and of one man. We are one.

Premier.—How did the war first break out between you?

Moshette.—One of my Councillors will speak.

Councillor Selika.—The first dispute we had was with regard to the country. According to our laws we know of no division of territory. When the war started, some of Machabi's people, who lived at Polfontein, shifted out of the Transvaal into Rietfontein in the country of the Barolongs, but Montsioa would not allow them to plough there.

Moshette, in his capacity of Chief, asked Montsioa why he did so. Montsioa said the cattle were destroying his corn. Montsioa tried to drive out Machabi's people. Moshette objected. A meeting was held at Rietfontein. Moshette, Montsioa, Machabi and Makobi were present, and they had an argument and hot words. The words were between Montsioa and Machabi's people. Montsioa ordered Machabi's people to leave Rietfontein and return to Polfontein, and they objected; subsequently Moshette sent Montsioa an ox in consideration of his allowing Machabi's people to remain at Rietfontein, and begged of him to have no war, but Montsioa was strongly against Machabi's people and insisted on driving them out, and Moshette sent me (Selika) to try and prevent fighting. I went to Rietfontein and was also to go to Montsioa's. While I was in Rietfontein, Montsioa left his own place with a commando, and attacked us. Many of us were killed. They attacked us when we were asleep, and drove us out. Moshette then told Montsioa as he had not listened to him and had insisted on fighting he should now fight against him. One of the reasons was that he had lost seven men in the attack on Rietfontein. Then Moshette went against Montsioa. That is the origin of the war.

Moshette.—I had no white men when the war started. The white people joined me to get loot. The white men offered their services; I did not call for them. I promised the first volunteers cattle, they having asked for it. With regard to any subsequent arrangements I should like to speak in the presence of those concerned in such arrangements. I do not think I could

go to Rooi Grond to assist in any settlement, as I have nothing to say to it. I can say that should nothing happen to hinder me, I shall go.

According to Bechuana law any man trekking into the country requires the consent of the Chief, and he knows that he holds the land allotted to him only on sufferance. No strangers who are simply visitors have been given ground.

Premier.—You say that under the Bechuana law no stranger can settle down in the country without your consent. Now have you given your consent to any stranger settling down in the Barolong country of which you say you are the Chief?

Moshette.—I do not know how many white people first came. I think 30 or 40. Where they came from I do not know. We merely saw them coming. The rest came in after we made peace. We only recognize the first 30 or 40. They gave them the cattle (Montsioa's), which they had promised them.

Premier.—Is there anyone at Rooi Grond entitled to speak for you, or are you alone able to speak?

Moshette.—It may be a way of the white people to speak through another, but we alone must speak for ourselves. All the Bechuanas know I am Paramount Chief.

Premier.—Does Montsioa acknowledge you?

Moshette.—That you can ask Montsioa yourself. If he does not acknowledge me he will be simply doing some underhand work.

Premier.—Would you not be sorry to see Montsioa deprived of any portion of his land? Do you not wish them to have enough country to live upon? If I were to tell you that Montsioa had now not enough country to live upon, would you not be sorry?

Moshette.—I should be sorry if Montsioa were to have no country; then I have no country. When we fought we thought it would have been as of old, but when the white people came the law was different. This is not the first time we have fought.

Premier.—Is it possible for Montsioa's people to live if the garden grounds at Mafeking, Seluba and Salaris be taken from them?

Moshette.—No, they would not be able to live.

Premier.—Is it necessary for him to have all those garden grounds to enable him to live?

Moshette.—Yes, it is necessary.

Mr. Sprigg.—You and Montsioa being brothers, how is it you have fought so often?

Moshette.—War broke out and then we used to settle the matter.

Mr. Sprigg.—But why was war so frequent?

Moshette.—War used to come just as two men travelling would have at fight.

Mr. Sprigg.—Did not the war originate in quarrels arising out of claims to the paramountcy?

Moshette.—The only quarrel of that sort was that relating to Rietfontein.

APPENDIX C.

REPORT OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE HONOURABLE THE PREMIER OF THE CAPE COLONY AND GASSITSIBI AND HIS COUNCILLORS AND MONTSIOA, HELD AT KANYE, IN GASSITSIBI'S COUNTRY, ON THE 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1884.

(INTERPRETER, MR. JOSEPH MCCARTHY, OF THE BECHUANALAND POLICE.)

Premier.—I am the representative of the Queen's Government in the Cape Colony. I did not come here to see Montsioa, for I expected to see him at his own place. I have come up to endeavour to effect such a peaceful

settlement as will secure annexation to the Cape Colony of the country from Griqualand West to Gassitsibi's, and to place it permanently under the Queen's Government. I expected to see Montsioa at his own station because I had to settle how the line was to be drawn between him and the Rooi Grond people. As he was not there the result was I could only make an arrangement with the white people. My business here is with Gassitsibi; this is his country. I want to know from him when the Queen's Government has the control of the country up to his boundary whether he will act in good faith and remain on good terms with the Queen's Government and keep the peace. We do not want to take over his country but we want to prevent anybody else from taking it. We want to know if he will promise to protect Colonial interests, and that he will give his country to no one but the Queen's Government. Further we want him to promise that he will prevent cattle or other property stolen from British subjects from being brought into this country, and if such cattle or property be brought into this country, that he will see that the stolen goods are returned and the thieves given up. We also want him to keep open all trade roads and to promise to levy no duties or licences upon Colonial trade. For this the Government proposes to ask the Cape Parliament to reward him. If he is a friend to the Colonial Government the Colonial Government will be a friend to him. I should like to know what he has to say to this. We do not want to take an inch of his country. We only want to live in peace.

Interpreter.—The Chief has sent for his son, as he wishes him to hear what takes place.

Premier.—That is right.

[Bathoen, the son, here came into the room.]

Gassitsibi (in reply to the Premier).—I have nothing to say except what you have just said is my wish. I shall listen to what settlement there is with Montsioa before I say further.

Premier (addressing Montsioa).—I shall first ask Montsioa how it is that if he heard I was at Rooi Grond and was waiting for him, he did not come to meet me.

Montsioa.—I did not know that you were at Rooi Grond waiting for me. I was never informed that you were waiting for me.

Premier.—Did you hear of it yesterday?

Montsioa.—Yes. Some of my people came here yesterday and told me.

Premier.—When Gassitsibi says that he wishes to hear the settlement with Montsioa before he talks, does he mean by that to say that the is a Chief under Montsioa? He is an independent Chief, is he not?

Gassitsibi.—Yes, I am an independent Chief.

Premier.—Very well. Tell Montsioa I have come up here to make a settlement of the country now occupied by his people and white men. I wish to know from him first, how it was that he got into war.

Montsioa.—I should like to have spoken in the presence of more of my people than are here to-day. The first time war broke out it was through Machabi's people; they came to me and asked my permission to live in my country, and after that they commenced by stealing my horses. I tried to recover the horses but they took them and sold them to the Boers. After a great deal of trouble I recovered them; but they were in such a condition they were of no use to me. This was at the time that the British Government was fighting the Transvaal Boers. After that they commenced reaping my corn, and they told me afterwards that the corn belonged to them.

Premier.—Has Montsioa any reason to think that any one suggested to them to do this, or was it that there was a bad spirit in them, for there was no war about?

Montsioa.—I cannot say. I do not know whether it was done in a bad spirit or whether they were incited to do it. If I should say they were incited to do it that would be mere suspicion. I have no authority to say that.

Premier.—When they trespassed on your ground what did you do? Did you call out a Commando?

Montsioa.—Before the first war started they fired on my people in their gardens. They sent me a message that the gardens belonged no more to me, that it was their garden and they should cut the crops. That was the first commencement of the war.

Premier.—Were you with the Commando which attacked Rietfontein ?

Montsioa.—They had collected their forces and joined them with Moshette. I was with the Commando when it attacked Rietfontein. The attack was made just as the day was breaking. The sun rose whilst we were still fighting.

Premier.—Now, I do not say that I believe it, but I wish to tell Montsioa what I have heard—some of Machabi's people have told me that men, women and children were killed indiscriminately. Is that true ?

Montsioa.—No. It is false.

Premier.—Montsioa says that the attack was made at daybreak. Surely it is possible that when the village was fired upon women and children might inadvertently have been killed.

Montsioa.—There was only one woman shot, and she was shot by her own people. The men were in laager expecting to have to fight, and the women were separate.

Premier.—But were not the huts fired ?

Montsioa.—Yes, they were fired, but that was after we had driven the men out, and the women were turned out of the place.

Premier.—You mean to say that it was only after the men and women were driven out that the huts were fired ?

Montsioa.—Yes, it was after we had returned from the pursuit.

Premier.—Is it not the native custom to fire the huts when making an attack as you go along ?

Montsioa.—Yes, but we did not at Rietfontein fight after the usual native manner.

Premier.—It is said that not only were women and children shot, but that children were thrown into the flames, and that Mr. Bethell had to interfere.

Montsioa.—That is a lie. Mr. Bethell was not present at that fight.

Premier.—Montsioa, I have only asked these questions because these statements have been made, and I wish to tell you that English people do not like cruelty such as this. I have told you what I have heard so that you might have the opportunity of refuting them if they were not true.

Montsioa.—They are false.

Premier.—Very well ; then I believe Moshette after this got white volunteers to help his people.

Montsioa.—Yes, Moshette did get volunteers. The question had then been settled. An English representative and Joubert had come and decided in my favour, and then it was that Moshette came down down on me though everything was settled. Before Moshette started fighting, Joubert and the English representative said we were to be at peace and there was to be no more war. I told them I intended to attack Moshette in consequence of his murdering my people on their return from the Diamond Fields. They told me I was not to fight. I said I would remain quiet but they would find that Moshette would start the war. It was as I said. Moshette did start the fighting.

Premier.—Moshette having got white volunteers Montsioa also got white volunteers, did he not ?

Montsioa.—No.

Premier.—Does Montsioa assert that he had no white volunteers at any time ?

Montsioa.—I had no white volunteers.

Premier.—Montsioa had Bethell and Walker fighting for him.

Montsioa.—Mr. Bethell came first and Mr. Walker came afterwards.

Premier.—I have seen a document giving the names of several men whose names I cannot remember now, on whose behalf Bethell applied for farms on the ground that they were white volunteers fighting for Montsioa. Who were these men ?

Montsioa.—I do not know of these volunteers. It must be nothing but lies. The people who get on the best are they that tell that which is false.

Premier.—But Montsioa had confidence in Mr. Bethell, had he not? And I have seen this list from Mr. Bethell claiming land for these men, on the ground that they were Montsioa's volunteers.

Montsioa.—I have heard only of these things after Mr. Bethell's death.

Premier.—Does Montsioa say that Bethell had no authority from him to send in this list of volunteers, and that there was no foundation for what Bethell did, for that is a serious reflection on Bethell?

Montsioa.—If I had volunteers they would have been known. They would have been known just as Moshette's volunteers were known. I had no volunteers.

Premier.—The result of the first war was that Montsioa entered into terms of peace with Moshette?

Montsioa.—Yes, we had peace.

(At this stage of the proceedings Montsioa stopped speaking, and the Interpreter stated that the Chief had sent for two white men whom he wished should be present at this interview.)

Premier.—I have no objection.

(Two traders, Messrs. James J. Keeley and H. Boyne, then came forward, and said that at Montsioa's request they were present. Mr. Uppington repeated that he had no objection to their being present.)

Mr. Keeley.—We heard that you were coming yesterday, and Montsioa came to see us. He seemed to be very much afraid.

Premier.—It is very unfortunate that Montsioa is here, as I wished to see him in his own country, and I have been very much delayed by his absence.

Mr. Keeley.—We told him that it was very wrong of him to run away, and we advised him to return to you.

Premier.—You understand that I wished to see him respecting the country that he required for his people to live on?

Mr. Keeley.—We told him that we were quite certain that he would be looked upon in the light of a defaulter.

Premier.—I tell you candidly I regard him as such. I have just asked Montsioa why it was that he came away, and I must say those who advised him not to be present did him bad service. What I wished to do was to bring him face to face with the so-called volunteers, so that a fair and proper settlement should be arrived at.

Mr. Keeley.—I believe that he thinks that he would be supported by Mr. Mackenzie, and he does not understand what is being done now.

Mr. Boyne.—What he thinks is, that if no settlement is made now, that the troops will come up; that is what he wants.

Premier.—Well, you may tell him that if he does not show any disposition to make a fair settlement without troops, he cannot look for assistance from England. (To Montsioa.) Now this is a question that I wish answered. Did Montsioa consider that the conditions of peace which he made with Moshette were binding? Did he feel himself bound by them?

Montsioa.—After the peace was made with Moshette and Machabi, Moshette left and went into the Transvaal. My son also went into the Transvaal, also the son of Gassitsibi went there.

Premier.—That was when the Royal Commission was there.

Montsioa.—Yes; when they came back they brought Colonel Moysey with them, with Mr. Greef from the Transvaal. They made the line; that was the line decided on by the British Government and the Transvaal. There was no native man with them in making the line. The boundary line was made for five persons—Mankoroane, Gassitsibi, Moshette, Massouw and Montsioa. That was the boundary line between the Transvaal and the Bechuana country. It was stated at the time that no person living on the outside was to go into the Transvaal to help them, and that no one was to come over from the Transvaal to assist us in any matter on this side. This is what the British Government had settled with the Boers. That was when Colonel Moysey made the boundary line. Whilst Colonel Moysey was still here he engaged people from me to place the beacons, and I gave him a regi-

ment to help him. Moshette sent out a party against them. Colonel Moysey was afraid, and he sent that party back again, as he said if any one was to die he would die, because he said he had been sent to lay down the line and he would do it. Then my children came back to me to Sehuba. That is how the fighting commenced. They also attacked me at the same time as I attacked Rietfontein, about sunrise. At midday I routed them. The fourth day afterwards I saw them coming again, and then I saw that they had white men with them.

Premier.—That is the first time they came with any white men?

Montsioa.—The first fight they were standing a distance off.

Premier.—Does he mean that the white men were, or does he allude to the border guard under Commandant Snyman?

Montsioa.—They were the same men who afterwards attacked me with Machabi's people. They came from the Transvaal. Moshette's and Machabi's people also came from the Transvaal side. After leaving Polfontein they came over to Rooi Grond. They commenced on the east side of Mr. Rowland's place where Nicolas Gey is now. That is the point they attacked me from early in the morning at Sehuba.

Premier.—Did the white men join in the attack on you at Sehuba?

Montsioa.—The first attack on Sehuba the Boers stood on one side. I did not know who they were, but afterwards found out that they were Boers.

Premier.—How many engagements were there at Sehuba?

Montsioa.—Three engagements. After the third engagement I went from Sehuba to Maffeking. After that Moshette came with the Boers down the Molopo River to Maffeking. It was a large commando. There were a large number of Boers with it. We fought every day. We fought every day for two years. I killed one of their headmen and they came and asked me to give his body up. The headman was killed in an engagement at night. I gave his body to them and they returned after that to Polfontein. They came back again after that and the war continued and they captured a lot of cattle. We had a hard fight for the cattle. It is getting on now for four years, and there has been always war in my country. It was useless to continue the battle, because we had fought every day in the year. The first commencement of the peace was when Coos Snyman came. He said, "We want peace; let us have it." I said, "Yes. Suppose we have peace, how is that to be determined on?" I told him that when people made peace they had to remain at peace. Next day he said we should have a meeting at which all were to be present. We saw them bring a document and they told me whoever refused his signature to this document did not want peace, and they told me that the volunteers had taken the country all down the Molopo and they asked me to speak. I said "I have nothing to say," and that I saw two men—one was an Englishman, the other was a Boer, and I saw them make a line. To-day I saw strangers making a line along the river. I said I should like to see the two first and ask them if they had changed their minds. I said I could not say anything until I saw those two men. In putting my name to the document I said I only signed for peace and that is all.

Premier.—Montsioa can never expect me to believe that he did not know what was in that document.

Montsioa.—The document was not written by me and I did not know what was in it.

Premier.—Montsioa must remember seeing Mr. Rutherford, who made a strong report in his favour to the British Government?

Montsioa.—Yes.

Premier.—Montsioa showed Mr. Rutherford this document, and Mr. Rutherford took a translation of it. Mr. Rutherford says in his report that certain clauses were expunged because Montsioa refused to sign them. I will remind Montsioa of what those clauses were. One was that Montsioa should take down his schanzes within a certain time and the other was that he should pay a war indemnity of — pounds.

Montsioa.—Yes.

Premier. - If Montsioa knew so well the contents of the treaty as to contest the clauses which were expunged, he will get no honest man to believe that he did not know everything that was in that treaty.

Montsioa.—Why I refused was because I was told to pull down my schanzas, and I refused also to pay any war indemnity.

Premier (to Mr. Keeley).—Montsioa will never get anyone to believe that he did not know the whole of the contents of that treaty. The truth, I suppose, was that he was at death's door, and he signed the treaty as being the best terms he could get.

Mr. Keeley.—He said so yesterday.

Premier.—It strikes me that he also misled Mr. Rutherford as to the 17th clause of that treaty. Mr. Rutherford in his report in the Blue-book represents the 17th clause as having been expunged before signature, but I have seen the original treaty signed by Montsioa and his Councillors in the possession of the Bestuur of Land Goshen, from which it clearly appears that the treaty was signed subject only to the 3rd and 19th clauses being expunged. If in the counterpart shown to Mr. Rutherford the 17th clause is also declared to be expunged there must be a forgery. This treaty practically deprived him of all land south of the Molopo River.

Mr. Boyne.—He told us yesterday that he would have signed anything for peace.

Premier.—Such is the fortune of war. France had to sign a very distasteful treaty at the conclusion of the Franco-German war in order to secure peace.

Mr. Boyne.—Montsioa told us that he had fled from Maffeking when you were expected because he was afraid; he says now that he is bound to say that he is a Boer with his mouth, but he is not so in his heart.

Premier.—It seems to me that he hears that the troops are coming up, and he thinks by staying away until then he will get all his land back again.

Mr. Boyne.—Yes.

Premier.—Very well, that is not quite honourable in the face of his treaty.

Mr. Boyne.—We have told him so, and we have advised him to acknowledge that treaty, and to tell you the truth in every way.

Mr. Keeley.—Yes, we have asked him to tell the whole truth and to keep nothing back from you.

Premier.—I do not like his leaving his station, and then not telling me the truth as to the reason. We are trying to do all in our power for him. Certain lands must be secured to certain volunteers who acquired rights to it before the formal declaration of British Protectorate. I cannot see how the engagement entered into with them can now be broken. They must get the land. Other land must be set apart for the Colony, which is undertaking expensive government, and must have some return for it, and *bona fide* rights generally must be secured. If out of the residue there should be any land at our disposal to be given to Montsioa, in addition to what is provided for him by our agreement with the Rooi Gronders, we should consider whether some further land might not be given to him in case it should be clear that his people required it. We are only too anxious to give him good terms, if he will only meet us. Our present proposal is to reinstate him in possession of the land at Sehuba, Maffeking and Saliris, with ample grazing ground on the north bank of the river. That is far more than he was in the undisturbed possession of when the British Protectorate was established, and I cannot help thinking it is an excellent settlement for him.

Mr. Boyne.—I should think so. Would he be a British subject?

Premier.—Yes. We desire to give him all the land he may reasonably require, and Mr. Sprigg is at present at Maffeking awaiting Montsioa, to go into matters with him, and he will be greatly disappointed at his not being there.

Mr. Boyne.—He has been sent away.

Mr. Keeley.—Would it not be better for Montsioa to unconditionally cede his territory to the Cape Colony, and leave it to decide what land he is to have?

Premier.—There is to be a public meeting at Rooi Grond on Friday, and we should like to see Montsioa there.

Mr. Keeley.—He is still a little hostile to you, as he thinks that you have made terms with the Boers, and that you have given away his land to the Boers.

Premier (to Montsioa).—Have you enough ground now for your people to live upon?

Montsioa.—I have no country.

Premier.—That is since the peace with Joubert. It is chiefly grazing ground that you have now. What more do you require?

Montsioa.—All the ploughing land in the country has been taken from me.

Premier.—But supposing the Colonial Government obtains for you the garden ground around Maffeking, Sehuba and Saliris, will you not be satisfied?

Montsioa.—I want all the ploughing land down the river.

Premier.—That cannot be given to you, for that is virtually giving you back the whole of the country, in violation of your treaty, and restoring you to land in which you were not in the undisturbed possession when the British Protectorate was established.

(Montsioa here consulted with those around him.)

Montsioa.—I have given up all hopes of getting my country.

Premier.—Well, supposing we make the arrangements for you that I have already explained, will you not be satisfied?

Montsioa.—What can I say to-day? When I am asked what I want, of course I want all my country. I do not want to say how I have been treated by the white people.

Premier.—I have nothing to do with the Transvaal. I represent Her Majesty's Government in the Cape Colony, and I have come here with the assent of the Imperial Government. Montsioa apparently positively refuses to take any part in a settlement until armed men are placed in his country. If he thinks that he will obtain the assistance of British troops under such circumstances, I must tell him, in my opinion, he is much mistaken. The British public will not favour a man who refuses to discuss a fair settlement. He evidently thinks that if I fail to bring about a settlement, Colonel Warren will come up with British troops.

Mr. Boyne.—That is so.

Premier (to the Interpreter).—Tell Montsioa that notes are being taken of all that is now occurring, that everything will appear in official documents, and if he shows no inclination to meet me I am inclined to think that not a soldier will come here, and the British public will view his conduct with great dissatisfaction. I have come to this remote country at great personal inconvenience to do my best for him, and I want him to come down to his own station, and in the presence of his own people, to show me what land he requires, and to have pointed out to him where the beacons will be placed.

Montsioa (after a few minutes' silence).—Mr. Uington can see Mr. Wright. He knows all about it. I gave the country to Mackenzie, and Mackenzie deputed Wright to be his representative.

Premier.—Who told you that Colonel Warren and the troops were coming?

Montsioa (after a long consultation with councillors and others).—I have merely heard it through the newspapers.

Premier.—But Montsioa cannot read. Who conveyed the information to him?

(The Interpreter then remarked that he had seen recent newspapers with persons at Maffeking who could read them.)

Premier.—Finally, I wish it to be conveyed to Montsioa that I come to his country to get as much land as possible for him. I have succeeded in getting back for him far more land than was given to him by his own solemn treaty. White people regard these treaty arrangements, and strictly speaking Montsioa might be bound by his. Certainly Montsioa has not strengthened his case by not meeting me fairly with regard to this matter. A meeting of

the Goshenites has been called for the 28th instant, and I wished him to come face to face with them, to speak out his mind openly, and to tell me what he wanted, as I wished to make a good settlement for him. It is for him now to say whether he will be present or whether he will not. I shall then be in a position to say where his beacons will be placed, so that the good intentions of the Queen, in his favour, may be carried out. After that I hope he will keep his people from stealing, and see that they maintain peace. A Government officer will be appointed, to whom he can always apply whenever he wants any redress for wrong done to him, and for advice when he is in any difficulty. As soon as we can make arrangements we shall also have a police force to secure the keeping of the peace by every man, whether white or black. That is all I have to say.

Montsioa.—You did not understand. What I wished to say was that Mr. Wright was left by Mackenzie, and if you see Mr. Wright, even if I am not present, you can speak with him.

Premier.—Why Mr. Wright? He is not your agent.

Montsioa.—I have given my country over to the Queen, and Mr. Mackenzie left Mr. Wright in charge of it.

Premier.—Mr. Mackenzie is no longer the Queen's representative. Mr. Rhodes has come since as Deputy Commissioner.

Montsioa.—If Mr. Mackenzie informs me that he has nothing more to do with the country then I can speak with you.

Premier.—When I get back to Rooi Grond I shall be compelled to go on with the settlement, and if Montsioa is not present it will be hopeless for him to expect to be listened to if he complains of the settlement afterwards. I think I have effected a very good settlement indeed for him. I have obtained for him a great deal more land than he had when he, as an independent Chief, entered into the treaty with Moshette. As I said before, white men must respect their treaties, and why not native Chiefs? I have come here to represent the Queen's Government, and Montsioa will, for the future, be under the Queen. Surely you know you entered into that treaty with Moshette?

Mr. Boyne.—We all know the treaty. But for that treaty Montsioa's people would have been annihilated. I think he is very lucky in getting such an excellent settlement.

(Gassitsibi and Montsioa requested that they might have further time to deliberate, promising to give an answer subsequently.)

In the course of the afternoon the conversation between Montsioa, Gassitsibi and the Premier was continued.

Premier.—I wish again to point out that the Cape Government has no desire to obtain possession of any part of Gassitsibi's territory. I should prefer to see him govern his own people, but I think he ought to promise me that, as soon as the Cape Government is established up to his territory, that any cattle belonging to British subjects improperly brought into his territory, or any thieves coming into his country, should be given up to the Colonial Government. He ought also to promise me not to give up his country to anybody but the Queen of England; that he will protect English trade here, and allow trade to come freely from the Colony and to pass over the roads of his country, without any duties being levied or licences charged. If he will promise to do this, I will bring the matter before the Colonial Parliament, and will ask for such reward as the Parliament may think fit to grant him.

(Gassitsibi asked that the interview might take place in the presence of his son, who was sent for.)

Bathoen, the chief's eldest son, being present, Mr. Upington proceeded to repeat what he had already said to Gassitsibi.

Premier.—Gassitsibi will see what has occurred to Montsioa, and unless some such arrangement as we propose to him is made the same may occur to

Gassitsibi. If Gassitsibi's people will only rely on the Colonial Government, we will see that they get their rights and that no man interferes with them. We do not want to take over their country, or to tax them, or to exercise direct government in any way. To take over the country means a loss to the Colony of thousands a year, and we have no desire to add to our responsibilities in that way. If, however, Gassitsibi will enter into an alliance with us, we will take care that no white man or black man in the country shall be wronged in any way. All we want is to be on friendly terms with the Chiefs, and that they should tell the Government everything that goes on, so that if they are wronged, or if they want advice, they will tell us, and we will try to help them. If Boers or any other people try to injure them they would then refer to Cape Town and the matter would be looked into. We do not wish Gassitsibi to give refuge here to any person whom he knows to be an enemy of the Queen of England, and we wish him to give protection to the Queen's subjects, whether they be traders or otherwise. If any person or Government comes here and asks Gassitsibi to give up his country, we wish him to be able to say "No; I can only give my country to the Queen of England." I wish him to clearly understand that we do not want to take over his country, but we wish to prevent anybody else taking it over. If Germany or the Transvaal or any other nation or people should ask Gassitsibi for his country, we wish Gassitsibi to say "No; I am the Queen's man." If he does that for the Queen's Government at the Cape, it is only fair that the Queen's Government at the Cape should do something for him in return. Now, what would he like us to do for him in return? What would he like me to ask the Cape Parliament to do for him? If I tell the Cape Parliament what the Chief promises to do, I have no doubt that the Cape Parliament will agree to do something for him. Now what will the Chief and his people say to such an arrangement?

Gassitsibi.—I wish my son to speak first.

Premier.—Very well. What has his son to say?

Bathoen.—All I can say is that I am afraid that this is not a matter which can be settled with only my father and myself. I think we must consult our people before we enter into such an arrangement, and just now our people are all out ploughing.

Premier.—It will be well that the Chief should consult his people before he makes this arrangement, so that everyone should understand it. They should understand that if no such arrangement is made Gassitsibi may find some people coming in and taking his country away from him. We propose that he should be an independent Chief and govern the country himself. Perhaps Gassitsibi would like to consult Mr. Price, who is at Sech-le's country, before he makes up his mind.

Bathoen.—I do not think there is any intention on the part of the Transvaal to take away our country. Piet Joubert was sent to bring peace, and since that there has been peace and no more war. Schoeman also came and told us that he wanted peace. It is with very great thankfulness that we see you here to-day, and to know that we have you as such friends. We also know that the Boers are at loggerheads with the English over the Transvaal, that it belonged to the Boers, and the British took it over, and, therefore, we are very thankful when we see to-day the Chief of the white people. We know the boundary which divides the country of the black and white people. It was the Boers that broke first that line. Where are the laws now which were made at Pretoria respecting that line? Where are they to-day? We want peace and rest, and we know that we shall get rest now we have seen the Chief of the white people.

Premier.—The great grievance of these people seems to be that one day they are told to regard one boundary line and another day they are told to regard another boundary line. Will Gassitsibi tell me to-day what is the boundary line between Montsioa and himself?

Bathoen.—It comes from the desert.

Premier.—How am I to know what the boundary is when people trespass

into your country if you cannot tell me what the boundary is? Possibly, if you do not tell what the line is, a line may be drawn which is not the right one, and this will be all your fault, because you will not tell us what is the real boundary. It was only the other day that Mankoroane told me, mile by mile, the boundaries of his country. Surely if Mankoroane could do this Gassitsibi should also be able to do the same?

Bathoen.—We have not required to enter into the question of a boundary line between Gassitsibi and Montsioa, because we have been on such friendly relations.

Premier.—But surely a boundary line between the two tribes is known, even if Chiefs are on the most friendly terms?

Gassitsibi.—The only boundary line I know is between myself and the Transvaal, not between myself and Montsioa.

Bathoen.—Our people have lived together, and we have not made trouble about boundaries.

Premier.—I have come here for the purpose of making a settlement which shall do justice to Montsioa. I want to find out the boundary between his country and Gassitsibi, but if Montsioa leaves his station and also leaves me to find out everything for myself, he must not complain hereafter. I was so anxious to settle this that I left within a few hours after the Imperial Government had agreed that I should come and see if we could settle this matter peacefully. I do not complain of Montsioa's being away from his station. That may have been accidental, but on the day we arrived at Rooi Grond one of his people informed me that a man had been despatched to bring him back. Although none of his people seemed to know where he had gone, yet a white man who lives near Montsioa's station told me some days ago that we should find Montsioa at Kanye, and that Montsioa's people knew very well where he was. I have since then been to Maffeking and I have spoken to his people, and I got what information I could from them respecting the war. Now what I want to know is how a white man knew Montsioa was at Kanye when his people did not know it, or, if knowing, they refused to tell me. I shall now have to leave for Rooi Grond, and when I report to the Queen's Government I have made a settlement, they will ask me if Montsioa has agreed. I shall say, "No; he got out of my way so as not to give me any information, and the result has been that I have been obliged to make the settlement without him." I tell Montsioa to his face that it will not be right of him if anything goes wrong for him to complain if he will not assist in making the settlement. If he does complain I shall say that it was his own fault, because he would not tell me what he wanted. He is very much mistaken in making no attempt to effect a settlement because he wishes to see the troops. The Boers have agreed to my terms, and they are such as enable Montsioa's people to have as much land as I think they should have. I shall now have to go on with the settlement of the country without Montsioa's assistance, because he will not help me. When the beacons are fixed the Boers will vacate the country, which they have undertaken to do, and Montsioa's people will occupy it. If it should happen that the beacons are wrongly placed, it will be because Montsioa was not there, and would render no assistance. As soon as Parliament meets the country will probably be annexed to the Colony, and the question of Montsioa's boundaries will then be settled for ever. When that has been arranged, I shall ask Gassitsibi to enter into an arrangement with the Cape Colony to give up any thieves which come here, to protect our traders, to promise to levy no dues on goods passing through the country and to keep the trade route open, and to promise not to give his country over to any foreign Government. If he will promise to do this, I will propose to Parliament that some recognition should be made of his services.

Montsioa.—You must not blame me. You did not inform me by letter that you were coming. If you had said that you would have been there on such a day I would have been there to meet you. Not knowing that you were coming I went away for the good of my health. If you do not give me justice it is not my fault.

Premier.—I desire to do Montsioa the fullest justice, and if I should do him any injustice it is because of his absence when the settlement is being arranged.

Montsioa.—It would seem that you did not come up to settle with me, but with the Boers. I did not know you were coming.

Premier.—No one knew I was coming. The Boers did not know I was coming. As soon as I came I placed myself in communication with Maffeking, and the people there promised me that they would at once send for Montsioa and bring him back. Now, I want to know from Montsioa why Montsioa did not return as his people promised he would?

Montsioa.—I came in my wagon, which is now gone away to get wood, but if it comes back I will immediately return.

Premier.—This morning I was informed that Montsioa left because he was afraid, and now he says he left for the benefit of his health. What is the true story?

Montsioa.—What I said this morning I do not deny. I gave my country to Mackenzie, and Wright was left by Mackenzie in charge of my country.

Premier.—There is no doubt whatever but that Montsioa gave up his country to the Queen, and the Queen can remove him if she wishes from the land tomorrow; but there is no wish to remove him. What I want to know from him is, how much land his people require, and he will not tell me.

Montsioa.—When am I wanted to be there?

Premier.—I do not propose to place any pressure upon Montsioa to be there. I say he ought to be there when the settlement takes place, and it will be better for him.

Montsioa.—If my wagon comes I will go back immediately. It is not necessary that I should be there. The settlement can be made without me, and if I am not satisfied I can still go to England and tell in what respect I have been deceived. What security can you give me that the very first morning after you leave I shall not hear a shot fired, as I heard the morning after Mackenzie left?

Premier.—Does Montsioa really mean this? I have already told him that the conversation we are now having will appear in official documents, and does he wish me to state in those documents that if I make a settlement for him of which he approves, well and good, but that if I do not that he will go in person to the Imperial Government and complain of the settlement? Does he mean to say that he will not come to assist me in making a settlement? If that is his position, then it is an intelligible one, but I want to know from him precisely what it is he means.

Montsioa.—Mackenzie made a settlement, and then he went to Rooi Grond, and immediately he left the Convention line was broken. I do not see that any Convention line can be binding. I do not see that any line can be made which cannot be broken.

Premier.—Do I understand from Montsioa that he has no desire to take any part in the settlement, that he will allow negotiations to go on but that he will take no part in them?

Montsioa.—Why do you think so?

Premier.—From his statement that he will allow the settlement to go on in his absence and that if he is not satisfied he will make complaint.

Montsioa.—The great argument I think is that I have no proof that after the settlement has been made and the beacons placed they will not be taken down, and the same trouble we had before will not occur again.

Premier.—That is his fear. I tell him that the settlement if properly made and approved of by Her Majesty's Government will be kept. Montsioa need not have been afraid and have run away from Maffeking.

Montsioa.—Who says that I'm afraid? I am not even afraid of death, for death only is known to God.

Premier.—Now let us have a decided answer. Let it be yes or no. Is Montsioa coming down to help us in effecting the settlement?

Montsioa.—If my wagon comes I will try to come down.

Premier.—Montsioa will understand that a meeting is to be held on Friday

next to discuss the arrangement as signed by the Bestuur of Goshen. On Saturday I will be prepared to go over the ground with Montsioa, getting him to show me what land will be sufficient for his people. If Montsioa is sincere in wishing for a settlement he will be there on that day. Gassitsibi will understand that our desire is that we should live on friendly terms. We only wish well to his people, and when Montsioa's country is annexed to the Cape and the Cape Colony's borders adjoin to that of Gassitsibi that we shall have a good understanding. I must now leave, for I have to return to Rooi Grond and hear what they have to say there. These are my last words.

Gassitsibi.—I had wished to have spoken, but my son says that I must not speak.

Premier.—It is the custom in European countries for the father to tell the son what he should do and not the son the father. Anyhow you have heard what I have said, and I will ask Bathoen if he intends to put this matter before his people when they have come in after the ploughing.

Bathoen.—Yes, I will do that.

The interview then broke up. Bathoen accompanied Mr. Upington through the village and expressed his great desire to be on the friendliest terms with the English people, and his regret that his people were out ploughing that day, for he would like to have the answer at once.

LETTER FROM KEBALEPILE, SON OF MONTSIOA, TO THE HON. J. G. SPRIGG.

Mafekeng, Molopo, November 18, 1884.

To the Hon. Mr. Gordon Sprigg,
Rooi Grond, Transvaal.

SIR,—I received your letter late last night, and called the Chief's Councillors together. After reading, I sent off a messenger to my father the Chief Montsioa. But as the cattle posts where he is at present visiting are some days from here, feel afraid that he cannot come soon. Then he is an old man and at present rather unwell through all the worry that has been in his country, must travel slow. I feel certain that my father did not know anything of your coming or he would never have left here soon eight days ago, and yesterday afternoon was the first we saw of your coming. Then the papers only said Bechuanaland, and that is a large country. Messrs. Rhodes, Bower and the Police came to Bechuanaland. We never saw anything of them. Therefore I hope you will not think as yesterday, that my father ran away from your coming, as I feel sure he would be glad to meet anyone that was likely to make a Peace Settlement in his country.

I remain, Honor Sir,

Yours truly,

KEBALEPILE MONTSIOA.

APPENDIX D.

INTERVIEW BETWEEN MOSEPELE, A NATIVE TEACHER, AND MINISTERS—IN THE VELDT—ON SUNDAY, 16TH NOVEMBER, 1884.

Johan Mosepele, a native teacher of the tribe of Moshette, living close to Kunana, came to us at the first outspan after leaving Kunana. It having been explained to him who those were whom he was addressing, he was asked to give a true narrative of the attack by Montsioa on Rietfontein. He said:—I will tell you the truth. The commencement of the war was at Rietfontein. Montsioa, without any provocation, was the aggressor. Montsioa said that he

must be the Paramount Chief. Moshette said no; we must live quietly together. Montsioa said no; I will thrash Machabi. Moshette said no; here is a beast (an ox) take it; you must not beat Machabi. Moshette gave Montsioa an ox not to beat Machabi. Montsioa took the ox and killed it, and we thought there would be no war. They parted. About a month after, without giving any notice, Montsioa's men came to Rietfontein early in the morning and fired into the village. I was there. Men, women and children, old people, cripples, and infants sucking at the breast were killed. Montsioa had a great force with him. The Ykalifijn people he brought with him. He burnt the town down; the men, women and children were asleep. They had arms with them, but they were taken by surprise and had no time to use them. Montsioa must have killed about 100 people. I saw the people run away and they were shot down like springboks. I ran away. We came and told Moshette. Moshette was startled. We told them the people at Rietfontein were dead. He said, how can they be dead when we have had no quarrel with Montsioa? There were no Boers present (at Rietfontein). There were none but Kafirs. In the first fight between Moshette and Montsioa, Montsioa fled. Moshette burnt his place because Montsioa had burnt Rietfontein. I am a teacher. I am not paid for it. I learnt to be a teacher in the Orange Free State at Moroko by Thaba Nchu. I was taught by Cott, Daniel, Cameron, Rudolph. It is long time since I left there. I left there about six or seven years ago.

In answer to the question as to whether the Barolongs would be under the British or Boers, he said that he was not a Captain or a trader, and he could only tell what he saw with his own eyes. Moshette would answer such questions. In answer to the question, would you rather be under the British or the Transvaal Government? Mosepele shrugged his shoulders and said, "What can I do?"

APPENDIX E.

TREATY BETWEEN MANKOROANE AND MASSOUW.

I, the undersigned Mankoroane Molahabanque and my councillors on the one side, and David Massouw Riet Taaibosch and his councillors, together with the members of management, on the other side, hereby solemnly declare, in the presence of the here undermentioned witnesses, that this day, the 26th day of July, 1882, the hostilities between us have ceased, and that we have hereby appointed the following gentlemen, viz. :—

G. J. v. Niekerk, Chairman,
A. J. G. de la Rey, Senior,
F. Stroebel,
C. H. C. King,
Agenor Daumas,

as a Commission over matters now, further to arrange, and in order to beacon off boundaries between Taungs, Mamusa and Phokwane, and further to determine and beacon off the territory which to the volunteers of David Massouw must be awarded, which boundaries shall be recognized by all sides; and we further declare that each of these Chiefs shall be independent of each other.

This Commission shall be chosen immediately, and at once commence their operations to determine these said lines, and to put up the necessary beacons. In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the members of the said Commission, or later between the Captains and their subjects, both parties declare that they will leave the case to the settlement of, and decision of, the Government of the South African Republic, by which decision both parties shall abide.

Further, we declare, both sides, that we will never call in the protection of any other Government excepting the Government of the South African Republic, under whose protection we shall be safe and unmolested.

Thus done and signed to-day, the 23th day of July, 1882, in the presence of the undersigned witnesses.

As witnesses—

Theodore Doms, Secretary of David Massouw.
 H. C. Boeschoten.
 D. M. Riet Taaibosch.
 Jeremiah, his × mark, General.
 Kasin, his × mark, Raadslid.
 David Links, his × mark, Ouderkapsten.
 David Links, his × mark, Raadslid.
 Lukas Links, his × mark, Raadslid.
 Saaibrand Oncras, his × mark, Raadslid.
 Botlasitse Gasibone, his × mark, Molahabanque.
 Jantje van Janki, his × mark, Raadslid.
 Janki, his × mark, Raadslid.
 Frans Matlabane, his × mark, Ouderkapsten.
 Louw, his × mark, Raadslid.
 Mankoroane, his × mark, Molahabanque.
 Kassayne, his × mark, Molahabanque.
 Masi, his × mark, Mahura.
 Molale, his × mark, Molahabanque.
 Tokoe, his × mark, Maleti.
 Tholofitiane, his × mark, Mase.
 Tagaayane, his × mark, Saku.

As witnesses—

R. L. Lamertine.
 C. H. Coyte King.

J. Jacobs.

APPENDIX F.

TREATY BETWEEN MOSHETTE AND MONTSIOA.

Translation from original Dutch counterpart in possession of the Chief Montsioa at Maffeking and submitted to R. Rutherford, Secretary to British Resident, on 21st November, 1882.

Deed of Conditions of Peace and the Terms thereof laid down and agreed upon between us, the undersigned Chiefs and our Captains and Councillors, on the 24th October, 1882.

ART. 1.—We lay down our arms on both sides and conclude a peace under the regulations following.

ART. 2.—Each of us, Moshette and Montsioa, shall be Captains respectively of his own tribe, independent of and not subject to each other, but shall henceforth be ruled and managed within our borders over our own subjects and possessions, and as such only subordinate to the laws and orders of the Government of the South African Republic and under its protection.

ART. 3.—Each of us shall be obliged within the time of two days after conclusion of this peace to leave our at present fortified town or position, and to destroy and raze to the ground all defences (schanses) or occupied places.

ART. 4.—Inasmuch as we henceforth place our territory and all our possessions under the laws and protection of the Government of the South African Republic, we each bind ourselves mutually and severally that no fortifications or works of position shall be made within our limits or afterwards be erected without the permission of the abovenamed Government.

ART. 5.—It is hereby distinctly understood that neither of us will ever henceforth undertake any hostilities against each other or against any other person within or beyond our territory without the previous knowledge of the Government of the South African Republic.

ART. 6.—Every difference that may hereafter arise or be occasioned between us and our subjects, and which we are not able to arrange in an amicable manner and without expenses, shall be submitted to the final decision of the Government of the South African Republic. No war shall exist in respect thereof without the consent of the aforesaid Government.

ART. 7.—Under no circumstances whatever shall either of us individually or jointly resort to any other State or Government with complaints or anything, except and exclusively to the Transvaal or South African Republic aforesaid, whose decision only shall be decisive and binding in all matters.

ART. 8.—It is distinctly understood that all engagements or debts made or contracted by each of the respective parties before this date must be acknowledged and duly honoured, and are hereby acknowledged by both parties to have been incurred by each.

ART. 9.—Grounds which have been promised by the two parties, or either of them, to his or their hired white volunteers, are hereby certainly and distinctly secured and awarded to the said volunteers, and by consequence are hereby fully acknowledged by both parties.

ART. 10.—In order to award these grounds properly and fully to the lawful appearers, and to cause them to be put in possession thereof, a Commission shall be chosen and appointed, viz., two persons by the two Chiefs, and a third person shall be appointed and chosen by the lawful volunteers by a majority of votes.

ART. 11.—The Commission shall go out and begin its labours within two months from this date. This Commission shall beacon off these grounds according to previously agreed-upon regulations, and no farm shall be or be made of greater extent than 3,000 (three thousand) morgen.

ART. 12.—“Grond brieven,” or documents of ownership, shall be issued in the form and terms and under the conditions such as are used by the South African Republic, and shall be signed and registered by that Government in the names of the lawful owners thereof.

ART. 13.—All white inhabitants of our land will be governed and controlled by the Government of the South African Republic, and shall in regard thereof stand under the laws thereof.

ART. 14.—In order to secure perpetual peace and rest a line shall be settled between the territories of each of the Chiefs and his people, which appointed line shall never for everlasting be trespassed over or violated.

ART. 15.—These lines shall run as is herein distinctly described.

Beginning at the point of the beacon of the South African Republic at Ramatlabama, thence in a straight line up the Molapo River, where a beacon shall be placed at a distance of one mile or 1,700 yards on the upper side of Maffeking, the old town of Molema, otherwise the at present defended place of Montsioa. Thence a line shall run with the Molapo stream up to the point where the same or its directions touches the line or lines of other Chiefs living beyond the territories of our tribes.

ART. 16.—All grounds lying to the north or north-west of this line shall henceforth and for the future indicate the territories of the Chief Montsioa and his people. All grounds lying to the south or south-west shall be or indicate the territories of the Chief Moshette and his people.

ART. 17.—All ground which is owing and must be given to the volunteers of both sides shall be taken and inspected within the lines as hereinafter described, viz. :—From the beacon on the Molapo River, which, as has been said, is at 1,700 yards or paces on the upper side of the town or positions now occupied by Montsioa (Maffeking), and thence along the Molapo River to the south-western side to where the same runs into the River Setlagolo, thence with this Setlagola River to the source thereof, and thence up along the most south-westerly spruit to the source thereof, and thence in a straight line up to the outside of the established line of the South African Republic, and then with the same line which runs along the great wagon road which goes from the Saltpan and along the Transvaal line up to the beacon on the “Rooi Grond” by the clump of trees, and thence along that line to the beacon at Buurman’s

Drift, and thence to the point of Ramatlabama, and from the point Ramatlabama back in a straight line to the beacon to be erected 1,760 (1,700) yards above the side of the town Maffeking, while in addition shall be excluded the place Rietfontein, which shall be given Machabi.

ART. 18.—Both undersigning parties assent hereby after the passing of this agreement to hold themselves strictly not to accept any new inhabitants or Natives at present residing beyond this territory, or to cause them to come into or live in it without the previous knowledge and concurrence of the Government of the South African Republic, nor shall any white inhabitants be allowed within our land unless they will take the oath of allegiance to the South African Republic.

ART. 19.—Seeing that the now too long waged war has not only occasioned great injury, laying waste and bloodshed, in consequence of which a great amount of debt liability has been incurred by the great Chief Moshette and his people, it is hereby agreed that the Captain Montsioa binds himself and his people to pay for war expenses the sum of sixteen thousand pounds (£16,000) sterling, in which is included £4,000, which has been incurred by Moshette and occasioned by an armistice distinctly asked for by Montsioa and concurred in by us. This amount shall be paid by Montsioa within one month from date in good current money or real value.

ART. 20.—All catt'e and goods which have been taken in booty during the war by the hostile parties shall remain the lawful property of the possessors, but all stolen cattle or goods taken from persons who have not been connected with the war shall be immediately given back or the value thereof paid to the owner, with such reasonable amount for damage as shall be just and right.

ART. 21.—After the conclusion of this contract of peace no complaints in regard to former misdeeds perpetrated before the beginning of hostilities by either of the parties shall be brought up against them; but this peace shall be a sufficient and full absolution on both sides, no reproaches shall be made, or any disturbance created by the Chiefs or their subjects.

ART. 22.—For the fulfilment of all these articles of peace we, the two Chiefs, bind ourselves and our subjects respectively; and we will move the Honourable the Executive Government of the South African Republic to make known this contract of peace to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty; and also in case unfortunately any difference or disunion should arise between us for the failing to truly follow up these articles of peace, it is fully concluded by this contract of us and our council that the very Honourable the Governor of the South African Republic without any delay or invitation shall peremptorily intervene, and, after full investigation, punish the guilty to extremity.

This our agreement and contract of peace is concluded for the prevention of further bloodshed and to establish peace and rest between us.

This done and ratified with our signatures in the presence of witnesses, with the omission and supersession of Articles 3 (17) and 19, on this 24th day of October, 1882.

| Marks of | | Marks of | |
|----------|---------------------|----------|-------------------|
| × | Chief Montsioa. | × | Captain Moshette. |
| × | Israel Molema. | × | Sechogo. |
| × | Sani Tanana. | × | Phoe. |
| × | Motlare. | × | Seleka. |
| × | Bolumel. | × | Mokolo. |
| × | Kebalepele Montsioa | × | Mobroa Kholi. |
| × | Molobeng. | × | Molise. |
| | Witnesses. | × | Captain Matuba. |
| (Signed) | J. J. van Eeden. | × | Motseoia Khuma. |
| (Signed) | J. D. S. Botha. | × | Maano. |
| | | × | Abram Matuba. |
| | | (Signed) | Pete Matuba. |
| | | × | Andries Sihra. |
| | | (Signed) | J. D. S. Botha. |
| | | (Signed) | J. J. van Eeden. |

men of very bad reputation, and I have no doubt that in the Land of Goshen and in Stellaland, there are men whose reputations are far from untainted; but, having made careful inquiry, I am bound to say that it is unfair to the people of this country to be stigmatized as murderers and robbers. There have been things done in this country which cannot be defended. I wish to speak plainly, and I tell you emphatically that the shooting of Mr. Bethell as he lay wounded was an outrage which must cause intense pain. Mr. Bethell's antecedents could not possibly justify such an act. I know that when there is a war a whole people cannot be held responsible for the acts of a few men. Even in European countries, where warfare is conducted upon perfect principles, outrages upon wounded men have occurred, and for such outrages it would be absurd to blame entire people. From all I have heard, the people of the Land of Goshen are not in sympathy with those who inflicted the death wound upon Mr. Bethell. Indeed, I have heard universal condemnation of the deed, and I am glad to be able to contradict the statement that the corpse was treated with indignity. Warfare cannot anywhere be carried on without occurrences calculated to shock sensitive minds, but I find no proof that war has been carried on in this country in a cruel or unfair manner (Cheers.) You have been styled land robbers, but I fail to see where there has been plunder of land from Montsioa. That Chief now gets under the settlement required by Her Majesty's Government, and cheerfully assented to by you, far more land than he was entitled to under the treaty of 1882. By that treaty which he entered into when he was an independent Chief, and which all his people looked upon as binding, he gave up practically all his lands south of the Molopo River. I think it is to the credit of the people of Land Goshen that they do not want to unduly press him, and that at the request of the Queen's Government they freely assent to Montsioa's obtaining more land than he agreed to be content with under his own solemn compact entered into with Moshet e. That's not land plunder. (Cheers.) It has also been alleged that during the war women and children were killed by the so-called volunteers in cold blood. I cannot find any evidence in proof of that allegation, and it now lies on those who made the charge to support it if they can. Such grave charges should not be made without ample proof, as they seriously mislead the public, and I know they have caused great indignation against you. To unjust charges we are all liable. Even our mission here is made the subject of unsparing and unjust comment in the English press. I even find that the injustice is not confined to England, for at Du Toit's Pan no less a sum than fifty pounds has been subscribed in these hard times for the burning of Mr. Sprigg and myself in effigy. (Laughter.) My advice to you is now to go about your daily avocations, cultivate the soil, advance your prosperity, respect the rights of all persons, and forget the feeling of irritation caused by what you see in the newspapers. When Parliament meets the subject will be fully gone into, and I shall be prepared to defend the general body of the people from groundless charges. (Cheers.) I trust that the result of the settlement now ratified will not only be advantageous to yourselves but a great benefit to United South Africa. (Cheers.) We have come to this country with the best wishes of the Transvaal Government, and Her Majesty's Imperial Government have expressed their pleasure at our undertaking to intervene. (Cheers.) We have effected what we consider to be a fair and equitable settlement; a settlement which, I believe, will bear lasting fruit, and which, while securing to the Cape colonists their interests in the interior, gives ample land to Montsioa, avoids the frightful consequences of war, and will be another step towards making us a great and united people. (Cheers.) In casting your lot with the Cape Colony you get the benefit of a just system of laws made by your own fellow-countrymen, and you will have peace and security for your persons and property. Pending formal annexation you are bound to carefully keep the peace and obey the laws, so that when Parliament meets you will not have given your enemies an opportunity of saying a word against you. Thereby you will show that you are worthy of becoming Cape colonists. I thank you for the unvarying kindness you have shown to my colleague and myself during our visit. (Enthusiastic cheering.)

APPENDIX G.

SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE HON. THOMAS UPINGTON PREMIER OF THE CAPE COLONY, AT ROOF GROND, ON FRIDAY, 28TH NOVEMBER, 1884, TO THE BURGHERS OF LAND GOSHEN, ON THE OCCASION OF THE LOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS PROPOSED BY THE CAPE MINISTERS, AS REPORTED BY THE ONLY SHORTHAND WRITER PRESENT.

Burghers of the Land Goshen:—As I cannot express myself in the Dutch language, I have requested my friend, Mr. Van Eck, to interpret for me, and I will endeavour to speak in such a way that you will understand what is conveyed to you through the medium of interpretation. I wish to explain to you what capacity I fill, and the reasons which have induced my colleague and myself to come to this remote country. I represent the Responsible Government of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. The Government of the colonists with whom many of you are closely related. When during the present year there was a change in Ministry, although not born in this country, I was selected as leader by a large section of colonists of Dutch and English extraction, because it was known that after experience of my politics in this colony I had sympathy with the colonial party formed of persons belonging to both nationalities, whose motto was that South Africa should be governed by the South Africans, that party holds that South African residents here are best able to judge what the true colonial policy should be. We specially hold that our native policy should be under the entire control of the Colonial Parliament and of the Ministry responsible to that Parliament. The causes which have led to the mission of my colleague and myself here are these. On entering into Office the Ministry, of which I have the honour to be the head, found a British Protectorate established over this country. We found too that disturbances had arisen likely to cause grave complications throughout South Africa. With a sincere desire to relieve Her Majesty's Imperial Government of responsibility, and to secure peace, we requested Her Majesty's representative to take our advice upon the subject. Her Majesty's representative, acting within his undoubted right, declined to take our advice unless we consented to undertake liability for an unknown expenditure, to which we could not agree, and the result was that the Government of this country continued to be carried on by Her Majesty's Government without any responsibility attaching to us. That attempt at Government, like all attempts to govern without consulting the will of the people, was such a failure that forcible measures were determined upon by Her Majesty's Imperial Government. Extreme people applauded this step; but we who were responsible to the Parliament of the colony for the peace of the colony, were in duty bound to endeavour to prevent war provided we could secure colonial interests, and accordingly we asked for permission to proceed here and see if we could settle the question without bloodshed. We said that we believed that the people would listen to us, and that we should be successful in obtaining without the horrors of war for the colony all its objects for the people here, security for their *bona fide* claims, and for the natives protection. Her Majesty's Imperial Government again, acting within their undoubted right, would not consent to our coming except under certain conditions. We requested that we should not be hampered by conditions; but those conditions were insisted upon, and one of them was that the Chief Montsioa should be restored to those lands to which he held undisturbed possession when the British Protectorate was established. Her Majesty, as head of the Protectorate, was clearly entitled to demand that her Protectorate should be respected. Before I left the colony I was told in many quarters that the people of this country would not assent to the conditions and they they would not vacate the land required by Montsioa. I ventured to predict that the inhabitants of the territory would have confidence in the Ministry placed in office by the majority of the Cape colonists, and they would never let it be said that they refused mediation. That prediction has come true with reference to the population of Goshen. I am bound to say that anyone coming here will see as respectable and as law-abiding a people as there is to be found in South Africa. (Cheers.) In every community there are sure to be found

APPENDIX H.

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE TERRITORY KNOWN AS LAND GOSHEN SHALL BE ANNEXED TO THE CAPE COLONY, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF HER MAJESTY'S IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT OF THE CAPE COLONY:—

First. As imperatively required by Her Majesty's Imperial Government, the Chief Montsioa to be replaced in occupation of "the garden grounds and grazing lands of which the Chief and his tribe were in the undisturbed possession in May last, when they were formally taken under British protection."

To this condition the following explanatory Note has been attached:—It appears to the Cape Ministers that the object of Her Majesty's Imperial Government can be secured by giving to Monts'oa and his people—who are not numerous—the ground as formerly enjoyed by him and them at Maffeking, Se'uba and Saliris, with ample grazing ground on the North Bank of the Molopo River. For this purpose the grounds at Maffeking, Sehuba and Saliris must be vacated by all white settlers, but as certain four or five persons acquired before the formal establishment of the British Protectorate *bona fide* rights by purchase or otherwise to farms in the districts proposed to be cleared, land of equal value shall be granted to such occupiers elsewhere by the Commission subsequently mentioned. The Chief Montsioa being absent, and it not being at present possible to ascertain his desires, the Cape Ministers are not able to say whether Montsioa and his tribe may not prefer to have an extension of arable land along the Molopo River instead of resuming occupation of Sehuba and Saliris, and consequently the arrangement above proposed may by the consent of all parties be altered, but the direction of Her Majesty's Imperial Government must be obeyed, and either the land at Maffeking, Sehuba and Saliris, or sufficient land elsewhere, if desired by Montsioa, be secured to that Chief and his people.

Second. All rights to land enjoyed by white settlers under grant or transfer before the formal establishment of the British Protectorate, to be respected in the same manner as arranged in Stellaland between Her Majesty's Deputy Commissioner and the Inhabitants of that Territory, and quitrents to be also paid as provided in Stellaland.

Third. After complying with the direction of Her Majesty's Imperial Government with regard to Montsioa and his tribe, and after securing the lawful rights possessed by white settlers before the formal establishment of the Protectorate, the remaining vacant lands shall be disposed of in the following manner:—(a) A Commission shall be appointed consisting of one nominee of the Cape Government, one nominee of the Existing Bestuur of Land Goshen, and Mr. G. J. van Niekerk as President. (b) Such Commission to enquire into and decide what persons have acquired *bona fide* rights to vacant land, and to make provision for such rights accordingly. (c) The residue of the vacant land to be waste Crown Lands of the Colony, (d) Titles to land or confirmations of existing titles where necessary to be issued as soon as possible.

Fourth.—The existing debt of the country shall be enquired into and duly audited, with a view to communications on the subject with Her Majesty's Imperial Government.

Fifth.—Pending the establishment of a fixed form of Government an officer shall be appointed by the Colonial Government who shall in conjunction with existing Bestuur of Land Goshen administer the affairs of the country and carry into effect the foregoing conditions, and the inhabitants shall freely aid and assist in maintaining order and protecting the rights of all persons living in the country. No act of the said Bestuur shall be valid until approved of by the officer so to be appointed.

(Signed) THOMAS UPINGTON.
J. GORDON SPRIGG.

In acceptance of these conditions is added the following :—

We, the undersigned, having read the conditions under which the Territory called the Land of Goosen is to be annexed to the Cape Colony, do accept those conditions, subject to the approval of the people of the Land Goosen, and do cede and transfer to the Cape Colony all our rights which we have possessed in the territory called the Land of Goosen. In witness whereof we have signed at Heliopolis, this twenty-second day of November, 1884.

(Signed) N. C. GEY VAN PITTIUS, Administrator of Land Goosen.
P. F. DE VILLIERS.
C. J. WEBER.
J. G. J. VILJOEN.
G. P. OTTO.
S. N. DE BRUIN BOUGA, Government Secretary.

Witnesses : C. J. VAN NIEKERK, H. J. SCHOEMAN.

The foregoing Conditions, having been read before a Public Meeting on the 28th November, 1884, were unanimously accepted by the people.

APPENDIX J.

MINUTE OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR AND HIGH COMMISSIONER WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONDITIONS PROPOSED BY MINISTERS.

South Africa.—Minute No. 56.

Government House, Cape Town,
5th December, 1884.

The Governor having transmitted to the Secretary of State "in extenso" the telegram addressed by Ministers to the Honourable the Commissioner of Crown Lands from Rooi Grond, and dated the 22nd ultimo, is now instructed to inform Ministers as follows :—

Her Majesty's Government are willing to agree to the first condition as telegraphed by Ministers, namely, that "the Chief Montsioa be replaced in occupation of the garden grounds and grazing lands of which the Chief and his tribe were in the undisturbed possession in May last when they were formally taken under British protection," and they will desire Major-General Sir C. Warren to carry out this agreement peacefully if practicable; but the words "undisturbed possession" are not to be governed by the Treaty of 1882.

As to conditions 2 and 3, Her Majesty's Government cannot recognize the "bona fide" character of the claims of the freebooters to land in Montsioa's country, but questions affecting the permanent disposal of land beyond the territory to be reserved for Montsioa would in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government be matters for the consideration of the Cape Parliament when the question of annexation comes before it.

The 4th condition Her Majesty's Government consider requires explanation. It is obvious that the Imperial Government cannot be committed to meet the expenditure of those who infringed the British Protectorate. Otherwise they would have no objection to consider the financial condition of the territory.

As to the 5th condition, until Ministers are authorized by Parliament to take over the country, Her Majesty's Government must retain the Administration to the Protectorate in their own hands; and Sir C. Warren will be instructed to occupy the country with an adequate force. But so long as the first condition is being faithfully observed, he will allow other matters to remain as far as possible in *statu quo* pending the meeting of the Cape Parliament, which, it is hoped, will be summoned as soon as possible.

HERCULES ROBINSON,
High Commissioner