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TWOPENCE.]

RELIGION OF HUMANITY.

Order and Progress.

POLITICAL TRACTS.

IX.—ENGLISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST.

BY
MALCOLM QUIN.

THE Treaty of Alliance which has been recently concluded between Great Britain and Japan raises questions of far-reaching and permanent importance, some of which I propose to consider in this Tract. In doing so, as it is hardly necessary to say, I shall not speak either as an opponent or as an apologist of the present English Government, but as an adherent of the Religion of Humanity, approaching the examination of these questions, consequently, from the stand-point of the political doctrines of Auguste Comte. Those doctrines have at least this claim to the attention of non-Positivists—and it is to non-Positivists that I am now especially addressing myself—that in spirit and method they are scientific, with the dispassionateness of science, if not with its indifference, and that they compel us to look at questions of nation, party, sect or class, from a stand-point of principle more lasting and more comprehensive than their own.

And first let me indicate what that stand-point is—in so far, at any rate, as it bears on the present question. It is clear that in discussing the Anglo-Japanese alliance we are discussing a complicated order of interests—interests of a wider range than any special interests of England or Japan, or of China, or of Corea, or of the Far East; we are discussing the universal interests of mankind. I am not now using this expression in any merely sentimental sense. It is evident that if there ever was a time when the policy of any given country could be regulated without reference to the various other countries of the world, that time has long since passed away. So far as Western Europe is concerned, as we all know, diplomacy, for hundreds of years, has had to take account not only of the parts but of the whole. We have had, within the limits of Europe, great conflicts and disastrous wars—wars waged for reasons good or bad; but no one who has won a reputation for European statesmanship has professed an indifference for European peace. Prince Bismarck's favourite maxim was that "if we wish for peace, we must prepare for war." That maxim is of the illusions that have

exercised a disastrous influence on the world, but such as it is, it is at least an acceptance and consecration of the ideal of peace amongst Western nations—a recognition that, even in the interests of the parts, it is necessary that policy should concern itself with the interests of the whole.

It has long, however, been impossible to restrict the application of this principle within the bounds of Europe. We cannot now have a merely Western policy. East and West, North and South, have been brought into such close communion that a dispute about an insignificant island in the Pacific, or about some obscure district in Central Africa, or about a court ceremony in China, may become the cause of a conflict in which the greatest nations in Europe may be involved—a conflict, moreover, which may rapidly outstrip its original limits, and diffuse itself, so intimate and intricate are now the relations of the world's peoples, by a sort of electric contagion, throughout the life of mankind. Statesmanship, therefore, is now bound to be international, in a sense universal. It must propose to itself, as its highest aim, to preserve not the peace of Europe only, but the peace of the world—and this for the plain, prosaic reason, if for no other, that the increasing neighbourhood of the earth's nations, and their advance in civilisation and luxury, make war ever more difficult to confine within a definite area, and ever more costly and disastrous.

It is from this point of view—the point of view of a statesmanship not international merely, but universal—that we must regard the alliance recently formed between Great Britain and Japan. We must regard it from this stand-point, if only because the English Government must so regard it. It cannot plead "British interests" only, or Japanese interests only, in justification of this alliance; it is bound to take account, and would itself admit that it is bound to take account, of interests wider still—the interests of the world's order, which it must be a constant aim of English statesmanship, even for the sake of England, to preserve and develop. In other words, the Anglo-Japanese treaty, whatever may be urged on its behalf, is only an instrument of sound policy in so far as it tends—not by intention only, but by its natural and probable effect—to maintain the peace of mankind.

When, from this point of view, we examine the terms of the new Treaty, we see that while in form it is an expression of two distinct policies, in effect it is calculated to promote only one—that policy which we may call an exclusive policy of "British Interests." I say British interests because, as we cannot doubt, the responsibility of initiative and decision in regard to this Treaty rests with England, and because, in concluding it, England has looked to her own good rather than to the good of her ally—has used Japan rather than been used by her, and has used her mainly for the sake of securing certain supposed advantages to this country in the Far East. For this reason, and for the sake of clearing

the argument, I shall say little in this Tract about the effect of the Treaty on the relations between Japan and Corea. We can the better afford to disregard them because they raise substantially the same questions as the relations between England and China, and any conclusions to which we come with regard to the latter will, therefore, allowing for differences of situation and degree, apply to the former also.

We say that the policy of the Treaty is an exclusive policy of "British interests," rather than a policy of international or universal statesmanship, because, although by profession it is largely directed to something else—towards the maintenance of "the *status quo* and general peace in the Far East and the independence and territorial integrity" of China and Corea—its language and provisions, in other respects, are inconsistent with such an intention. A policy which sincerely and unequivocally aimed at the prevention of aggressive war in the Far East, and at the protection of Chinese independence, would, as we may unhesitatingly admit, be a great policy, worthy of a statesmanship far-sighted and universal. It would, too, in a large and permanent sense, be a policy of "British interests." But to deserve such praise as this, it must understand its own purposes, be rigorously consistent with those purposes, and respect the conditions of their practical fulfilment.

It is here that the Treaty fails. In form, as we have seen, it is an expression of two policies—a major policy and a minor—an international policy of preserving peace in the Far East, and maintaining Chinese independence, and a merely imperial policy of British interests. But it is clear, from the language and stipulations of the Treaty, that the international policy is not really adopted on international grounds—that it is not rightly understood, and that the conditions of its fulfilment are either not recognised, or are not unequivocally accepted. The major policy is eclipsed or neutralised by the minor. The consequence of this is that neither the greater policy of preserving the world's peace, nor the smaller policy of advancing the essential interests of England, is really secured by the Treaty. This, we have no hesitation in saying, will be proved to be true, should it ever become an effective instrument. The new alliance can only accomplish its professed object on condition that, of the two distinct policies which it avows, that which is lasting and international is allowed its natural supremacy over that which is temporary and merely British.

An English statesman, proposing to himself the great aim of preserving peace in the Far East and maintaining Chinese independence, is bound to recognise that such an aim carries with it its own logic, and imposes on him a definite course of action. It is not open to him to avow such a policy, and then to adopt measures irreconcilable with it. Now, there are two general conditions, the strict and rigid observance of which is necessary both to the preservation of peace in the Far East,

and to the maintenance of Chinese independence. The first of these conditions is entire abstinence on the part of foreign Powers, Western or Eastern, from interference in the domestic affairs of the Chinese Empire. Unless that condition is accepted, the independence of that empire becomes a meaningless phrase, and the peace of the Far East—and not only of the Far East, but of Europe itself, and the civilised world—must be perpetually endangered. The English statesman who fails to recognise this cannot be said to understand his business. If our object is not peace, but war; or if we are indifferent about war; or if we are prepared for the risks of war; or if the "British interests" at stake are, in our opinion, such that war on a great scale—war in Asia, and war in Europe, and war, perhaps, in America—would not be too high a price to pay for securing them—then, indeed, we need not concern ourselves about the possible effect of foreign interference in the internal affairs of China. But this is not the stand-point of the Treaty. Its ostensible stand-point is peace, and the independence of the Chinese empire. Those who adopt that stand-point —or who profess to adopt it—are not entitled to disregard the possible consequences of European action in China. They must take account of those consequences, and give to them their due importance. Now, we may venture on the prediction—and venture on it with the melancholy conviction of its certain and near fulfilment—that if the policy of foreign interference in China is continued, not only will Chinese independence—such as it is at the present moment—be destroyed, but war in the Far East, and war in Europe itself, will be the inevitable consequence. Those who choose this interference choose war, and under such conditions the alliance between Great Britain and Japan cannot prevent war, and may very possibly extend its area. The one certain advantage it secures for us is an ally in the Far East, should war break out.

To make this the more clear, let me explain what I mean by the policy of foreign interference in Chinese internal affairs. I mean that policy which for many years has been pursued, first by one Western Power and then by another, and which eight years ago was adopted by Japan—the policy of compelling the Chinese either to admit foreign missionaries, or foreign traders, or foreign adventurers, or to bring their domestic policy, their social customs, their methods of administration, or their industrial enterprises into accord with European ideas. We have described this as a policy of interference in Chinese internal affairs, but in effect it has been much more. Interference has almost invariably been followed by aggression and dismemberment, and by the development of an alien ascendency in China itself. The relations between foreign Powers and China, from the time of the first war waged by Great Britain in 1840 down to the punitive expedition of last year—have had a uniform character; they have been relations of resistance and defence on the part of China, of increasing interference and spoliation on the part of the foreign Powers. It

was in the nature of things that this interference and spoliation—unless abandoned entirely—should tend to increase. They created their own justification. It was inevitable that they should produce resentment and exasperation in the Chinese mind—a bewildered and helpless indignation—and along with this such a political and social confusion as added new difficulties to the tasks of Chinese Government, and arrested any native forces of progress which might otherwise have declared themselves. For sixty years—to go no further back—the history of China in its dealings with the Western Powers has been this: an obstinate conservatism, clinging to an old religion, an old policy, an old social order, an old industry, an old ceremonialism; patiently laborious, entirely pacific, and non-aggressive; but exposed to the irresistible encroachments of alien nations, abandoning themselves to the instincts of the harpy, proclaiming their religion by methods of oppression and injustice, advancing their industry by a policy of bloodshed, and bringing in a chaos of Western ideas by a process which stupified and humiliated an ancient and great nation, and involved in contempt all that it held sacred.

The latest proof and consequence of this policy pursued by Europe in China may be found in the Peace Protocol, the terms of which were forced upon the Chinese Government in August, 1901. That Protocol bears witness to two things—first, to the truth of what we have just said, that Western aggression in China has ever found a new apology for itself, and new motives for extending its area, in the confusion and disorder which it has itself occasioned; secondly, to the condition to which China, at the present time, has been reduced by the pursuance of that policy. The maintenance of the *status quo* in the Far East is one of the professed objects of the new Treaty. It is important, therefore, to recognise what that *status quo* actually is within the limits of the Chinese empire. Much must depend, so far as the declared purposes of the Treaty are concerned, on whether that *status quo* is favourable to settlement and orderly progress in China, or, on the contrary, contains within itself the seeds of new dangers, and a provocation to new aggressive interference.

Now, by the provisions of the Peace Protocol, or by earlier agreements which it includes and re-enacts, China is compelled to accept a number of regulations, great and small, far-reaching and minute, which place her under the constant surveillance of foreign Powers, and afford them abundant opportunities for a disturbing and irritating interference in her affairs, and for developing their encroachments upon her freedom. The avowed policy of the new Treaty is, as we have seen, a policy of Chinese integrity and independence, and yet, by the fifth article of the Protocol, China agrees to prohibit the importation into its territory of arms and ammunition, as well as of materials exclusively used for their manufacture. That is to say, an essential condition of integrity and independence—perfect freedom to adopt all measures of self-defence—

is struck at by the very country, amongst other countries, which has now formed an alliance professedly in the interests of China. The other provisions of the Protocol are conceived in the same spirit, and carry with them similar consequences. It assigns to the Foreign Legations in Peking an exclusive district, which may be made defensible, in which Chinese are not at liberty to reside, and in which each Power is entitled to maintain a permanent guard for the defence of its Legation. It gives to the Powers the right to occupy certain points of Chinese territory, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. It compels the Chinese Government to issue edicts prohibiting for ever, under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society. It makes it obligatory on China to improve the navigation of its own rivers, and in one instance at least places this work under the control of an international commission. It forces upon the Government a scheme for the re-organisation of the Foreign Office, and compels it to make modifications in the Court ceremonial for the reception of foreign representatives. It is perhaps hardly necessary to mention the large war indemnity which China, under the Protocol, is obliged to pay to the Powers. Admitting the necessity for the collective punitive expedition, and the title of those engaged in it to exact reparation from China for the outrages which were pleaded as its justification, a money payment was one of its inevitable forms, and a form which was less open to objection than any other. As, however, important Chinese revenues are assigned as security for its payment, this indemnity also is transformed into a means of increasing European control.

This, then, so far as the Chinese Empire is concerned, is the *status quo*—the kind of "independence and territorial integrity"—which it is one of the purposes of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to maintain. It is a *status quo* in which China is subjected to the control and interference of foreign powers; in which she is hindered and restrained in the discharge of the first duty of a free State—the defence of its liberty; in which a part of her capital is alienated from its own citizens in the interest of an armed stranger, and a stranger who pours contempt upon her most sacred traditions and customs; in which her ports, her railways, her roads, her revenues, and important points of her territory are virtually under foreign control; in which her Government is humiliated and discredited in the eyes of the very people amongst whom it is its duty to preserve order—a people, too, rendered agitated and resentful by the presence of hateful aliens; in which she is exposed to the constant pressure of Western nations, rivals in a policy of encroachment and spoliation, and engaged in forcing upon her, not a settled system of beliefs and civilisation, but the hundred contending sects of a lapsing creed, the fierce competition of European commerce, the distractions of Western social and political ideas, and

the growing confusion of Western scepticism. It is no exaggeration to say that never, at any time, have the rulers of a great nation been called upon to discharge the two chief tasks of all governments—the task of preserving national freedom, the task of maintaining domestic order—under circumstances so fatal to their right performance as those which have been imposed on the Chinese Government by the policy of the European Powers.

The cessation and abandonment of this policy are, as we have said, a *sine quâ non* of the success of that higher policy to which the Anglo-Japanese alliance is, in part at least, avowedly directed—the policy of Chinese integrity and independence, the policy of peace in the Far East. We may assert it as a certainty of political science, that unless the policy of domestic interference is discontinued, the policy of independence and peace must fail. They are policies incompatible and mutually exclusive. Now it would be a great act of far-sighted and strong statesmanship to discontinue the one policy, and to prosecute the other. Have we any reason to expect the English Government—the existing Government or any other—to be capable of such an act? England is at present engaged in crushing and suppressing a nationality in South Africa. The British empire lives by the subjugation or effacement of nationalities. Wherever it establishes itself, national freedom, in the precise and scientific sense of that term, disappears. This is true, and it is an important truth. Nevertheless, English policy, and the temper of the English people, are not consistent. They are not systematic and continuous; they are irregular, and prone to anomalies. It is possible, therefore, for our statesmen—having no science of fixed policy, and carried hither and thither by a conflict of interests and an ebb and flow of opinions and humours—to crush a nation with one hand, and protect and raise a nation with the other. Be this as it may, amidst all our lapses into a low policy, we must constantly make our appeal for a high policy—a policy such as would recover for our country its dignity, and gain for it a great place as a guardian of peace and freedom. A policy of this order it is open to us to pursue in the Far East at the present time. Our Government has only to be true to the major aim of the new Treaty. and to yield it its natural precedence over the minor aim. But to be true to this major aim, and give effect to it, it must do two things—it must, in the first place, on its own account, and on behalf of England, initiate the new policy of non-interference in Chinese domestic affairs, and consistently and resolutely pursue it. Let China be free, as Germany or Russia is free, to exclude or admit the English missionary, the English trader, the English "reformer," and English social customs. Let her territory be relieved of the presence of the English soldier. Let her ports, so far as England is concerned, once more become her own. Let her roads, her rivers, her railways, and her political and judicial machinery be restored to her own control. In a

word, let the expression "territorial integrity and independence"—and it is the English Government, in its new Treaty, that has chosen and used these words—have its plain, unequivocal sense in regard to China, as it has in regard to any other self-governing country; and let us trust to China, as in the long run we may safely trust, to receive from England what England has to give her, and to give in return what England ought to obtain from her.

It may be said that such a policy as this would be a reversal of the policy we have pursued in China for sixty years. Undoubtedly, it would be such a reversal, but the time calls for it—calls for it not merely on those large grounds of liberty and justice which a political scepticism sometimes affects to despise, but on the more obvious and immediate grounds—grounds urged by the new Treaty—of peace in the Far-East, of Chinese independence, of plain, enduring English interests. Let us admit that the policy of the "open door," as we call it, is for the Chinese, as for all other peoples, in the long run a sound policy—that no nation, Eastern or Western, can now safely cut itself off from other nations, but must open its mind, and open its life, to the stream of the world's influences, and be prepared to take, and to give, the best. Let us admit, too, that Europe has a natural mission to the East—to those nations which seem to us self-contained and backward—and that this mission is to raise them to the plane of its own highest life, when once a sure criterion of that highest life has been discovered, and it can be given free from the doubtful or base. But if we admit this, it becomes all the more clear that the policy of the "open door" is only a sound policy, capable of yielding its best results, either to those who open or those who enter, when it is a policy freely embraced from within—even if at first slowly and reluctantly embraced—instead of being imposed from without.

But, it may be argued, there are two great hindrances to the adoption of this new and wise policy of non-interference—one the hindrance of English opinion, representing, as we may say, the pressure of English commercial interests; the other, the hindrance of the existing international situation in regard to China. We need not deny the reality of these hindrances. They are a consequence of the bad, traditional policy which we have pursued for sixty years, and which could not be pursued without fettering our statesmanship, and limiting our moral freedom. But these hindrances are not too great to be overcome. English commercial opinion, it is true, is not always a high, enlightened opinion. It is often the victim of false fears and real fallacies—such a fallacy, for example, as the fallacy that "the trade follows the flag," such a fear as that which loads capital with the cost of arms, instead of recognising that the greatest of commercial interests is peace, and that peace may be preserved by policy. But English commercial opinion has often

been on the side of peace—sometimes in a sense not noble or broadly sagacious—and it may be brought once more on the side of peace by a policy which would eventually gain great opportunities for English commerce, and gain them at a smaller cost, and with less anxiety, than is possible under a system of provocation and interference. In saying this, we are not asking our Government to follow the policy which we sometimes disdainfully reject as visionary and idealistic : we are only asking it to be consistent with the policy which, in principle, it itself avows in its treaty. In that treaty it professes not to be aggressive, and not to be acting exclusively for England, and for English trade, but internationally, and for the trade of all countries. The "open door" in China, it tells us, is to be open to all. English commercial opinion, therefore, if it is short-sighted enough to demand a wasteful and provocative policy of interference and exclusive interests, must be resisted for its own sake, and for the sake of the still greater interests which our Government professes to have in view.

But, it may be argued, if the hindrance of English commercial opinion can be thus overcome, the hindrance arising from the ambitions of other foreign Powers with regard to China has still to be faced. This brings us to the second of the two general conditions, the observance of which is necessary for the preservation of peace in the Far East, and the maintenance of Chinese independence. If England reverses or suspends her policy of interference in China, will other Powers do the same? This hindrance is, in reality, smaller than the former one. England it was that began the policy of aggression in China, and England it is that ought to end it. She has the power to end it, if only she has the will. She will have overcome her main difficulty, when she has overcome herself. Of the European nations that have recently taken a part in the movement of aggression against China, all have not an equal capacity for continuing such a policy. Germany—the latest to enter the field of competition—has, it is true, easily distanced all others in reckless brutality and raw, provocative insolence, but it is improbable that either her domestic situation, or the immature strength of her navy, would allow her to permanently develop her hostile action—especially in face of an effective resistance in China, supported by other Powers. The three Powers that have the greatest capacity for effectual interference in China are England, Russia, and France. Of these three we may leave France out of account, both because her tendency is not, except under pressure of rivalry and competition, to extend what she calls her "colonial" enterprises, and because she has her hands already full. Moreover, no one who understands the true genius and temper of France, as distinguished from the purposes of some of her official representatives—can doubt that to a disinterested and bold policy on the part of England she would respond—and this in spite of her

entanglements with Russia. The Power really rival to ourselves in the Far East is Russia herself, and Russia is a rival because, like England, she is restless, disturbing, aggressive, and this in a field of action in which she is brought naturally into conflict with us. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, in fact, as all the world sees, is an alliance against Russia, whether for the sake of English interests in China, or of Japanese interests in Corea. Therefore, when the high international policy, which we are urging upon our Government, has reckoned with Russia, it has reckoned with its most formidable opponent. Now, there is only one sure and final way by which England can check Russian aggression upon China, and that is by ceasing aggression herself, and by discontinuing that policy of interference in Chinese domestic affairs which has always brought, and must always bring, aggression in its train. The advantages of that discontinuance would be so many, and so great, that they can scarcely be exaggerated. For one thing, it would fulfil the major policy of the new Treaty—give it a force certain and irresistible—by enlisting China herself in its support. It is absurd to talk of an alliance for the protection of Chinese "integrity and independence" if China herself is against us, and ready to turn, in her distress, to Russia, or to any other Power, that comes to her with an illusory offer of help. But China will be against us so long as we have not proved to her that she can trust us. She knows us as the oldest and most powerful of her enemies. She sees that in this very Treaty, which has been ostensibly framed to protect her integrity and independence, there are dark, insidious clauses, ominous of further pressure and interference on our part. She may well fear that the intention of the Treaty is not a Chinese intention, or an international intention, but a British intention, and that our aim is not to protect her, but only to protect our share in her from the greed of others. If we disabuse her of this fear—and we can only disabuse her of it by ceasing to oppress her, ceasing to impose ourselves upon her, ceasing to thrust upon her our religions, our trade and our policy—we shall win her, and win her both for our commerce and for what is best in our ideas. Under such circumstances, the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be transformed into a triple alliance, with China as its most important member. Such an alliance would have, for its special purposes, a force certain and irresistible. Russia—in so far as Russia stands for aggression and disturbance—would be checked and neutralised by it; England would regain by it, what she has lost, fame and place in the world as a great guardian of peace and freedom; and the international situation, not in the Far East only, but in Europe also, would become largely one of calm and promise.

These results, we say, would follow, and follow as a sure consequence, not from the adoption of what might be considered a new, chimerical policy of fantastic ideals, but from the consistent prosecution of the

policy which our Government itself avows—the policy of peace and the *status quo* in the Far East, the policy of Chinese integrity and independence. What will be the consequence if we do not so prosecute it—if, instead of prosecuting it, we adhere to the old policy of domestic interference in China? The consequence will be that, in the future as in the past, that policy will entail new aggression and spoliation; that we shall have China not with us, but against us; that Russia, with its illusory promises, will seem the friend, and England the enemy; that we shall have to protect "English interests" in the Far East with the aid of Japan alone, against a hostile China on the one hand, and a hostile Russia on the other; and that the international situation, East and West being now so bound together, will be one of immeasurable anxiety, tending ever towards an immeasurable war.

In the presence of such alternatives, can we doubt that the true aim of England in the Far East—whether we are looking to "British interests," in the sure and permanent sense, or to the greater good of the world's peace—should be to secure the confidence and friendship of China, and to do this by respecting her freedom, her sense of nationality, her attachment to ancient traditions, and her native methods of rule, trusting to the slow, infallible force of teaching and influence to bring her, by degrees, up to the level of a higher culture? Over and above the arguments we have already adduced in support of this policy, there is an argument, important not to England only but to all the European Powers—the argument of the inherent strength of the Chinese people. In dealing with China, let us remember, we are not dealing with a nation passive and effete. China, in her relations with England and Europe, wields great natural forces—the force of numbers, the force of labour, the force of expansion, the force of self-sufficiency. In dealing with her, we are dealing with a population of 400,000,000, and a population amongst the most industrious in the world, extraordinarily patient, extraordinarily active, and with a capacity for asserting itself, even when, in appearance, yielding. Almost alone, amongst Eastern peoples, the Chinese have left their native limits and carried their power of plodding labour to countries so distant as the United States and Australia. China, at the same time, can stand, in a material sense, alone, as she has stood for a thousand years—feeding herself and clothing herself, without dependence on the products of other lands. These forces—forces of self-possession and permanent resistance—she wields in her dealings with the European Powers, and she adds to them other advantages, hardly less great—such an advantage, for example, as the vast mineral reserves which she is only now beginning to touch.

Are we to pit ourselves against this stupendous aggregation of human forces, or are we to respect it, and enlist it on our side? The answer to this question comes from South-Africa. For two years and a half we have been engaged in an attempt to subdue a population not

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of 400,000,000, but less than that of a London borough. We have employed in this attempt the greatest army ever sent from our shores. We have spent upon it the lives of thousands of our bravest soldiers, and a capital of £200,000,000. We have mustered for it, as Mr. Chamberlain boasts—and if he had been capable of understanding the significance of such a boast he would never have uttered it—not the forces of the United Kingdom only, but forces from Canada, Australia and India, and we have been brought by it, or by the consequences of it, to the verge of conscription itself. Nevertheless, even after two and a half years of such an effort and such expenditure, 8,000 Boers are baffling and occupying a British army of 230,000 men, and when that remnant is crushed, and the war is over, we have still a greater problem to solve than the problem of arms.

Yet bloody, disastrous, dangerous, costly and futile as the war in South Africa has been, it fades into insignificance compared with the war which we are preparing for ourselves, if we persist in our old policy of pitting ourselves against China, enlisting against us her mind and her strength—her force of numbers, her force of labour, her force of expansion, her force of self-possession, and the new vast force of her mineral treasure—instead of frankly and definitively abandoning that policy in favour of the policy which would leave her free, and win her. The Treaty between Great Britain and Japan contains, as we have seen, the two policies, the major and the minor—the policy of peace and Chinese independence, the policy of interference and British interests. If the Treaty is interpreted in the sense of the major policy, all the really solid advantages which the minor policy represents will be secured, and a great contribution will have been made to the peace of the world; if it is interpreted in the sense of the minor policy, both British interests and the world's interests will be sacrificed.

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