

The Truth about the War in South Africa.

AN APPEAL TO HONEST MEN.

BY

Leys
W. T. STEAD.

PRICE ONE PENNY.

NEW OF REVIEWS" OFFICE,
Y HOUSE, NORFOLK STREET, LONDON, W.C.

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“Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel just :
And he but naked, though lock'd up in steel,
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted.”

Henry VI.

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“REVIEW OF REVIEWS” OFFICE,
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THE TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE APPEAL TO HONEST MEN.

I APPEAL to honest men because it is only an honest man who will admit that the question whether we are in the right or wrong in this war is not in the least affected by the fact that the immediate cause of the rupture was the Boers' ultimatum.

To those professors of unctuous rectitude, who have the hypocrisy and effrontery to pretend that there can be no question as to the justice of this war, because, as the *Standard* actually declared, "we are fighting in self-defence," it is idle to address any appeal, either to reason, conscience, or common sense. But there are many who are incapable of deluding themselves by such cant, and to them I appeal.

Are we in the right in this war? It is a question worth considering. It is not settled by waving the Union Jack, nor even by chanting "Rule Britannia." The attempt to silence its consideration by brutal violence and rowdy clamour is well calculated to give pause to all reflecting men. The Jewish mob which cried out "Crucify Him! Crucify Him!" imagined that they had effectually carried their point. They gained their immediate ends no doubt. Not even the pleading voice of the Roman judge could be heard above the din. They got their way and got their crucifixion. But it brought them an immortality of infamy, and followed them for all time as the supreme example of the murderous results which are apt to follow when the stormy clamour of an excited mob is allowed to silence the still small voice of reason and justice.

What is the first condition of just judgment? Is it not ability to put ourselves in our brother's place, to consider what we should do if we were standing in his shoes, and then when we have with a sympathetic imagination examined the facts, to judge him as we should wish ourselves to be judged?

Put yourself in President Kruger's place, and ask whether you would not do exactly as President Kruger has done—only more so—so far as relates to the Ultimatum. The case is clear as daylight. There is fortunately no dispute as to the facts. Which side is right or which is wrong in the controversy may for the moment be ignored, for the intrinsic merits of the dispute do not affect the simple question which must first be disposed of.

The Boers, rightly or wrongly, believe, and are prepared to die rather than abandon their belief, that the Convention of 1884 did, in the words of successive English statesmen, from Lord Derby to Mr. Chamberlain, guarantee them an absolute right of internal self-government, which forbade any interference by Great Britain in their affairs.

The British Government, rightly or wrongly, believes that, despite Mr. Chamberlain's explicit repudiation of any right to interfere to force upon the Transvaal reforms in the internal affairs of the State, the time has come when it must for the protection of its subjects interfere directly in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, and finding its interference resented proceeds to enforce its demands by the despatch of horse, foot, and artillery for the avowed purpose of compelling the Boers to submit.

Every additional soldier sent to South Africa since the Bloemfontein Conference was sent out admittedly and avowedly as a menace to President Kruger, in order to induce him by the display of armed force to permit us to dictate our own terms as to the way in which his country should be governed.

Whether the Boers or the British were right in their original contention, no one questions the fact that the despatch of thousands of armed men from the inexhaustible store of our Imperial resources to the frontiers of the Transvaal was a menace of war. "Do what we tell you, or it will be worse for you! If you don't give in we shall send thousands and ever more thousands of soldiers to surround you, to throttle you, and to compel you to submit." That was our policy. The Boers bore it patiently for a time:— But at last they were driven first to remonstrate, and then to declare that the despatch of any more troops must be regarded as a declaration of war. And because they did this, we are told that they began the war, and we are fighting in self-defence!

Put ourselves in their place. Imagine that the French had a difference of opinion with us, say as to the evacuation of Egypt.

Our declarations and our pledges on that subject were quite as explicit and as precise—to say the very least—as anything the Boers ever promised about the Outlanders. Suppose that the French intimated that in their judgment the time had come for us to fulfil our obligations, to keep our word, and to clear out of the Nile Valley. We should, of course, object. Suppose, then, that France began despatching ironclad after ironclad to lie off the Suez Canal; suppose that she avowed her intention and had the means to send a fleet twice as strong as any we could muster to Alexandria, with an army large enough to sweep Egypt from the Mediterranean to Omdurman, how long should we be in discovering that such action on the part of France made her the aggressor, and justified us in stopping it by an immediate challenge and ultimatum? No State in the world would consider itself bound to wait until its neighbour brought up overpowering forces with the avowed object of coercion.

If a highwayman presents a pistol at your head, you do not become the aggressor if you throw up his hand.

Hence I address my appeal to men honest enough to admit that the Boer's ultimatum in no way affects the question of our right to make this war.

If we had been in President Kruger's place we should with one consent have been declaring that the ultimatum was forced from us by the deliberate and calculated aggression of a State determined to destroy our independence. This is so obvious that argument is wasted upon those who have not sufficient tincture of the elementary virtue of honesty to admit it at once without reserve.

To those honest men and to those alone I address myself. As for the others who in their unctuous rectitude are protesting that they are reluctantly driven to make war in self-defence, we might as well discuss the Ten Commandments with a pirate, or discourse to a burglar upon the Sermon on the Mount.

The merits of a policy leading to war, and of a policy which has, unfortunately, culminated in war, are no more affected by the question as to which party took the responsibility of challenging the intentions of the other, than the merits of the dispute between our American colonists and George III. was affected by the question as to which fired the first shot in the Revolutionary War. Having thus disposed of the controversy as to the ultimatum, without more delay than I proceed to discuss the question, "Are we in the Right in this war?"

CHAPTER II.

CAUSE FOR MISGIVINGS.

WHEN we are summoned to go to war we need always to be reminded that we are sitting as judges in our own case. This is true in all wars, and of both parties to the dispute. It should always make us very cautious before accepting the complacent assumptions of flattering self-love or the promptings of interested motive. We need to search narrowly to see that no essential fact is overlooked, that full justice is done to the case of our opponents, and that we have successfully eliminated all prejudice, passion or selfish feeling before pronouncing judgment.

Before we decide to pass what is equivalent to a death sentence upon a foreign state in friendly treaty relations with Her Majesty, we surely ought to approach the discussion of the question with an anxious, nay even a tormenting desire to ascertain whether we are in solemn sad reality shut up to this solution and no other of the question at issue.

If the matter in dispute involved but the life and liberty of one single man, even if he were the basest and wickedest of mankind, the conscience of mankind would not merely demand, but insist, upon suspension of judgment until everything that can be urged by the accused in his own defence had been fully heard, and a verdict returned by a jury of impartial men, who were no parties to the suit, who had no personal animus against the prisoner, and who, above all, had no hope of profit by his condemnation.

How much more, then, is it incumbent upon us to banish from the Judgment Seat whose verdict may doom not one single man, but hundreds and thousands, to a violent death, all motives of passion and prejudice, of personal resentment, or of Imperial ambition, in order

that the capital sentence may not be passed, until we have at least afforded the threatened State the irreducible minimum of security against mistaken judgment which the law guarantees the red-handed murderer.

I put it to my reader as an honest man, has this been done? We have had tumultuous and passionate gatherings in Trafalgar Square. Peace meetings have been broken up. Every device known to unscrupulous journalism has been used to excite prejudice against the Boer. Everything, in short, has been done to inflame popular passion and distort judgment, to an extent which would instantly vitiate any trial in any tribunal in which it was permitted.

The unbridled indulgence in all manner of appeals not to the reason but to the passion of our people, the hoarse cry of vengeance for Majuba, and the cynical appeals to the coarsest instincts of Imperial ambition and national selfishness, are the most patent features of the present situation. They are the first reason for misgivings whether or not we are in the right in this quarrel. We may be, or we may not be. But we certainly have not taken the elementary precaution to avoid being misled by the fool-frenzy of popular passion or the sinister promptings of self-interest.

The second cause for grave misgivings is that our history in the past has shown a long and melancholy list of wars into which we have plunged in haste, to repent at leisure with the melancholy reflection that we had made a disastrous and a criminal mistake. Whatever may be said as to the popularity of the present war, its popularity is not to be compared to the popularity of the Crimean War. All the false prophets of 1853-4 were noisily blatant in their declarations as to the divine duty of going forth to war against Russia. Micaiah had an even worse time fifty years ago than he has to-day. Zedekiah, the son of Chenaanah, and all the company of the false prophets who lured Ahab to his doom at Ramoth-gilead, combined their forces to launch us into that fatal war.

It was disguised, as this attack on the Transvaal is disguised, as a war in vindication of human liberty, of lofty morality, and the progress of mankind. We now know that we backed the wrong horse. The war gave a new lease of life to the hideous despotism of the Sultan; it gave a death-blow to the hopes of a whole generation of Eastern Christians; it cost the lives of 500,000 men; entailed an expenditure of £250,000,000. It began an era of armaments and war, and it shunted Russia through Central Asia on to India. It is difficult to conceive of any war which contrived so absolutely to defeat every high-flown aspiration of those who hounded it on than the war in the Crimea. To this day we are suffering from its inexhaustible harvest of mischief. Having made such an irreparable mistake less than half a century since, we shall indeed do well to look carefully lest once again we may not be committing a similar blunder, and perpetrating under pharisaic benedictions a similar crime.

We appear to have come round to the time when our nation seems doomed to make an unjust war. Once in twenty years the temptation to slaughter seems to assail with irresistible force great masses of our

people. What happened in the Crimean War every one remembers. But little more than twenty years after the Peace of Paris the Jingo fever broke out savagely in our midst. Thanks to Mr. Gladstone its worst consequences were averted. But in Afghanistan they waged two long bloody and disastrous wars, in which, after slaughtering thousands, and spending millions, we were glad to evacuate a country which it was criminal lunacy to invade. Once more we have reached the moment of fatality. Twenty-one years since Lord Lytton and Lord Salisbury made war upon the Ameer of Afghanistan. Sir Alfred Milner and Lord Salisbury are now making war upon the President of the South African Republic. The recurrence of the period when John Bull seems to go "must" like an old elephant is an additional cause for looking well to our path.

I lay no stress upon the fact that many leading statesmen who have held high office under the Crown, and who in all probability will hold high office again, have declared this war to be unnecessary, and therefore criminal. Their criticisms will be discounted by the imputation of party motives. But while laying no stress upon their impeachment, it is at least worth remembering that while the Opposition naturally opposes, that fact neither vitiates the force of its arguments nor weakens the value of its exposition of the facts. Even if we minimise the importance of any Liberal criticisms, the fact that Mr. Morley, Sir W. Harcourt, Mr. H. Campbell Bannerman, and Mr. Bryce should all have united in censuring the justice of the war should not be forgotten.

But in estimating the probabilities of the question under discussion there is one element which must profoundly disturb the complacency even of the most moderate optimist. This is that the policy which has brought on the war is a policy which has been repudiated and denounced in advance by the very Minister who is now responsible for its adoption. In my previous pamphlet I reproduced the very words in which Mr. Chamberlain denounced as immoral and unwise the very policy which has landed us in war. I quote his public declaration that he would never be a party to the very identical policy which has brought about this war. Mr. Chamberlain, no doubt, has changed his mind. It is a habit of his so frequently indulged in as to suggest that his right name is Chameleon, not Chamberlain. But the fact that the policy which he publicly declared was the only sound, moral, safe, and wise policy, down to this very year, has now been abandoned, with the immediate result that we are confronted by a war in which we have to face every evil which he predicted would be the inevitable result, gives us pause. Can a policy be right now which was publicly demonstrated to be so abominably wrong in 1896 and in 1897? Circumstances alter cases, no doubt. But if we had no right to offer President Kruger anything more than friendly counsel in 1896, how comes it that we have a right to do what Secretaries of State have constantly repudiated, viz., go to war to force reforms upon a State with whose internal government we have admitted over and over again we have no right to interfere?

Another reason for entertaining grave misgivings as to the justice of our quarrel is the fact that even if we are right, the letter of the law is unmistakably against us. We guaranteed the Boers complete freedom

of independence in their internal affairs. The Convention of 1884 is absolutely clear on this point. Lord Derby, who negotiated it, assured the Boers when he signed it, "Your Government will be left free to govern the country without interference." He reported to the Acting High Commissioner at the Cape that the Convention granted "the same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in the Free State." Mr. W. H. Smith, when leader of the Government in the House of Commons, declared in the most positive fashion:—

It is a cardinal principle of that settlement (the Convention of 1884) that the internal government and legislation of the South African Republic shall not be interfered with.

Mr. Balfour in 1896 (January 15th) declared that "the Transvaal is a free and independent Government as regards its internal affairs;" and Lord Salisbury 16 days later declared explicitly that "the Boers have absolute control over their own internal affairs."

The war has been brought about by a departure from this cardinal principle, and by an assertion of a right to dictate both as to legislation and administration in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. This may be all right; but the Boers have a strong *prima facie* case that it is anything but right. The war may be just or unjust, but there is no doubt at all that it is directly and immediately due to what is, on the surface at any rate, an absolute reversal of the principles which have heretofore been recognised as binding upon us.

When we come to ask on whose authority this revolution in our South African policy was brought about, we are confronted by an astounding fact, one which indeed more than justifies the very worst misgivings honest men entertain with regard to this war. We are told that it is Sir Alfred Milner's war, and we must accept it on his authority.

But those who make the appeal forget that the fact that we are at war not merely with the Transvaal, but with the whole South African Dutch, is the final conclusive and absolutely unanswerable answer which facts have made to the claims of Sir Alfred Milner to be regarded as a man who knows what he is dealing with. Until war broke out there was a chance that Sir Alfred Milner's reputation might survive. Now it has disappeared. He has been weighed in the balances and has been found wanting. We gave him a free hand. We clapped the telescope to our blind eye in order to let him do as he pleased without criticism, much less control. Never was any High Commissioner more blindly trusted, more loyally supported. We thought we could trust him to know the kind of men he was dealing with, and that he saw his way to keep South Africa in peace. We can think that no more. He has led us into a bloody quagmire by assurances that we had only to follow him unhesitatingly to come out safe and sound and dry on the other side. Every prediction the Milnerite party made has been falsified by the fact. Mr. Chamberlain has himself no small cause for resentment at the way in which he was misled by the High Commissioner as to the possibility of pursuing a policy of bluff without having to pay the penalty of war. From Cape Town there came to London a constant flood of pacific assurances. "I give you my word of honour," said the

fugleman of the bluffers, "that I am not playing for war." Nearly every mail brought the most vehement declarations that if we only gave Milner his head there would be no war. Mr. Chamberlain repeated these assurances to the Cabinet. Nay, it is even said he repeated them to the leaders of the Opposition. If Ministers under Mr. Chamberlain's guidance forsook the well-trodden familiar path of no interference and strict observance of the obligations of the Convention, it was because Sir Alfred Milner and his friends at Cape Town had satisfied Mr. Chamberlain that they could put the thing through without war. Believing that, Sir Alfred Milner has had his chance, and as a result he has landed us on the very war of races which it was his first duty as High Commissioner to avert. Not all the king's horses and all the king's men can ever set up Sir Alfred Milner's reputation in the opinion of his countrymen. He advised us to change our road, assuring us that he would take us a short cut across ice which was quite strong enough to bear our weight. We believed him. We left the old road. We ventured upon the thin ice at his bidding. It has not supported our weight. On the contrary, it has broken under our feet, and we are now floundering in the waters. Milner, I love thee, but never more be an officer of mine. Never again can we trust his judgment, or pay the slightest regard to his diagnosis of a political situation.

The first fundamental question to be asked of anyone in Sir Alfred's position is whether or not he can discern the real nature of the forces with which he is dealing. The essential question in this Transvaal question was whether you could bluff or bully or squeeze President Kruger into conceding what we demanded without going to war. Milner evidently believed we could. Mr. Rhodes certainly proclaimed aloud that we could. But the result proves that on this fundamental vital fact upon which everything turned they did not know their man. They have put their judgment to the test and it has proved to be worthless.

If in May last Sir Alfred Milner had told the Cabinet that he was going to take up a new policy in the Transvaal which would compel them to summon Parliament in October, call out the reserves, ask for £10,000,000 vote of credit, and necessitate the despatch of 70,000 men to South Africa, they would have dismissed him on the spot rather than face such a prospect. But they were never warned. They were indeed continuously deceived; honestly, no doubt, for Sir Alfred Milner first misled himself. But the facts having proved the High Commissioner to be utterly incapable of appreciating the fundamental factor of the situation, how can any honest man fail to feel grave misgivings as to a policy launched under such auspices which, at its very inception, has falsified all the predictions of its author?

Finally, to all other causes for misgivings as to the justice of our quarrel add this. That in the opinion of every outsider we are as hopelessly, and as manifestly, in the wrong as the French General Staff were in their quarrel with Alfred Dreyfus. We may, of course, scoff at the opinion of the foreigner when it is adverse to ourselves. We sang a very different tune when the opinion of the foreigner condemned the persecutors of Dreyfus.

Then the amazing uniformity of the opinion of everyone outside France was acclaimed as an overwhelming demonstration of the unanimity of the opinion of the intelligence and conscience of mankind. It will hardly do immediately after magnifying the opinion of foreigners in the case of Dreyfus to belittle it when, as it happens, it is equally unanimous in condemning us in the case of the Transvaal. We may not like it, but the fact remains.

Outside the English-speaking world there is only one opinion as to the criminality of our policy in the Transvaal. Opinions may differ as to whether we are animated by lust of gold, Imperial ambition, or a desire for vengeance, but there is no difference of opinion as to the turpitude of our conduct. That we have deliberately plotted to bring about this war in order that we may steal their country from the Boers is an article of faith even among our warmest friends on the Continent. It is strange, if our conduct is actuated solely by such noble, self-sacrificing motives of the loftiest morality, that our good should be so evil spoken of. The fact, however, is unfortunately only too manifest. If the voice of the foreigner anticipates the verdict of posterity, then we have a poor look-out at the hands of History. For the verdict of the foreigner is that in levying war on the Transvaal Britain is acting as the Pharisaic Pirate of the World.

For all these reasons therefore it seems true that an honest man anxious to do justice, and to avoid imbruing his hand in his brother's blood, may well feel more than dubious as to the answer he should return to the question:—Are we in the right in this war?

CHAPTER III.

WRONGS "INTOLERABLE" AND OTHERWISE.

It is often asked by indignant patriots whether we are indifferent to the wrongs of our fellow countrymen in the Transvaal. They seem to imply that those who object to light up the flames of a civil and servile war in South Africa are shamefully lacking in the sense of obligation to the cause of humanity. That the headstrong blundering of incapable redressers of the wrongs of the Outlanders has already inflicted upon the Outlanders a thousand times more wretchedness than Boermisgovernment would have caused them in ten years to come is true, no doubt, but I do not insist upon that point. It will take a great deal of redress born of franchise to make up to the helpless crowd of 50,000 refugees at Cape Town, now being fed from day to day by public charity, the hardships which they are enduring as the result of Mr. Chamberlain's policy.

What I would rather dwell upon is the comparative urgency of two rival claims upon our philanthropic zeal. The Outlanders in the Transvaal are not the only people in the world whom it is our duty to defend and whose grievances we ought, if possible, to redress. To hear some people talk the Outlanders are the only class of persons in the whole wide world who suffer from unjust laws and tyrannous oppression. But the fact is otherwise. There are many people to whom we are under

solemn obligations whose sufferings are immeasurably greater than those of the Outlanders. Yet to-day no one says a word as to our duty to them. It may be worth while recalling briefly some facts which are at present completely ignored.

Lord Rosebery speaks of the "intolerable conditions of subjection and injustice" to which they are subjected in the Transvaal. The conditions are not good, but to speak of them as "intolerable" is to trifle with the English language. Not only were they tolerable, but not an Outlander in the Transvaal but has shown by his presence there that he is willing and able to tolerate them. They do not like them any more than they like the African sun, but they put up with both for the sake of the golden treasure found beneath the surface.

They are part of the disagreeables of life, part of the price which they pay and are willing to pay for the chance of making their fortunes in the El Dorado of Africa. Paradoxical though it may sound, it is nevertheless perfectly true that the Outlanders, one and all, would regard it as a far more intolerable grievance to be shut out from the Transvaal than to be compelled to submit to the very worst wrongs for which they seek redress.

No Outlander need be in the Transvaal unless he deliberately chooses it as his residence. Most of them have travelled thousands of miles by sea and land in order to take up their abode under the very conditions of subjection and injustice which Lord Rosebery describes as intolerable, and none of them have shown the slightest readiness to sacrifice their lives in order to purchase their liberties.

Not only are the Outlanders one and all voluntary victims of Boer "subjection and injustice," but there are very few of them. They are, all told, not a quarter of a million, and of these there are very few who are not very much better off than they were at home.

Mr. Morley's description of the lot of these victims of intolerable "subjection and injustice" is worth quoting here.

The Transvaal labourer is more or less content to go on with his high wages of from 15s. to £2 a day. The return of the wages for 1898 gives an average of over £1 a day to each white man, and 80 per cent. of them have rooms in addition free, and though living is dear yet the figures leave a large margin to put by or send home. With these earnings the worker is naturally fairly satisfied, for the political condition does not yet, to his knowledge, touch him. He has not yet suffered much, if at all, from the way the law is administered; he does not yet directly feel taxation, and he has rather a dread of a change which, while bringing rest and progress, might, he fancies, and possibly with truth, tend to lower prices, and with that wages.

When we come to examine into the conditions of "subjection and injustice" which are so intolerable, what do we find? That it takes under the new franchise law about twelve months longer for a foreigner to get a vote in the Transvaal than he would in this country. When he gets his vote he can elect, not only members for the Second Volksraad, but for the First, and also for the President and Commandant-General—a privilege never allowed to naturalised foreigners in this country. As for taxation, he pays 10 per cent. on his imports, whereas the Cape and Natal charge 15 per cent. The police is perhaps as corrupt as that

of New York—although that is doubtful, and the ring that battens on monopolies and concessions is no worse than Tammany Hall. They have a press practically free to the point of license, absolute freedom of religion, and open courts.

Not even the worst enemies of the Boers allege that any Outlander women have suffered outrage at their hands, and as for attacks on life, the fact that for twelve months past they can only produce the deaths of Edgar and Mrs. Applebee is the most conclusive proof that the Transvaal is singularly free from the worst form of violent crime. Probably this immunity from murder would not continue if the Outlanders were permitted greater license in the procuring of weapons, but we need not enter into that. The Outlanders belong to all nationalities. It is only our own British Outlanders who make serious complaints of subjection and injustice. So far from regarding the Transvaal as an intolerable tyranny, Americans, Irish, Germans, Dutch, and French Outlanders have volunteered to fight in the ranks of the Boers against our soldiers. Not a single Government in the whole world has deemed the wrongs of its subjects in the Transvaal worth even a diplomatic representation. Everybody in the world, excepting ourselves, agrees that the state of things in the Transvaal although far from ideal, is certainly not bad enough to call for any interference from without.

Yet, in order to redress these most "intolerable" wrongs suffered by a mere handful of voluntary victims, we are spending £10,000,000, and putting into the field a larger army than we sent to the Crimea. And Lord Rosebery says we must "close our ranks" and say nothing in criticism of this astonishing enterprise.

Leaving this well-to-do handful of self-sacrificed victims in Johannesburg, let us turn our gaze eastward, to another class of victims whose sufferings are so unmeasureably greater than those of the Outlanders that it is almost an outrage to name them in the same breath. In Macedonia there are living at present not 100,000, but a million and a half fellow Christians under the direct rule of the Turk, who but for our action at the Congress of Berlin would have been free self-governing citizens of the Principality of Bulgaria. For objects of our own, we thrust them back into servitude. Russia had freed them. England with the ready aid of Austria re-enslaved them. But as a salve to our conscience we undertook the responsibility of seeing that they were provided with some kind of autonomous institutions which would secure their lives, their property, and the honour of their women from the lawless outrages of the Turk. It is 21 years since we solemnly undertook that obligation. Repeatedly in more or less ineffectual fashion we have admitted our responsibility to the wretched Macedonians, but from 1878 to 1899 nothing has been done. The Pasha and the Bashi Bazouk are as supreme in Macedonia to-day as they were before the great war of Liberation. Nor is Macedonia the only region where there are grievances crying aloud for redress a thousand-fold more grievous than the worst that is alleged against the Boers. Have we already forgotten Armenia?

The tragedy of that unhappy race was only a year or two ago painfully familiar to us all. Within the last few years the Turks and their Kurdish

allies have massacred more Armenians than all the Outlanders who are claiming the franchise in the Transvaal. In the same period, Armenian women more than twice or thrice the number of the whole female Outlander population in the Transvaal have been subjected to the last extremity of bestial outrage at the hands of savages whose lust was whetted by fanaticism. These wretches were our proteges in a far more real sense than is the Outlander who wanders to the Rand to make his fortune.

The Armenians and Macedonians number probably twentyfold the total number of British subjects in the Transvaal. Not one of them is where he is by his own deliberate choice. They were born in the land where they suffer, and escape for all but a few individuals is impossible. They are denied all the liberties which the Outlanders possess. They are robbed by extortionate tax-gatherers, fleeced by a lawless soldiery, without hope of redress in the Courts. They are treated as dogs by every strolling Moslem; proscribed, hunted, persecuted, they are of all men most miserable. Here, indeed, are conditions of subjection and injustice "intolerable," if you please.

But when all England, thrilled with agonised sympathy for the wrongs, the really intolerable wrongs of these fellow Christians of ours, who owe their miserable plight to the meddling and mischievous diplomacy of our own Government, Lord Rosebery clapped an extinguisher upon the agitation. For Lord Rosebery recoiled in horror from war, even from the risk of war when it was a question of delivering millions from the bondage of Hell. He may have been right.

War is too terrible an argument to be lightly employed even to save millions of men and women from the atrocities of the Turks. But now when war is being let loose in order to redress the two-penny-half-penny grievances of a handful of self-expatriated Englishmen, Lord Rosebery says—what?—"In face of this attack (*sic!*) the nation will I doubt not close its ranks, and relegate party controversy to a more convenient season!" Lord Rosebery should surely leave this kind of thing to the Pecksniffs of Patriotism. "Attack" forsooth!

How eloquently Lord Rosebery discoursed in those days upon the "Angel of Death, which would appear in every hamlet, every village, every town of the United Kingdom to summon your sons or brothers, the flower of your youth and manhood, to lose their lives in this European conflagration." We could well have done with a little of the same pious zeal in protest against the new war, the first which we have waged with white men since the Crimea. As for the unfortunate Macedonians and Armenians—what chance is there now of our being able to ameliorate their miserable lot? To lock up 70,000 of our best fighting men in South Africa by a policy which confirms every foreign power in the conviction that we are absolutely untrustworthy is the very worst way in the world to help the Christians of the East. All our energies, all our attention, will be absorbed in the civil war which Mr. Chamberlain has kindled in South Africa. And so, in order to smooth the rose leaf under one Outlander in the Transvaal we leave a score of Christians to writhe under the horrors of the despotism of the Turk.

CHAPTER IV.

HOW THE WAR CAME ABOUT.

I AM appealing to honest men who are in doubt as to whether this war is just. I am, therefore, most anxious to set out the matter as simply and clearly as possible, furnishing the reader in every case with references to the original sources of information. I think that if anyone takes the trouble to read this chapter he will, at least, have a clear view of the differences which have been allowed to lead to war. He will form his own opinion as to whether they justify the abandonment of the negotiations. It is enough for me to furnish him with materials for judgment. I have been compelled to summarize and extract, but as I refer in every case to the official documents, the reader can verify for himself the accuracy of my quotations.

The subject may be said to open with Sir Alfred Milner's despatch of May 5th, in which he proclaimed the power of demanding the franchise as "the true remedy" which would "strike at the root of all those evils."

The gist of his despatch was contained in the statement that

The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of Helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for redress, steadily undermines the influence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government within the Queen's dominions.

How many thousands were in this position of Helots. Sir Alfred Milner has not stated—because he does not know. An accurate or even approximate estimate of the number of Outlanders who are at once British subjects and political Helots, with a statement as to the number of years they have been in the country, ought surely to have been ascertained before negotiations were opened. But no authentic figures are obtainable, nor even to this moment have the High Commissioner or the Outlanders' Council afforded us anything but random guesses or hypothetical calculations as to the actual numbers of those on whose behalf we are now at war.

Sir Alfred Milner on May 6th proposed to Mr. Chamberlain to ask President Kruger that Outlanders who had been five years in the country should have the franchise, and that they should have at least seven seats, or one-fifth of the Volksraad.

After much hesitation President Kruger at last offered to go halfway to meet the friendly counsels of Sir Alfred Milner. He offered to reduce the term of residence from 14 years to 7, provided that he was allowed to limit the concession by as many limitations as Mr. Disraeli proposed to limit the operation of household suffrage in his first Reform Bill.

Sir Alfred Milner naturally refused to accept a 7 years' franchise so limited as meeting the necessities of the case. The Conference broke up, and each negotiator went home.

Mr. Kruger went to Pretoria, and on June 12th he introduced a franchise Bill with nine years retrospective and seven years prospective

qualification. He also proposed to limit the concession by the stipulations to which the High Commissioner had objected. The Bill was treated by the Volksraad as Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill was treated by the House of Commons. Acting under the influence of the Cape Dutch, the majority in the Volksraad re-modelled the Bill; made it seven years both retrospective and prospective, and stripped it of all the limitations and conditions which robbed it of its value.

On July 17th, speaking with reference to the plan proposed to the Volksraad and approved by it, Mr. Chamberlain said:—"These proposals are in advance of previous concessions, and leave only a difference of two years between Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger."

Mr. Chamberlain then proposed that the two governments should unite in appointing a Mixed Commission of Inquiry to ascertain whether the new law really did secure for the Outlanders that "substantial and immediate representation" which Sir Alfred Milner insisted upon.

The Boers did not like this suggestion. They remembered, ruefully, that a Mixed Commission of Inquiry had in 1877 preceded the annexation of the Republic. Mr. Conyngham Greene, our agent at Pretoria, and Mr. Smuts, the State Attorney, discussed matters. After talking the matter over, Mr. Greene promised to recommend to Sir Alfred Milner, for acceptance by Her Majesty's Government, an alternative proposal, by which, in return for three conditions—(1) No interference; (2) no assertion of suzerainty, and (3) arbitration—the Boers would concede the five years' franchise, and allow the Outlanders to have eight seats on the Volksraad.

Before submitting this proposal the Boers inquired whether Mr. Chamberlain would consent to consider it without prejudice to the question of the Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise, which they wished to keep open in case their alternative proposition was not accepted.

Mr. Chamberlain replied by wire:—

"If the Government of the South African Republic were to put forward such a proposal this Government would not consider it a refusal of the Joint Commission, but would be prepared to consider it on its merits."

Mr. Conyngham Greene explained this in the following terms to Dr. Smuts:—

"You can see they are inviting your proposal, and they never would have done this unless they were prepared to accept it."

Which would no doubt have been a fair enough inference from the Colonial Secretary's reply if he had been any other person than Mr. Chamberlain. But the Boers did not understand "the new diplomacy."

The offer made by the Transvaal Government in its despatch of August 19th was described by Sir Alfred Milner himself as being "as liberal as anything that I was prepared to suggest." That this was so may be seen from a comparison of what was asked and what was offered.

ASKED BY MILNER.—MAY.

Five years' franchise.
Seven seats in the Volksraad.
A minimum of one-fifth of the representation.

OFFERED BY KRUGER.—AUGUST.

Five years' franchise.
Eight seats in the Volksraad.
A minimum of one-fourth of the representation.

The franchise offered by President Kruger was the full burgher franchise, which carries with it the right of voting not only for the first Volksraad, but also for the President and Commandant-General. No wonder Sir Alfred Milner declared that it was as liberal as anything he was prepared to suggest.

This offer was strictly conditional. As Mr. Kruger had explained to Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein, his burghers would not hear of his giving away everything for nothing. He proposed, therefore, that in return for the five years' franchise we should give him the threefold *quid pro quo* which was duly set forth in the despatch. In order to bring out quite clearly the fencing and evasive way in which Mr. Chamberlain met Mr. Kruger's effort to arrive at a settlement, I will print the proposed conditions and Mr. Chamberlain's response side by side.

(1). INTERFERENCE.

THE TRANSVAAL'S CONDITION.

(1.) That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action, and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place.

This condition received a very important explanation in a subsequent despatch dated September 2nd, in which the Secretary of State, Mr. Reitz, observed that "with reference to the question of intervention, this Government has neither asked nor intended that Her Majesty's Government should abandon any right which it really might have on the ground either of the Convention of London (1884) or of international law, to intervene for the protection of British subjects in this country."

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S RESPONSE.

"First, as regards intervention, Her Majesty's Government hope that the fulfilment of the promises made and the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future will render unnecessary any further intervention of their behalf, but Her Majesty's Government cannot, of course, debar themselves from their rights under Conventions, nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilised Power to protect outside subjects in a foreign country from injustice."

Now, as it is evident from the above quotations that no one had asked Her Majesty's Government to do anything of the kind, this elaborate

setting forth of the suspicious and grudging attitude of mind which prevails at Downing Street was naturally calculated to have the worst effect.

Mr. Reitz, commenting on this reply, made the remark that the stipulations asked for were "most reasonable, and demand on the side of Her Majesty's Government no abandonment of existing rights, but solely the obtaining of the assurance that Her Majesty's Government would in future, as regards the Republic, simply abide by the Convention of London (1884)."

(2.) SUZERAINTY.

(2.) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being allowed tacitly to drop.

This, again, was explained in the subsequent despatch, as follows: "As regards the assertion of suzerainty, its non-existence has, as this Government ventured to think, already been so clearly stated in its despatch of 16th April, 1898, that it would be superfluous to repeat here the facts, arguments, and deductions stated therein. It simply wishes to remark here that it abides by its views expressed in that despatch."

"Her Majesty's Government would refer the Government of the South African Republic to the second paragraph of my despatch of 13th July."

This paragraph runs as follows:—

"Her Majesty's Government concur generally in the views expressed in your despatch, and have no intention of continuing to discuss this question with the Government of the Republic, whose contention that the South African Republic is a Sovereign International State is not, in their opinion, warranted either by law or history, and is wholly inadmissible."

Here again was an evasion. If Mr. Chamberlain had said that the preamble of the Convention of 1881 would never be quoted as justifying any authority over the Transvaal, he would have satisfied the Boers. Their suspicions had been roused by the despatch of October, 1897, in which he had refused to listen to any proposals for arbitration. He had written:—

"Her Majesty towards the South African Republic holds the relation of suzerain who has accorded to the people of that country self-government on certain conditions, and it would be incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the construction of the conditions on which they granted self-government to the Republic."

It was in vindicating their claim to be allowed to appeal to arbitration that the Boers used the phrase about the Sovereign International State, which was fastened upon at once by Mr. Chamberlain for the purpose of evading the demand that we should not reassert the existence of the suzerainty of 1881, which everyone believed was dead and buried ever since 1884

(3.) ARBITRATION.

(3.) "That arbitration, from which foreign element should be excluded, would be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme became law. They wished, however, to know whether the Government was willing that burghers of the Orange Free State should be eligible for appointment as members of such a Court of Arbitration. What subjects should be regarded as arbitrable and what should not—the object aimed at being the automatic settlement of all points, both those which are in dispute at present and those which may arise hereafter." (*Blue Book*, c. 9521, p. 46.)

(3.) "The Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a tribunal of arbitration from which foreigners and foreign influence were excluded. Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration." (*Ib.* p. 50).

Grudging as was this acceptance of the principle of arbitration, the Boers made the best of it, apparently thinking that we were nearer to an agreement on that point than on the others. But they regarded Mr. Chamberlain's reply as a rejection of their proposal.

They received the intimation with deep regret, for, as Mr. Reitz wrote:—

The proposal which has now lapsed contained in the letters of this Government of August 19th and August 21st was induced by suggestions given by British Agent to State Attorney, and these were accepted by this Government in good faith, and on express request, as equivalent to an assurance that the proposal would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

The Boers, finding their offer flung back in their faces, then fell back upon the original proposal of Mr. Chamberlain, and accepted the Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise law. The wording of their acceptance was somewhat obscure, but there is no doubt as to what they meant. They have subsequently repeatedly affirmed that they meant their reply on September 2nd to be an acceptance of Mr. Chamberlain's proposal. But instead of welcoming this reluctant acquiescence in his demands, Mr. Chamberlain went back on his own proposals, and repudiated his own proposition the moment it was accepted by President Kruger!

If the rejection of the conditions of Mr. Kruger prevented the immediate concession of the five years' franchise, the repudiation by Mr. Chamberlain of his own proposal for a Mixed Commission of Inquiry into the seven years' franchise precipitated the war.

Mr. Chamberlain, in his speech of Thursday, October 19th, astounded the House by declaring that he regarded his despatch as a qualified acceptance of their offer. "We did not accept everything," said Mr. Chamberlain, "but we accepted nine-tenths of the whole." Again, he

said "our reply to the Transvaal despatch was the acceptance of every point except that instead of giving a pledge that we would never interfere again, he expressed a hope, an honest and earnest hope, that if these measures were carried out there would be no reason for our intervention." Mr. Chamberlain went on to say: "I cannot explain to the House why, having got that despatch from the Government, the Transvaal went back on their own proposal. The Transvaal, without reason, as I conceive, formally withdrew their own proposal. They asserted that we had refused their conditions, although they could not prove it. They withdrew their proposal." Whether or not they had justification for referring to Mr. Chamberlain's despatch as a rejection of their proposal, the reader can form his own judgment from the above quotation from Mr. Chamberlain's despatch. But, granting that the Boers misunderstood Mr. Chamberlain, why, in the name of all that is reasonable and honest and straightforward, did he not send them a telegram telling them that he had accepted their proposal. As Sir Edward Clarke observed in his speech: "This becomes more and more sad. It is dreadful to have a country of this kind entering upon a war, a crime against civilisation when this sort of thing has been going on." For, as Sir Edward Clarke proceeded to point out in the very despatch which Mr. Chamberlain declared was an acceptance of President Kruger's offer, he had written, "It is on this ground that Her Majesty's Government have been compelled to regard the last proposal of the Government of the South African Republic as unacceptable in the form in which it has been presented. Is it then a matter of form?" "Yes," replied Mr. Chamberlain. So it comes to this, that the Professor of the New Diplomacy was so punctilious about a matter of form that he plunged us into a war, which Sir Edward Clarke declares to be "an absolutely unnecessary war." There might have been some excuse for Mr. Chamberlain if he had made the war believing that it was unavoidable, and that it was his duty to press for terms which the Boers were certain to reject; but there can be no excuse for a statesman who makes war, and then on the eve of the very first battle stands up in the House of Commons and declares he had accepted the proposals of his opponent, and, therefore, saw his way to a peaceful settlement, which broke down because he was unable to make his meaning clear, and also because of a punctilio as to a matter of form. It is difficult to characterize the wickedness of such a position. We were dealing with peasants, of whose ignorance and stupidity we have heard a great deal too much, and yet Mr. Chamberlain, of all men in the world, fastens a war upon them because in their proposal, which he admits was reasonable, and nine-tenths acceptable, there was an error in a matter of form which led him to declare the proposal unacceptable. We are at war, therefore, not because the Boers have any hostile intention against the Imperial position in South Africa, not because of the wrongs of the Outlanders, not for suzerainty or for paramountcy, not for equal rights, or for any other of the glozing pretexts that are put forward as salves to the consciences of men responsible for unnecessary bloodshed, but simply and solely because Mr. Chamberlain could not make himself understood, and

wrote a despatch as an acceptance which everybody in the world regarded as a rejection. That Mr. Chamberlain did this innocently the charitable may believe, but they will find it rather difficult to persist in their belief if they compare the militant, menacing, and insulting speech delivered by Mr. Chamberlain at the garden party at Highbury at the very time when he had in his despatch-box an offer from the Boers which he regarded as a satisfactory basis for settlement of the controversy. The offer of President Kruger was received on the 21st August. The answer of Mr. Chamberlain, which he regarded as an acceptance, but which the Boers read as a rejection, was written on the 28th, and on the 26th August, two days before he sent out his unintelligible despatch of acceptance, he made a speech at Birmingham in which he declared that President Kruger accompanied his offers with conditions which he knew to be impossible, and warned him that the sands were running out from the hour glass. Although he told the House of Commons that he had already received the offer which he accepted, he told the garden party at Highbury that the issue was in the hands of President Kruger, that he had it in his hand by the acceptance of those moderate and reasonable reforms, the least which we can ask in common justice, but which we are now told Mr. Chamberlain knew he had already offered to give us. At Highbury there was no hint of this. He went on to adjure Mr. Kruger to speak the necessary words. "The sands are running down in the glass, the situation is too fraught with danger, it is too strained for any indefinite postponement." This language reads strangely coming straight from the mouth of a minister, who now tells us that he had received a proposal which he had resolved to accept, which he did accept, and which he was very much surprised to find President Kruger regarded as a rejection. After Mr. Chamberlain's explanation no one can be in any doubt as to how this war came about.

It will thus be seen that both parties claim that they have accepted the proposals of the other, the difference being that when Mr. Chamberlain found his despatch of acceptance was misunderstood he never deigned to make any further explanation, or to tell anyone until October 19th, when the war had actually broken out, that he intended the despatch to be an acceptance. The Boers, on the other hand, repeatedly declared that they had accepted the proposal of the Joint Commission.

But instead of accepting their reluctant adhesion to his own proposition, Mr. Chamberlain, in the despatch of September 8th, repudiated the whole thing. He wrote:—

Her Majesty's Government cannot now consent to go back to the proposals for which these in the note of 19th August are intended as a substitute, especially as they are satisfied that the law of 1899 in which these proposals were finally embodied is insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial representation which Her Majesty's Government have always had in view and which they gather from the reply of the Government of the South African Republic that the latter admit to be reasonable. Moreover, the presentation of the proposals of the note of the 19th August indicates that the Government of the South African Republic have themselves recognised that their previous offer might be with advantage enlarged, and that the independence of the South African Republic would be thereby in no way impaired. (*Ib.*, p. 64.)

To this Mr. Reitz, the State Secretary of the Transvaal, replied in terms of studied moderation, which hardly conceal the amazement and dismay with which the Boers found themselves tricked by Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Reitz wrote:—

With a view to the assurance given by the Secretary of State for Colonies that he would not consider the said offer as a refusal in answer to his invitation to a joint inquiry based upon existing franchise law and scheme of representation for Witwatersrand goldfields, it cannot understand why as soon as this invitation was accepted (as was done by this Government in its Note, September 2nd) Her Majesty's Government declares that it cannot any longer agree to the inquiry on this subject, and for purposes which that Government itself proposes.

It is also not clear to this Government on what grounds Her Majesty's Government, after having recently by means of its invitation intimated that it could not declare without an inquiry whether franchise law and resolutions taken about representation would afford immediate and substantial representation to the Outlanders in South African Republic, is to-day in a position, without having made any inquiry so far as this Government is aware, before the law can have been tested in its operation, to declare that the measure just mentioned is insufficient for the object contemplated.

To that unanswerable remark there has been no reply even attempted. Mr. Chamberlain has not even condescended to waste a word of explanation as to his right-about-face. In view of his express promise to keep the offer open pending the consideration of an alternative scheme, this abandonment of his own proposal the moment the Boers had been brought to accept it, has an ugly look—even in Birmingham. How it was regarded in the Transvaal we need not be told. If there is war in South Africa to-day, it is because the Boers were convinced from the bad faith shown in this transaction that no matter what concessions they made, Mr. Chamberlain was determined *coûte que coûte* to force them into war. They may have been mistaken, but I ask my reader whether as an honest man he can deny that to a suspicious, ignorant peasant in the Transvaal Mr. Chamberlain's method of going back on his word could have suggested any other conclusion.

CHAPTER V.

PRETEXTS FOR SLAUGHTER.

WHY must we slay our brother? Ask this question and note the answer.

(1.) FOR THE FRANCHISE.

From a diplomatic point of view the answer is because Mr. Chamberlain and President Kruger, while agreeing on a Mixed Commission to inquire into the extension of the franchise necessary to give immediate

and substantial representation to the Outlanders, could not agree as to the nominal point where the inquiry should begin.

President Kruger wanted it to begin at the existing seven years' franchise. This Mr. Chamberlain accepted in July as a "basis of settlement," and repudiated in September in order to insist upon the inquiry beginning with a five years' franchise as a basis.

Common sense would surely have suggested that as there was agreement, the franchise should be fixed so as to enfranchise immediately a substantial number of Outlanders, and also an agreement to have the matter investigated by a Mixed Commission on the spot—there was no need to quarrel over the point from which you begin your inquiries.

Get the Mixed Commission to work, and let it make a report as to how many Outlanders would be enfranchised if the period of residence was fixed at one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven years. Then if those enfranchised by the existing law was not substantial enough, we should know exactly how much the term would need to be shortened to bring up the number of new Outlander burghers to the desired standard.

Hence we are to slay our brother because Mr. Chamberlain, having got from the Boers an acceptance of his proposition for a Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise, went back upon his word, and refused to appoint the Mixed Commission, which had, as its starting point, the concession of a five years' residential franchise.

Is that good enough for the Day of Judgment? When our brother's blood cries to Heaven, like the blood of Abel, against us, will it stand us in good stead to say, We slew him because Mr. Chamberlain would not stand to his word, and raised his demands as soon as President Kruger had given in to his proposition?

A thimblerrigging diplomacy is a poor justification for wholesale homicide.

But from the point of view of diplomacy the actual matter of quarrel is this difference about the five years or the seven years as the point from which the Commission of Inquiry should begin.

Is that not too thin to justify our cutting our brothers' throats?

(2.) FOR THE SUZERAINTY.

We might have had the five years' franchise if we would have given up the pretension that we had vague and indefinite rights of interference, based upon the suzerainty conceded in the preamble of the Convention of 1881.

Let us look at the matter from a practical point of view.

The difference between the number enfranchised by a five and a seven years' franchise may possibly be 10,000. It would probably be much less, but let us admit the larger number.

If we had accepted President Kruger's proposition, 10,000 Outlanders might have had to wait till 1901 before they got the franchise, instead of getting it this year. That is the very outside estimate of the difference it would make.

Do you think that is sufficient to justify us in killing the 10,000 able-bodied men who will perish in this war? To send 10,000 men to bloody

graves in order that 10,000 other men may have the franchise two years earlier than they would have it under the existing law?

And who are the men who propose this horrible holocaust?

Why are these Reformers in such a desperate hurry that they would purchase the immediate enfranchisement of 10,000 Outlanders by the slaughter of 10,000 men?

They are the men who blocked the extension of franchise to our own people for years, and who, by their opposition to a reform of registration laws, are preventing the enfranchisement of far more Englishmen in England than all the Outlanders, men, women, and children, in the Transvaal.

When you hear people talk about the franchise as an excuse for war, remember it means the sacrifice of a life for a vote.

Had we not better let 10,000 men have waited two years longer for their vote rather than have hurried up registration of the new voters by deluging South Africa with blood?

Lord Derby and Lord Rosmead, who negotiated the Convention of 1884, believed that they had given up the suzerainty of 1881. They told the Boers so, and the Boers accepted their word for it. The word suzerainty, Lord Derby stated in the House of Lords, was dropped because it was objected to by the Boers, and because it was liable to misapprehension. The substance of suzerainty, which alone we cared for, was retained by the Article 4 of the new Convention of 1884, which Lord Derby said was "in substitution for the Convention of 1881."

The Boers believed the word of an English statesman and minister of the Crown. From 1884 to 1897 no one ever dreamed of alluding to the survival of the suzerainty of 1881. Tories and Liberals alike treated it as dead and buried. But in 1897 Mr. Chamberlain raised its ghost from the grave, and scared the Boers with the spectre which they thought had been laid for ever.

The arguments justifying this scandalous breach of faith are worthy a Shylock. Because the suzerainty was not repudiated in set terms in a formal article we are justified in reviving it, although it is not denied that the Boers consented to sign the Convention of 1884 in consideration of Lord Derby's pledged word that the suzerainty was given up.

But Shylock was more honest and straightforward than Mr. Chamberlain.

But all agree that the suzerainty of 1881, although it scares the Boers, gives us absolutely no hold upon them which we do not possess already by virtue of the London Convention of 1884, and the general right of international law possessed by every nation to protect their subjects in foreign lands.

Why then should we sacrifice 10,000 of our brethren as a hecatomb before this unhallowed ghost which Mr. Chamberlain persists in reviving?

Is it a pretext that will avail in the great day of account that we killed our brother because he believed that we dealt honestly with him in 1884, whereas we wish to make out that we swindled him by a piece of sharp practice which would bring the blush to the cheek of an Old Bailey lawyer?

Fraud is no excuse for murder, and an attempt to cheat instead of excusing war only makes it more criminal.

(3.) THE SOVEREIGN INTERNATIONAL STATE.

But it is said the Transvaal claims to be a Sovereign International State, and this is a defiance of Britain.

But in the first place, subject to only one limitation, the Transvaal is a Sovereign International State.

By the Convention of 1884, as Lord Derby expressly stated, "the conduct and control of foreign diplomatic intercourse" was conceded.

That gives it an international character. It is as sovereign in its international dealings, with one single exception, as the British Empire itself. It can, if it pleases, make war without saying by your leave to England. There is no higher form of the exercise of sovereignty in international relations than the levying of war. We have no check on that.

The only limitation—a limitation which the Boers have loyally observed—is that treaties and engagements with foreign States may be vetoed by us if within six months we notify that they are in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or any of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa.

The Transvaal was permitted by Lord Salisbury to become a party to the Geneva Convention, and would be invited as a party to that international Convention to take part in the next international Conference which is to revise that Convention.

Mr. Chamberlain himself has defined it in his despatch of December 31st, 1895, as "a foreign State which is in friendly treaty relations with Great Britain."

A foreign State cannot be a vassal State. It must be a sovereign international State, not absolutely sovereign, but sovereign subject to one solitary stipulation, to which the Boers have always been loyal. Even if the Boers are mistaken in the correct name by which to describe their exact political status, is that good enough reason for spending ten millions and cutting 10,000 throats? English monarchs styled themselves Kings of France for centuries after we ceased to reign over an inch of French territory. But the French did not slaughter us for that inaccuracy of nomenclature. Dare we stand before the throne of the Eternal with hands reeking with our brother's blood and justify our slaughter by the plea I killed him because he called the South African Republic "a Sovereign International State," whereas we believe that he ought, as a matter of political etymology, to have said it was something else?

(4.) PARAMOUNTCY

We are told impatiently that all these questions are merely on the surface. The war is not a war for the franchise or the suzerainty or any other of such items of leather and prunella, it is a war to establish our ascendancy, paramountcy, supremacy, authority, preponderance, I know not what. In other words the Briton and the Boer are fighting out the

question who is to be cock of the walk. It is a war of races, the struggle for power. Which is to be boss, Dutchman or Englishman? So we must fight it out.

To all which incentives to the spirit of the cockpit, I reply that this is of the devil devilish, and a war for any such cause is hatched in hell. To use less theological language, I would say that the notion that either Dutchman or Englishman must sit upon the head of the other, is absolutely opposed to every principle of sound statesmanship or enlightened government. The whole doctrine of ascendancy is utterly wrong. The fatal fascination of Protestant ascendancy has been the curse of Ireland. If we were to introduce into this country even now the notion of English paramountcy over Scotland we should have civil war in a year. What preponderance there is in the nature of things, in superior numbers, wealth, acreage, and trade, the English have over the Scotch. But is there a Scotchman living who would brook being treated as an inferior race, who was compelled to recognise the authority and paramountcy of the South Briton? And if the Scotch would not stand it, why should we expect the Dutch to tolerate any such pernicious nonsense? In South Africa the natural force of things—area of territory, number of subject races, wealth, power, enterprise, commerce, shipping, and the prestige of Imperial position—all tell in favour of the British. But the Dutch, who are our equals in numbers, who are the pioneers and the agriculturists, naturally resent the arrogance which would thrust them all into an inferior position. The only sound principle of government within our Empire is to know neither Dutchman, Scotchman, or Englishman, but to regard all men as equally loyal subjects of the Queen.

There is not a Colony in the whole Imperial circle which would not revolt if we were to attempt to base upon our paramountcy any pretension to interfere in their internal administration. Even in South Africa, Mr. Chamberlain, for all his paramountcy, protests that he cannot compel the self-governing Colony of Natal to give the franchise to Her Majesty's Indian subjects. It is only in dealing with a free and independent Republic that he dares to demand the franchise in the name of paramountcy.

War for paramountcy is war for a phantom—a vampire phantom, and no one would sooner revolt against any attempt to enforce it than the very Outlanders themselves as soon as they got the vote.

(5.) EQUAL RIGHTS.

Paramountcy will not do. What then do we say to war for equal rights?

We are all for equal rights, even in England where a House of Lords exists as a kind of Oligarchical first Volksraad in the election of which not a single citizen has a vote; but let us discriminate a little. What does this cry for equal rights come to?

It is not a cry for equal rights for citizens of the state at all; but naturalisation of foreigners. The Transvaal gives only so much less "equal rights" as its naturalisation period exceeds that of the other

states, and it is not a question of Dutch not giving equal rights to British, for the same exclusiveness prevails with regard to the Dutch British subjects from the Cape and Natal. Equal rights do exist in the Transvaal, and it is merely a question of expediency as to naturalising foreigners, not a question of right at all.

But waiving that point and accepting equal rights as meaning granting naturalisation to foreigners, let us look how the matter stands.

In all South Africa, in the Cape where the Dutch are nearly in a two to one majority, in the Free State where they are absolutely supreme, as well as in Natal and in Rhodesia, the principle of equal rights prevails universally. There is only one state where the salutary rule has not yet been applied. That state is the Transvaal. There the principle of confining political rights to one race survives as a relic of a bygone generation. It is an anachronism which exists chiefly owing to three things. One is the personality of an old man of seventy-five; the second, the impatience and arrogance of the British; and the third, the existence of the goldfields of the Rand. When Kruger passes, the system with which he is identified will break up. Even while Kruger lived, if we had treated him decently instead of constantly threatening him with extinction, and bulldozing him with an ultimatum one day and a raid the next, we could have prevented things ever coming to this pass. Even after all that has passed, a single conference with the High Commissioner broke down the fourteen years' franchise and opened the constitution to all Outlanders who had been seven years in the Republic. The goldfield, although it attracted the multitude whose inroad led the Boers to safeguard their Republic, would inevitably break down in time the rustic oligarchy of the Boers.

The inequality of races still surviving in the Transvaal was therefore a passing phenomenon. A little patience and Kruger would have been gathered to his fathers. A little persistent pressure and the Outlanders would have had the casting vote, both in the Volksraad and in the Presidential election. If the old fable of the contest between the sun and the wind as to which could first compel the traveller to part with his cloak had been taken to heart by our authorities, equality of rights for all white races would have long ere this been in a fair way to be established in the Transvaal as it is in the Free State. That inequality has been perpetuated so long is the natural consequence of the constant menace of the extinction of their independence. To endeavour to force equality by invasion was suicidal, you might as well try to ripen pine-apples by snowstorms. There is nothing in the Dutch character that is antagonistic to equal rights. The Hollanders were precursors of liberty and equality in the Old World. In the Free State, where no goldfield acts as a lodestone for all the adventurers of the world, there are no complaints of inequality. In the Transvaal, and in the Transvaal alone, the principle of inequality has found a temporary lodging. But the irresistible force of events, the law of progress, the conditions of its environment would inevitably have caused the anachronism of the Boer oligarchy to disappear like an ice floe in the Gulf Stream. But, no! The champions of British paramountcy masquerading as the crusaders

of equal rights are now about to carry fire and sword into the Transvaal in order to enable the Briton to boss the Boer.

Was there ever a more colossal illustration of cant made manifest before the eye of mortal man?

(6.) VENGEANCE FOR MAJUBA.

This is the real and openly avowed motive of multitudes. Remember Majuba! is the rallying cry of the ruffians who smash up public meetings. It is the inspiring watchword with which our soldiers start for the seat of war. Because a gallant handful of British soldiers were worsted in fair fight nearly twenty years ago, we let slip the sleuth hounds of our army upon the Boer! Was there ever more unworthy motive to inspire the noble rage of a great nation. Whatever we may think of the merits of this war, no one can deny that to the most of those who exult in the prospect of battle, the dominating impulse is vengeance.

Now of this it is unnecessary to say more than that war for revenge is morally indistinguishable from wholesale murder.

(7.) FOR PANIC FEAR.

I come now to the last and the most abjectly miserable of all the pleas that are urged for this war against the Transvaal. The wolf, we are told, must really eat the lamb, because if he does not devour the lamb, the lamb will infallibly devour him. In other words the most contemptible refuge of lies in which the war party seeks shelter is the amazing assertion that the 30,000 herdsman of the Transvaal are plotting the overthrow of the British Empire! I have heard men, otherwise sane, gravely assert that the Transvaal burghers, of whose ignorance and almost incredible stupidity we hear every day, have planned the destruction of the British Empire in Africa, and the conversion of Cape Town into a Dutch Portsmouth, from which a supreme Dutch navy would steam to challenge our Empire of the Seas! There seems to be literally no limit to the self-hypnotising capacity of the human mind. The most valiant gamecock can be reduced to a condition of helpless catalepsy by a straight stroke of chalk on a board before his beak, and there are Englishmen who seem to be equally liable to a paralysis of their reason from equally trivial causes. The men who believed in the lies of Titus Oates and those who shudder at night at the thought of Jesuit conspiracies have their counterpart in the believers in this latest bugaboo of the political alarmist—the great Pan-Africander Dutch plot to erect a Dutch Republic upon the ruins of the British South African Empire! We have all marvelled at the insane terror which possessed the French who shivered at the thought of the Dreyfus syndicate. But the Jews and their millions are at least a solid reality, whereas this Dutch conspiracy is but the shadowy nightmare of the dyspeptic Jingo. That some Dutchmen in Africa have dreamed dreams of founding a great Federation of States under the shelter of the Union Jack which would be as predominantly Dutch as Quebec is predominantly French is true enough. We should despise them if they did not indulge in these

political reveries. Nor should we in the least object to the realisation of their dreams if they can win their predominance, as they have won it in the Cape by proving that they were better workers, better politicians and more numerous than the British.

We no more object to Dutch supremacy in Africa, if the Dutch are the majority, than we object to French supremacy in Eastern Canada. If they are in the majority, how can they help being supreme, and how can we prevent it, except by killing them out, or by denying them the right to Parliamentary government? What we have to do is to have a little faith in the vigour of our race and the sound principles of democratic government. But the war party, finding all other prettexts fail them, have no other refuge left but this—that the English race and the British Empire are so decrepit and so weak that we cannot hope to hold South Africa, unless on any pretext or on none we proceed incontinently to put to the sword some thousands of our Dutch fellow-subjects.

Is there an honest man alive who would consent to hold South Africa on such terms?

Those who deliberately advocate war on such grounds deserve not the sceptre of Empire but the gallows of the murderer.

The following verses, though somewhat exaggerated, only too truly represent the sentiments of the Jingo party in this country:—

THE HUNTING OF THE BOER.

A NEW BATTLE HYMN FOR THE EMPIRE.

Ho! sportsmen, come ye forth from the South and from the North,
From the happy homes of England to the Battle and the Breeze;
For the trooper's on the tide and to-morrow we will ride
To the Hunting of the Boer in the land beyond the seas.

Oh! 'twill be rattling fun to see the beggars run,
When the guns begin to speak, and dum-dum bullets pelt:
And the bursting Lyddite shell and the growling Maxims tell
We're a-hunting of the Boer on the uplands of the Veldt.

We've stood their lip too long, and now we're going strong
To settle up the score of that damned Majuba Hill,
When they licked us through the folly of that poor unlucky Colley—
So now we go a-hunting, to kill, and kill, and kill.

Oom Paul in vain will pray for mercy in that day,
When the storm of vengeance bursts upon the bloody Boer;
We shall smash them in the field; if they fly and do not yield
We shall hunt them down with bloodhounds on their spoor.

We are strong and they are weak ; we shall teach them to be meek,
 When we shoot them down with dum-dums, that torture when they slay ;
 And if all things go well we shall chivvy them to hell,
 Before the canting Boers have time to pray.

And the niggers they will come at the beating of our drum,
 The Swazis and Basutos and the rest ;
 They will rape and burn and slay, and we shall not say them nay,
 For the hunting of the Boer they are the best.

Then three times three for Joe, who slips us on the foe,
 To the Devil with John Morley and all the friends of peace ;
 And though the Boers may squeal, we shall bleed them white as veal
 Ere the Hunting of the Boer shall ever cease.

JOE JINGO, JUNR.

CHAPTER VI.

NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITIES.

CAPTAIN MAHAN, writing in the *North American Review* for October, remarks that, "the consciences of nations are awake to the wickedness of unnecessary war, and are disposed, as a general rule, to seek first, where admissible, the counterpoise of an impartial judge, where such can be found, to correct the bias of national self-will." The same observation has frequently been made by others, as, for instance, when it is said that, while we are quite prepared to slay our brother, we wish before doing so to exhaust all the resources of civilisation, in order to ascertain that there is no other alternative left us. Such was believed to be the feeling of all Englishmen until this last unhappy outbreak. Henceforth it will be difficult for any Englishman to look the foreigner in the face and talk about peace, for we are face to face with the fact that in the Transvaal, so far from eagerly seeking opportunities in order to correct the bias of national self-will, there has been from first to last an obstinate refusal to resort to any form of arbitration for the settlement of the controversy between us. It takes two to make an arbitration, as it takes two to make a quarrel, and unfortunately we have not been one of the two who were willing to arbitrate. Some excellent persons, whose reason is clouded by their passion, have not hesitated to declare that President Kruger was the worst enemy of peace and arbitration in the world. Considering that President Kruger has for years past been pressing, in season and out of season, for a reference of all outstanding disputes between him and us to arbitration, such a statement deserves to be preserved, if only as an illustration of the extent to which the moral law is suspended when the war-fever is in the air. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour" is one of the commandments which, it would seem, is more honoured in the breach than in the observance when our country is bent upon forcing a quarrel upon a neighbouring state.

When we examine in the tribunal of our own conscience the question whether or not everything has been done that might have been done in order to avert war, we are confronted at the very threshold of the enquiry by one plain, unmistakable and undisputed fact. We may reason as we like; we may quibble; we may explain it away, and make all manner of excuses we please; but the broad fact remains, after all has been said and done, towering aloft above all controversy, namely, that President Kruger has demanded arbitration, and we have refused it. It will be said of course, "We have stated our willingness to discuss what questions could or could not be referred to arbitration." That is true, but the fundamental question, the question on which peace and war hung, we have not only refused to refer to arbitration, despite President Kruger's repeated appeals, but we have refused even to adopt any one of the many forms of arriving at a pacific settlement which were suggested by the Peace Conference at the Hague. To read the correspondence which passed between the High Commissioner and the Colonial Secretary on the subject of arbitration, it is difficult to believe that they are speaking in the name of the same Government which sent Lord Pauncefoot to the Hague, and which will this month sign the Arbitration Convention. For instead of welcoming an opportunity of referring to arbitration a dispute between the South African Republic and ourselves, the whole drift and purpose of the despatches is to find pretexts for evading the obligation to make any such reference. The first great pretext is that the Transvaal is our vassal, and that therefore it would be impossible for us to refer a dispute to arbitration, seeing that we are the paramount and suzerain Power, and that a vassal has no right to appeal from our decision. Even if we grant to the full the state of vassalage into which Mr. Chamberlain endeavours to translate the Transvaal, that is no reason why, when a dispute arises between vassal and suzerain, resort should not be had to the decision of an impartial neutral. The doctrine has been laid down and apparently without protest from any people here on our side, that to appeal for the good offices of a foreigner as arbitrator was to admit foreign intervention in our affairs. This is simply preposterous. Arbitration is not intervention. Did Switzerland intervene in the affairs of England when she took part in the Alabama arbitration? Did Russia intervene in the affairs of the British Empire when M. de Martens acted as arbitrator in the Venezuelan dispute? This objection to resort to arbitration because it involved foreign intervention in our domestic affairs is one of the most transparent refuges of lies that ever disgraced British diplomacy.

But there is another point to which the attention of all honest men should be called. Before the question arises as to whether or not we have resorted to arbitration there is the prior question whether we have used ordinary methods of diplomacy to arrive at a settlement. Unfortunately we have done no such thing. The ordinary method of diplomacy is that each Government maintains its trusted representative in the capital of its neighbour, and that this representative is entrusted with the task of making explanation, smoothing out misunderstandings, and generally keeping the peace. The accredited ambassador or

minister or Consul-General is the well-established method of keeping the peace which is recognised all over the world under the name of diplomacy. It will be a surprise to many good people in this country to know that Mr. Chamberlain, ever since he was at the Colonial Office, absolutely refused to avail himself of this well-established and invariable method of diplomatic action. The South African Republic by the Convention of 1884 was expressly authorised to conduct its diplomatic intercourse and shape its foreign policy without any interference on our part, with only one reservation, namely, that treaties inimical to our interests might be vetoed by us within six months of their conclusion. The South African Republic, therefore, was absolutely within its chartered right to appoint its diplomatic representatives to conduct its business with foreign Powers. It appointed Dr. Leyds to represent it in Europe, and Mr. Montagu White, who is Consul-General in London. Ever since Mr. Chamberlain has been in office he has refused to recognise either Mr. Montagu White or Dr. Leyds as having any authority whatever to speak or act on behalf of the South African Republic. Not only so, but Ministers abroad were expressly forbidden—such at least is the current report—to hold any communication whatever with Dr. Leyds excepting in his private capacity. The British Government, acting at the instance of Mr. Chamberlain, boycotted Dr. Leyds, and boycotted also Mr. Montagu White, Consul-General in London. The consequence is that we were in exactly the same position dealing with the Transvaal that we would be in a dispute with Russia after having refused to hold any intercourse whatever with M. de Staal or any ambassador accredited by the Russian Government. Mr. Chamberlain had no right to take any such step. It was a gross breach of international good manners. It was a distinct attack upon the diplomatic privileges which we had solemnly conceded to them in the Convention of 1884. If the ordinary laws of diplomatic intercourse had prevailed, and our Government had been in constant communication with the duly accredited representative of the Transvaal, as we should be with those of any other foreign State in friendly treaty relations with Her Majesty, who can doubt but that many misunderstandings might have been removed and peace might have been preserved. Of course it is easy to say that it would not, but the onus of proof lies upon those who have deliberately in the whole of these negotiations deprived themselves of one of the recognised methods adopted by all civilised States for conducting international intercourse. When the account comes to be summed up between Great Britain and the Transvaal, the impartial judge will not fail to lay his finger upon this point as one great leading item in the indictment against Great Britain. It does not matter in the least that Dr. Leyds may be very objectionable to us personally. We have no right because we dislike an ambassador to refuse to hold diplomatic intercourse with the country which he represents. Whatever may be said against Dr. Leyds, nothing can be said against Mr. Montagu White. During the whole of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Mr. White was labouring day and night in the cause of peace. He did everything that man could do in order to induce President Kruger to make any and every concession that would avert war; but during the

whole of that time he was under an absolute boycott, and the nearest approach he ever made to an interview with any of Her Majesty's Ministers was when he had an informal and strictly unofficial conversation with Lord Salisbury's private secretary. That is not the way in which nations conduct business when they wish to remain at peace. Arbitration comes in when ordinary diplomatic methods have failed, but in this case ordinary diplomatic methods were not tried. This refusal to recognise the representatives of the South African Republic whose status was from the point of view of international law securely based upon the Convention of 1884 is significant of the whole spirit in which these negotiations have been conducted. From first to last there has been manifest a hectoring, bullying determination to snub and humiliate the small State, and to refuse it any of the ordinary privileges and rights belonging to an independent Government expressly authorised to conduct its own diplomacy without reference to us, save and except when treaties come to be signed.

It stands on record that our Government has refused indignantly to permit any arbitration as to the question in dispute between us and the Transvaal. It is equally on record that President Kruger has over and over again implored us to adopt that method of settling differences. In the second place, it is the fact that our Government has deliberately denied itself the recourse to the usual diplomatic method of holding personal communication with the accredited representatives of the South African Republic. Even these two counts, heavy though they are, do by no means exhaust the evidence as to the reluctance of our Government to use the most obvious opportunity for arriving at a peaceful settlement. Even supposing we admit that Mr. Chamberlain was right to boycott the diplomatists from Pretoria, granting further that there was solid ground for objection to avail himself of the services of a foreign arbitrator in the dispute between ourselves and the Transvaal, there still remains a wide field within which he could have found many expedients for avoiding the catastrophe in which he has at last succeeded in involving the Empire. A reference to arbitration does not necessarily involve a reference to a foreigner. In his endeavour to meet the objections of his implacable adversary, President Kruger was willing to forego any appeal to a foreign arbitrator, being quite content to accept the decision of an arbitral tribunal composed exclusively of British or Afrikanders, but this project met with no more support than its predecessors. The question, we were loftily told, was one of policy, and, therefore, it was impossible to refer it to arbitration. Let us admit then that although we have heard similar assertions made not less loftily concerning every subject that ever has been referred to arbitration, there still remain other sources of pacification which were pressed upon the Government, and pressed upon them in vain. In order to prove this, I cannot do better than reproduce here a letter which was published in the *Times* on October 5th, calling attention to the suggestions of the Hague Convention, and pointing out how they might be adopted for the solution of the difficulties which were being used for the purpose of forcing on war.

May I venture to suggest to all those persons who profess to desire peace

that similar difficulties to those which confront us in the present situation were carefully considered and provided for by the Peace Conference at the Hague? It is, of course, true that the Arbitration Convention has not been signed by all the Governments as yet, and has not been ratified by any. It is, therefore, in no sense an international document and possesses only the authority which belongs to a carefully drafted statement by the representatives of all civilized Powers as to what are likely to be the most effectual means of avoiding an appeal to the sword. In the drafting of this deliberate judgment of all the Governments our own representatives took a leading place.

We may, therefore, while admitting to the fullest extent the fact that the Hague Convention is at present of no binding force upon anybody, recognize that it nevertheless does express the judgment of the civilized world as to what course ought to be taken when two disputing States arrive at the position in which we stand in relation to the Transvaal. It may also be admitted without qualification or reserve that the differences between the Transvaal Republic and the British Empire do not stand on exactly the same footing as differences arising between two absolutely sovereign and independent States. Nevertheless the Hague Convention contains at least three articles, the principle of which might with profit be referred to as suggesting a way out of the present difficulty. The first is Article 1. This article runs as follows:—

In order to prevent as far as possible the recourse to force in international relations the signatory Powers agree to employ all their efforts to bring about the pacific solution of the differences which may arise between States.

Here the agreement on the part of the signatory Powers to employ their efforts to avert war is not limited to the case of disputes arising between the signatory Powers, or even between independent Powers. The undertaking relates to differences which may arise between States without qualification, whether those States are in the position of Bulgaria in relation to the Ottoman Empire or of the Transvaal in relation to ourselves. The suggestion, therefore, of Article 1 is that the signatory Powers should employ their efforts to avert war, which at present so far they do not seem to have done. This, however, we will pass by, and proceed to the clauses which bear directly upon the questions at issue.

Under Article 9 the Powers unanimously agree to recommend as the best means of reconciling antagonistic views existing as to questions of fact involved in the dispute the appointment of international commissions of inquiry. The article runs as follows:—

In disputes of an international character, involving neither national honour or essential interests, and arising from a divergence of opinion on points of fact, the signatory Powers consider it useful that the parties who may not have been able to agree by diplomatic means should institute, as far as circumstances may permit, an international commission of inquiry, so as to clear up all questions of actual fact by an impartial and conscientious examination.

It would be difficult to have made any suggestion that would have gone more directly to the very root of our chief controversy at this moment with President Kruger. The advantages of such a course of proceeding were recognised by Mr. Chamberlain when he accepted the seven years' franchise law as a basis of settlement, and proposed a mixed commission of inquiry to clear up "by an impartial and conscientious inquiry all questions of fact." This proposal made by Mr. Chamberlain has been accepted by the Transvaal Govern-

ment, and, therefore, we are in the position of finding both parties to the dispute in entire agreement with the suggestion of Article 9 of the Hague Convention. The only reason why this commission is not at present engaged in making its "impartial and conscientious inquiry" is because our Government has gone back upon its own proposal, and now refuses to accept from the Transvaal Government the proposition which originally emanated from itself.

But, supposing that Ministers persist in their rejection of a proposition which has the unanimous recommendation of all the civilised Powers, we then come to a situation in which the dispute becomes acute, the negotiators on either side having done their best and having failed to arrive at a pacific arrangement. Under those circumstances, the next step is to appeal to the sword, but The Hague Conference, in order to avert so grave a calamity, framed Article 8, providing for special mediation. This Article was drafted by the American delegates and had the hearty support of the British delegates as well as of the Lord Chief Justice of England, who, before the Conference met, had expressed himself strongly in favour of such a method of settling disputes.

Article 8 runs as follows:—

The signatory Powers agree to recommend the application, in circumstances which permit it, of special mediation in the following form:—In the case of a grave disagreement endangering peace, the disputing States each choose one Power to which they entrust the mission of entering into direct communication with the Power chosen by the other side, for the purpose of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. During the continuance of their mandate, the duration of which, unless the contrary is stipulated, cannot exceed 30 days, the contending States shall cease all direct relations in regard to the question in dispute, which is considered as referred exclusively to the mediating Powers. They must apply all their efforts to arranging the difference. In case of the actual rupture of pacific relations, these Powers remain charged with the common mission of profiting by every opportunity of re-establishing peace.

It will be objected at once that in the dispute between us and the Transvaal Republic we cannot allow the intervention of any foreign Power, and therefore that this article does not apply. Admitting to the full, for the sake of argument, that this is the case, we have to ask ourselves whether the principle involved in Article 8 might not be remembered with advantage at the present crisis. The essential principle of Article 8 is that when the original negotiators have done their best and stand face to face and no appeal is left but to the sword, the signatory Powers agree to recommend that a period of 30 days' truce should be interposed between the rupture of the negotiations and the declaration of war, and that during these 30 days new negotiators should be brought in, who would approach the subject with a fresh mind, free from the prejudices or animosities generated by the long diplomatic wrangle, and that those fresh negotiators should apply all their efforts to arranging the difference. During the time when the matter was handed over to these fresh negotiators, all direct relations in regard to the questions in dispute between the disputing States would cease.

Article 7 provides that the acceptance of mediation need not interrupt mobilisation, war preparations, or current military operations. The right to accept or reject the conclusions arrived at by the new negotiators would, of course, remain in the hands of the disputing States. Now why should not the principle of Article 8 be adopted in relation to our present difficulties with the Transvaal? In view of the unanimous recommendation of all the Powers at

the Peace Conference, it would involve no slight either upon Mr. Conyngham Greene or upon Mr. Secretary Reitz, if the Transvaal Republic on the one side and the British Empire on the other were to appoint fresh negotiators. Let us say, for instance, that President Kruger might appoint Mr. Fischer of the Orange Free State, or Mr. Hofmeyr of our own colony, while we might on our part appoint Lord Pauncefote or the Duke of Devonshire, and entrust to them during the period of truce the duty of attempting to arrive at an honourable and pacific settlement.

This suggestion, although cordially supported in influential quarters, met with no response. Ministers having surrendered themselves apparently into the hands of Mr. Chamberlain, reeled helplessly down the abyss into the war which Mr. Chamberlain had made inevitable. The contrast between our professions at the Hague and our actions at the present crisis naturally led to much cynical comment on the part of those who were our colleagues in the Peace Conference. In proof of this I can only refer to one passage from a speech of the French delegate, Baron d'Estournelles, who took a leading part in supporting Lord Pauncefote at the Hague. Baron d'Estournelles is well known as the man who for years was virtually permanent French Ambassador at the Court of St. James's. He has given proof time and again of his friendship for this country in trying circumstances. No one can accuse him of any *parti pris* in what he says on this subject. But this is the way in which this distinguished French diplomatist and friend of England spoke on the subject before Mr. Chamberlain's policy had borne its fruit:—

I shall only say one word about England to call to mind that it is to her eminent delegate, Lord Pauncefote, that is due the great honour of having been the first to produce a project for an international tribunal of arbitration. This honour may become an unalterable and brilliant glory if England remains faithful to the initiative which she has taken. A dispute of long standing has just broken out between her and the little State of the Transvaal. This is the crucial test! This is the opportunity for an action strengthening the declarations of the Government. . . . Will England, after three months, take two contradictory initiatives? Will she resort to the machinery of the Hague to declare war at Pretoria? No, that seems impossible. She will not condemn herself. She will not with her own hands tear up the peace-making document which she has hardly drawn up; she will not make the world resound with the noise of battle on the morrow of the day when she held up before its eyes the shining sign so long expected of justice and peace-making.

CHAPTER VII.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN AS A DANIEL COME TO JUDGMENT.

It is well calculated to give pause to those who are wildly clamouring for war against the Transvaal, to know that the man who leads them on was only three years ago profoundly convinced of the immorality, the impolicy, not to say the criminality, of the course which they are adopting. Probably no Secretary of State has ever afforded his opponents so

many telling quotations in support of their views as the present Colonial Secretary. It is not necessary to go back to the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain, when the member for Birmingham was regarded as one of the bright and shining lights of the Radical Party. Everything that Mr. Chamberlain said when he was member of the Gladstone Cabinet would naturally be discounted by those who regard such utterances as belonging to a period of immaturity, before the present Colonial Secretary had found salvation in the Unionist camp. I shall forbear, therefore, from making a single quotation from any of the speeches delivered by Mr. Chamberlain in his Radical days. The passages to which I would call the careful attention of my readers are taken without exception from the public utterances made by Mr. Chamberlain when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies in the present administration. None of them date back further than the beginning of 1896. In these speeches we find laid down with characteristic precision and emphasis principles of South African policy which run directly counter to the course which the War Party is at present pursuing.

1ST PRINCIPLE—KEEP IN WITH THE DUTCH.

On the 22nd April, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain, addressing a select audience at the Constitutional Club, after pointing out the fact, which is as plain as the sun at noonday, that Great Britain is the paramount power in South Africa, went on to define what ought to be the governing principle of our policy in those regions.

"In South Africa," said Mr. Chamberlain, "two races, the English and the Dutch, have to live together. At the present time and probably for many years to come the Dutch are in the majority, and it is therefore the duty of every statesman, of every well-wisher of South Africa to do all in his power to maintain amicable relations between the two races. In our own Cape Colony the Dutch also are in a majority. There are tens of thousands of Dutchmen in the Cape Colony who are just as loyal to the throne and to the British connection as, let me say, our French Canadian fellow subjects in the Dominion of Canada. At the same time these Dutch fellow subjects of ours very naturally feel that they are of the same blood as the Dutchmen in the two neighbouring Republics, and they sympathise with their compatriots whenever they think that they are to be subject, or are likely to be subject, to any injustice or to the arbitrary exercise of force. It was, therefore," he went on, "a proposition to be universally accepted that we must use every exertion and exhaust every means of securing good feeling between the Dutch and the English. It is true that as the paramount power in South Africa we could not be indifferent to the grievances of the Uitlanders . . .

"But as a Dutch Government, as well as an English Government, it ought to be our object, in endeavouring to secure the redress of their grievances, to carry with us our own Dutch fellow subjects. (Cheers.) Up to a recent date—until recent events—the sympathy of the Dutch population at the Cape, in the Orange Free State, and even of the Progressive Dutchmen in the South African Republic itself—the sympathy

of all was with the Imperial Government, and with the Uitlanders in endeavouring to secure the redress of their grievances. There has been a revulsion of feeling since, from causes which are well known to you, but I do not despair, in fact I have a confident hope, that we shall be able, in the course of no lengthened time, once more to restore the situation as it was before the invasion of the Transvaal, and to have at our backs the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population in Africa; and if we have that, the opinion—the united opinion—which that will constitute will be an opinion which no power in Africa can resist. Now, gentlemen, that is the policy, the South African policy, of Her Majesty's Government." ("Hear, hear.")

But this was not by any means the only reference which Mr. Chamberlain made to the importance of keeping on good terms with the Dutch. On the 14th February, 1896, he declared that the keynote of the policy, not of this Government alone but of all Governments in South Africa, was to conciliate the two races and to secure the Dutch support. Mr. Chamberlain said:—

"We are constantly reminded of the fact that our Dutch fellow-citizens are in a majority in South Africa, and I think I may say for myself as for my predecessor that we are prepared to go as far as Dutch sentiment will support us. It is a very serious thing, a matter involving most serious considerations, if we are asked to go to war in opposition to the Dutch sentiment."

In 1897, when Sir Alfred Milner was entertained at dinner on the 28th March on his departure for the Cape, Mr. Chamberlain once more referred to the fundamental principle of sound policy in South Africa. "The problem," said Mr. Chamberlain, "before us and before him is not an insoluble problem. For what is it? It is to reconcile and to persuade to live together in peace and goodwill two races whose common interests are immeasurably greater than any differences which may unfortunately exist."

Here we have, therefore, laid down clearly and succinctly the touchstone of sound statesmanship in South Africa. After the maintenance of the paramountcy of Great Britain in South Africa, which has never been called in question, the one object which every British statesman must keep in mind, as the *sine qua non* of a successful policy in South Africa is to keep in line with the Dutch, to have at our back the sympathy and the support of the majority of the Dutch population in South Africa. This, of course, is plain common sense.

Ever since George III. lost us the American colonies by endeavouring to carry out a policy of Imperialism which ignored the wishes and prejudices of the colonists, Great Britain has maintained and extended her colonial Empire on the principle of conceding self-government to the Colonies which are sheltered by the Union Jack. The sheet-anchor of the whole Imperial system is that the colonists must be allowed to do as they please; that to each colony as soon as it arrives at a sufficient stage of maturity, there must be conceded responsible government, and that the local majority rules. It is by the adoption of this principle that we have established peace, tranquillity, and loyalty among the French Canadians, where seventy years ago there was nothing but dis-

content effervescing every now and then into actual rebellion. By the adoption of the same principle, which indeed we forced upon the Cape colonists almost against their will, we have placed the control of the Cape Colony in the hands of the majority of the electors whose representatives create the executive government by which the affairs of the colony are managed.

In the Cape Colony at this present moment, the white population is divided into two unequal parts; the larger section, numbering 230,000, are either Dutch or of Dutch descent. Side by side, intermingled with these Dutch-speaking fellow subjects, is the minority of 146,000 men of British descent, speaking English. Down to the year 1872 the Cape Colony was without responsible government. Twenty-seven years ago we insisted upon investing them and investing the local voting population with the control of their destinies, and as that local voting population is predominantly of Dutch descent, it is not to be wondered at that in the House of Commons at the Cape, which consists of ninety members, the Dutch have at this moment a majority of twelve, or nearly one-seventh of the whole number. It is obvious, therefore, that if constitutional government is to be carried on in the Cape, and the principles which have been established as the only sound principles of colonial policy are to be adhered to, Mr. Chamberlain was perfectly right in declaring that we are a Dutch Government as well as a British Government, just as in Canada we are a French Government as well as an English Government. Hence the one test to be applied to any and every policy which is proposed in Downing Street should be whether or not it will enable us to act with the support of the Dutch majority in whose hands we have placed the control of the destinies of Cape Colony. Let that be regarded, therefore, as the first principle which should govern our policy in South Africa at the present crisis. Does it or does it not secure for us the support of the Dutch? Does it or does it not tend to promote the union of the two races? Does it or does it not enable us, in Mr. Chamberlain's phrase, "to have at our backs the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population in South Africa?" If it does it bears with it the credentials of success. If it does not, it is foredoomed to failure. That is the first point upon which we have to thank Mr. Chamberlain for laying down the law in terms of unmistakable precision.

(2.) NO WAR TO ENFORCE REFORMS.

The second point on which we are glad to quote Mr. Chamberlain's words is the famous declaration as to the impossibility of waging a civil war against the Transvaal. Replying to those who urged him to draw the sword to reduce the grievances of the Uitlanders in 1896, on May 8th, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain said, in answer to Sir William Harcourt in the House of Commons:—

"In some quarters the idea is put forward that the Government ought to have issued an ultimatum to President Kruger—an ultimatum which would

have certainly been rejected, and which must have led to war. Sir, I do not propose to discuss such a contingency as that. A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of a civil war. It would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war. As I have pointed out, it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish. To go to war with President Kruger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, with which successive Secretaries of State standing in this place have repudiated all right of interference, that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise." (Cheers.)

This, therefore, is the second point upon which we welcome Mr. Chamberlain as a Daniel come to judgment. When we are urged to go in and whip the Boers, let us remember that, in the words of the Colonial Secretary, the war which was thus lightly invoked "will be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war"; and further, it will not only be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war, but it will have no moral justification.

(3.) NO CLAIM TO INTERFERE.

The third point Mr. Chamberlain laid down is that we have no right to make a claim to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal.

"In the last communication," Mr. Chamberlain said on May 8th, 1896, "I sent to the Press, I defined what I conceived to be our rights in the matter. I said we did not claim and never had claimed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, but we did claim, both as representing the interests of our fellow-subjects in the Transvaal and as the paramount Power in South Africa responsible for the security of the whole country, to make friendly representations to him and to give him friendly advice as much in his interests as in our own."

Again, speaking on the same point on February 13th, in the House of Commons, Mr. Chamberlain expressly disclaimed any right to force reforms on President Kruger. He said:—

"I do not say that under the terms of the Convention we are entitled to force reforms on President Kruger, but we are entitled to give him friendly counsel . . . If this friendly counsel which he was then offered, was not well received," Mr. Chamberlain declared "that there was not the slightest intention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to press it. All they will ask is that President Kruger himself should suggest some alternative . . . I am perfectly willing to withdraw it, and to seek a different solution if it should not prove acceptable to the President. The rights of our action under the Convention are limited to the offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce."

(4.) DON'T WORRY ABOUT WORDS.

Another principle upon which Mr. Chamberlain insisted in those days with commendable emphasis was, that the essential thing was not

a phrase or a word, but the reality of a fact. For instance, on the 9th of May, 1896, he said:—

“I do not care about words. It matters not whether we call ourselves suzerain or paramount; but it is an essential feature in our policy that the authority and influence of this country should be predominant in South Africa.” And the predominance and influence of this country in South Africa was then to be achieved, in his opinion, by bringing about a better feeling of union and concord between the two great races which now inhabit that country. If, therefore, we would pursue a wise and statesmanlike policy in South Africa, we must not care about words, and we must be supremely indifferent whether or not we call ourselves suzerain. We must concentrate our efforts upon bringing about a better state of union and concord between the English and the Dutch. This is sound sense, and cannot be too frequently insisted upon.

(5.) DON'T ASK MR. KRUGER TO COMMIT SUICIDE.

The fifth point upon which Mr. Chamberlain laid down sound principles in 1896 was that President Kruger would be perfectly justified in rejecting any proposal which, in his opinion, is calculated to undermine his own position. This passage is very notable, and may be commended to those who are indignant with President Kruger for not at once accepting Sir Alfred Milner's demand for a five years' franchise. Mr. Chamberlain said, speaking of his suggestion to President Kruger that the majority of the population should have the franchise, and should have a fair proportion of political power:—

“The answer that has hitherto been given, not on the part of the Government of the Transvaal but on the part of some of its friends, has been that to grant this request would be to commit suicide, inasmuch as the moment the majority got the franchise the first use they would make of it would be to turn out the existing Government of the Transvaal and substitute a government of their own liking. (‘Hear, hear,’ and laughter.) I confess I thought there was some reason in that objection. It is rather difficult to attempt to persuade anyone so capable as President Kruger that it would be desirable that he should proceed to his own extinction, and accordingly I brought before him an alternative suggestion which, at all events, would relieve him from that difficulty. . . . The question is whether President Kruger will consider that that proposal will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does he will be perfectly justified in rejecting it.”

(6.) “PATIENCE! TIME IS ON OUR SIDE.”

At the South African dinner on May 21st, 1896, Mr. Chamberlain declared “that the prosperity of South Africa depended less upon its marvellous natural resources, upon its agriculture and its mining industries, than it does upon the statesmanship, the wisdom, and the moderation of the men who are mainly responsible for its political destiny. He then quoted, with high approval, the address, signed by sixty-five members of the Cape Parliament representing the Afrikander constituencies, to Lord Rosmead, in which they stated, “that there

need be no apprehension whatever of the existence of any spirit of hostility in the minds of the Afrikaner people against England, if South Africa be left to work out its own destiny." They prayed Her Majesty's Government to resist all efforts to induce them to depart from "that policy of moderation and conciliation which can alone secure the real progress and true happiness of South Africa." "Those," said he, "are wise, moderate, and patriotic words. We must have patience; we can afford to wait. Time is on our side, and I do not doubt its healing hand will close the wounds that have been so rudely opened, and will remove all obstacles in the way of the prosperity of South Africa."

(7.) DON'T DESPATCH ARMIES, BUT RESTORE GOODWILL.

At this moment when the barbaric tomtoms of militant Jingoism are reverberating in our ears and we read daily exhortations to the Colonial Secretary to launch an ultimatum and despatch an army to compel President Kruger to concede reforms dictated at the sword's point, it may be well to recall Mr. Chamberlain's solemn public pledge on the subject. Speaking in reply to Sir Ashmead Bartlett—"That will never be my policy," said Mr. Chamberlain. Let us hope that he will be as good as his word. In any case, when we listen to these imperious demands for the despatch of armies to enforce an ultimatum, let us at least remember the grave and weighty words in which Mr. Chamberlain ridiculed the folly, exposed the illegality, and condemned the policy which now finds enthusiastic support from those who call themselves his most devoted followers.

On August 12th, 1896, replying to Sir Ashmead Bartlett, who had assailed Mr. Chamberlain's policy, he asked:—

"What is the alternative? What is the policy which the honourable gentleman would put forward if he were standing here in my place? What would be the policy of the hon. member for Sheffield as Colonial Secretary? (laughter.) We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Kruger that unless the reforms which he was specifying were granted by a particular date, the British Government would interfere by force. Then I suppose he would come here, and ask this House for a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000—it does not matter particularly which (laughter)—and would send an army of 10,000 men, at the very least, to force President Kruger to grant reforms in a State in regard to which not only this Government but successive Secretaries of State have pledged themselves repeatedly that they would have nothing to do with its internal affairs. That is the policy of the honourable gentleman. That is not my policy. My policy has been to restore the good feeling which was beginning to be created between the Dutch and the British population. . . . Common prudence demands that at all events we should give time for the feeling of irritation produced by the Raid to subside, and that we should not base upon our own wrong a demand for reform that would be absolutely unjustifiable under such circumstances. (Cheers.) That is my policy, and I believe that policy is succeeding."

We have here, therefore, seven principles clearly laid down by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the guidance of our South

African policy. They are good principles, and Mr. Chamberlain expresses them with characteristic vigour. They are accompanied with a definite pledge that he will "never" adopt the alternative policy based upon the principles of an ultimatum, the despatch of troops, and the levying of war, in order to force internal reforms upon the Transvaal. But unfortunately Mr. Chamberlain seems to have turned his back upon every one of his seven principles, and to have forgotten the public pledge which he gave as to his resolution never to adopt a policy advocated by Sir Ashmead Bartlett, which, in the opinion of the Jingo press, is on the verge of being adopted by Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues. If we take those seven principles, string them together, and apply them as a seven-fold test to the policy which is advocated by the War Party, we find that they run counter to it at each point of the seven. It would indeed be difficult to frame a more severe condemnation of the present policy of the Colonial Office than by simply printing side by side the principles upon which Mr. Chamberlain declared his determination to act, and the principles upon which he has acted. Take, for instance, the very first and the most important of all, his explicit recognition of the fact that after the maintenance of British supremacy in South Africa, there is nothing so important as the union of the Dutch and British, and the securing of Dutch support to British policy. What do we see to-day? That there is not a Dutchman in South Africa, whether in the Cape or Natal, or in either of the Republics, who is not convinced that the policy which Mr. Chamberlain is advocating is fatal to the best interests of Africa, and will be opposed to the uttermost by the whole strength of the Dutch population. Instead of having the Dutch at our backs, we have half of them standing bayonet in hand, preparing to receive our attack, while the other half are only waiting for an opportunity to trip us up, if not to strike us in the back, while we march our troops northward for the purpose of slaughtering their kinsmen. So far from having secured the support of the Dutch population, the Dutch Ministry which is at present in power under Mr. Schreiner at Cape Town, has declared its determination to endeavour to preserve neutrality in the war which our Jingoës propose should be waged by the British against the Transvaal: and the very latest news from Capetown tells that the fifty-three members of the Cape Parliament, which only contains ninety all told, have signed an address to their brothers in the Transvaal expressing profound sympathy with them in their present tribulation, and confining their advice to President Kruger to the suggestion that he should accept the proposal for a Joint Commission, a proposal which he had already accepted.

According to the majority of the Ministerial papers, there is nothing left for us to do except to adopt the policy which Mr. Chamberlain pointed out would be as immoral as it was unwise—viz.: that of despatching an ultimatum and backing it up by an army in order to begin what he has told us will be a long war, a bitter war, and one which could not fail to be disastrous to the best interests of South Africa. Mr. Chamberlain cannot complain if his own policy is judged by the standard of his own professions. All that we ask him is that he will remember what he said in 1896, and act up to it. Instead of this, he is

applauded on every hand by the hotheads of his party, because they believe that he is acting in direct opposition to all the seven principles above enumerated. Why cannot Mr. Chamberlain return to Chamberlainian principles, and abandon those of Ashmead Bartlett, which he appears to have adopted in face of his positive declaration that he would never be guilty of such an act?

CHAPTER VIII.

OLIVE SCHREINER'S APPEAL.

ON September 18 the Johannesburg correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* received the following appeal from Olive Schreiner:—

“Meetings should be held throughout the British Isles in support of the position taken up by Mr. John Morley in his Arbroath speech if a national disaster is to be avoided. The generous arrangement made by the people of the Transvaal for admitting foreigners to the citizenship of their little State has exceeded all that was anticipated. If their advances are not being met in the same spirit, the conviction is being forced on them that the men for the hour in authority in England have determined to goad them into war and take their land from them. The story of wrong in 1895 gives strength to this conviction. By ceaseless misrepresentation and exactions, which would mean the surrender of their land, we are to-day driving one of the bravest and most heroic little Teutonic folk the world has seen to despair. We are setting them with their backs to the wall and offering them this choice—‘Your land or destruction.’ They are prepared to give the only answer possible to a small race under such conditions.

“Let England clearly understand what war in South Africa means. The largest Empire the world has ever seen will hurl its full force against a small State of about thirty thousand men, including lads of sixteen and old men of sixty, without a standing army or organised commissariat. The entire little people will have to resolve itself into an army of wives and daughters, who will prepare the bread and meat the farmers put into their saddlebags when they go out to meet their enemies. To-day the women in the Transvaal are demanding guns, that they may take their part in the last stand.

“We may crush this little people with the aid of the Australians and the Canadians, since the British Isles seem unable to crush them alone. We have numbers and wealth on our side; they have a conviction that their God fights with them. Ours is a politicians’ war; theirs is a people’s. But with our vast resources we must literally crush them, though they may sell their lives dear at a cost of twenty or thirty millions and of a heavy loss among our soldiers. We may take the land and lower the little flag of his independence so dear to the Boer, but we shall have placed a stain upon our own that the centuries will not wash out. England and South Africa will both have lost. England will have lost in honour, and will have cut that cable of affection and

sympathy which alone can permanently bind South Africa to her. South Africa will be left torn and bleeding in every part, consumed by bitterness, till such time as she is strong enough to rise and work out her own redemption and carve out her own great fortune. Only the international speculator who, through his persistent misrepresentation by means of the press, has wrought this evil will gain and fill his already over-filled pockets with South African gold.

"It is said the bulk of the English nation have no desire to take his land or independence from the Boer, nor to shed English blood and sacrifice English honour in order that a few international speculators may gain command of the Transvaal goldfields. This is true. But there are times in the life of a nation when silence and inaction are as criminal as active participation in crime.

"We English in South Africa have never wholly lacked, from the days of General Dundas and Sir George Grey down to those of Sir William Butler, a line of great Englishmen who have perceived that the true line of statesmanship lay in dealing with the South African problems in a spirit of manly justice, simple straightforwardness, and a broad humanity. Let the principles which animated the action of these men be reverted to, and the bond of sympathy and affection binding South Africa to England will never be broken."

"Words in Season: an English South African's View of the Situation"—Olive Schreiner's previous contribution to the discussion of the topic of the day—began with a comparison between the sentiments of the English and Dutch South Africans, and incidentally tells the history of South Africa from the Dutch point of view. Olive Schreiner thinks that love—the love of man for woman and woman for man—is rapidly amalgamating the English and Dutch into one South African people. She says:—

THE SOUTH AFRICAN DUTCH.

In the Cape Colony, and increasingly in the two Republics, are found enormous numbers of cultured and polished Dutch-descended South Africans using English as their daily form of speech, and in no way distinguishable from the rest of the nineteenth century Europeans. Our most noted judges, our most eloquent lawyers, our most skilful physicians, are frequently men of this blood; the lists of the yearly examinations of our Cape University are largely filled with Dutch names, and women as well as men rank high in the order of merit. It would sometimes almost seem as if the long repose the people have had from the heated life of cities, with the large tax upon the nervous system, had sent them back to the world of intellectual occupations with more than the ordinary grasp of power. In many cases they go home to Europe to study, and doubtless their college life and English friendships bind Britain close to their hearts as to ours who are English born. The present State Attorney of the Transvaal is a man who has taken some of the highest honours Cambridge can bestow. Besides, there exist still our old simple farmers or Boers, found in the greatest perfection in the midland districts of the Colony, in the Transvaal and Free State, who constitute a large part of the virile backbone of South

Africa. Clinging to their old seventeenth century faiths and manners, and speaking their African taal, they are yet tending to pass rapidly away, displaced by their own cultured modern children; but they still form a large and powerful body. Year by year the lines dividing the South Africans from their more lately arrived English-descent brothers are passing away.

LOVE AS A FACTOR IN POLITICS.

Love, not figuratively but literally, is obliterating the line of distinction; month by month, week by week, one might say hour by hour, men and women of the two races are meeting. In the Colony there are few families which have not their Dutch or English connections by marriage; in another generation the fusion will be complete. There will be no Dutchmen then and no Englishmen in South Africa, but only the great blended South African people of the future, but speaking the English tongue, and holding in reverend memory its founders of the past, whether Dutch or English. Already, but for the sorrowful mistakes of the last years, the line of demarcation would have faded out of sight; external impediments may tend to delay it, but they can never prevent this fusion: we are one people. In thirty years' time, the daughter of the man who landed yesterday in South Africa will carry at her heart the child of a de Villiers, and the son of the Cornish miner who lands this week will have given the name of her English grandmother to his daughter, whose mother was a le Roux. There will be nothing in forty years but the great blended race of Africans.

THE UITLANDERS.

But during the last few years a new phenomenon has started up in South African life. The discovery of vast stores of mineral wealth in South Africa, more especially gold, has attracted suddenly to its shores a large population which is not and cannot, at least at once, be South African. This body is known under the name of Uitlanders (literally "Foreigners").

To those who know the great mining camps of Klondyke and Western America, it is perhaps not necessary to describe Johannesburg. Here are found that diverse and many-shaded body of humans, who appear wherever in the world gold is discovered. The Chinaman with his pig-tail, the Indian Coolie, the manly Kafir and the Half-caste, all forms of dark and coloured folk are here, and outnumber considerably the white. Nor is the white population less multifarious and complex. On first walking the streets, one has a strange sense of having left South Africa, and being merely in some cosmopolitan centre, which might be anywhere where all nations and colours gather round the yellow king. Russian Jews and Poles are here by thousands seeking in South Africa the freedom from oppression that was denied that much-wronged race of men in their own birthland; Cornish and Northumberland miners; working men from all parts of the earth; French, German, and English tradesmen; while on the Stock Exchange men of every European nationality are found, though the Jew predominates. The American strangers are

not large in number, but are represented by perhaps the most cultured and enlightened class in the camp, the mining engineer and large importers of mining machinery being often of that race; our lawyers and doctors are of all nationalities, while in addition to all foreigners, there is a certain admixture of English and Dutch South Africans. In the course of a day one is brought into contact with men of every species. Your household servant may be a Kafir, your washerwoman is a Half-caste, your butcher is a Hungarian, your baker English, the man who soles your boots a German; you buy your vegetables and fruit from an Indian Coolie, your coals from the Chinaman round the corner, your grocer is a Russian Jew, your dearest friend an American. This is an actual, and not an imaginary, description. Here are found the most noted prostitutes of Chicago, and that sad sisterhood created by the dislocation of our yet unco-ordinated civilization, and known in Johannesburg under the name of continental women, have thronged here in hundreds from Paris and the rest of Europe. Gambling, as in all mining camps, is rife; not merely men, but even women put their money into the totalisator, and a low fever of anxiety for chance wealth feeds on us.

A HELPFUL ANALOGY.

Rightly to understand the problem before the little Transvaal Republic to-day, it is necessary for Englishmen to imagine not merely that within the space of ten or twelve years, forty millions of Russians, Frenchmen, and Germans should enter England, not in driblets and in time extending over half a century, so that they might in a measure be absorbed and digested into the original population, but instantaneously and at once; not merely, that the large bulk of them did not intend to remain in England, and were there merely to extract wealth, not merely, that the bulk of this wealth was exported at once to other countries, enriching Russia, France, and Germany out of the products of English soil; that would be comparatively a small matter—but, that the bulk of the wealth extracted was in the hands of a few persons, and that these persons were opposed to the continued freedom and independence of England, and were attempting by the use of the wealth they extracted from England to stir up Russia and France against her, that through the loss of her freedom they might the better obtain the command of her wealth and lands. When the Englishman has vividly drawn this future for himself, he will hold, as nearly as is possible in a nutshell, an image of the problem which the people and Government of the Transvaal Republic are called on to face to-day.

THE THREAT OF WAR.

If it be asked, why at this especial moment we feel it incumbent on us not to maintain silence, and what that is which compels our action and speech, the answer may be given in one word—WAR! The air of South Africa is heavy with rumours; inconceivable, improbable, we refuse to believe them; yet, again and again they return. There are some things the mind refuses seriously to entertain, as the man who has

long loved and revered his mother would refuse to accept the assertion of the first passer-by that there was any possibility of her raising up her hand to strike his wife or destroy his child. But much repetition may at last awaken doubt, and the man may begin to look out anxiously for further evidence.

We English South Africans are stunned; we are amazed; we say that there can be no truth in it. Yet we begin to ask ourselves, "What means this unwonted tread of armed and hired soldiers on South African soil? Why are they here?" And the only answer that comes back to us, however remote and seemingly impossible, is WAR! To-night we laugh at it; and to-morrow when we rise up it stands before us again, the ghastly doubt—war! War—and in South Africa! War—between white men and white! *War!*—Why?—Whence is the cause?—For whom? For what? And the question gains no answer. We fall to considering. Who gains by war? Has our race in Africa and our race in England interests so diverse that any calamity so cataclysmic can fall upon us as war? Is any position possible that could make necessary that mother and daughter must rise up in one horrible embrace, and rend, if it be possible, each other's vitals? . . . Believing it impossible, we fall to considering, who is it gains by war?

THERE IS PEACE TO-DAY.

There is peace to-day in the land; the two great white races, day by day, hour by hour, are blending their blood, and both are mixing with the stranger. No day passes but from the veins of some Dutch South African woman the English South African man's child is being fed; not a week passes but the birthery of the English South African woman's child gives voice to the Dutchman's offspring; not an hour passes but on farm, and in town and village, Dutch hearts are winding about English and English about Dutch. If the Angel of Death should spread his wings across the land and strike dead in one night every man and woman and child of either the Dutch or the English blood, leaving the other alive, the land would be a land of mourning. There would be not one household nor the heart of an African-born man or woman that would not be weary with grief. We should weep the friends of our childhood, the companions of our early life, our grandchildren, our kindred, the souls who have loved us and whom we have loved. In destroying the one race he would have isolated the other. Time, the great healer of all differences, is blending us into a great mutual people, and love is moving faster than time. It is no growing hatred between Dutch and English South African born men and women that calls for war. On the lips of our babes we salute both races daily.

Then we look round through the political world, and we ask ourselves what great and terrible and sudden crime has been committed, what reckless slaughter and torture of the innocents, that blood can alone wash out blood? And we find the blood.

And still we look, asking what great and terrible difference has suddenly arisen, so mighty that the human intellect cannot solve it by means of peace, that the highest and most noblest diplomacy falls

powerless before it, and the wisdom and justice of humanity cannot reach it, save by the mother's drawing a sword and planting it in the heart of the daughter? We can find none.

THE MUUR KAT OF THE TRANSVAAL.

It may be said, "But what has England to fear in a campaign with a country like Africa? Can she not send out a hundred thousand or a hundred and fifty thousand men and walk over the land? She can sweep it by mere numbers." We answer yes—she might do it. Might generally conquers; not always. I have seen a little *muur kat* attacked by a mastiff, the first joint of whose leg it did not reach. I have seen it taken in the dog's mouth, so that hardly any part of it was visible, and thought the creature was dead. But it fastened its tiny teeth inside the dog's throat, and the mastiff dropped it, and, mauled and wounded and covered with gore and saliva, I saw it creep back into its hole, in the red African earth. But might generally conquers, and there is no doubt that England might send out sixty or a hundred thousand hired soldiers to South Africa, and they could bombard our towns and destroy our villages; they could shoot down men in the prime of life, and old men and boys, till there was hardly a kopje in the country without its stain of blood, and the Karoo bushes grew up greener on the spot where men from the midlands had come to help their fellows fall, never to go home. I suppose it would be quite possible for the soldiers to shoot all male South Africans who appeared in arms against them. It might not be easy, a great many might fall, but a great Empire could always import more to take their places; we could not import more, because it would be our husbands and sons and fathers who were falling, and when they were done we could not produce more.

VICTORY THE WORST DEFEAT.

Then the war would be over. There would not be a house in Africa, where African-born men and women lived, without its mourners from Sea Point to the Limpopo; but South Africa would be pacified—as Cromwell pacified Ireland three centuries ago, and she has been pacified ever since! As Virginia was pacified in 1677; its handful of men and women, in defence of their freedom, were soon silenced by hired soldiers. . . . A hundred or a hundred and fifty thousand imported soldiers might walk over South Africa; it would not be an easy walk, but it could be done. Then from east and west and north and south would come men of pure English blood to stand beside the boys they had played with at school and the friends they had loved; and a great despairing cry would rise from the heart of Africa. But we are still few. When the war was over the imported soldiers might leave the land—not all. Some must be left to keep the remaining people down. There would be quiet in the land. South Africa would rise up silently and count her dead and bury them. She would know the place where she found them. South Africa would be peaceful. There would be silence, the silence of a long exhaustion—but not peace! Have the dead no voices? In a thousand farmhouses black-robed women would hold

memory of the count, and outside under African stones would lie the African men to whom South African women gave birth under our blue sky. There would be silence, but no peace.

OLIVE SCHREINER'S 5,000.

You say that all the fighting men in arms might have been shot. Yes, but what of the women? If there were left but five thousand pregnant South African born women, and all the rest of their people destroyed, those women would breed up again a race like to the first. Oh! Lion-Heart of the North, do you not recognise your own lineage in these whelps of the South?—who cannot live if they are not free!

The grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the men who lay under the stones (who will not be English then nor Dutch, but only Africans) will say, as they pass those heaps, "There lie our fathers, or great-grand-fathers, who died in the first great war of independence," and the descendants of the men who lay there will be the aristocracy of Africa. Men will count back to them, and say: My father or my great-grandfather lay in one of those graves. We shall know no more of Dutch or English then, we shall know only the great African people. And *we*? We, the South Africans of to-day, who are still English, who have been proud to do the smallest good so it might bring honour to England, who have vowed our vows on the honour of Englishmen and by the faith of Englishmen. What of us?

EMPIRE: BANYAN OR UPAS?

Do not think that when imported soldiers walk across South African plains to take the lives of South African men and women that it is only African sand and African bushes that are cracking beneath their tread: at each step they are breaking the fibres, invisible as air, but strong as steel, which bind the hearts of South Africans to England. Once broken they can never be made whole again: they are living things: broken they will be dead. Each bullet which a soldier sends to the heart of a South African to take his life wakes up another who did not know he was an African. You will not kill us with your Lee-Metfords: you will make us. There are men who do not know they love a Dutchman, but the first three hundred that fall, they will know it.

Do not say, "But you are English, you have nothing to fear: we have no war with you!" There are hundreds of us, men and women who have loved England; we would have given our lives for her; but rather than strike down one South African man fighting for freedom, we would take this right hand and hold it in the fire, till nothing was left of it but a charred and blackened bone.

OLIVE AS AN AFRICAN FRANKLIN.

I know of no more graphic image in the history of the world than the figure of Franklin when he stood before the Lords of Council, in England, giving evidence, striving, fighting, to save America for England. Browbeaten, flouted, jeered at by the courtiers, his words hurled back at him as lies, he stood there fighting for England. England recognises

now that it was he who tried to save an empire for her; and that the men who flouted and browbeat him lost it. There is nothing more pathetic than the way in which Americans who loved England, Washington and Franklin, strove to keep the maiden vessel moored close to the mother's side, bound by the bonds of love and sympathy, that alone could bind them. Their hands were beaten down, bruised and bleeding, wounded by the very men they came to save, till they let go the mother ship and drifted away on their own great imperial course across the seas of time.

England knows now what those men strove to do for her, and the names of Washington and Franklin will ever stand high in honour where the English tongue is spoken; the names of Hutchinson, and North, and Grafton are not forgotten also; it might be well for them if they were!

Do not say to us: "You Englishmen, when the war is over, you can wrap the mantle of our imperial glory round you and walk about boasting that the victory is yours."

We could never wrap that mantle round us again. We have worn it with pride. We could never wear it then. There would be blood upon it, and the blood would be our brothers'.

We put it to the men of England. In that day where should we be found—we who have to maintain English honour in the South? Judge for us, and by your judgment we will abide. Remember, we are Englishmen!

WHAT SIR ALFRED MILNER NEEDS.

Looking around to-day along the somewhat overclouded horizon of South African life one figure strikes the eye, new to the circle of our existence here; and we eye it with something of that hope and sympathy with which a man is bound to view the new and unknown, which may be of vast possible good and beauty. What have we in this man, who represents English honour and English wisdom in South Africa? To a certain extent we know. We have a man honourable in the relations of personal life, loyal to friend, and above all charm of gold; wise with the knowledge of books and men; a man who could not violate a promise or strike in the dark. This we know we have, and it is much to know this; but what have we more?

When a woman rules the household with none but the children of her own body in it her task is easy; let her obey nature and she will not fail. But the woman who finds herself in a large strange household, where children and step-children are blended, and where all have passed the stage of childhood and have entered on that stage of adolescence where coercion can no more avail, but where sympathy and comprehension are the more needed—that woman has need of large and rare qualities springing more from the heart than from the head. She who can win the love of her strange household in its adolescence will keep its loyalty and sympathy when adult years are reached, and will be rich indeed.

There have been Englishmen in Africa who had those qualities. Will this new Englishman of ours evince them, and save an empire for

England and heal South Africa's wounds? Are we asking too much when we turn our eyes with hope to him?

Further off also, across the sea, we look with hope. The last of the race of great statesmen was not put into the ground with the old man of Hawarden; the great breed of Chatham and Burke is not extinct; the hour must surely bring forth the man.

We look further yet, with confidence, from the individual to the great heart of England—the people. The great, fierce, freedom-loving heart of England is not dead yet. Under a thin veneer of gold we still hear it beat. Behind the shrivelled and puny English Hyde, who cries only "Gold!" rises the great English Jekyll, who cries louder yet, "Justice and honour!" We appeal to him; history shall not repeat itself.

Nearer home we turn to one whom all South Africans are proud of, and we would say to Paul Kruger, "Great old man, first but not last of South Africa's great line of rulers, you have shown us you could fight for freedom; show us you can win peace. On the foot of that great statue which in the future the men and women of South Africa will raise to you let this stand written, 'This man loved freedom and fought for it; but his heart was large; he could forget injuries and deal generously.'"

And to our fellow Dutch South Africans, whom we have learnt to love so much during the time of stress and danger, we would say, "Brothers, you have shown the world that you know how to fight, show it you know how to govern; forget the past; in that Great Book which you have taken for your guide in life, turn to Leviticus, and read there in the 19th chapter, 34th verse: 'Be strong, be fearless, be patient.' We would say to you in the words of the wise dead President of the Free States which have become the symbol of South Africa, 'Wacht een beetje, alles zal recht kom.'" (Wait a little, all will come right.)

On our great African flag let us emblazon these words, never to take them down, "FREEDOM, JUSTICE, LOVE"; great are the two first; but without the last they are not complete.

CHAPTER IX.

I REPRINT here the following report of an address delivered by me in which I attempted to define in plain words the moral issue involved in the present war:—

AFRAID OF GOD.

STARTLING SPEECH BY MR. STEAD.

A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST WAR IN THE TRANSVAAL.

Mr. Stead delivered an address last night at Westminster Chapel upon the Duty of Christians in the present crisis. He said that he had never before spoken with so grave a sense of responsibility, or with such an intense conviction as to the fact that we were standing at the turning of the ways. The real root question which underlay everything, and of which this present trouble in the Transvaal was but a symptom was the question, whether or not we believed that there was a God who judgeth in the earth, who loved righteousness, and who abhorred a lie. The whole of our trouble in the

Transvaal sprang out of the deliberate conviction, frankly expressed and unhesitatingly acted upon, that this was not true, and that it was sometimes good policy to tell a lie and stick to it. He did not believe that, and knowing that we were going forth to battle with a lie in our right hand, he trembled as to the result; not perhaps in the campaign which was opened, but in the certain consequences which would result therefrom. The following are the more striking passages of Mr. Stead's speech :—

“ A SERIOUS CHARGE.

“It has been my lot for the last twenty years or so to dwell much among those whom we may call the artificers of the Empire. The men—consuls, admirals, colonial governors, Prime Ministers—who have been empire-builders, have been for the last dozen years many of them my intimate personal friends. Now the question whether or not it is right to lie, to lie before God and man for politic ends, is a question which I have been discussing for the last three years intimately, closely, with men who believe that it is, and who acted upon their belief. And all the trouble that we are in now has come from their acting upon that belief. I remember discussing the question three years ago after the Jameson Raid with people who knew all about it, who were in it up to the neck, and the question was ‘Should we own up, or should we lie?’ Some of them owned up, and others of them lied; and those who owned up did their best to shield the others who lied. I discussed this matter seriously, passionately, earnestly, with them all, from Mr. Rhodes downwards, and I said to them all ‘I do not care what you say, whatever evils there may come, whatever trouble there may come from admitting the truth and admitting frankly that what was done in South Africa was done with the cognisance and approval of the Colonial Office, let us have the truth, tell the truth, and shame the devil.’ And they said, ‘Oh, no, we cannot. It is impossible. If we were to admit it all, if we were to produce all the cables, if we were to produce all the correspondence, if we were to show that we had not taken a step without sending to the Colonial Office in order to get their advice and approval, what position should we cut before the world and as a nation? In what position should we stand? How could we admit it? No, we cannot. We have got to cover the Colonial Office, and if it is lying, then we must lie, lie, and get it through.’ And they did it. It covers me with shame and regret to think of that ghastly farce which was played at the South African Committee at Westminster. It sat and professed to examine into the truth of things, but in reality hushed everything up, refused to insist upon vital evidence, and, when they got one witness in the box, who was ready and willing to speak the truth, ordered him out of the box, and then drew up a lying verdict, which was approved by the House of Commons. From that all our trouble has come. One contemporary French observer said, ‘It marks the abdication of the British conscience.’ From that time when we had our Colonial Office whitewashed, we had a declaration going forth to South Africa, to the Transvaal, and to the Dutch of South Africa, that British honour, that British fair-play, that British truth no longer existed, and that we were willing to do anything, to resort to perjury, lying, suppression of evidence, rather than admit the truth. From that came a deep, bitter distrust of everything that we could say or do in the minds of Paul Kruger and his advisers.”

After referring to the revival of the suzerainty of 1881, which had been definitely abandoned by the Ministry of which Mr. Chamberlain formed a part, Mr. Stead commented in strong terms upon the fraudulent nature of the claim thus put forward. He said that if we had consented to waive this fraudulent

revival of an abandoned right, we could have had the five years' franchise, which Sir Alfred Milner declared was the best method of redressing the wrongs of the Uitlanders. But Mr. Chamberlain refused absolutely to give up a fictitious right which we had possessed under the Convention of 1881, and refused to allow the justice of his pretension to be submitted to arbitration. This fraudulent claim of a dead suzerainty was revived in order to enable Mr. Chamberlain to refuse arbitration. This intensified the suspicion of President Kruger, and made him feel that he was dealing with a sharper rather than with a statesman. But even then the Transvaal accepted, though most reluctantly, Mr. Chamberlain's proposal for a Joint Commission to examine into the seven years' franchise. No sooner was it accepted than Mr. Chamberlain went back on his word, repudiated his own proposition, and thrust them into war.

A TERRIBLE PERORATION.

Mr. Stead concluded as follows :—

“I remember in Ireland a long time ago I was talking to an Irishwoman, a very beautiful Irishwoman, who had been hunted from holding to holding by a scoundrel of a landlord's agent, an immoral brute who wished to make her his mistress, and she refused. She was turned out on the roadside over and over again. She was then sitting in her cabin by her fire of turf. I said to her, ‘How is it, if the man is such a scoundrel, you never got anybody to kill him?’ And she looked at me in a curious kind of way, and said, ‘Oh, Sir, because I am afraid of God.’ We are now engaged at the present moment in the assassination of a people, and I am afraid of God. You say to me, ‘Then what is our duty?’ Ascertain the facts. See for yourself. You have got the Blue-Books. Everything that I have said concerning the course of negotiations you can find in the despatches of the Government. Look at them for yourselves, and ask yourselves whether you dare spill your brother's blood upon any such pretext as this. And supposing you come to the same conclusion as I have, what should we do then? Would you say, ‘We are in for it now. We have got to fight it through.’ I do not know whether you think so or not. I do not. I think, if I fasten a quarrel upon a man, a wrongful quarrel, if I have lied to that man, if I have swindled him, if I have gone back on my word, and then threatened to kill him unless he gave in to everything that I demanded; if he then attacked me, I think the first thing to be done is to own that we are wrong, and make reparation for our crime. What we ought to do is plain. We should order a real strict investigation into the charges made against the Colonial Office of perjury and lying in connection with this matter. If it should turn out that there was legal evidence procurable, that is to say, if the cablegrams now have not only been suppressed but destroyed, if the correspondence still exists, all perjurers should be prosecuted. Then let us send the best man we could get to Paul Kruger, and say to him: ‘We have been led into this war by an informal conspiracy of fraud and lying, we have forced you to attack us. We admit that we were wrong. Retire to your own territories, and let us agree what damage we have done to you, and we will pay you compensation for the same.’ I ask you in your own conscience, before high Heaven, whether if it be true what I say, anything less than that would meet the demands of justice? Put yourself in Paul Kruger's place; imagine that you had been unjustly driven into a war like this, and imagine that your opponent had suddenly opened his eyes to the crime which he had committed against you, what would you expect him to do? Surely to make a confession of sin in the first instance, and then to make such reparation as he could. I know that in this matter I am as a voice crying in the wilderness. I know that in the present moment of passion and fury, when passion is excited and the

streets ring with the cheers for soldiers going to fight in this unholy quarrel, my voice will hardly be heard. But mark my words, if I am right we shall not have long to wait before we shall find that God is not dead, neither is He asleep; and if, as I believe, He loves this England of His, and this people of His, although but a small remnant are still faithful to Him; then, as upon Israel of old when they sinned, and went in opposition to the Divine will, will descend disaster after disaster, until we turn from lying and all these evil ways into the paths of justice and truth. I hate prophesying tribulation. I hate speaking of evils that are still to come; but it does not require much of a prophet's eye to see how easily—I do not say in the Transvaal but on a far wider area—judgment might overtake us.

“A friend of mine said to me the other day, ‘It is no use your worrying yourself about this. We are all too hellish rich to care anything for your morality—morality is off the slate.’ Although he put it coarsely, it expresses a very widespread conviction. We are rich, we are strong, we can do what we please, and there is no damnation waiting for us. But if there be a God, and He cares for His people, we shall not have long to wait for the judgment and the doom. Let us, at least, wash our hands of our brother's blood.”

CHAPTER X.

THE GENESIS OF A CRIME, AND ITS NEMESIS.

THE present war, which is an outrage upon Christianity and humanity, has been forced upon the Boers by a policy which it is difficult to characterise in parliamentary terms. The Boers have their own sins to answer for. Nor do I for a moment pretend that their system of government is ideal, or their administration pure. The Outlanders had plenty of grievances which it was our duty to try to redress so far as it was possible to do it without going to war, or without breaking our pledged word not to interfere in the internal affairs of the South African Republic. That may be admitted, and if anyone likes to throw hard words at President Kruger, and abuse him for not having the wit to see that he could have circumvented the war party by accepting the five years' franchise, I shall not say them nay. We have no responsibility for the mistakes and shortcomings of President Kruger. What we have to do is to ask whether our own policy has been free from reproach, whether we have acted throughout in a straightforward honourable fashion, and whether we, being the superior and more civilised Power, have used every available means of allaying the suspicions of the very distrustful Old Peasant with whom we had to deal.

Unfortunately that is just what we have not done. We have done everything imaginable to excite distrust and justify suspicion. Our policy has been slippery and tricky; we have put forward claims which are demonstrably fraudulent; we have absolutely refused to refer the one great cause of dispute to arbitration, and we have finally thrust them into war by repudiating our own proposition the moment they accepted it. The best cause in the world—and I have never denied that the cause of the Outlanders is a good cause—would be damned irretrievably by the method by which it has been handled.

Lying at the root of everything, the element which has continually baffled the efforts of all peacemakers has been the intense conviction of President Kruger and his advisers that the Colonial Secretary was determined by hook or by crook to destroy their Republic and reduce the Transvaal to the status of a British Colony.

Now in order to understand President Kruger's belief it is necessary to go back to the conspiracy which was at once exposed and baffled by the never to be sufficiently lamented impatience of Dr. Jameson. It is not very ancient history, for it is only four years old, and it is absolutely impossible to understand the reluctance of President Kruger to accept our assurances or to believe our word unless we put ourselves in his place and look for a moment how things must appear to him.

What President Kruger knows is that in the autumn of 1895, he was served with an ultimatum by Mr. Chamberlain which threatened him with war if he did not reopen the Drifts. To avoid war he gave in, reopened the Drifts and immediately found himself face to face with a conspiracy to overthrow his government which was engineered, armed and financed by the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. In order to facilitate the armed intervention of British troops, he saw that Mr. Chamberlain had made over to Mr. Rhodes a strip of land convenient as a jumping-off place for an invasion of the Transvaal. He saw also that Mr. Chamberlain had expedited the arrangement by which the mounted police could be placed at the disposition of Dr. Jameson for use on emergencies. Finally when the conspiracy hung fire among the Outlanders, he saw Dr. Jameson at the head of the troops taken over from Mr. Chamberlain, use the jumping-off place as the base from which he invaded the Republic.

All that he knows as a matter of fact. But besides what is within his own knowledge, he knows that the following statement as to the complicity of Mr. Chamberlain in the deadly "complot" has been publicly made and is widely believed by those who have an intimate knowledge of South African affairs.

Information as to the conspiracy to overturn the Boer Government in the Transvaal was communicated by Dr. Jameson to Lord Rosmead, High Commissioner at the Cape, and was fully expounded to Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary, who, owing to Lord Rosmead's illness, was virtually Acting High Commissioner.

It was also communicated to Mr. Newton, the Imperial Magistrate on the frontier, and was elaborated in detail by Dr. Jameson, administrator under the Crown of the Chartered Company's territory. All this, with the exception of the communication to Lord Rosmead of the outline of the conspiracy, is officially admitted and is on record as proved.

It is further stated that before the Prime Minister of the Cape went very far in his conspiracy he found it necessary to enlist the support of the Colonial Office in his designs. He therefore sent over to London his *fidus Achates*, Mr. Rutherford Harris, with instructions to inform Mr. Chamberlain of what was brewing and to ask him to expedite the transfer of the jumping-off territory, and the transfer of the police in order to enable them to support the insurrection from the outside. Dr. Harris executed his mission and cabled to Mr. Rhodes the result of his

interview. At first Mr. Chamberlain refused, but subsequently after Dr. Harris had "spoken openly" to Mr. Fairfield of the Colonial Office, and had communicated to Mr. Chamberlain the contents of a cablegram from Mr. Rhodes, warning him that if he thwarted the conspiracy he would lose South Africa, Mr. Chamberlain gave way, and on the convenient pretext of the necessity for protecting the builders of the Bechuanaland railway from (non-existent) savage tribes, handed over the police and the jumping-off strip to the Chief Conspirator.

Further Mr. Kruger has heard that the communications between the conspirator's emissaries and the Colonial Office were close and constant, and that during the whole month of November cablegrams were constantly passing and repassing between the chief conspirator at Cape Town and his trusted emissaries and friends in London, who were on his behalf keeping the Colonial Office in touch with the movement. He knows also that on November 4th Mr. Fairfield advised the removal of the Imperial troops before the "ugly row" began in which the leading rôle was to be played by the forces of the Chartered Company. (This letter is one of the few documents that are in evidence.) He has heard also that so far from Mr. Chamberlain knowing nothing of the complot, he took so keen and close an interest in its development that he insisted that Dr. Jameson's men should go in under the Union Jack, and that the next Governor of the Transvaal should be appointed by the Colonial Office. He has read the telegram from the chief conspirator in reply to this intimation about the flag, and he has drawn from it his own conclusions. Further he knows that just before the Raid took place a cablegram was received at Cape Town from a trusted friend of Mr. Rhodes in London, who immediately, after a long interview with Mr. Chamberlain, telegraphed "Hurry up." He has heard also that another telegram from another friend of Mr. Rhodes arrived with the same urgent summons, and he has heard that this also was forwarded, as the result of a pressing intimation from the Colonial Office, that it was better to get the Transvaal "ugly row" over as soon as possible, as the Venezuela dispute with the United States was threatening. And he knows that as the result of these urgent cablegrams, sent after visits paid to the Colonial Office, Dr. Jameson did "hurry up" accordingly.

But before Dr. Jameson could get Sir John Willoughby and the regular officers of the British Army who were "seconded" for service with the Chartered Companies troops it was necessary to satisfy them that Mr. Chamberlain was privy to the conspiracy. This communication was therefore formally made to them before the frontier was crossed. Dr. Jameson told Sir John Willoughby that Mr. Chamberlain knew and approved of the enterprise, and Sir John Willoughby in making his statement to his officers used the phrase "Imperial authorities" instead of Mr. Chamberlain. On receiving this intimation the little army invaded the Transvaal, to be captured three days later at Doornkop. The officers were subsequently restored to the regular army, as it was proved they had acted in good faith, believing the assurances made to them by Dr. Jameson on the strength of the cablegrams sent from London by Dr. Harris, Miss Flora Shaw, Mr. Maguire, and others, who were all in touch with the Colonial Office.

President Kruger also knows, for it is in evidence that when Mr. Rhodes went home to face the music after the raid his first step was to send Mr. Hawksley to tell Mr. Fairfield of the existence of cablegrams which had passed between Capetown and London, which established the complicity of the Colonial Office in the conspiracy. Mr. Rhodes after this went and had two hours' conversation with Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office. Mr. Chamberlain then stood up in the House of Commons and solemnly declared that "to the best of his knowledge and belief everybody, Mr. Rhodes included, were all equally ignorant of the intention or action of Dr. Jameson, and that belief he expressed after having carefully examined all the statements of all the parties concerned." Ten months later Mr. Chamberlain admitted he had never discussed the subject with Mr. Rhodes, whose confidences were not wanted—being indeed unnecessary.

Mr. Rhodes then returned to Africa, where he met Mr. Tatton Egerton, M.P., who told him plainly that Mr. Chamberlain was in the conspiracy up to the hilt. Mr. Kruger also knows that it has been publicly stated in London, and never contradicted, that when Mr. Tatton Egerton was confronted with the Colonial Secretary, he was asked, "Who told you I was in it?" "Rhodes himself," said Mr. Egerton. "The traitor!" was said to be Mr. Chamberlain's only reply.

Mr. Kruger also knows that copies of all the incriminating cablegrams were furnished by Mr. Hawksley to Mr. Chamberlain, that they were kept by him for some days and then returned. He has further heard that the correspondence accompanying these letters frankly recognises the complicity of the Colonial Office in the conspiracy.

All this Mr. Kruger has heard. He knows also that in 1897 a representative Committee of the House of Commons was appointed for the purpose of examining into the truth of these assertions. He knows also that the Committee, which included among its members Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Sir W. Harcourt, instead of making a thorough inquiry, deliberately and resolutely in the face of vehement protests in the press, hushed up the whole matter. They refused to insist upon the production of the incriminating cablegrams, they never demanded, from the Colonial Office or from the other side, any of the correspondence that had passed, and when they found the chief witness, Mr. Hawksley, was actually displaying a willingness to answer questions, they ordered him off the stand and refused to allow him to give evidence. Then that Committee drew up a report in which they entirely exonerated the Colonial Office from all complicity in the plot, and declared that "the fact that Mr. Rhodes has refused to allow the cables to be produced before the Committee leads to the conclusion that any statements purporting to implicate the Colonial Office contained in them were unfounded, and the use made of them in support of his action in South Africa." This in plain English was a lie, and Mr. Chamberlain, who signed the report, knew it to be a lie. For immediately after signing this damning statement that Mr. Rhodes was a liar and a blackmailer, who made a fraudulent use of cablegrams in order to lure his subordinates into an illegal conspiracy, Mr. Chamberlain stood up in the House of Commons and said, "But as to one thing, I am perfectly convinced,

and that is there has nothing been proved, and there exists nothing which affects Mr. Rhodes' personal character as a man of honour. So far as I am concerned in considering the position of Mr. Rhodes, I dismiss absolutely those charges which affect his personal honour."

All this Mr. Kruger knows. What possible conclusion could he draw from it except that in dealing with Mr. Chamberlain he is dealing with a man who was privy to the conspiracy to overthrow his Government and annex the Transvaal, and who did not hesitate at any amount of false statement and suppression of evidence in order to save his skin. Nay, it is even worse than this. For the proceedings of the Committee convinced him that both parties in England are willing to join in a conspiracy to conceal the truth whenever it suits the interest of England in South Africa so to do. As Lord George Hamilton ingenuously said when praising Sir W. Harcourt and the Liberal members of the Committee for hushing up the scandal: "They behaved as Englishmen always behave in positions of responsibility. They declined to push the inquiry to a point which would endanger the supremacy of British rule in South Africa."

But we are not left to infer what President Kruger thought. Mr. Hofmeyr, the leading Dutchman of South Africa, being asked by the interviewer of the *Daily Mail* what he thought of Mr. Chamberlain's conduct at the inquiry replied:—

It took us all by surprise—even more so than Jameson and Rhodes. We trusted in English justice and British fair play. What do we see? With all the documents at their disposal, the Committee refused to call for the most important ones. The House of Commons by a large majority exonerates him. Where are we? What is going to be the next move? We don't know; we feel suspicious. Can you wonder at it? If this is a specimen of public honour, if Chamberlain's idea of personal honour is to govern British statesmen, what are we to expect next? *There can be no trust by the Dutch community in the Colonial Office so long as these principles prevail there.*

Can anyone wonder at the Dutch community? Read what the *Temps*, the most serious and best informed of all the French papers, said of the proceedings of the South African Committee:—

The Committee sacrifices everything, including the honour of England, to its desire to preserve the reputation of that meddling and imperious statesman. The evil is wrought and is irreparable. It is now proved that the Queen's Government has plotted in time of peace the invasion of a friendly country, and that there is no majority in Great Britain to condemn the crime. It is the apotheosis of the Birmingham statesman; it is also the abdication of British conscience.

It is not necessary for the reader to accept the truth of the statements which President Kruger believes to be true. All that I ask is that the reader should ask himself, How was it possible under these circumstances for President Kruger to regard Mr. Chamberlain in any other light than as fellow-conspirator with Mr. Rhodes, and that he should believe that Mr. Chamberlain only differed from the late Prime Minister of the Cape in being less courageous in admitting his sins, and much less scrupulous in suppressing the truth?

We must then as honest men admit that, rightly or wrongly, President

Kruger had the best justification for his intense suspicion of Mr. Chamberlain's good faith. If Mr. Chamberlain were an innocent misjudged Minister, it was nevertheless necessary for him to do his level best to allay the suspicion with which he was regarded, and even to go out of his way to prove that the Dutch distrust was unfounded. Alas, instead of doing this, he took, wilfully or otherwise, the very step which of all others deepened the Dutch distrust into a fixed conviction that in dealing with Mr. Chamberlain they had to do with a man who had no conception of honesty and good faith.

Within three months of his whitewashing by the South African Committee Mr. Chamberlain, in order to justify his refusal to allow the disputes between England and the Transvaal to be referred to arbitration, deliberately revived the dead and buried suzerainty of the Convention of 1881.

Again, I do not ask the reader to accept my deliberate judgment that this was a piece of scandalous sharp practice. I only ask him to try and think what President Kruger must have thought of it. President Kruger was

NOTE.—The words and paragraphs bracketed or printed in italics are proposed to be inserted, those within a black line are proposed to be omitted.

Her Majesty's Commissioners for the settlement of the Transvaal Territory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, bearing date the 5th of April 1881, do hereby undertake and guarantee, on behalf of Her Majesty, that from and after the 8th day of August 1881, complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, Her Heir and Successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal Territory, upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations and limitations :—

Whereas the Government of the Transvaal State, through its Delegates, consisting of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the said State, Stephanus Johannes Du Toit, Superintendent of Education; Nicholas Jacobus Smit, a member of the Volksraad, have represented to the Queen that the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 3rd day of August, 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State on the 25th October, 1881, contains certain provisions which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations from which the said State is desirous to be relieved; and that the south-western boundaries fixed by the said Convention should be amended, with a view to promote the peace and good order of the said state, and of the countries adjacent thereto; and whereas Her Majesty the Queen, &c., &c., has been pleased to take the said representations into consideration. Now, therefore, Her Majesty has been pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared that the following articles of a new Convention shall when ratified by the Volksraad of the South African Republic, be substituted for the Articles embodied in the Convention of 3rd August, 1881; which latter, pending such ratification, shall continue in full force and effect.

We, the undersigned, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, ~~Martinus Wessel Pretorius, and Petrus Jacobus Jonhart, as representatives delegates of the Transvaal~~ *Burgess, South African Republic*, do hereby agree to all the above conditions, reservations, and limitations, ~~under which self-government has been restored to the inhabitants of the Transvaal Territory, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, Her Heir and Successors, and we agree to accept the Government of the said Territory, with all rights and obligations thereto appertaining, on the 8th day of August 1881, and we promise and undertake that this Convention shall be ratified by a newly elected Volksraad of the Transvaal State South African Republic within three six months from this date.~~

one of the deputation which in 1884 came to this country to negotiate with England for the abandonment of the suzerainty of 1881. He met Lord Derby and Lord Rosmead, who in consideration of concessions made by President Kruger on the western frontier deliberately consented to give up the suzerainty. President Kruger with a keen shrewd Dutch eye to the possibilities of the future asked that the abandonment of the suzerainty of 1881 should be made the subject of a special article in the new Convention. Lord Derby explained that to do this would give a handle to the Opposition, but he gave the delegates a paper—reduced herewith—in which he showed them that in the new Convention which was to be substituted for the old one, the preamble which asserts the suzerainty and the last clause which also recognised it would be omitted. Armed with this document and believing the word of a British statesman the delegates returned to Pretoria, and by virtue of their report that the suzerainty of 1881 was gone for ever they secured the consent of the Volksraad to the ratification of the Convention.* That public statement of theirs was never objected to. No one from 1884 down to 1897 ever dreamed of asserting that the suzerainty of 1881 survived. Speaking near Swindon on October 14th, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, M.P., said:—

He was in office in 1884, when the second Convention with the Transvaal was settled, and he believed the members of the Government all considered that the suzerainty was abolished. It was understood that the Convention of 1881 had disappeared, and had been replaced by the Convention of 1884.

* Extract from the Report of the Deputation of the South African Republic to the Honourable Volksraad, 28th July, 1884.

7. Your Deputation, leaving the judgment of the said Convention entirely to your wisdom and declaring itself ready to give all explanations desired in dealing with it, wishes, with all discretion, to refer to some principal points in which this London Convention is distinguished from the Convention of Pretoria.

b. It is entirely bilateral, whereby your representatives were not placed in the humiliating position of merely having to accept from a Suzerain Government a one-sided document as rule and regulation, but whereby they were recognised as a free contracting party.

c. It makes, then, also an end of the British suzerainty, and, with the official recognition of her name, also restores her full self-government to the South African Republic, excepting one single limitation regarding the conclusion of treaties with foreign powers (Article 4). With the suzerainty the various provisions and limitations of the Pretoria Convention which Her Majesty's Government as suzerain had retained have also, of course, lapsed. (Parliamentary Paper, C. 9507, p. 24.)

Contrast this with Mr. Chamberlain's statement in his despatch of October, 1896, when he refused to have questions as to the infringement of the Convention submitted to the arbitration of any neutral Powers. He based his refusal to consent on the ground that "Her Majesty toward the South African Republic holds the relation of a suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic self-government upon certain conditions, and that it would be incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the construction of the conditions on which she accorded self-government to the Republic." (*Ib.*, p. 16.)

Lord Cadogan, indeed, in the House of Lords, took the earliest possible opportunity of declaring that the object of the Convention of 1884 was to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. But in October, 1897, Mr. Chamberlain, fresh from his whitewashing at the hands of the South African Committee, confirmed the worst fears of President Kruger by calmly asserting that the suzerainty still existed, and, therefore, that the preamble of the Convention of 1881 still governed the situation!

President Kruger, to express it in the forcible vernacular, felt himself swindled. Who can say without reason? Rightly or wrongly there is no disputing that he and all his people honestly believed that in 1884 they had made an honest deal with honest statesmen, and that England had frankly, fully and for ever given up the Convention of 1881, preamble and all, and that not a rag of the suzerainty remained, save and except Article 4 of the new Convention about the right of veto on Treaties. For thirteen years no British Minister had breathed a word about the suzerainty. But in October, 1897, Mr. Chamberlain, of all men in the world, revives this dead and buried suzerainty, and adduces it as a reason why he cannot send our disputes with the Transvaal to arbitration? What could President Kruger think—excepting what he did think, that he was dealing with a Jeremy Diddler rather than with a Minister of the Crown.

Let no one say, as the more sane of Mr. Chamberlain's apologists pretend, that the reference to the preamble of the Convention of 1881 was necessary merely from the point of view of legal interpretation, and that it is only an affair of historical reminiscence. President Kruger could not take it in that light for several reasons. Mr. Chamberlain in set terms not merely affirmed the suzerainty of 1881 as being still in existence, but expressly refused to allow the question to be submitted to arbitration. (*Blue Book.*) Mr. Conyngham Greene, the British agent at Pretoria, as explicitly declared that the Government never would give up the right they possessed under the Preamble of 1881. (*Ib.*) Nay more even in the last so-called conciliatory despatch, Mr. Chamberlain wrecked all hope of a pacific settlement by referring to "the Conventions" in the plural, thereby once more emphasizing the continued existence of the suzerainty of 1881, which the Boers know was abandoned by Lord Derby in 1884.

If Mr. Chamberlain would have frankly abandoned this monstrous fraud and had explicitly declared that he disclaimed all pretensions to interfere in the Transvaal under the Convention of 1881, he could have had the five years' franchise in August. But he refused. He would neither give up this fraudulent claim or allow it to be submitted to the judgment of a mixed British and Africander Court of Arbitration. How could we marvel that President Kruger could not trust such a negotiator?

But although President Kruger knew he was dealing with a man as capable of resurrecting dead claims as he was of denying on oath his complicity in the Rhodesian conspiracy, he nevertheless consented to Mr. Chamberlain's proposal of a Joint Commission into the seven years' franchise. But no sooner did he agree to this concession, a concession which he made most reluctantly fearing that it might entail a recognition

of our right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, and sooner, I say, did he agree to this proposition than Mr. Chamberlain went back on his word, changed his terms, demanded a Joint Commission not into the seven years but into the five years' franchise, and so wrecked the last chance of a pacific settlement.

This being the case—and any one who pleases can read the whole scandalous story in the Blue Books of which this pamphlet is a mere digest—can any honest man venture to say that we are in the right in this war which is now raging in South Africa?

The question of the magnitude of the grievances of the Outlanders does not in the least affect the question whether in proposing to remedy them we have acted in honest straightforward fashion or whether we have been adopting alternately the methods of the burglar and those of the long firm.

I claim to have proved beyond all gainsaying or dispute:—

1st. That President Kruger has ample justification for believing that Mr. Chamberlain was a confederate of Mr. Rhodes in the conspiracy of 1895.

2nd. That Mr. Chamberlain has deliberately revived and pressed the claim to the suzerainty of 1881 which was given up by Lord Derby in 1884, and that he refused to give it up even when offered the five years' franchise in exchange.

3rd. That when President Kruger accepted his proposal for a Joint Commission into the seven years' franchise Mr. Chamberlain went back on his word and raised his terms.

4th. That from first to last, even while promising to discuss the reference of minor questions to arbitration, Mr. Chamberlain has always refused to allow the one burning question to be referred to the judgment of an arbitral tribunal.

This being so, I ask every honest man whether we can for a moment pretend that we are in the right in this quarrel?

Have we not indeed, on the contrary, been entirely in the wrong, no matter how just may be the claim which we make for the redress of the wrongs of the Outlanders?

We have gone into this war with a lie in our right hand, and if, as the ancients believed, there is a God who judgeth in the earth, there is before us but a terrible looking forward to of judgment to come.

That is the real question that underlies all others. Is there a God, a righteous God, to whom deliberate lying, even for Imperial ends, is abhorrent?

It has been my lot for many years past to mingle much with those whom I may call the artificers of empire. They are not religious men as a rule, although there are some notable exceptions.

There are few questions which I have discussed so much with them as this supreme question, of the existence of a righteous Ruler of the universe.

I well remember the discussions that raged over the question whether or not Mr. Chamberlain should be pressed to make a clean breast of it before the South African Committee? I always argued strongly that honesty was the best policy in the long run, that Mr. Chamberlain could

quite truthfully minimise his admissions, and although it would, of course, necessitate his retirement from the Ministry, it would not permanently injure his career even if in the end it did not help him to the realisation of his ambitions. But my friends one and all scouted the idea. "Joe," they said, "was in for it and he must lie himself out of it, cost what it might." Some of them said they would not lie themselves, but they would not give Mr. Chamberlain away. "He could do his own lying for himself." So the watchword was "Lie! Lie! Lie!" and in the proceedings of the South African Committee we have the result.

It was a risk, an immense risk. Any one of half-a-dozen witnesses might by a single incautious word have spoiled the whole conspiracy of deception. I never believed they could have got through with it. Nor could they have done so had there been one member on the Committee skilled in cross-examination who was not a party to the hushing up. When it was all over I was taunted with my simplicity. "You can always trust to unctuous rectitude," said one of my friends, "and, when that fails, to the natural cunning of the official Englishman."

Far outside the ring of the Africans the evil lesson of that Committee was eagerly taken to heart. Honesty was not the best policy. Truth was not essential in politics. "Just see how Chamberlain came off scot-free. Where would he have been if he had told the truth?" And the apparent triumph of falsehood poisoned the morale of multitudes of our Imperialists.

That it was falsehood; that the verdict was obtained by wholesale suppression of vital evidence and flat denial of essential facts no one who was in the conspiracy ever disputed, nor do they now deny it. On the contrary, I shall be severely handled for referring to the subject again. It is such a pity, when a lie has served its turn, to insist upon referring to so painful a subject.

If "a proud look, a lying tongue, and hands that shed innocent blood," are still an abomination to the Lord, how can we expect Him to go forth with our armies as of old time?

"Hear the word of the Lord ye scornful men that rule this people!

"Because ye have said, We have made a covenant with Death, and with Hell we are in agreement; when the overflowing scourge shall pass through it shall not come unto us, for we have made lies our refuge, and under falsehood have we hid ourselves.

"Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Behold judgment will I lay to the line and righteousness to the plummet, and the hail shall sweep away the refuge of lies and the waters shall overflow the hiding-place. And your covenant with Death shall be disannulled and your agreement with Hell shall not stand; when the overflowing scourge shall pass through, then ye shall be trodden by it.

"For the wicked shall be turned into Hell and all the nations that forget God."

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