

THE SCANDAL OF THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN COMMITTEE.

A PLAIN NARRATIVE FOR PLAIN MEN.

*Hayes*

BY

WILLIAM T. STEAD.

“The Chastity of Honour feels a Stain like a Wound.”

BURKE.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

“REVIEW OF REVIEWS” OFFICE,

MOWBRAY HOUSE, NORFOLK STREET, LONDON, W.C.

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## PREFACE.

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THE time has come when it is necessary to set forth in plain words, which the plain man can understand, a narrative of Mr. Chamberlain's complicity in the conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the South African Republic in 1895.

Let me, at the beginning, emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the conspiracy to bring about a revolution in the Transvaal with a British force on the Border in support, which was the Jameson Plan, and the Jameson Raid. The two things are almost always confounded by the indiscriminating public. So far from being identical, the Jameson Raid cut the throat of the conspiracy. Dr. Jameson acted, no doubt, with the best intentions in the world, but, as a matter of fact, he not only upset Mr. Rhodes's appercart, but from excessive zeal caused the miscarriage of an enterprise which, however indefensible it may have been from the point of view of constitutional law, would, if it had succeeded, have delivered us from all our present troubles. If, therefore, any person should say that Mr. Chamberlain was privy to the Raid, or that Mr. Chamberlain had anything whatever to do with the Raid, either that he knew about it beforehand, or that he sanctioned it, or that he was in any way whatever responsible for it, such person would say that which is not true. The Raid was Dr. Jameson's own act, and it spoiled everything. The Jameson Plan was that to which Mr. Chamberlain was privy.

I have never made any charge, or accusation, or complaint against Mr. Chamberlain for the support which he gave to the conspiracy against the Government of Paul Kruger. Neither do I at this moment lay any stress upon that side of the question. Others, no doubt, take a very serious view of the matter. They may be right, and I may be wrong. All that I wish to point out is that, so far from being animated, as many ignorantly declare, by a persistent and vindictive animosity against Mr. Chamberlain, I have from first to last endeavoured to make every conceivable excuse for his action in the autumn of 1895. If since I have been driven to criticize his action, it has been due, not to anything that he did in 1895, but to the manner in which he persisted, in the face of all warnings and protests, in adopting a policy of concealing the truth, denying facts and making both parties in the House of Commons unwilling accomplices in a conspiracy to deceive the nation, which is, I believe, without parallel in the history of Parliamentary Government. It is this offence which is rank, an offence committed in the full light of day, after careful and long deliberation, and with the distinct purpose and object of concealing the truth and giving official Parliamentary currency to a lie.

If any one blames me for this publication, I have only to say that I have been so vehemently assailed, alike by friends and foes, for saying that the scandal of the South African Committee was far more serious than that of the Raid, that a plain straightforward narrative compiled from the official record is necessary to show that I have not spoken without book.

W. T. STEAD.

Oct. 25th, 1899.

# PREFACE

The first two chapters are devoted to an account of the work which the British Government has done in the Sudan since the outbreak of the Sudanese Revolution in 1956.

Let me at the beginning say that the importance of this book lies not in the facts which it contains, but in the way in which it is written. It is a book which is intended to be read by the general public, and not by the Sudanese Government. It is a book which is intended to be read by the general public, and not by the Sudanese Government. It is a book which is intended to be read by the general public, and not by the Sudanese Government.

I have never seen any copy of this book in any of the libraries of the Sudanese Government. It is a book which is intended to be read by the general public, and not by the Sudanese Government. It is a book which is intended to be read by the general public, and not by the Sudanese Government.

W. I. ...

## PART I.

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# BEFORE THE PLAN.

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## CHAPTER I.

### A QUESTION OF MORAL MERIDIAN.

"Of all forms of prestige," says Mr. Lecky, in his new book, "The Map of Life," "moral prestige is the most valuable, and no statesman should forget that one of the chief elements of British power is the moral weight that is behind it. It is the conviction that British policy is essentially honourable and straightforward, that the word and honour of its statesmen and diplomatists may be implicitly trusted, and that intrigues and deceptions are wholly alien to their nature." "The statesman," says Mr. Lecky, "must steer his way between the fanaticism of those who have recognized no morality in Imperial politics and the fanaticism of those who imagine that in dealing with savage or half-savage military populations it is possible to act with the same respect for the technicalities of law and the same invariably high standard of moral scrupulousness as in a peaceful age and in a highly civilized country." This is true, and admirably well said.

The popular memory is so short and the passion of controversy so hot, that people are apt to forget everything but the last impression; and as it has been my lot to oppose the present war as unnecessary and unjust, it would not be surprising if Mr. Lecky were to put me down as a representative, perhaps the most conspicuous representative, of the latter class of fanatics. So far from this being the case, I feel that I lie under much greater danger of condemnation for an exactly opposite reason. I do not think that there is any one in this country who has asserted so uncompromisingly the injustice of judging men who live, let us say, in the moral meridian of Pretoria as if they were ethically in the latitude of Westminster. No doubt many of those with whom I am now acting have done so, and have in times past deemed it their duty to denounce me very roundly for what they consider my failure to apply an unalterable standard of right and wrong to all men in all places and at all times. I recognize the honesty of their censure, and sympathize largely with its motive; but it has always seemed to me unjust to expect that men, whether they are Boers or Britons, who live in the amorphous, semi-chaotic conditions that prevail in South Africa should be expected to conform to the same high standard of constitutional correctitude on which we have a right to insist from statesmen who are dealing with problems in a land like ours, "of old and just renown, where freedom broadens slowly down from precedent to precedent." It must be admitted that circumstances alter cases, and that when you are dealing with thieves and murderers you can hardly act in exactly the same way as you would if

you were dealing with honest men. This, indeed, seems to be such a truism that it would hardly be necessary to insist upon it if it were not that the distinction lies at the very basis of the whole of the position which I have taken in relation to the complicity of Mr. Chamberlain in the Jameson Plan, which was wrecked by the Jameson Raid.

Without going so far as to say that it would be perfectly right to do things on the borderland of civilization which would be heinous to the last degree to attempt in a settled country, there is no doubt whatever that, when society is resolved more or less into its primitive elements, a man is constantly compelled to do things which would bring upon him the severest moral condemnation if he were to practise them in Regent Street. Take, for instance, the simple question of self-defence. In a highly organized community, with the police at every turn, if a man attempts to take your life, you do not whip out a revolver and shoot him, you appeal to the constituted authorities. But if your life is attempted on the prairie or the veldt, you are compelled to take the law into your own hands, and kill, if you would not be killed. Similar modifications are of necessity imposed upon us by the conditions of our environment, and we are never in a position to form a just judgment about any one until we put ourselves in his place, and realize the extent to which he is living in a different atmosphere and in a state of society whose accepted standard of ethics in political matters differs altogether from our own.

This is specially the case in revolutionary movements. Even the most austere purists among our historians hold up to the admiration and respect of mankind many of the great revolutionary leaders whose lot it was to overturn decaying and moribund dynasties and pave the way for a better state of things. The ethics of a Revolutionist are of necessity different from the ethics of a Constitutionalist, and there are few Revolutionists among those whose names the world holds dear to her heart who would not be hopelessly condemned if their action was measured by the ethical standard of the Constitutionalist. It is, of course, possible to argue that there are no circumstances in the world that justify men in conspiring to destroy an oppressive Government, but that has never been the standpoint of the English Liberals, and still less the standpoint of the English Nonconformists. From the Tolstoian point of view, no doubt, I am wrong, but I was born in the midst of the great revolutionary turmoil of 1849; I was reared on the principles of the Puritan revolution of the 17th century, and of the American Revolution of the 18th. It is therefore impossible for me to regard revolutions, and conspiracies to produce revolutions, with anything approaching the abhorrence natural to the champions of Church and State, to whom constituted authority, as such, is something so ineffably sacred as to brand any one who endeavours to overturn it with the mark of crime. In my early boyhood my imagination was more or less fascinated by the romance and heroism of the revolutionary movement of the mid-century, and I grew up regarding Mazzini and Garibaldi as the supreme type of the prophet and hero of our time. It is therefore impossible for me to judge with severity conspirators against established governments.

The right of appeal to Revolution, that *ultima ratio* of oppressed populations, is indestructible, and may always rightfully be exercised when two conditions are present: first, that the sufferings and grievances of the oppressed population are sufficiently real to convince them that life were well risked in order to remove them; secondly, that they have a reasonable prospect of success. These two conditions are the Alpha and Omega of revolutionary ethics. Wherever a population is so harassed and

oppressed by its rulers that men count not their lives dear unto them, but are willing to risk all in order to win their liberties, that is the first condition; the second is that they must have a reasonable prospect of success. The most terrible oppression, the negation of God established as a system of government, would not be sufficient to justify an appeal to Revolution unless it had, at least, a reasonable prospect of success.

As that is the doctrine which I have always held and acted upon, even in judging conspiracies and attempted revolutions against our own Government and that of neighbouring and well-settled States, it is obvious that the doctrine applies with much greater force when we are dealing with half-baked States which are gradually taking shape in newly-settled countries. In many South American Republics Revolution is regarded by the population as the normal and almost constitutional method of changing the Government. It was well said that in Afghanistan on the death of an Ameer civil war necessarily ensued, for a civil war is the only form of a general election known to the Afghans. So it may be said that a revolution in one form or another is the natural and not unhealthy form of the evolution of settled society in the borderland of civilization. The nice rules which prevail at Westminster cannot be applied in the rough-and-tumble contests of pioneer communities. Hence many things from a revolutionary point of view are justifiable, and even lawful, in an unsettled state in which a few score thousand herdsmen and miners, scattered over a country as large as Italy, are endeavouring to work out for themselves some form of polity corresponding to their needs. All this is necessary to be said in order that my position may not be misunderstood. The average Englishman assumes that the conditions of life in the Transvaal or in Rhodesia are practically the same as those which exist in Kensington or in Sheffield; and when he finds anything done in either of those countries which would be unquestionably flagitious if it was done in Middlesex or Yorkshire, he is apt to cry out in holy horror, and maintain that no one with any moral sense can possibly excuse or justify such a flagrant violation of the rules by which civilized nations with a settled polity have agreed they should abide. That, however, is as unjust and even as absurd as it would be to condemn the carrying of firearms in a wild country swarming with footpads and robbers, merely upon the ground that no one needs to go to dinner or to church in England with a loaded revolver in his pocket. Hence everything that is done in the Transvaal or in similar border-countries must be judged according to the moral meridian of the country in which it occurs.

Hence I have never been able to join in the cry of horror that has been raised concerning the action of the Outlanders and their allies, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Beit, and Mr. Chamberlain, in organizing a conspiracy for overthrowing the Government of President Kruger in the autumn of 1895. No doubt that conspiracy, from the revolutionary point of view, lacked the first essential to justify a revolution, in the fact that the grievances of the Outlanders, of which we hear so much at the present moment, were not weighty enough to drive the Outlanders themselves to risk their lives in a desperate struggle against the Government of which they had cause to complain. That, however, was not demonstrated at the time when the conspiracy was entered into. It was believed that the Outlanders were really oppressed to such an extent that they were willing, in case of need, to descend into the streets and risk all that they had, including their lives, rather than endure any longer what was described as the "intolerable" oppression of the corrupt oligarchy that reigned in Pretoria. On that point, however, we were misinformed. But I think there



is no doubt that Mr. Rhodes and his allies honestly believed that the Outlanders were prepared to make an insurrection, and that all they required to encourage them in the enterprise, which on that supposition was laudable enough, was the moral support of their kinsmen on the other side of the frontier, and such material assistance as they needed in order to take the field.

I shall describe more at length in the next chapter some of the statements which misled Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain, but all that I am contending for now is that on the statement of what were then believed to be the facts, their conduct, however constitutionally unjustifiable, could hardly be regarded as the subject for severe censure from the point of view of the moralist and the revolutionist. What Mr. Chamberlain did was much less than what was done by Cavour times without end, and Cavour to this day holds a high place among the statesmen who are lauded by English Liberals. The analogy between Cavour and Rhodes is much closer than most people imagine. Cavour, however, acted under circumstances which required much more serious justification for a revolutionary attempt than any of those prevailing in South Africa. He intrigued and conspired, and assisted in the intrigues and conspiracies of others, in an old European country, in which the rules of international law were in full force. Not even the most censorious critics of Mr. Rhodes can deny that a revolutionary attempt among the scattered European populations of South Africa was much less likely to be disastrous to the permanent welfare of the country than any similar movement in the densely peopled, highly organized states of Italy. But neither Mr. Rhodes, Dr. Jameson, nor Mr. Chamberlain ever contemplated any of the bloody campaigns which the Garibaldi waged in Italy. Their calculation was that a very little extraneous support would enable the Liberal Party in the Transvaal, aided by the Outlanders, to overturn the Government of Paul Kruger, when the intervention of the High Commissioner would be evoked, and a plebiscite would be taken which would transfer the control of the Transvaal Republic from the hands of the Tories of the Kruger school to those of the Liberals, who were quite prepared to march with the times and readjust the institutions of the Transvaal to the necessities of the modern state. Everything miscarried, owing to the unfortunate inroad of Dr. Jameson; but if that had never taken place, there was a good prospect of a beneficent revolution being carried through in the Transvaal, which would have had the enormous advantage of placing the control of the South African Republic in the hands of the majority of the adult male population of the country.

Hence I have never been able to join in the outcry against Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain for the part which they took in promoting the Jameson Plan in 1895. They were misinformed as to their facts, and their well-meant plan appears to have miscarried owing to two causes: first, the reported insistence of Mr. Chamberlain upon forcing the Union Jack upon the Transvaal; and, secondly, Dr. Jameson's ill-judged inroad, which was precipitated by messages from people in communication with the Colonial Office. This will appear more clearly in subsequent chapters.

## CHAPTER II.

## THE INVERTED PYRAMID.

IF the contemplated revolution in the Transvaal lacked primary justification in the absence of any large section of the population driven sufficiently mad by oppression to be willing to risk life and property in a revolt against the Government, it certainly did not lack justification in the economic and political condition of the country. The South African Republic was in the position of the inverted pyramid; the majority of the population, possessing more than half the land and nine-tenths of the wealth, and paying nineteen-twentieths of the taxes, had practically no share in its administration and no voice in its legislation. The Government of Paul Kruger rested upon the support of an armed minority of burghers, whose numbers are variously estimated at from twenty to thirty thousand. But this minority was almost evenly divided into two halves. When the last Presidential election took place, the vote was so even between the supporters of President Kruger and those of General Joubert that three attempts were necessary before they could ascertain on which side the majority actually lay. After the third attempt, the figures showed a very slight majority for President Kruger. Notwithstanding all the excitement of the election, not 15,000 burghers could be brought to the poll, and of these about 7,500 voted for President Kruger and 7,000 for General Joubert. What may be called the old Tory party of the burghers, therefore, hardly numbered one-half the burghers on the electoral roll, and the other half contemplated with grave dissatisfaction the reactionary and exclusive policy of Oom Paul. The Tory minority, which had thus been installed in office by the narrowest of majorities, acted as Tory majorities are wont to do under similar circumstances. They proceeded to strengthen their position by all legitimate and illegitimate means. The Outlanders were the natural allies of General Joubert and the Liberals who followed his lead. It was, therefore, deemed necessary in the interests of the existing *régime* to increase the safeguards against the swamping of the existing electorate by the too rapid introduction of new burghers who were alien in sympathy and opposed in politics to the dominant oligarchy. In his effort to intrench himself more firmly in possession of power, President Kruger, with the Tories of the Transvaal, extended a welcome hand to various foreign adventurers, whom they called to their councils, and whom they permitted to batten on the tax-levied plunder of the Outlanders. The situation, however, was one which was delicate and dangerous, owing to the animosity and jealousy which had been excited by the annexation of the country in 1877, and the limitations with which their independence had been fenced round when the Transvaal was given back in 1881. If the Boers and the Outlanders had been left entirely to themselves, they would, sooner or later, have arrived at a *modus vivendi*; but President Kruger was able, whenever his power was seriously threatened, to invoke the spectre of British intervention or British aggression, and compel into his ranks the unwilling recruits, who,

although they disliked the prospect of British intervention, disliked still more the prospect of losing their cherished independence. The words of which we hear so much to-day, suzerainty and paramountcy and British ascendancy, were the trump cards in Paul Kruger's hand. He could always point to some foolish speech or publication which appeared to justify his contention that the British were only waiting an opportunity to wrest from the burghers their cherished independence. The position, however, of Paul Kruger was an anachronism, and every year it became more and more impossible.

The rich gold deposit of the Rand had in two or three years attracted a great emigrant population. Johannesburg from a mining camp had swollen in the course of three or four years to the dimensions of a city of 100,000 inhabitants. The yield of the mines rose to eight or nine millions a year. Railways crossed the country from Natal and Delagoa Bay, while from the Cape the ceaseless stream of emigrants crossed the veldt and swelled the emigrant population. These new-comers were looked upon with scant favour by President Kruger and the small ring of Hollanders who ran the Transvaal Republic. They were treated as strangers in a strange land; and instead of making any effort to bring them within the pale of the Constitution, President Kruger and his advisers deliberately set to work in the opposite direction—instead of opening the doors, they narrowed the portals of the Constitution.

In the time of President Burgers the Republic's franchise was about as liberal as that of the Free State. In 1883 (after the War of Independence) the probation was raised to five years. In 1889 the Second Raad was invented, to be elected to its nugatory labours upon a lower franchise; but the First Raad was still shut away from the Outlander influence, and in 1890 the term was increased to fourteen years. The first session of the Second Raad was in 1891. In 1893 the First Raad hemmed itself in still further by enacting a two-thirds clause, to make it impossible for any franchise extension to be voted even by a majority of burghers. That showed that the clique at headquarters knew that the feeling was changing among their own burgher electorate. Finally, in 1894, in an orgie of reactionary prejudice, they took away the birthright of franchise from those born in the country, if they happened to be children of Outlanders.

It was obvious that such a condition of things could not last. Sooner or later the new-comers, whose right to settle in the land was secured by a clause in the Transvaal Convention, would demand the right to have a voice in the levying of the taxes and in the spending of the same. They would also claim the right to municipal government in Johannesburg, and they could not be expected to acquiesce in a refusal to have the English language taught to their children in the schools. All this was recognized, but the mining population was so busy extracting gold from the reef that political questions remained in abeyance. From time to time petitions were presented praying for the privileges of citizenship, but without result.

It is, however, unnecessary to labour this point. At present the Ministerialists, with Mr. Chamberlain at their head, and a large section of the Liberals, are employed day and night in dwelling upon the grievances of the Outlanders. In 1895 little was known of the wrongs of the Outlanders, and very few of those who are now most clamorous on their behalf knew who they were or cared anything about them. It was the existence of this inverted pyramid in the Transvaal which invited revolution, and tempted Mr. Rhodes to embark on the enterprise which, notwithstanding the benevolent assistance of Mr. Chamberlain, unfortunately miscarried.

## CHAPTER III.

## MR. RHODES'S POSITION.

I NEED not waste time in repeating once more my deep conviction that the conventional estimate of Mr. Rhodes, which Mr. Labouchere and Sir William Harcourt have done much to popularize, is utterly untrue. Mr. Rhodes is a statesman, and a great statesman, with a firm grasp of the essential principles of democratic government. There are many Unionists who condemn Mr. Rhodes's gift of £10,000 to Mr. Parnell, on the ground that it was a payment for political support, instead of being a contribution to a political cause with which Mr. Rhodes was in entire sympathy. Mr. Rhodes, little as it is suspected by those who abuse him daily, is a man of the broadest popular sympathies. He is more nearly a Socialist in his ideas than any wealthy man or leading statesman of my acquaintance. He is not merely a great Englishman, he is a great Colonist, and he understands perfectly well the fundamental bases of the stability of our Empire. Our colonies are loyal because they govern themselves according to their own sweet will and pleasure, without any interference from Downing Street. Mr. Rhodes carried this principle out with frank blunt logic, which paid little regard to the exigencies of party politics. He saw that in Ireland the majority of the population was excluded from power, and that in consequence, wherever Irishmen were found all over the world, they were as salt in the mortar of the Imperial fabric. He saw, further, that the Home Rule movement was the lever by which it was possible to introduce the principle of federation into the British Empire. Although there is no more loyal and enthusiastic Imperialist than Mr. Rhodes, his political ideas are distinctly Colonial or American, rather than those which find favour among English Conservatives. The principles of the American constitution seem to him as they seem to most colonists, the most obvious and practical method of applying democratic principles to the political organization of states, and no man, by training, constitution, and study, is more absolutely opposed to the high-flying doctrine of the paramountcy of Downing Street, which at the present moment is so much in fashion with the majority at Westminster. Indeed, Mr. Rhodes for a long time laboured under great suspicion in this country among the Conservatives on the ground of his very outspoken denunciation of the Imperial factor in South African affairs. He was accused of publicly declaring that the one object of his policy was to eliminate the Imperial factor, and this accusation, together with his gift to Mr. Parnell, cause him to this day to be looked at askance by some of the zealots of Unionism. But it was loyalty to England and to the English idea which made Mr. Rhodes so strong a Home Ruler, and so keen to resent the intrusive and often mischievous intermeddling of the Imperial factor in South African affairs. It is probable that if the man in the street to whom Mr. Chamberlain appeals were to be asked to name the most distinctively British Imperialist in South Africa, he would unhesitatingly name Cecil Rhodes, and he would

be right; but it is worth while to remind him that because Mr. Rhodes was an intensely loyal and enthusiastic British Imperialist, he set himself for years past to work with the Dutch, through the Dutch, for the Dutch in the Cape Colony. For years Mr. Rhodes was the idol of the Afrikaner Bond, and the right hand of Mr. Hofmeyr, the head of the Cape Dutch. This was not because Mr. Rhodes loved the Dutch more than he loved the Briton. It was because he saw that the Dutch were in a majority of nearly two to one.

To start from the Cape, and work northwards to Cairo; to unite the British races in a firm comradeship, and to promote the union of all the States south of the Zambesi into a federation like that of the United States of America, these were the well-known features of his policy. Vast as were his Imperial aspirations, and enthusiastic as was his British patriotism, he saw that both Imperialism and patriotism would best be served by being friends with the Dutch; and so it came to pass that, for a dozen years, he worked hand-and-glove with Mr. Hofmeyr, nor did he even hesitate to expose himself to the fierce animadversions of Olive Schreiner, because he leaned so far on the side of the conservative Dutch element in the Colony. The more British Mr. Rhodes was in his ultimate aims, the more Dutch he became in his immediate policy. He not only built himself a Dutch residence, but he introduced legislation on the Native question, which exposed him to the fierce outcry of the influential set of people, who are always disposed to put the worst construction on any measure which appears to run counter to the principle of free labour. For the sake of the Dutch, he accepted their fiscal system; imposed duties upon bread-stuffs, permitted the manufacture of brandy to be untaxed; nay, to please them he was willing to give way on the question of the flag. Sir Hercules Robinson was made High Commissioner chiefly because he had the confidence of the Dutch. All this was known and recognized, and counted upon. It was assumed that nothing was more fixed and stable in the policy of South Africa than that Mr. Rhodes would continue at the head of affairs, and be maintained there by the Dutch vote, even if the British turned against him.

In order to keep in with the Dutch, he had done little or nothing to help the Outlanders of the Rand. He ever counselled patience: Paul Kruger was an old man. The Outlanders were growing in strength daily, and the fusion between the Afrikaner Bond and Rhodesian Imperialism was making satisfactory progress. But in the summer of 1895, on his return to Africa, Mr. Rhodes suddenly executed a curve which occasioned some of us no little surprise. He abandoned the old policy of patience, and decided to take an active part in promoting the success of the popular party in the Transvaal.

His reasons were simple, and if his information had been correct his conclusions would have been irresistible. Always thinking of Africa as a whole, Mr. Rhodes confidently counted upon uniting the Dutch and English in a common policy. He would begin with railways and customs conventions, and then go on to a political federation. To keep the two races together was the main object of his policy.

In 1895 he found the Outlanders waxing very discontented with the Imperial factor which obtained them no redress, and at the same time he found the Cape Dutch so exasperated with President Kruger's railway policy that they were ready to support a war against the Transvaal. Mr. Rhodes saw in this simultaneous increase of dissatisfaction with President Kruger's *régime* a chance of uniting both the Cape Dutch and the Transvaal Outlanders in common action, not against the South African

Republic, but against the Hollander Ring and the Tory half of the burghers, on whose support President Kruger exclusively rested. He was impelled to take the risk by the assurances which he received from Johannesburg that the Outlanders were certain to make their revolution anyhow, and that it entirely depended upon his policy whether the outcome of that revolution was the substitution of a more friendly or a more hostile Government in the place of President Kruger's administration. If he held aloof he was told he might prepare to see the new rulers of the Republic even more difficult to manage than old Paul himself. For the Outlanders were a motley crowd, and many of the leading spirits, Americans, Irish, *Sydney Bulletin* Australians, and Germans, were no lovers of the British Imperial factor, which had given them no help in their time of need. The Germans also were making no secret of their intention to regard any realization of his cherished dream of federation as an attack on German interests. He believed the time had come for giving the necessary impetus to the movement which, after the fashion approved in the moral meridian of Pretoria, would lead to the upset of President Kruger.

Mr. Rhodes, after some natural hesitation, due to the extreme complexity of his position as Prime Minister of the Cape and Managing Director of the Chartered Company, decided that, so far as he was concerned, the policy of abstention must cease. He was a large employer of labour, he was drawing wealth from the Consolidated Gold Fields on the Rand, and he did not think it right that the influence which naturally pertained to his position as capitalist and employer should be thrown away merely because, in another colony on the other side of the frontier, he held posts of trust under the Crown. So it came to pass that, rightly or wrongly, Mr. Rhodes took a part in the Outlanders' agitation. He did not take a conspicuous part, but he gave the movement his countenance and his support. He was very much in the position Mr. Parnell found himself at the beginning of the Land League agitation.

Whether because of Mr. Rhodes's support, or not, there was no doubt that the Outlanders' agitation received an immediate accession of strength. The petition to the Volksraad, asking for the admission of Outlanders within the pale of citizenship, was signed by 38,000 persons as against 13,000 who had signed the previous petition. It met with no better fate than that which had attended its predecessor, and as the first result of his essay in constitutional agitation in the Transvaal Mr. Rhodes found the petition of rights flung back in his face.

Constitutional methods having failed, had the time come to resort to the extraordinary expedients of the Revolutionist? Mr. Rhodes asked himself, "Can I or can I not carry with me the Cape Dutch?" Their support was indispensable.

Just at the critical moment, the quarrel about the closing of the Drifts afforded him an opportunity for testing the sentiments of the Cape Dutch. Nothing that he could do or say could induce President Kruger to take one step towards either railway or customs convention. The Transvaal held aloof, fixed its own railway rates without reference to its neighbours, and levied a very heavy duty upon the produce of their farms. This irritated the Cape Dutch. Johannesburg naturally was a great market for the produce of the thrifty Dutch farmers, who found themselves shut off by an iron wall of tariff from their would-be customers. This enabled Mr. Rhodes to execute his change of policy with greater assurance than he would otherwise have ventured to have done had the Cape Dutch and the Boers been on good terms.

The position was difficult, not to say dangerous, but it had to be faced, and Mr. Rhodes had to face it in each of his four-fold capacities: (1) He was a Johannesburger and leading capitalist of the Rand; (2) managing director of the Chartered Company; (3) chairman of the De Beers; and (4) Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and Privy Councillor to the Crown. Here was a multiplex personality indeed. Fourfold duties involve quadruple responsibilities, and the fact that he was Prime Minister of the Cape in no way exonerated his responsibility as managing director of the Chartered Company, nor did his position in the Chartered Company justify his abdicating his legitimate position on the Rand.

So, finding that President Kruger had hardened his heart against the Outlanders, Mr. Rhodes decided that, in his capacity as a Johannesburger and mine-owner, he might take a hand in the organization of a quasi-revolutionary movement in the Transvaal. It was difficult for him, no doubt, not to let his left hand—the Premier of the Cape—know what his right hand—the Johannesburg capitalist—was doing.

He comforted himself, when he reflected upon the anomalies of the position, that he was but doing what Paul Kruger had often done in those regions, without his excuse. Queen Elizabeth aided and abetted revolutionary enterprises on behalf of the forefathers of the Boers in the old Spanish days, and the Emperor Alexander II. had not considered it incompatible with his treaty obligations to wage unofficial war in Servia against the Sultan, a foreign State with whom he was on friendly treaty relations. None of these considerations, I am well aware, weigh with Mr. Courtney. But they weighed with Mr. Rhodes, and if we put ourselves in his place we shall not find it easy to come to his conclusion. One thing at least is quite certain. If his contemplated bloodless overturn of the Tory Government in the Transvaal had been carried out we should have escaped all the miseries of this abominable war. But that is anticipating.

## PART II.

## THE PLAN.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE LOCH PLAN AND ITS EXPANSION.

IT was one morning before breakfast in Matabeleland, immediately after the conquest of the country, that Mr. Rhodes first mooted the idea of solving the difficulty in the Transvaal by the twofold process of developing an insurrection within and fomenting it by a display of armed force on the borders. As Dr. Jameson afterwards told the Committee, it was Mr. Rhodes's idea, for "all ideas are Mr. Rhodes's." That conversation before breakfast was one of the instances which may be regarded as marking the watershed of Mr. Rhodes's career. "In all things," he once said, "it is the little questions that change the world; our very charter came from an accidental thought, and all the great changes come from little accidents." It is easy to see how the idea of roping in the Transvaal occurred to the mind of the great African as he contemplated the progress which the conquest of Matabeleland had made in the realization of his great idea. He had with steady purpose worked towards the extension of the British Empire from the Cape to the Zambesi. He had been regarded as a visionary, derided by his colleagues, thwarted by the men from whom he might have expected help, but, through rain and storm, through good repute and ill, he had pressed steadily forward, until, with the help of Dr. Jameson, he saw Rhodesia at his feet. Lobengula, the last great savage chieftain who had barred the advance of the white man through South Africa, had been smitten down without any aid from the Imperial factor, and between Bulawayo and the Cape the whole map was coloured British red with the exception of the two small Dutch Republics. A faint-tinge of red, in the shape of the fourth article of the London Convention, might be said to surround the Transvaal, where the imported British element was daily becoming richer and stronger. Such is the genesis of the idea which was destined to play such havoc in South Africa.

Mr. Rhodes returned to this country with Dr. Jameson in the end of 1894 and left for Africa in the beginning of 1895. Both Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson called to see me in December, when Mr. Rhodes discoursed upon South Africa and his ideas on things in general in his accustomed fashion. In that interview two things stood out clearly—first, that Mr. Rhodes was very uneasy as to the danger of the French coming from the West and establishing themselves on the Nile—a forecast which was only too fully realized when Major Marchand seated himself at Fashoda in 1898; his other preoccupation was the state of things in the Transvaal. It would last, he said, for a few years, but trouble was inevitable. It was necessary, above all things, to be prepared for it when it came. The first indispensable thing was to have a High Commissioner who commanded



the confidence of the Dutch. "For without the Dutch you can do nothing." It was for that reason he so strenuously advocated the appointment of Sir Hercules Robinson. I strongly opposed it, believing that the advanced age of Sir Hercules Robinson and his failing health more than set off the advantages which he possessed in the confidence of the Dutch. But Mr. Rhodes would hear of no one else. The trouble was coming in the Transvaal, it was necessary to keep things quiet as long as possible, and Sir H. Robinson was the only man whom the Dutch trusted. He had negotiated the Convention of 1884, and they believed in him. As long as he was there he would be able to keep in with the Dutch, which was in those days the Alpha and Omega of Mr. Rhodes's policy. Mr. Rhodes, as usual, had his way, and Sir Hercules Robinson was appointed as the successor to Lord Loch. Mr. Rhodes returned to Africa a full-fledged Privy Councillor, and was recognized throughout the Empire as the greatest and most successful of all our colonial statesmen.

On his arrival in South Africa, however, he appears to have received information from a variety of sources which led him to believe that affairs in Johannesburg were so critical that the long-anticipated revolution could not be much longer deferred. Mr. Rhodes had satisfied himself by a personal interview with Paul Kruger, some months before, that nothing could be done by personal influence. In the old Dutchman he found, at least, one man he could not square. The interview was not published, but, according to all reports, it was very stormy, and much to the point. Mr. Rhodes had sought the interview with Kruger in order to induce him to join the Railway Union, which, to his mind, was the precursor of South African unity. He employed every argument that he thought was likely to overcome the prejudice of the old peasant against a scheme which he instinctively felt would tend to defeat the one object of his life, namely, the maintenance of a distinct Boer Republic, free from the domination or control of the British colonies, by which he was surrounded. After trying him this way and that way, Mr. Rhodes, as sometimes happens with him on rare occasions, lost his temper, and told the old man, in terms which Kruger never forgot, that the union of South Africa was as certain as that the sun would rise next day; that it had better come through him and with him, than over him and against him, but that in one way or another it would be impossible for the Transvaal to stand in the way of the peaceful federation of all the countries south of the great lakes. Old Paul Kruger at first held his peace and listened to the profuse flow of words in grim silence. But after a while the old man's wrath flamed out, and the two great personalities which dominate South Africa were in a state of volcanic eruption, in which both spoke to the other in plain words never forgotten by either. Mr. Rhodes from that moment gave up all hope of ever attaining his ends through Paul Kruger. "He was absolutely hopeless and irreconcilable. There were ten years more of mischief in him," said Mr. Rhodes grimly. "We cannot wait till he disappears; South Africa is developing too rapidly. Something must be done to place the control of the Transvaal in the hands of a more progressive ruler than Oom Paul."

What that something should be he had not at that time made up his mind, and there was strong within him in those days the desire to do whatever had to be done without saddling the Imperial factor with any responsibility or putting himself under any obligation to Downing Street. Both Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson were dominated by the memory of the great adventurers who, in the days of Elizabeth and Hastings, had laid the foundations of the British Empire without much support from,

and even against the distinct orders of, the authorities in London. Dr. Jameson dreamed o' nights of Clive, while Mr. Rhodes brooded silently over the possibilities which were lost by the too scrupulous regard for the orders of the Imperial Government.

A conversation took place in the month of April which shows how this thought possessed him. He was lunching with Major White and a Dutch gentleman at Groote Schuur, when the conversation turned, as was usual in those days, upon what he regarded as the heinous conduct of our officers in Uganda, who were wasting time lying upon their backs and eating three meat meals a day, while the French were creeping across the Continent towards the Nile to establish themselves there and cut the communications between Khartoum and Uganda. Major White objected that the officers might have no instructions. "No doubt," said Mr. Rhodes, "you cannot expect the Prime Minister to write down that you are to seize ports, &c., but if you thought that it was the object of the Government to attain a given thing, you should take no notice of their orders which would defeat the object of the Government." Major White made a note of this conversation in his diary, condensing the substance of the talk into the phrase which he evidently thought expressed Mr. Rhodes's conception of his obligations to Downing Street: "You cannot expect the Prime Minister to write down that you are to seize ports, &c., but when he gives orders to the contrary, disregard them. *Verbum sap.*" There is little doubt that if Mr. Rhodes had been in Uganda, or if, as Sir William Harcourt once proposed, Uganda had been handed over to the South African Company, his officers would have forestalled Marchand at Fashoda, a consequence which Sir William Harcourt did not contemplate when he proposed to make over Uganda to Mr. Rhodes for the purpose of saving expense to the exchequer, of which he was the custodian.

Dwelling in the midst of thoughts like these Mr. Rhodes applied himself to consider the easiest and directest method of solving the Transvaal problem. He naturally wished to do it off his own bat, if possible. By doing so he would not be interfered with from without: he could keep his own counsel, choose his own time, and adopt his own methods, without reference to the scruples of those who dwelt in a different moral meridian to that of South Africa. He had the Imperial factor in South Africa pretty much in his pocket, for Sir Hercules Robinson was failing and stricken in years, and had of necessity to leave most of the work of his office to Sir Graham Bower, the Imperial Secretary, who during 1895 was virtually Acting High Commissioner. So long as Mr. Rhodes was hand-in-glove with Sir Graham Bower, Sir Hercules Robinson could be treated very much like the Sovereign whom he represented, whose Royal assent to an Act of Parliament is never asked until it has received the sanction of both Houses of Parliament, and then it is given as a matter of course. Mr. Rhodes calculated with confidence that Sir Hercules' approval would be given when he was confronted by the *fait accompli*, which had been brought about by his Prime Minister and his chief Secretary.

Mr. Rhodes, in his own person, was a very composite agglomerate of political entities; he was, so to speak, House of Commons, House of Lords, and Queen all rolled into one, and, in addition, he represented the electorate upon which all these rested. He never considered that because he was a Privy Councillor he ought not to do anything which was lawful for a Johannesburg Outlander, nor did he realize that his position as Prime Minister of the Cape forbade his employment of the resources of the Chartered Company for the attain-

ment of his ideal of the United States of South Africa. If there had been no Downing Street, and the Colonial Office had had no more say in the affairs of the Protectorate of Bechuanaland than it had in the self-governing colony of the Cape, Mr. Rhodes would have gone on his own way without troubling Downing Street. But the moment he came to look into the question, he found that the Imperial factor, whose intervention in African affairs he had always opposed, must still be reckoned with, and that for this reason: it was the Imperial factor alone which had any status in the Transvaal. The Suzerainty which survived in Article 4 of the London Convention was only an attenuated ghost of sovereignty; but, such as it was, it was all he could discover to enable Great Britain to put forward any claim to have any voice in Transvaal affairs. That was the first consideration. The second was that the Colonial Office was in occupation of the territories from which alone it would be possible to lend efficient military aid to the Outlanders' insurrection in Johannesburg. At first Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson seem to have contemplated stationing troops at Tuli, 600 miles from Johannesburg. The only advantage of this action was that at Tuli they were in their own dominions and could do as they liked without asking the Colonial Office for anything. But the distance of Tuli from Johannesburg was too great, and it was therefore reluctantly admitted that, if anything had to be done, the Colonial Office must be taken into their confidence for the purpose of securing, first, the cession of a jumping-off piece of territory in Bechuanaland, and, second, the transfer of the Bechuanaland Police and mounted force, which would be useful when the time came for supporting the insurrection from the outside.

In the month of June Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Beit held council together as to what was to be done in the Transvaal, and Mr. Beit, with the spirit of personal loyalty to Mr. Rhodes which has ever distinguished him, agreed to go halves with Mr. Rhodes in whatever financial responsibility might be incurred, and to support him to the uttermost in whatever had to be done in London, Johannesburg, or Capetown. There was no written contract or formal obligation, merely the spoken word binding him to help; nor did Mr. Beit, when troubles came, and that spoken word cost him a quarter of a million sterling and the prospect of imprisonment, ever repine or reproach his friend, whose Imperialism seems to have a fascination for Mr. Beit, not less potent than it exercised over Mr. Beit's Kaiser when last year he met Mr. Rhodes at Berlin.

At the end of May or June Johannesburg was still clinging to the hope of obtaining a change of Government by constitutional means. As Mr. Beit afterwards told the Committee, there was still an idea of sending a big petition to the President, asking for their rights, so that nothing really was decided about rebellion. It was just a suggestion of Mr. Rhodes, nothing else, at that time. Mr. Beit went down to Johannesburg and talked over that suggestion of Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Lionel Phillips and Mr. Charles Leonard. Both of these gentlemen agreed with him that a revolution would have to take place sooner or later, and they were very much afraid that it might break out prematurely, before Johannesburg was in any way prepared. They therefore agreed that, if the rebellion should break out, it was most important that there should be a force on the border to help them, in case they needed help, in order to put the thing through as quickly and as completely as possible. Mr. Beit then returned to Capetown, and sailed for England with Dr. Rutherford Harris on June 14th.

Dr. Harris was the secretary, in South Africa, of the Chartered Com-

pany, private secretary to Mr. Rhodes, a member of the Cape Parliament, and whip to Mr. Rhodes's majority. Dr. Harris is a man of wealth and of ambition; he is now standing for a Welsh constituency, and is looking forward to a Parliamentary career in the House of Commons.

Dr. Rutherford Harris was sent to London on a special mission. There had been a change of Ministry. Mr. Chamberlain had just been installed as Secretary of State for the Colonies. Khama, the Bechuanaland Chief, was in England, agitating, under the auspices of the London Missionary Society, in opposition to the proposals to place his country under a protectorate of the Chartered Company. Now Lord Ripon had promised to Mr. Rhodes the cession of Bechuanaland; and it was Dr. Harris' mission to ascertain from the Colonial Secretary whether he would reverse his predecessor's policy, under the influence of Khama's objection, or whether he would abide by it.

It was in the execution of this mission that I first saw Dr. Rutherford Harris.

He appeared at Mowbray House, if I remember rightly, accompanied or introduced by Lord Grey. With the aid of a map, he set forth at considerable length the urgent reasons why I should not support—as I was then doing—Khama's protest against being taken over by the Company. Displaying his map, he pointed out that the Transvaal was becoming the richest and most powerful State in South Africa. He emphasized the domination, necessary and inevitable, of the Dutch in Cape Colony, and he laid great stress on the necessity of developing Rhodesia as a counterpoise. Unless Rhodesia was strong, the federation of South Africa, which he talked about as if it were a thing of the near future, might be brought about by the Dutch; hence the importance of fulfilling Lord Ripon's pledges, and handing over the protectorate of Bechuanaland to the Chartered Company without delay.

I remember feeling at the time puzzled by the urgency with which this cession was claimed. I saw no reason for it, and it could only be given by opposing a powerful British sentiment in favour of Khama. The talk about federation and the Transvaal did not seem to me to fit in with their eagerness to take over Khama's territory at once. The two things seemed apart to me, nor did Dr. Harris vouchsafe the slightest hint as to the key that would solve the problem. So far was he from doing so, that after he went away I wrote a character sketch of Khama in *The Review of Reviews*, in which I strongly opposed the handing over of Khama to the Company, and declared that 1900 would be quite soon enough for the transfer, and only then if Dr. Jameson's administration of Rhodesia justified so large an addition to his responsibilities. I had no hint given me from any source whatever that Mr. Rhodes had come to the conclusion that the time had come for active measures in the Transvaal. In his last interview with me he had said that he did not think things would come to a head for years, and the appointment of Sir H. Robinson had been made in order to keep the confidence of the Dutch and to avoid any upset. Dr. Harris was so very far from giving me any inkling of the change of policy at the Cape, that months afterwards, when the Jameson Raid took place, I publicly declared my conviction that Mr. Rhodes could not have had any share in so wild an enterprise, because it was so contrary to the policy he had always insisted upon for promoting the objects of the Empire in South Africa.

If, however, Dr. Harris kept me absolutely in the dark, and not even gave me a hint as to why Khama's territory was wanted, it was otherwise with the Colonial Office. There was a reason for his speaking more

openly at Downing Street than at Mowbray House. The net result of his arguments in favour of the immediate taking over of Khama's territory was to leave me unconvinced and utterly at a loss to understand the cause of this urgency. There was a railway to be made northward, no doubt, and the Rhodesians naturally wanted to extend the area of Rhodesia; but the railway could be built without transferring the protectorate, and the net result of his mission, so far as I was concerned, was to leave me unconvinced and bewildered as to the urgency. There is no hurry about the matter, I said, and I could have come to no other conclusion, because the key to the whole matter was withheld from me. The key to the whole matter was not the railway, but the necessity for having a jumping-off place for the armed force which was to assist the insurrection in Johannesburg. But of that I heard not a whisper, not even the most guarded allusion.

Dr. Harris had of necessity to pursue a very different course when he saw the Colonial Minister. If he had only spoken to him as he spoke to me he would have produced the same impression, namely, that there was no need for hurry, and the object of his mission would have been defeated. It was indispensable, therefore, that he should show his hand and explain why the territory was wanted, otherwise it would not have been made over. Before accompanying Dr. Harris in his visit to Mr. Chamberlain, it is well to recall the circumstances under which it was made.

Mr. Chamberlain was just feeling his feet in the Colonial Office. He was a man full of ambition, bringing the instincts of a commercial traveller to the affairs of the Empire. Pushfulness was to be the watch word of his Colonial administration. Mr. Chamberlain at the general election fought in July, 1895, had gained a great personal success, and come out of it as its greatest figure. He was the hero of the election, and when he was established at the Colonial Office it was at once recognized that he would have a free range throughout the world. He had not been in office a month when he suddenly found himself confronted with Mr. Rhodes's demand for the immediate cession of Bechuanaland, on a pretext of railway building, a plea most calculated to appeal to the instincts of Mr. Chamberlain. His path was made clear for him by the fact that he was merely required to make good his predecessor's promise. But here it is well to stop for a moment, and to recall the previous dealings of the Colonial Office and the former High Commissioner with the same problem which was then exercising the mind of Mr. Rhodes.

It is impossible to judge Mr. Chamberlain fairly, or to understand how natural it was for Mr. Rhodes to turn to the Colonial Office for support, without going back to 1894, when Lord Loch paid his memorable visit to Pretoria. In the year 1894, Lord (then Sir Henry) Loch being High Commissioner, and Mr. Cecil Rhodes being Prime Minister of the Cape, the Transvaal teacup seemed as if it was likely to boil over. The immediate occasion of Lord Loch's visit to the Transvaal was the need for arranging the difficulties as to the commandeering, or impressing of British subjects for military service, in the Transvaal. He had also to arrange the Swazi settlement. His visit to Pretoria was regarded by the Outlanders of Johannesburg as an indication that the British Government meant to have a say in the settlement of the question between the Transvaal Government and the Outlanders.

Mr. Lionel Phillips, immediately before Lord Loch's visit, had been meditating an appeal to Mr. Rhodes, but he had shrunk from doing

so owing to the intense jealousy with which Mr. Rhodes was regarded by President Kruger. He and his friends were halting between two courses. They did not know whether to appeal to the other South African States or to the British Government. At that time Mr. Lionel Phillips was not sure about trusting Mr. Rhodes, and was inclined to see what money could do by way of purchasing an honest Government for the Transvaal. About Midsummer, Lord Loch came down and had two long conversations with Mr. Lionel Phillips. We have two accounts of their conversations, one from Mr. L. Phillips, written at the time, another given by Lord Loch to the House of Lords three years later. Mr. L. Phillips, in letters which he wrote to Mr. Wernher at the time, met Lord Loch full of the idea that the British Government should interfere in the affairs of the Transvaal. In his own phrase, "The Government is absolutely rotten, and we must have reform; the alternative is revolution or English interference." After Lord Loch's visit Mr. Phillips seems to have come to the conclusion that it might be possible to combine the two latter alternatives and arrange for both a revolution and British intervention. Mr. Phillips wrote:—

"Sir Henry Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone) asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms we had in Johannesburg, whether the population could hold the place for six days until help could arrive, &c., &c., and stated plainly that if there had been 3,000 rifles and ammunition here he would certainly have come over. He further informed me, in a significant way, that they had prolonged the Swazi agreement for six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared; as much as to say, if things are safer then, we shall actively intervene."—*Cape Inquiry Appendix*, No. 4.

Mr. Phillips then went on to explain how it was that the High Commissioner did not come to Johannesburg, and then proceeds as follows:—

" . . . . The Government has had a fright, and knows that the first shot unjustly fired by the burghers would mean English intervention and the loss of the independence of the Republic. In case of hostilities, apart from the loss of life, the Boers would doubtless do no end of damage to machinery. Of course, we don't want any row, but, as I told Eyselen and Leyds, if the Government or Raad does nothing to pacify the people, we shall have a revolution sooner or later. . . . ."—*Ib.*

On July 5th Mr. Lionel Phillips was still full of the idea of a possible disturbance. He reports that a good many men are buying rifles in case of contingencies. "If Sir Henry Loch comes back in a few months about Swaziland there may be a row. We don't want a row," and he went on to state that their best plan was to raise a fund of from ten to fifteen thousand pounds with which to "improve" the Volksraad. A month later he replied to Mr. Beit, promising to see whether it was possible, without creating unnecessary alarm, to get the companies to possess themselves of a few rifles. If the Boers knew there were 3,000 or so men there armed with rifles, there would be less real danger of wiping out Johannesburg. If the spending of money does not bring reform, the only alternative is force, and that will come in time. So far Mr. Lionel Phillips.

Lord Loch afterwards explained that he had been utterly misunderstood, and that his inquiry as to the number of rifles was only to remind them of the hopelessness of their position from a military point of view. That may have been so, and the misunderstanding may have been perfectly genuine on both sides. But what was vital to Mr. Rhodes was the plan which Lord Loch intended to carry out in case disturbances broke out in

## CHAPTER II.

## THE PLAN MADE POSSIBLE BY MR. CHAMBERLAIN.

ON Aug. 1st, before Mr. Chamberlain had been a month at the Colonial Office, he found himself confronted by Lord Grey and Dr. Rutherford Harris. Lord Grey introduced Dr. Harris as a representative of Mr. Rhodes, and the interview took place in the Colonial Office in the presence of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Selborne, Under Secretary of the Colonial Office, while Mr. Fairfield and Sir Richard Meade, although not present, appear to have occasionally entered the room during the conversation and to have been well aware it took place. It is well to remember that Mr. Chamberlain was new to the Colonial Office traditions, and it is probable at that time knew nothing about the Loch plan. The interview lasted for sometime. There was, of course, the necessary explanation as to the promise given by Lord Ripon and the necessity of completing the transfer and pushing forward the railway. Mr. Chamberlain listened with interest and sympathy. The subject was new to him, he did not wish to give a definite answer. He intimated distinctly that he did not think there was any need for hurry.

Then it was that Dr. Harris broached the subject, the real secret of his mission.

Mr. Chamberlain gave the Committee this account of this interview:—

Dr. Rutherford Harris pressed very strongly for the immediate transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Chartered Company. I told him that I was new to my office, that I could not be hurried, and, in fact, that I was averse to the policy, and that I must decline, at all events at that time, to consider it. . . .

But I pointed out to him that for this purpose it was not absolutely necessary that the Protectorate should be transferred; that it would be sufficient that a strip of land should be reserved sufficient for the making and the protection of the railway; and I suggested this as an alternative course, assuring him that under any circumstances, whatever might be the fate of the Protectorate, I would support his application and give him all the facilities that he might require for the purpose of making the railway. So in regard to this point, which occupied, I should say, at least nine-tenths, or at all events by far the greater part, of the very lengthened discussion which took place on this occasion, the net result of the conversation was that I refused the Protectorate, but that I promised every possible support to the railway. . . .

From that moment the transfer was decided upon, and of course with the transfer went the police—that was a most natural consequence in my mind; not one which aroused the slightest suspicion in my mind. . . .

On my return from Spain, or shortly afterwards, another interview was held at the Colonial Office, I think on Nov. 5th or Nov. 6th, and at that interview the three chiefs were present with the missionaries, who acted as interpreters for them. . . .

Dr. Harris told me that his information led him to believe that the reformers, as they were called, were exhausting every peaceable method for obtaining redress; that their applications, which had been respectfully made to the Government of the Transvaal, had been met with insult and their demands rejected; that their patience was becoming exhausted, and that sooner or later it was quite possible that a rising would take place. He said that, in his opinion, such a rising would be an absolutely bloodless revolution; that he thought the action of the Transvaal Government was unpopular, not merely with the English, but with the great majority of the Dutch in the Cape Colony, and that very many of the subjects of the Transvaal itself sympathized with the grievances of the reformers, and would not be prepared for anything like a forcible repression of their movement. It was in the course of this conversation that he made the remark, the exact words of which I could not possibly pledge my memory to at this distance of time, but it was to the effect: "I could

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On my return from Spain, or shortly afterwards, another interview was held at the Colonial Office, I think on Nov. 5th or Nov. 6th, and at that interview the three chiefs were present with the missionaries, who acted as interpreters for them. . . .

Dr. Harris told me that his information led him to believe that the reformers, as they were called, were exhausting every peaceable method for obtaining redress; that their applications, which had been respectfully made to the Government of the Transvaal, had been met with insult and their demands rejected; that their patience was becoming exhausted, and that sooner or later it was quite possible that a rising would take place. He said that, in his opinion, such a rising would be an absolutely bloodless revolution; that he thought the action of the Transvaal Government was unpopular, not merely with the English, but with the great majority of the Dutch in the Cape Colony, and that very many of the subjects of the Transvaal itself sympathized with the grievances of the reformers, and would not be prepared for anything like a forcible repression of their movement. It was in the course of this conversation that he made the remark, the exact words of which I could not possibly pledge my memory to at this distance of time, but it was to the effect: "I could



tell you something in confidence," or "I could give you some confidential information." I stopped him at once. I said: "I do not want to hear any confidential information; I am here in an official capacity. I can only hear information of which I can make official use"; and I added, "I have Sir Hercules Robinson in South Africa, I have entire confidence in him, and I am quite convinced that he will keep me informed of everything that I ought to know." Dr. Harris says in his evidence that he had in his mind something which Mr. Rhodes had told him, that he made no explicit statement to that effect, but that he referred to the unrest at Johannesburg (which is perfectly correct), and that he added a guarded allusion to the desirability of there being a police force near the border. Of course, I do not wish to deny that, but all I have to say about it is that if such an allusion was made I did not understand it, at all events as referring to anything which has subsequently taken place. I do not think that I desire to say in the most explicit manner that I had not then, and that I never had, any knowledge, or until, I think it was the day before the actual Raid took place, the slightest suspicion of anything in the nature of a hostile or armed invasion of the Transvaal (6223).

That is Mr. Chamberlain's version of what was said to him by Dr. Harris.

Now for Lord Selborne's. He also was present on that famous interview:—

As to my impressions of what passed at the interview with Dr. Harris in August. I am clear. He did commence to impart some information which I distinctly understood to be of a confidential character, and Mr. Chamberlain, interposing, stopped him at once in the manner which he has described. Until Dr. Harris told the Committee the other day what he believed himself to have said, I had always imagined that he was going to proceed to give us some information concerning the plans of the leaders of the revolution at Johannesburg (9596).

I cannot give you the words. There had been an allusion just before to the Transvaal and what was happening in Johannesburg; and it was the fact that his sentence which was broken off followed immediately on that which led me to believe that he was going to speak on that subject (9598).

In Dr. Harris's account given to the South African Committee, he said that he entered at great length into the question of the transfer of the Protectorate, and then continued:—

In addition to these complex and intricate questions, it was present to my mind that in the event of a rising at Johannesburg, Mr. Rhodes wished to be in a position to render assistance with the police force of the British South Africa Company should certain eventualities arise. I made no explicit statement to that effect, but I referred to the unrest at Johannesburg, and added a guarded allusion to the desirability of there being a police force near the border. Mr. Chamberlain at once demurred to the turn the conversation had taken. I never referred to the subject again at that or at either of the two subsequent interviews I had with Mr. Chamberlain (6220).

Questioned by Sir W. Harcourt, Dr. Harris said:—

I made a guarded allusion to the fact that, under certain eventualities, it might be as well to have a police force near the border, or not far off, or something like that (6358).

Dr. Harris, in describing his instructions, said:—

I was instructed by Mr. Rhodes to visit England and to press these considerations upon the attention of the Colonial Secretary. Mr. Rhodes left it to my discretion to add if I thought fit that, in view of the grave situation at Johannesburg, an immediate transfer would facilitate the placing of a colonial police force in a position to act, should circumstances require (6220).

Questioned upon this Dr. Harris said:—

The only use I made of that discretion was to make a very guarded allusion to it, because I came home not to make statements to Mr. Chamberlain of Mr. Rhodes's private plans, but to get the Protectorate, and I have explained why I said that (6351).

Dr. Harris further stated, in reply to a question by Mr. Blake, that "he thought he might have said something of this kind":—

We shall be here, and if a rising takes place at Johannesburg, of course we should not stand by and see them lightly pressed, or something to that effect (8510).

Mr. Chamberlain thought that would have been an explicit statement which would have aroused his suspicion, and that therefore Dr. Harris must have been mistaken.

It is worth while noting a curious contradiction between the evidence of Mr. Chamberlain and that of Lord Selborne. According to Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial Office disbelieved entirely in the reality of the threatened rising in Johannesburg. In his dispatch published after the Raid, Mr. Chamberlain set forth the evidence in favour of the theory that there was no desire to appeal to arms. He then said:—

I mention these matters because they seem to me to prove that, whatever may have been the secret schemes of individuals, the agitation, as the great majority of the Uitlanders understood it, and to which they gave their sympathy, was one proceeding on the only lines on which an agitation against an organized Government of military strength can proceed with any hope of success; that is to say, it was an open and above board agitation, prosecuted without violence and within the lines of the constitution" (9010).

There were, indeed, rumours from time to time that violent measures were in contemplation, but these rumours were continually falsified by the event; so that in the long run the opinion gained ground that the Uitlanders did not mean to risk a collision with the Government; and in the light of later occurrences it would seem evident that, so far as the Raid itself is concerned, that view was the correct one (9013).

But when Lord Selborne gave his testimony he contradicted this point-blank. He said:—

I was also in the most constant communication with Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Robert Meade, and Mr. Fairfield throughout the autumn of 1895, and I believe I knew absolutely everything that passed in the Colonial Office at that time. We believed that a *bona fide*, spontaneous revolution was about to occur in Johannesburg. It might be delayed for a year, or possibly two years; on the other hand, it might occur in a few weeks. We believed that that revolution might produce a civil war in the Transvaal, and that a civil war in the Transvaal would produce a very critical and dangerous situation throughout South Africa (9596).

A few days after this famous interview (the first) Mr. Edward Fairfield, who was the permanent official at the head of the African Department, met Mr. Hawksley, Mr. Rhodes' solicitor, an old friend of his, and asked him what was up. He was a little annoyed that Dr. Harris had not come to his room after the interview to tell him what was up; he thought it rather curious. Mr. Hawksley said that it was a mere inadvertence on the part of Dr. Harris, and that nothing could be further from his wish than to slight Mr. Fairfield in any way, or to keep back anything that he had said to Mr. Chamberlain. In proof of this, Mr. Hawksley suggested that it would be as well that Mr. Fairfield should meet Dr. Harris and have a chat, when he would tell him everything that was going on. Mr. Fairfield consented, and Dr. Harris, Mr. Hawksley, and Mr. Fairfield met a few days later. After some general talk, Dr. Harris spoke openly to Mr. Fairfield of the plan. The scheme, as explained to Mr. Fairfield, was the same as that which Miss Flora Shaw rapidly described before the South African Committee. Her version is substantially the same as that which was given to every one in those days. It may be as well to follow it here.

(8875.) The Jameson plan, as I was given to understand it, was this: The time had come when Johannesburgers were going to effect their revolution; they had made up their minds that within the next winter or spring, or some time, they would be obliged, if they wished to have their grievances redressed, to rise, and they had made up their minds that they would rise. What they expected was (they told me) a perfectly bloodless revolution, receiving the support of a very large body of the Dutch population. They believed there would be practically no difficulty, supported as they hoped they would be by the Dutch population, in deposing (as, of course, would be necessary as the result of the revolution) the existing Government and proclaiming a provisional Government. They believed the proclaiming of a provisional Government would probably be the work of a few

hours, and their intention was, as soon as the provisional Government was proclaimed, to immediately place themselves and their movement in the hands of the Imperial Government, by telegraphing to the High Commissioner to come up and mediate between them and judge the situation. Then, though they thought it was going to be a perfectly bloodless revolution, and that they would require no force, they, at the same time, recognized that nobody could be perfectly certain what would happen in events of that sort, and that it might be desirable to have a force; and as they were precluded by the nature of the movement from informing the High Commissioner what they were going to do, it was therefore impossible for him to have or prepare any force of any kind; and in this difficulty, which appears to have been in their minds for some time, it was arranged between them and Dr. Jameson (so I was given to understand) that Dr. Jameson should take the responsibility of having a force ready, which, when the High Commissioner called upon him, he might place at his disposal. That is, as clearly as I can remember it, the Jameson plan.

Now, Mr. Fairfield represented the Colonial Office tradition. Personally, he had no sympathy with Imperialism. Without being much of a moralist, he nevertheless maintained that morality and Imperialism could not go together, and that the inevitable sequence of sending our people to live in places of such very different moral meridians to our own would tend to level down our moral standard. Mr. Fairfield was a genial cynic and observer who, from the Colonial Office, looked down upon the British Empire as a profound mistake, and therefore personally he had little sympathy with the high-flying notions of Mr. Rhodes and his friends. But Mr. Fairfield knew all about the Loch plan, and he was too much of a philosopher to allow his personal sentiments to bias his judgment as to the probabilities of the future. He therefore received the information as it was given him, and from that time until he left the Colonial Office to die, conversations took place with him constantly on the basis that he knew everything about the plan. He could be relied upon to listen sympathetically to the information brought in by the conspirators, and could be counted upon to give them advice in season when a timely word might save them from disaster.

Mr. Fairfield had been at the Colonial Office for many years, and was as popular there as he was in society. He was a Liberal of the Little England school, a journalist in his way, and a man of considerable literary gifts. I knew him of old as an occasional contributor to the *Pall Mall Gazette*. He was a perfect gentleman, and although worried and nervously strained by the new Secretary of State, he was a loyal servant. Mr. Chamberlain said he was a man absolutely truthful and absolutely honourable.

The question as to how far the information communicated by Dr. Harris to Mr. Fairfield was by him transmitted to Mr. Chamberlain is a point upon which opinions differ. Mr. Chamberlain himself said:—

Now I do not deny that the words were used or that the conversation took place—I cannot, of course, do that; but I am perfectly convinced that if the words were used Mr. Fairfield did not understand them or did not hear them, and I base that upon this statement principally, that although both before and after the Raid I was in daily communication with Mr. Fairfield, he never directly or indirectly said one single word about anything of the kind having ever been said to him. I think to any one who knew Mr. Fairfield, it is absolutely impossible to believe that if he had known of a communication of this kind he would not have communicated it to his chief (9557).

Again, at a later period, Mr. Chamberlain said:—

(9566.) Certainly. Mr. Fairfield was accustomed to talk to me about everything in the fullest possible way, and, as I say, we were meeting many times a day over a great part of the time. I am quite certain that whatever may have been said to Mr. Fairfield, he did not know it, or he would have told me.

(9567.) That is the general and universal tradition of the public office?—Absolutely.

Dr. Harris is perfectly certain that Mr. Fairfield was told, and although his deafness is admitted, the supposition that he did not understand what Dr. Harris was saying to him during a long and intimate conversation only needs to be stated to be laughed out of court; for although you may not hear a statement, a conversation cannot be kept up if you cannot hear what your interlocutor is saying to you.

From that time onward in the conversations which took place between the Rhodesians and Mr. Fairfield, it was understood that he knew about the plan, and, whether he approved of it or not, would like to know all its developments, and would—and as a matter of fact did—give them a hint when the time arrived as to fitness of times and seasons for the execution of their project. But this is anticipating.

Mr. Rhodes telegraphed to Dr. Harris urging him to go to the Colonial Office, and to insist once more upon the urgent need for the cession of the Protectorate. Dr. Harris, who had already told Mr. Chamberlain the real reason, and had been rapped over the knuckles for his pains, telegraphed that he dared not again mention the real reason. Nevertheless, Dr. Harris went a second time to Mr. Chamberlain to receive his answer to the application which he had made. Dr. Harris scrupulously refrained from saying anything more as to the Jameson Plan or as to the real reason why the change was desired, but confined himself to what may be regarded as the legitimate arguments that lay on the surface. Mr. Chamberlain said that neither the Protectorate nor the mounted police would be given until after a period of two years. So the interview terminated, and Dr. Harris once more had to report more definitely than before the failure of the effort to secure the assent of the Colonial Office.

Then Mr. Rhodes waxed exceeding wrath, and fired off a telegram, one of the most remarkable of the series of telegrams which were shown to Mr. Chamberlain. It was a characteristic Rhodesian outburst. Such at least was the story current as to the message from Capetown. I have not seen the cable, for the collection was only once brought to my office for the purpose of showing me telegrams of a very different nature and for a very different purpose. That Mr. Rhodes did send such a telegram is, I believe, not disputed in the least by Mr. Chamberlain.

When this telegram came the recess holiday had begun. Mr. Chamberlain departed for the Mediterranean, Dr. Harris went shooting in Scotland, and Downing Street remained for a month or two at peace. When Mr. Chamberlain came back to town at the end of October he found his department in a state of considerable excitement. Events in South Africa had been moving rapidly. President Kruger, not content with refusing the Outlanders votes, had filled up the measure of his iniquity by breaking the Convention of London by closing the drifts or fords across the river into the Transvaal to merchandise sent from over sea. Meanwhile stories as to the imminence of the outbreak of the revolution in Johannesburg were increasing. The Cape Ministry, with Rhodes at its head, was pressing Mr. Chamberlain to hurl an ultimatum at President Kruger, but this Mr. Chamberlain refused to do until he had secured the support of the Ministry at the Cape. To this day there are very few, even among those who are actively interested in the present war, who know that four years ago Mr. Chamberlain was preparing to make war on the Transvaal, and would have done so without hesitation with the support of his colleagues, in order to compel the Transvaal Government to remove its veto upon goods from abroad coming through the Cape into the Transvaal. Before taking the final step Mr. Chamberlain, with the advice of Mr. Fairfield, took every precaution against a war with the

Transvaal being regarded as an attack by the British Government on the Dutch. In those days Mr. Chamberlain, coached by Mr. Fairfield, refused to send his ultimatum unless he received the assurance that the Cape Government would pay half the cost of war, and that the railways would carry troops and munitions of war free from the Cape to the Transvaal. There was a moment of suspense, and then, to the delight of Mr. Chamberlain, there came a telegram from the High Commissioner saying that his terms had been accepted by the Cape Government. Mr. Rhodes, and Mr. Schreiner were convinced that there was nothing for it but to go forward, and so they yielded to Mr. Chamberlain's desires. The ultimatum was then agreed to. A message from Lord Salisbury was sent to Mr. Montagu White, the Consul-General of the Transvaal Republic, warning him that if President Kruger did not give way and promise never to close the drifts again without the consent of the British Government, it would be regarded as a breach of the Convention, which would compel the Government to resort to the last argument of kings. As might well be imagined, the near approach of an Imperial war with the Transvaal created no little excitement, not only in the Colonial Office, but also amongst the Afrikanders in London.

As the matter did not concern them, they were left in the dark by Mr. Rhodes, so much so that some of them were much alarmed on discovering that Mr. Chamberlain was meditating taking a hand in the question on his own account. True to the old tradition, Dr. Harris deprecated the intervention of the Imperial factor in South African affairs. He did not know that Mr. Chamberlain's intervention had been solicited by Mr. Rhodes and the Cape Ministry, otherwise he would have felt at ease. But during the later weeks of October there was much uneasiness amongst the Rhodesians in London. Their own instructions had been that the Transvaal question was to be settled by a revolution in Johannesburg, supported by the expanded Loch plan of stationing troops on the frontiers in support. And now it seemed as if Mr. Chamberlain was getting ahead of them by intervening in the case of the Drifts. This led to the first of the telegrams produced before the South African Committee. In it Dr. Harris, in somewhat uncouth language, necessitated by the use of a code cipher, deprecated forcing the Drifts question, instead of adhering to the old plan.

It is obvious that if you have got the Secretary of State at the point of preparing an ultimatum, and urging the Cape Ministry to defray half the cost of a war with the Transvaal, the atmosphere of the Colonial Office must be much more receptive to semi-revolutionary plans than when there was no prospect of war. If we had been going to war with the Transvaal in December, even the most scrupulous would blame Mr. Chamberlain if he were not to enter into communication with revolutionists who were contemplating overturning the Government with which he was about to go to war. Bismarck, it will be remembered, entered into very compromising relations with the Hungarians before the war of 1866. After what Bismarck had done no one could be surprised at Mr. Chamberlain doing the same.

Of course there were various methods open to him by which he could obtain information without resorting to notifications similar to that which he rebuked so gravely in the case of Dr. Harris. He was on terms of intimate friendship with at least one of the directors of the Chartered Company, who was in full possession of the so-called Jameson Plan. Nothing could have been easier than for him to hear, not at Downing Street, but in his club, or at home, or in

a friend's house, full particulars as to everything that was going on, so far as they were known to his friend, who was in the secret. Even if this method was not resorted to, it was possible for him to be kept well informed through Mr. Fairfield, whose communications with Dr. Harris and Mr. Hawksley were continuous and intimate. There was also a possibility that Mr. Chamberlain was kept advised by the High Commissioner or the Imperial Secretary at Capetown, for it is difficult to believe that no communication had taken place between Mr. Chamberlain and Sir H. Robinson after the question of a possible insurrection at Johannesburg had been specially brought before the attention of the Colonial Office. We are, however, left to conjecture. All that I now point out is that if Mr. Chamberlain wanted to have information as to the designs of Mr. Rhodes, he could have obtained that information without compromising himself. Further, I think I may remark that it was his duty as a Minister, on the eve of war with the Transvaal, to inform himself as much as possible as to the means by which the enemies of that Republic contemplated its overthrow. It is also equally clear that, when he had secured the promise from Mr. Rhodes and the Cape Ministry to share the expenses of the war, he would be much more amenable to the representations of Mr. Rhodes's friends as to the wisdom of giving over the jumping-off strip and letting Mr. Rhodes have the Bechuanaland police. *Do ut des* is a maxim of universal application, and as Mr. Rhodes had met Mr. Chamberlain's wishes by inducing the Cape Ministry to meet half of the cost of the Transvaal war, the least he could do was to facilitate the transfer of the jumping-off strip to the Chartered Company. The Colonial Secretary, while adjourning the realization of Mr. Rhodes's wishes until 1897, had left Mr. Rhodes to use his ingenuity and resource for the purpose of overcoming the difficulties which this refusal entailed. Mr. Rhodes, as soon as he got over his angry mood, set himself to work to devise an expedient whereby he could gain his ends. After much cogitation, it occurred to him that for the purpose of the plan it was not necessary to insist upon the whole of the Protectorate. All that was needed was a narrow strip on the frontier upon which he could concentrate the men necessary to carry out the expanded Loch scheme—that is, the Jameson plan. He therefore suggested to the High Commissioner that he should propose to Mr. Chamberlain as a compromise the cession of a strip of territory running the whole length of the Transvaal frontier on the ostensible pretext of constructing the railway, which, although right enough and a legitimate reason for conceding the territory, was not the real reason. Therefore when Dr. Harris presented himself before Mr. Chamberlain at the conference at which Khama and his chiefs were present, everything was satisfactorily arranged. The administration of a jumping-off strip, one hundred miles long and a few miles broad, was handed over to the Chartered Company, and the Police were also placed at their disposal. Khama was delighted; the five, Dr. Harris, Mr. Maguire, Mr. Beit, Lord Grey, and Mr. Hawksley were content. The Rhodesian group was indeed in high feather. Within two months of the time when Mr. Chamberlain had declared that he would not listen to the proposal to hand over the Protectorate and the Police for two years, they had succeeded in obtaining immediate possession of the jumping-off place and the Police. It is not difficult to understand the change. Mr. Rhodes was then at the zenith of his power, again and again he had tried conclusions with the Colonial Office and had come off victorious. There was a certain holy horror of him in the Colonial Office, for there was by no means such faith in Mr. Rhodes then,

as an Imperialist, as there is to-day. They thought, and Mr. Chamberlain doubtless shared their dread, that if Mr. Rhodes did not get anything he set his mind on he would not hesitate to ally himself with the Dutch of South Africa, and carry out the project of federation with their aid. It is not marvellous that Mr. Chamberlain should have reconsidered his attitude. The tendency in this direction was facilitated by the exigencies of his own policy in the Drift question.

What might have been very culpable in dealing with a friendly State in peaceful treaty relations with the Government would appear in a very different light to a Minister who was preparing to wage war with an unfriendly State over the breaking of a convention with Her Majesty. Mr. Chamberlain also was shielded behind the authority of the High Commissioner, who had obediently transmitted the offer of Mr. Rhodes. The fact that Mr. Rhodes had practically the High Commissioner in his pocket was only an added reason why Mr. Chamberlain should be less sensitive to the carrying out of the expanded Loch plan, should the necessity arise. Whatever the cause, there appears to have been no doubt that Mr. Chamberlain not merely assented to the administrative changes necessary to provide Mr. Rhodes with a jumping-off place should disturbances arise in Johannesburg, but it appears that he went even further, for it is not a habit of Pushful Joe, when he takes an interest in anything, to do his work by halves. But this must be reserved for the next chapter.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE BRITISH-FLAG-HURRY-UP PLAN.

I AM now venturing upon ground in which not only is there no legal proof as to the accuracy of the statements that I make, nor is it possible that there should be; for I am dealing with a conspiracy in which the conspirators were naturally careful to avoid leaving about any written shreds of evidence as to what they were after, and further, it is tolerably certain that if they were challenged they would refuse to admit anything that would give away their friend and accomplice. It is, therefore, difficult to make a definite statement which would not in proportion as it is definite be repudiated by the persons whose evidence would be necessary to bring the charge home. There are, however, some shreds of evidence available, owing to the tardy and belated production of telegrams which passed between Mr. Rhodes and his emissaries in this country. The cablegrams themselves are suggestive, but the explanations current in London as to the circumstances in which these telegrams were written bring their importance into still greater relief.

What the cablegrams suggest is that as Mr. Rhodes expanded the Loch plan until it became the Jameson plan, so some one else in London expanded the Jameson plan until it became the British-flag-Hurry-up plan that wrecked the whole scheme.

We know that Mr. Rhodes was the author of the Jameson expansion of the Loch plan. Who was responsible for the British-flag-Hurry-up expansion of the Jameson plan?

As I have admitted, it is a matter not of direct evidence, but of inference from such scraps of evidence as escaped suppression. But all these scraps of evidence point in one direction. The British-flag-Hurry-up plan did not originate in Johannesburg. On the contrary, it destroyed the movement in Johannesburg. It did not originate with Mr. Rhodes. The cablegrams show that. They also show that it was thrust upon him from London. There are at least two of the surviving cablegrams which show that some influential persons in London were so insistent upon the British-flag plan as to lead Dr. Harris to telegraph urgently to Mr. Rhodes warning him as to the necessity for his adopting the British-flag extension of the Jameson plan. Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson, according to Mr. Fitzpatrick, yielded sufficiently under this pressure as to excite such alarm and distrust at Johannesburg that the revolutionary movement ended in a fiasco. Colonel Rhodes also admits that this forcing of the British flag upon the movement wrecked it. Who did it?

Let us ask who alone in London was strong enough to compel Mr. Rhodes to run so terrible and, as the result proved, so fatal a risk? Whose support was so indispensable as to force Mr. Rhodes against his better judgment to waver on the Flag question? There was one man in London, and only one man, who was in such a position. And by a very significant coincidence, this very man was in close, intimate and constant intercourse with the group from which emanated the cablegrams that put pressure upon Mr. Rhodes.

What is the natural inference?

Let us now proceed to examine this somewhat startling theory of the genesis of the British-flag-Hurry-up theory by the light cast upon it by the cablegrams.

One of the first cablegrams published was from Mr. Rhodes to Dr. Harris. It was evidently sent in reply to some appeal which had been



sent by Dr. Harris at the end of October, as to whether Jameson's plan was to be carried out under the Union Jack. The telegram runs thus: "As to English flag, they must very much misunderstand me at home. I of course would not risk everything as I am doing except for the British flag." Dr. Harris, in cross examination, was careful to explain that this telegram was elicited by one that he had sent explaining that there were two sections of opinion in London, neither of which appeared to believe that Mr. Rhodes was quite to be relied upon. One section doubted Mr. Rhodes's loyalty somewhat. Another section, while admitting that he was absolutely loyal, doubted whether he would have sufficient influence with the leaders at Johannesburg to see that, if there was a change, it would result to the benefit and advantage of the British flag. In cross examination by the South African Committee, the only explanation of the "two sections" which Dr. Harris would give was that they were "people one meets in ordinary daily life"! This explanation is rather extraordinary, for one would hardly have thought it necessary to telegraph to Mr. Rhodes at Capetown, dinner-table talk, or the chatter of irresponsible frivolity. This is made more evident by the telegram in answer to Mr. Rhodes's expostulation. (This was: "Thanks, they do not misunderstand you, but feared if you should have power to insist upon it.") Who were the "they" whose misgivings are reported? He tells us "they do not misunderstand you, but feared, &c." What, then, was the current explanation which was believed, and is believed, at the present moment by many? The story was, and is, that the "they" referred to here was none other than Mr. Chamberlain, who, at a given stage in the movement, was said to have refused his support unless there was a definite agreement that the plan should be carried out under the Union Jack. It was the only method by which Mr. Chamberlain could have a sure confidence that the movement would not be engineered solely for the benefit of Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Chamberlain did not see where he and the Empire came in, unless the plan was carried out under the British flag, that the Transvaal was reduced to the status of a British Colony, and that the next Governor would be appointed from the Colonial Office. The story may be true, or it may be false. It is obvious that the person who communicated this message from Mr. Chamberlain to those who telegraphed it to Mr. Rhodes would certainly repudiate or explain away the significance of the conversation thus reported. But let us look for one moment at the position of affairs.

Whatever chances the success of the insurrectionary movement might have had was foredoomed to failure by this insistence upon the British flag. Mr. Rhodes knew that better than any one else. Many years before that, he had made a speech in which he declared that nothing could be more detrimental to the future of South Africa than showing any disrespect to the flags of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. To propose to supersede the Transvaal flag by the Union Jack was the last thing in the world which Cecil Rhodes ever thought of. But if confronted by a demand from London, which, compelling him to choose between the loss of the support of Downing Street or the utter destruction of the revolutionary movement in the Transvaal, what could he do? He evaded the question, and said what was perfectly true, that he was risking everything for the sake of the flag and all that the flag represented, but he might have added that it did not follow as a consequence that he was going to make the movement in Johannesburg under the British flag. This, however, was widely believed in Johannesburg and led

to the paralysis of the Revolutionary Committee on the very eve of the expected revolution. Mr. Phillips and his colleagues had definitely arranged with Mr. Rhodes that the Transvaal flag was to be used, because it was an internal insurrection for rights in the Transvaal. Mr. Farrer, Mr. Price Hughes's relative, was even more emphatic. He said, "This is the Boer country; it would be absolutely morally wrong to go in except on the basis that we want a reformed Republic, and I will not go a yard further in this business unless that basis is maintained" (7936). Colonel Rhodes, who gave his evidence with refreshing candour, gives as his reason that the insurrection did not take place: "Because they would not rise until they got a distinct assurance about the flag, and they only got that on Sunday morning" (5065).

Mr. Leonard was sent to Capetown in order to represent to Mr. Rhodes that unless he gave them the definite assurance that no attempt would be made to hoist the British flag they would not consent to make any movement at all. Mr. Chamberlain may have been misrepresented, and there may have been no basis for the statements so freely made about his action in this matter. But what is perfectly clear is that some person or persons high in authority in London had put sufficient pressure on Dr. Harris and his friends in favour of exacting the promise that the Jameson plan should be carried out under the Union Jack, as to lead to a revolt in the revolutionary party, and to cause the whole conspiracy to fizzle out like a damp squib. It may not have been Mr. Chamberlain; but if not, who was it? In the engineering of the revolutionary campaign the introduction of the flag was the one fatal mistake which was made; and it is evident that pressure was brought to bear on Mr. Rhodes in that direction by his emissaries, who had been in communication with Mr. Chamberlain. That, at least, is clear, and although it may not carry us far, it, at least, leaves considerable suspicion whether the failure of the conspiracy does not lie at the door of the inconsiderate and headstrong Imperialism which overreached itself by grasping too eagerly the fruits of the revolution.

So much for the British flag part of the new Plan. Who was the author of the "Hurry up" section. Here the evidence is clearer. There is more than enough evidence to show that the impulse to plunge was communicated by telegrams from London, sent by a person who enjoyed the confidence of the Colonial Office. In December, when everything had been got ready, when Jameson was stationed on the frontier, and the rifles were arriving in oil-cans and coke-waggons in Johannesburg, Mr. Rhodes received two telegrams, which have been published, declaring that delay was dangerous and that Mr. Chamberlain wished the rising to be done immediately.

The author of these telegrams was cross-examined at great length before the South African Committee as to what she meant, and as to what she regarded as her justification for thus telegraphing. She says: "I telegraphed it in the *bona fide* belief that Mr. Rhodes would take it exactly as I meant it, as being what I believe Mr. Chamberlain's views were. I had special reasons to believe that the Colonial Office would wish to have it done immediately (9652). Therefore, when I say, you must do it immediately, I mean that the British must make their rising immediately; I had no other meaning at all" (9659). There is therefore no mistake about what she meant her telegram to say, and there is as little doubt that Mr. Rhodes did accept it in the sense in which it was sent. Miss Shaw was a personal friend, a lady in a position of great trust and responsibility on the *Times*; she

had the run of the Colonial Office, and she was in the habit, at least three times every week, of calling at the department to talk over Colonial affairs either with Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Fairfield, or Sir Robert Meade. She was armed with the private cipher handed over to her by Dr. Harris, on his departure from London, in order that secret confidential communications might be made by her to Mr. Rhodes, and received by her from him, for the purpose of passing them on in London. It is impossible to imagine that any one placed in such a responsible position would go a hair's breadth further than what was warranted by information received by her from the Colonial Office. So much for her.

Now for the source of her authority. She says she did not have it from Mr. Chamberlain, she had it from Mr. Fairfield. She had gone down to the Colonial Office full of the news that the insurrection, which Mr. Rhodes was supporting, was on the verge of breaking out. She had special knowledge how soon matters would be brought to an explosion. And with this information in her mind, she went down to the Colonial Office to discuss matters with Mr. Fairfield, who, on his part, was as well aware as herself of what had been going on. He then said to her, with a significance which she fully appreciated: "Well, if the Johannesburg burghers are going to rise, it is to be hoped they will do it soon" (9656). The reason was obvious. The trouble with America over the Venezuelan dispute was coming to a head, to say nothing of complications in Europe. The manner in which he said it convinced her that she was justified in sending a private and confidential message to Mr. Rhodes, that it was the wish of Mr. Chamberlain that the British in Johannesburg should make their rising immediately. Attempts have been made to explain away Mr. Fairfield's remark. All the changes are rung upon its being a hypothetical observation, and not in earnest. Against this we have the fact that Miss Shaw knew that the rising was imminent, and that whatever she sent to Mr. Rhodes would be received as a word of command from Mr. Chamberlain. She had not merely heard a casual remark from Mr. Fairfield, he gave her a warning which justified her in sending the message to Mr. Rhodes, as Mr. Chamberlain's wish.

Under the impulse of such telegrams from London, telegrams emanating from a person who was in constant confidential communication with the Colonial Office, intimating in set terms the desire of the Colonial Office that the insurrection should be hurried on, is it to be wondered at that Dr. Jameson's head got hot, and he decided to rush matters? Hence we had the Raid, which destroyed the Plan.

It may be said that this is nonsense and that there is not a word of truth in any of the stories that the Colonial Office was responsible either for the flag incident or for precipitating the Raid. But, though I fully admit that as most of the evidence has been carefully suppressed, and the witnesses were practically bound over not to speak the truth if they were called upon, it is impossible to prove the matter up to the hilt, as it ought to have been proved, and could have been proved, before the South African Committee, still the evidence which is afforded by the fragmentary telegrams to which I have referred, the two relating to the Flag, and the one transmitting Mr. Chamberlain's wish that the insurrection should be precipitated, justify a horrible suspicion that Mr. Chamberlain may have been not merely passively privy to the Jameson Plan, but the inspirer of the far more indefensible British Flag and Hurray up Plan. If this were so, what a lurid light would be cast upon the origin of the present war, in which also the British Flag is hurrying up to the Transvaal with a vengeance.

## PART III.

## AFTER THE PLAN.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE COMMITTEE : ITS CONSTITUTION.

THE South African Committee of the House of Commons was appointed "To inquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion into the South African Republic by an armed force, and into the administration of the British South Africa Company, and to report thereon; and further, to report what alterations are desirable in the government of the territories under the control of the Company."

The Committee inquired first into the origin and circumstances of the incursion into the South African Republic. It was first appointed at the end of the session of 1896, but, beyond a formal meeting, it did nothing that year. It was reappointed on Jan. 29th, 1897, and was composed of the following members:—

*Ministerialists.*

MR. SECRETARY CHAMBERLAIN.  
 THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.  
 MR. W. L. JACKSON (*Chairman*).  
 THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, Q.C.  
 SIR W. HART DYKE.  
 MR. J. L. WHARTON.  
 MR. BIGHAM, Q.C.  
 MR. CRIPPS, Q.C.  
 MR. GEORGE WYNDHAM.

*Liberals.*

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT.  
 SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.  
 MR. SYDNEY BUXTON.  
 MR. BLAKE.  
 MR. JOHN E. ELLIS.  
 MR. LABOUCHERE.

This Committee of fifteen, of whom seven were to form a quorum, had leave to hear counsel to such extent as they should see fit, and had power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records.

It held its first meeting on Feb. 5th, 1897, and its last meeting for the hearing of witnesses on July 2nd, 1897. It held twenty-nine sittings for taking evidence, and three more for considering its Report. The Report was finally approved on July 13th, 1899, by ten votes to one, Mr. George Wyndham being the solitary dissident, four being absent. The ten who voted were:—

*Ministerialists.*

MR. SECRETARY CHAMBERLAIN.  
 THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.  
 THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.  
 MR. W. HART DYKE.  
 MR. WHARTON.  
 MR. CRIPPS.

*Liberals.*

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT.  
 SIR H. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.  
 MR. SYDNEY BUXTON.  
 MR. JOHN E. ELLIS.

Mr. Blake retired before the consideration of the Report.

Mr. Rhodes was under examination for five days and a half. He was asked 2,126 questions. His evidence occupies 121 pages of the voluminous Blue Book.

Mr. Schreiner was under examination for three days and a half.

Dr. Rutherford Harris was in the witness-box on four different days.

Mr. Chamberlain twice entered the witness-box, on each occasion to explain away the evidence of Mr. Rhodes' emissaries, who had spoken of the communications which they made to him.

The Report and the Proceedings of the Committee form a bulky Blue Book, No. 311, containing 601 pages of letterpress, price 4s. 9½d. In addition, there is an Appendix, 311, I., price 1s. 2d., and an Index, 311, II., price 11½d.; total, 846 pages.

The Cape Inquiry was appointed May 28th, 1896. It was conducted by a committee of seven members appointed by the Speaker. They were:—

SIR THOMAS UPINGTON, *The Attorney-General (Chairman)*.

MR. SCHREINER.

MR. DU TOIT.

MR. ROSE INNES.

MR. JONES.

MR. MERRIMAN.

MR. FULLER.

The Chairman drew up and signed solely a minority Report exonerating Mr. Rhodes, but all the other members of the Committee signed the Report of July 17th, 1896. They were unable to secure the attendance either of Mr. Rhodes or Dr. Jameson or of Dr. Harris. The cablegrams which had passed between London and Capetown had been removed to London, and the inquiry, although fairly complete as relates to the organization of the Raid, did not touch upon the question of the relations between the conspiracy and the Colonial Office. Its Report, a squat Blue Book, containing 263 pages of evidence, 106 pages of report, and 268 pages of appendix, is very interesting, chiefly on account of its translation of the contents of the Transvaal Green Book, No. 2.

The task of investigating the circumstances of the Raid was therefore ready to the hand of the South African Committee. Almost the only question that was left over was the alleged complicity of the Colonial Office in the plans of Mr. Rhodes.

Instead, however, of investigating this, the Committee devoted most of the time (1) to hearing evidence as to the way in which Johannesburg was governed by President Kruger, and (2) to thrashing out once more the thrice-thrashed chaff of the story of the Raid. These subjects, on which no one had anything fresh to say, and all the facts were on record, were made the subjects for laborious examination and cross-examination. The real matter at issue, which touched the honour of the nation, the extent to which the Colonial Office was implicated, was dealt with most gingerly, apparently with the object of avoiding at any cost the discovery of the truth.

## CHAPTER II.

## IF MR. CHAMBERLAIN WERE INNOCENT.

BUT in order to bring into clear relief the essential hollowness of the so-called inquiry, I appeal to the reader to ask himself what course he would have taken if, being innocent, he had, like Mr. Chamberlain, found that he was the subject of such widespread suspicion. Would he not have eagerly seized every opportunity at the inquiry of turning a flood of light upon every dark and shady place, of insisting upon the production of every shred of available evidence, and especially of furnishing to the Committee every document in his possession, and of lending his active co-operation in the search for all documentary or other evidence which might be in existence? That surely was what any "honourable member, who was also an honourable man," to say nothing of his being a Minister of the Crown, would have done. Here was the opportunity which, of all others, an innocent Minister must have longed for in order to vindicate his honour, and to dispel to the winds the foul fog of suspicion which had gathered so densely round the Colonial Office. How did Mr. Chamberlain avail himself of it? If there had been nothing in the story of his complicity in the conspiracy which was spoiled by the Raid, this is surely what Mr. Chamberlain would have done:—

He would have met the Committee by a full statement, accompanied by the presentation of a copious *dossier* of all the documents in the Colonial Office bearing upon the question at issue.

He would have called as Secretary of State upon the cable company for copies of all the cables exchanged between London and Capetown from August, 1895, to January, 1896.

He would have further handed in a list of all persons with whom he had communication on the subject, and have requested that they should be called to give evidence on oath.

He would then have tendered himself for examination and cross-examination, and would have insisted upon continuing the inquiry until the last vestige of suspicion had been cleared away.

That is what Mr. Chamberlain could have done if there had been no truth in the story of the complicity, and it is obvious what an immense advantage it would have been to him and to the Government of which he is a member if he had taken this course.

But that is just what Mr. Chamberlain did not do.

The Committee had been sitting from February till April 30th before he tendered himself for examination, and then he merely appealed to be allowed to give his version of what occurred at the interview with Dr. Harris immediately after Dr. Harris's own statement. He made his statement. Mr. Labouchere asked him four questions, and then the examination of Dr. Harris was resumed. The incident bore a very curious resemblance to the extraordinary method in which, at Rennes, members of the General Staff claimed the right to interrupt the evidence of witnesses whenever their testimony went against them.

Mr. Chamberlain did not enter the witness-box again until some of the cablegrams had been produced. The Chairman introduced him, saying, "I understand you desire to make a statement, on the conclusion of the evidence, as to your recollection of what took place and your recollection of the telegrams as far as you remember them."

That was all. A desire to make two specific statements which were intended to weaken the force of the evidence of witnesses already heard—that was the extent of Mr. Chamberlain's desire to assist in the elucidation of the facts! If he had nothing to conceal, why this extraordinary backwardness in coming forward?

If it were true as the Committee reported, Mr. Secretary Chamberlain being one of the signatories, that

"Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies, nor any of the officials of the Colonial Office received any information which made them or should have made them or any of them aware of the plot during its development,"

Mr. Chamberlain would surely have challenged any and every witness and exhausted every source of information in order to dispel the doubt which has filled the world with suspicions as to our good faith.

But, no, that was the very last thing which Mr. Chamberlain did. It was expected by those innocents, who imagined that the Committee met to investigate, and not to be hounded, that the Secretary of State would have laid before them, before a single question was asked, copies of all telegrams, letters, and memoranda in the archives of the Colonial Office which directly or indirectly bore upon the matter at issue. Mr. Chamberlain, it was believed, would present the Committee with the following documents:—

1. Copies of telegrams and dispatches exchanged between the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner from the day of Dr. Harris's guarded allusion to the revolution in Johannesburg, down to the crossing of the frontier.

2. Copies of all notes and memoranda by himself, or by officials of the Colonial Office, as to the nature of communications made to the emissaries and friends of Mr. Rhodes, between August and January, on their visits to the Department.

3. Copies of all letters written to or received from the representatives of Mr. Rhodes, especially those letters interchanged between the Colonial Office and Mr. Hawksley when the cablegrams were submitted to Mr. Chamberlain and returned by him, as well as the correspondence that followed thereupon.

It is difficult to believe that Mr. Chamberlain, after receiving so plain an intimation from Dr. Harris as to the impending revolution in Johannesburg, abstained altogether from writing or cabling one word of warning to the High Commissioner. Such messages, with the High Commissioner's replies, would have been vital to the question under discussion. The absence of any such communications, if there were none, would be almost as significant as if they existed. But of information on this point Mr. Secretary Chamberlain gave us never a word.

That memoranda exist in the Colonial Office as to the visits paid by and communications received by emissaries of important Colonial Prime Ministers is a matter of course. This was proved by the production in the middle of Dr. Harris's evidence by Mr. Chamberlain of a letter written by Mr. Fairfield to Mr. Chamberlain, which must obviously have only been one of a series. Mr. Chamberlain, being often at Birmingham,

must have received copious notes from his officials in town. But this, and this alone, was produced by him.

That there existed correspondence between the Colonial Office and Mr. Rhodes's solicitor, is now well known, and has been admitted by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons. Part of it was produced by Mr. Hawksley. None of it was ever brought forward by Mr. Chamberlain. When challenged to produce it after the inquiry in the House of Commons, he first of all took no notice, and then the challenge being repeated two years later, he disdainfully refused to gratify the "spiteful curiosity" of his questioner.

Now let us turn to the matter of obtaining the evidence of available witnesses. The persons who were more or less incriminated at the Colonial Office were Mr. Edward Fairfield and Sir R. Meade. Both were ill when the Committee was appointed. Both have since died. By every tie of loyalty they were bound to make out the very best case they could, both for their office and their chief. If they could have made a statement before a commission, absolutely refuting the statements made as to their knowledge of the plot, it is difficult to believe that they would not have done it.

But although the whole case pivoted on their evidence, notably on Mr. Fairfield's, Mr. Chamberlain took no steps whatever to secure for his accused officials an opportunity of declaring their innocence on oath. They were left to die with all the suspicion hanging round their heads, nor can any one now obtain their evidence. If Mr. Chamberlain had been innocent, the statement made by these men before the commissioner charged to obtain their evidence on oath would have been invaluable. But as it was not taken, what is the obvious conclusion?

The second group of witnesses whom it was expected Mr. Chamberlain would summon in order to prove that he received no communication as to the plans of Mr. Rhodes were the emissaries and friends of Mr. Rhodes, who between August and December were in full possession of the plans of the conspirators, and who were also, by a curious coincidence, in more or less constant communication with Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Fairfield, and Sir R. Meade. These witnesses were Dr. Rutherford Harris, Mr. Maguire, Lord Grey, Mr. Hawksley, Mr. Beit, and Miss Flora Shaw. But instead of summoning each of these persons to the witness-stand and asking them whether in any way they had ever made any communication to him as to the Plan which the Raid upset, one, the most intimate confidant of Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Grey, was safely interned at Bulawayo; a second, the most intimate counsellor of Mr. Rhodes, was no sooner found to be giving dangerous evidence than he was ordered out of the witness-box and not permitted to return; and the third, Miss Flora Shaw, was only called owing to the insistence of Mr. Labouchere, who, for once, overcame the opposition of the Attorney-General. Yet it was Miss Shaw who had actually telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes that Mr. Chamberlain desired the insurrection to be brought about at once! The examination of Mr. Maguire was a farce, and that of Mr. Beit not much better. Both were only called at the last moment, and neither was asked a single question as to how far he had, by cable or by word of mouth, done anything which, rightly or wrongly, produced the impression on the minds of the conspirators in Africa that their designs had the approval and benediction of the Colonial Office.

What inference can be drawn from such a neglect of the simplest and most obvious method of dissipating the delusion that Mr. Chamberlain was "in it"—excepting, indeed, that which every one has drawn, viz.,



that it was no delusion? If those documents were not produced, if those witnesses were not pressed to speak, and if Mr. Chamberlain's own evidence was so fragmentary, and tendered in so extraordinary a way, why was it? As Cardinal Manning once said to me, speaking of another famous instance of alleged innocence: "I never say to any one who says that he is innocent that he is guilty, even if I have the proofs of his guilt in my hand. No, I always address him thus: 'You say you are an innocent man, I am glad to hear it; but if I am to believe it, you must act as an innocent man.'"

Can any one in face of the tactics of the Colonial Secretary when confronted with this accusation say that he has acted as an innocent man?

## CHAPTER III.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CABLEGRAMS.

THE Cape Committee of Inquiry had attempted to get possession of the cablegrams which had been sent from London to the conspirators in Cape Town. They had failed, as copies of cables are sent to London after fourteen days and destroyed after twelve months. It was pointed out when the Cape inquiry closed that the production of the cables was one of the chief reasons for holding the inquiry in London. There the cables were within reach. Mr. Rhodes would be in the witness-box. The missing link in the chain of evidence could be easily supplied.

Mr. Chamberlain does not appear to have taken the slightest trouble to secure possession of the cables or to prevent their destruction. It is evident, then, to the meanest understanding that, putting it at the lowest, the cablegrams did supply a contemporary record of the communications exchanged between the chief conspirator and his emissaries, who were in constant touch with the Colonial Office. The telegrams may have proved nothing, but they were admittedly regarded as authentic by Mr. Rhodes. He acted upon them as genuine dispatches, and after he had ample opportunity of comparing notes with Mr. Chamberlain, he evidently saw no reason for withdrawing his confidence from his friends and agents, who remain his friends and agents still.

Mr. Chamberlain knew, no one better, that it was the cablegrams which according to the gossip of London society would establish his complicity in the conspiracy. It might have been thought that, at all costs, without even counting the cost, he would have moved heaven and earth in order to secure their production. But against this there is to be put the fact that he knew the contents of those which passed between Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Harris. He had read them all carefully, and knew that they were regarded by Mr. Rhodes as being the authentic record of negotiations between himself and the Colonial Office. Many of the cablegrams—those from Mr. Rhodes—Mr. Chamberlain did not see for the first time in June, 1896. Most of the contents of those sent to Mr. Rhodes were summaries, more or less exact, of communications made by Mr. Chamberlain or the officials at the Colonial Office to the agents of Mr. Rhodes. But although he declared repeatedly that he had no objection to their publication, he refused to take any step that would have secured their production.

Mr. Rhodes refused to produce the cablegrams or to answer questions about them, as they were all confidential (473). Mr. Chamberlain never asked him to do so. The Committee never pressed him on the point. Only at the very last Mr. Labouchere ventured to ask Mr. Chamberlain if he would not endeavour to procure them.

The following questions and answers show the result :—

(9584.) Mr. Labouchere : I suppose you would like these telegrams to appear?—

Mr. Chamberlain : I really am quite indifferent.

(9585.) Would you apply to Mr. Rhodes as Colonial Secretary?—I do not think I have any right to approach him as Colonial Secretary in such a matter.

(9586.) Or in your individual capacity?—I do not think he would pay the least attention to me; if for any reasons he desires not to produce them, I think he would not be influenced by my request.

(9587.) Would you mind making it?—No, I should not mind making it.

(9588.) Then you will make it?—No, that is a different thing; I say I should not mind making it; I do not say I will make it.

(9589.) You have no objection to making it?—Not the least.

We are, therefore, reduced to the necessity of piecing out the few cablegrams which did appear by the elucidatory information supplied by the witnesses.

I begin the story with the way in which the existence and importance of these cablegrams were first officially brought to the attention of Mr. Chamberlain.

When Mr. Rhodes came home to face the music after the Raid, he told Mr. Hawksley, who travelled with him in the train from Plymouth, that the cables from London—which, of course, Mr. Hawksley knew all about—had been considered by him and communicated by him to others, as supporting the action he had taken in South Africa (8733, 8741). As soon as Mr. Hawksley heard that, he advised Mr. Rhodes that the Colonial Office should be informed of the fact that those cablegrams had been used in that sense. Mr. Rhodes assented, and Mr. Hawksley no sooner arrived in London than he went to the Colonial Office and told Mr. Fairfield. "I told him that telegrams from Dr. Harris, reporting what Dr. Harris had done in London from time to time as he did it, had been received by Mr. Rhodes, and had been acted upon by him" (8733). They had a talk for half an hour, discussing the matter, and when Mr. Hawksley left, Mr. Fairfield said he would think the matter over (8751). The existence of the telegrams was no news to Mr. Fairfield, the only new fact was the use that Mr. Rhodes had made of them, in order to secure support for the Jameson Plan. On the following morning Mr. Hawksley received this letter from Mr. Fairfield:—

(8752.)

MY DEAR HAWKSLEY,

I told Meade of our conversation, and he said we must at once tell Mr. Chamberlain. We did so, and he requests that you will ask your various clients who have sent telegrams about him or the Office to send copies to me through you. He does not recollect saying ament the insurrection which was supposed to be impending which he would greatly care about if it became public, but he would like to know, as a preliminary matter, what it is he and we are supposed to have said. Perhaps, also, you could tell us how much of what was sent from here reached the five, or whatever number it was, and if so, whether it was in substance or in words.

Yours truly,

E. FAIRFIELD.

P.S.—Perhaps you will come and see me with the copies.

Mr. Hawksley replied in the following letter:—

(8753.)

MY DEAR FAIRFIELD,

I thought I had better follow your example, and so told Rhodes of my talks with you. I have not seen Grey, but shall do so to-morrow. Grey, I understand, has never cabled anything to South Africa, and the information given to the people in Johannesburg has all been oral. I think, therefore, perhaps enough has been done, and we may leave matters at this point. Mr. C. knows that I know, and can shape his course with this knowledge. You know, and I do not, what has passed between the High Commissioner or his Secretary and the Colonial Office. As I hope I made clear to you, there is not the slightest intention to make any use whatever of confidential communications. If you can hurry up the publication of the dispatch about the Uitlanders it would do much good.

Very truly yours,

BOURCHIER F. HAWKSLEY.

Mr. Chamberlain says that Mr. Fairfield reported that the Harris cables contained accounts of interviews with officials at the Colonial Office and with himself (9559). Mr. Hawksley did not take the copies of the cablegrams to Mr. Fairfield, but allowed the matter to rest. Mr. Chamberlain, who saw Mr. Rhodes immediately after his arrival, and had two hours' talk with him, in the presence of a third party, at the Colonial Office, never asked him a single question as to the use he had made of the Harris cablegrams (9559). Neither did Mr. Chamberlain make a single effort for months to ascertain what the cablegrams contained which had led Mr. Rhodes to produce them as evidence of the complicity of the Colonial Office to hesitating confederates in South Africa.

Still more strange, it was after he had received, through Mr. Fairfield, this explicit intimation that Mr. Rhodes had not only supported the revolutionary movement in Johannesburg, but had shown telegrams sent from London which appeared to prove that the Colonial Office was "in it," he solemnly declared to the House of Commons that, after examining the statements of all parties concerned, "to the best of his knowledge and belief, everybody, Mr. Rhodes included, were all equally ignorant of the intention or action of Dr. Jameson"—which was true, no doubt, as to the Raid, but which produced an entirely misleading impression as to the part played by Mr. Rhodes in the matter.

It was not till May that Mr. Chamberlain, finding London full of rumours that he was in the conspiracy, and that the cablegrams proved it, bethought himself that it might be as well to see how far the reported interviews with himself and his officials justified the current gossip. He heard rumours, he said, which were current in London about the existence of these telegrams, and about their containing something very important indeed. "I then determined that I would see exactly what was in them, and accordingly I instructed Mr. Fairfield to insist upon their production" (9560). So Mr. Hawksley compiled from copies and from originals (8796) as full a collection of cablegrams to and from Mr. Rhodes, sent by Dr. Harris and his friends, as he could put together. The collection, however, did not contain the telegrams to and from Miss Flora Shaw. Mr. Fairfield's request for the cablegrams was made in May. It was not till June 6th that Mr. Hawksley forwarded the copies of the incriminating cables to the Colonial Office. He accompanied them with a letter asking that they should be treated as confidential and returned after perusal. The other contents of the letter, which Mr. Chamberlain described as only an "ordinary covering letter," Mr. Chamberlain has not yet made public.

The copies of the cablegrams were kept by Mr. Chamberlain for ten days, during which time Mr. Labouchere has stated they were submitted to the Attorney-General. They were examined and annotated by Mr. E. Fairfield and Sir R. Meade. Mr. Chamberlain returned them on June 17th. He sent them back with a letter, which, while giving full permission for their publication, led to a correspondence, still in Mr. Chamberlain's possession, which he carefully withheld from the knowledge of the Committee (*vide* answer to Dr. Clark, House of Commons, Aug. 3rd, 1897). The following extract from the examination of Mr. Hawksley by the Attorney-General affords an instructive example of the way in which the Committee of No Inquiry conducted the "investigation."

On the 25th May, Mr. Hawksley being under examination by the Attorney-General, and Mr. Secretary Chamberlain being present, we have the following record of question and answer:—

(8777.) Now did you send them (the cablegrams) in June to the Colonial Office, with a letter or a verbal message?—I probably sent a covering note.

(8778.) Have you got the covering note?—No.

(8779.) I should be glad if you would produce it, if you please; it may have a bearing on the question.—I suppose it is at the Colonial Office.

(And Mr. Secretary Chamberlain sat still and said never a word.)

(8780.) I mean a copy of your letter.—Yes.

And then the Attorney-General suddenly diverged to the subject of the cablegrams, never, by the way, giving the Committee a single hint that he himself had been shown copies of the famous secret cables.

Then, after asking some questions on the subject of the cables, he suddenly harked back to the covering letter:—

(8804.) Now I must ask you whether you have not got a copy of the covering letter here? Were they sent to the Colonial Office under the seal of secrecy?—They were.

And thereupon this astonishing cross-examiner, who had stated that this covering letter “may have a bearing on the question,” did not even press for an answer to the first part of his question.

So matters remained until the trial at Bar. The officers accused said nothing of the assurances given them as to the sympathy and support which the conspiracy commanded in the Colonial Office. But when the officers, after being sent to gaol, were advised to resign their commissions, Sir John Willoughby wrote the following letter to the War Office:—

(5622.) I have the honour to state that I took part in the preparation of the military expedition, and went into the Transvaal, in pursuance of orders received from the Administrator of Matabeleland, and in the honest and *bona fide* belief that the steps were taken with the knowledge and assent of the Imperial authorities. I was informed by Dr. Jameson that this was the fact. It was in these circumstances and on these statements that I took in the other officers with me, namely, Major H. F. White and Captains R. Grey and R. White, and the foregoing explanations apply to them also.

He explained afterwards that he had used the words “Imperial authorities” on Dr. Jameson’s word. Dr. Jameson denied that he had ever used the words “Imperial authorities.” He said that Mr. Rhodes had never told him that he had the sanction and approval of the “Imperial authorities.” Dr. Jameson was not asked whether he had not told Sir John Willoughby that the famous Plan had the sanction and approval of the Colonial Secretary!

Fine distinctions are necessary in delicate circumstances.

There was a long wrangle with the War Office about the commissions. Ultimately the commissions were restored, excepting that of Sir John Willoughby.

It was in the autumn of 1896 that, believing there was no chance of averting the holding of the inquiry, and that if it was held there was no possibility of so hocussing a Parliamentary Committee as to avoid the disclosure of the cables, I bethought me of putting the very best possible face upon Mr. Chamberlain’s part in the conspiracy by telling the whole story in my Christmas Annual, which that year was entitled “The History of the Mystery; or, The Skeleton in Blastus’ Cupboard.” No sooner, however, was the book on the machine than urgent messages were brought to me representing that the cablegrams would be suppressed and never need be produced if I consented to omit all reference to the cables in my story. I had sent the proofs of my story to Mr. Fairfield, who held that everything would of necessity come out. This, however, was not the opinion of others, who said that it was my story, and my story alone, which would render the production of the cablegrams unavoidable. I shrank from taking the responsibility of forcing a revelation as to the

extent to which our Colonial authorities had been implicated, even with the most praiseworthy motives, in a revolutionary conspiracy, and so, under protest, I consented to black out every passage in which any reference to cables or cablegrams occurred. I yielded against my better judgment to the importunity of the representations made to me. I said I was certain it would be impossible to prevent a Parliamentary Committee from insisting upon the production of cablegrams, which were obviously vital to the subject under investigation. Alas! I little knew the extent to which it is possible for a Parliamentary Committee to substitute a game of political blindman's buff for the serious searching inquiry which they were instructed to make into matters vital to the honour and good faith of our country.

It was about this time that I had vehement disputes as to whether or not it was justifiable to lie to suppress the cablegrams and to conceal the extent to which the Colonial Office was implicated. I argued hotly that deliberate lying such as that which was declared to be necessary for reasons of state not only would do no good in the long run, but would certainly entail dire penalties in the near future.

It was this cynical but perfectly sincere expression of a conviction that in order to get a Minister out of a scrape any amount of lying was justified that made me realize that the South African Committee had to try a much bigger issue than the comparatively trivial one of the Raid. It was not the career of Mr. Rhodes or the character of Mr. Chamberlain which was at stake. The question was immeasurably more momentous. It was whether both parties in the State, including the picked men of both front benches, appointed by the House of Commons to ascertain the truth and report the same, could be so far worked upon by one or another motive as to use the machinery created for the discovery of truth into an ingenious method of palming a falsehood upon the world. And behind that, again, there was the still vaster and more terrible question, if the deadly game succeeded, whether a nation whose supreme authority appointed to make inquiry into the facts lent itself to a conspiracy to conceal the truth and declare the thing which is not—whether such a nation could look forward to anything but terrible tribulation to come. Many mistakes, errors, crimes can be committed by nations, but for a Select Committee of the House of Commons under stress of any temptation to stoop to palter with us in a double sense—to convert an investigation on oath into a general hush-up and whitewash arrangement, and to return a false verdict by dint of suppression of evidence—that, I confess, seemed to me more than any nation could essay and come off scatheless.

Despite all my protests, the game was played out to the end, although with some difficulty. Owing to the insistence of one or two members of the Committee, some of the cablegrams were produced; but the "inquiry" was closed, so as to render it impossible to secure the others. Mr. Rhodes himself expected the inquiry to be resumed in 1898, when both he and Lord Grey would be available as witnesses.

The reader can form his own opinion of the importance of the cablegrams by examining those which were with the utmost difficulty procured for the inspection of the Committee.

## CHAPTER IV.

## WHO HAVE SEEN THE CABLEGRAMS ?

IN estimating their value, it should be remembered that those from Capetown were sent by Mr. Rhodes himself, and that those from London were sent by his trusted emissary, Dr. Harris, who was despatched to London for the express purpose of securing the assistance and co-operation of the Colonial Office for the plan of supporting an insurrection in Johannesburg from outside. Remember also that the confidence and good relations between Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain have not been impaired by the knowledge that these cablegrams were used to make people in South Africa understand that the Colonial Office was in it, and that Mr. Chamberlain has declared in the most emphatic manner that nothing whatever has been proved and that nothing exists that reflects upon Mr. Rhodes's personal honour. Mr. Chamberlain, therefore, does not feel that Mr. Rhodes acted dishonourably in using Dr. Harris's telegrams as proof that the Colonial Office was in it.

It may be said that Mr. Chamberlain, being of a placable and forgiving disposition, has forgiven Mr. Rhodes, believing that he was honestly deceived by Dr. Harris. But this assumption is inconsistent with the continued confidence which Mr. Rhodes places in Dr. Harris. It is not too much to say, when these facts are taken into account, that the authenticity of the cablegrams is practically vouched for by both Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes.

Before printing the cablegrams in detail, such of them, that is, as were produced before the Committee, it may be well to ask what the Committee did in order to ascertain the contents of these communications. The incriminating cables reported interviews held by Mr. Rhodes' emissaries with Mr. Chamberlain and officials in the Colonial Office. They were despatched from London to Capetown, and were used in South Africa by Mr. Rhodes in order to induce wavering supporters to come into his enterprise. As to that fact there is no dispute. It stands in evidence, and is not denied by any one. Clearly, therefore, the first and most important question to be answered by any Committee which desired to know what justification there was for the statements in the cablegrams was to obtain the cablegrams themselves, and if these were unprocurable to ascertain from the persons who sent the cables and those who received them, what they intended to convey by their dispatches, and what impression was produced upon their minds by those messages.

There was also another obvious method of ascertaining the truth, namely, that of interrogating those persons who saw the cables either in Africa or in England. It was a simple and obvious question to ask what impression the cables made upon their mind. Curiously enough, none of these simple and obvious questions were asked by the Committee. The first witness whom they examined was Mr. Rhodes, and the moment he said that the communications were confidential, no one asked him anything more

about the subject. It was within his power to have handed over copies of all the cablegrams to the Committee, and if they had pressed him he must have done so; but they not only did not press him, they did not even ask him what was the impression produced upon his mind by the messages from his emissaries, nor did they ask him whether he was still of opinion that their messages were faithful transcripts of interviews which had taken place at the Colonial Office. Without even asking those elementary questions, the Committee proceeded to declare that Mr. Rhodes had no warrant for the statements which he made when he showed the cablegrams, and, in short, convicted him of deliberately practising a wilful fraud, without asking him for any explanation as to his conduct. If Mr. Rhodes had been asked and pressed first to produce the cables, secondly to state the effect produced upon his mind by the receipt of the cables, thirdly to state whether he still believed that the statements in the cablegrams dispatched by his emissaries accurately expressed the information they received from the Colonial Office, and fourthly, what statements he had made and to what persons, when he showed these cablegrams as a proof that he could count upon the support of the Colonial Office--if these four questions had been asked and pressed, the Committee would obviously have been in a much better position for pronouncing judgment. But these questions were not put, or at least not pressed, and to this day no one has any warrant for saying whether Mr. Rhodes does or does not believe that he was faithfully served by his emissaries, or whether he does or does not believe that he was justified in counting upon the co-operation and support of the Colonial Office. Of course, every one knows what the fact is, but to elucidate that fact the Committee took no pains whatever.

Next there were the persons who sent the telegrams, notably Dr. Harris and Miss Flora Shaw. The first question which naturally occurs to any person hearing that such emissaries, or friends, had been telegraphing to South Africa interviews with Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office officials, would be to ask, whether, in their opinion, the dispatches which they sent were of a nature to justify Mr. Rhodes in using them in support of his action in South Africa. Did they, or did they not, send them with intent that they should be so used, and did they maintain that the telegrams, as they stood, conveyed to Mr. Rhodes that his belief in the complicity of the Colonial Office was, or was not, justified by any information which they received from the Colonial Office or its officials? They were asked an infinite multitude of questions, but on the vital matter as to whether or not they would admit that they had misled Mr. Rhodes, or misrepresented Mr. Chamberlain, they were never asked at all. Yet, surely, this must have appeared to any investigator one of the first questions to be pressed. Here were persons sending confidential dispatches to Mr. Rhodes, upon which Mr. Rhodes acted in a given sense. What more obvious than to ask them whether or not, in their opinion, Mr. Rhodes had misinterpreted their dispatches, or whether, if he had not, they still believed that they had not misinterpreted the Colonial Office?

In addition to Dr. Harris and Miss Flora Shaw, who themselves dispatched telegrams, there were three others—Mr. Hawksley, Mr. Beit, and Mr. Maguire, all of whom had seen the cablegrams, to say nothing of members of the Committee, who themselves had an opportunity of perusing them. If the cablegrams were not themselves procurable, we could at least learn from the persons who had read them whether or not they afforded a *prima facie* justification for Mr. Rhodes's use of them in



support of his action in South Africa. But although all of those persons were placed in the witness-box, not one member of the Committee asked one of the three whether or not, in their opinion, the contents of the cablegrams justified Mr. Rhodes in the interpretation which he put upon them, or afforded any material of which a conspirator would be justified in making use as a proof of the fact that he enjoyed the confidence and support of the Colonial Office. A series of telegrams so critical, dealing with a question so dangerous, could not but have made some impression upon their minds, and in the absence of the cablegrams themselves, the next best thing was to ascertain what those who had seen them could tell us of their real character. Then there was a further question that each of these three might have been asked, namely, whether in their judgment there was any justification for the imputation so freely cast upon the senders of those telegrams, that they had either given free rein to their imagination or had deliberately lied in accordance with instructions to vamp up telegrams for the purposes of conspiracy. But here again the Committee did not deem it necessary to obtain the opinion of those who were most competent to judge, and then, after having persistently neglected to make the most obvious and elementary inquiries as to the facts, it did not hesitate to draw up the most positive declarations as to the innocence of the Colonial Office and the guilt of Mr. Rhodes.

## CHAPTER V.

## THE HARRIS CABLEGRAMS.

WHEN you once get a Committee of Investigation appointed, and fully launched upon the task of making believe to inquire into the facts, it is almost impossible to avoid some shreds or fragments of facts being brought to light. Although the Committee had half finished its labours before any of the cablegrams were produced, when it was drawing to a close there was extracted from the cable company a very incomplete and imperfect collection of cablegrams exchanged between Mr. Rhodes and his agents. Some of these cablegrams had no bearing on the subject-matter of the inquiry, but there were several which touched upon the subject. Their significance will be better appreciated if they are printed in consecutive order, as they were received, with such elucidatory remarks as can be extracted from the evidence of the witnesses.

**Dr. Harris, London, to Charter, Capetown. July 31st, 1895.**

**Inform Dr. Jameson your telegram received, doing our utmost, do not think I shall fail.**

This telegram was despatched by Dr. Harris immediately after his arrival in England on his mission to the Colonial Office. The telegram from Dr. Jameson to which it was in reply is not in evidence, but it appears to have been a message urging him to spare no effort to obtain from the Colonial Office the territory and the troops necessary to carry out the famous Plan. Dr. Harris saw Mr. Chamberlain for the first time in August, and from that time onwards cablegrams were constantly interchanged between Dr. Harris and Mr. Rhodes. All communications made to the Colonial Office, or received from the Colonial Office, were forwarded by cable, so that Mr. Rhodes was kept informed as to everything that went on. But none of these cables between 31st July and 21st October are in existence. This gap occurs in the critical period when Mr. Rhodes was furious with Mr. Chamberlain for refusing to hand over the territory and troops necessary for carrying out the Jameson Plan. On Oct. 21st the British South Africa Company sent a long telegram relating to some defects in recent consignments of cartridges, but there is nothing to prove that this had any relation to the Plan.

There is another gap after this for nearly a fortnight, a period within which falls the dispatch forwarded from London to which Mr. Rhodes replied on Nov. 6th, relating to the question of the flag. This cablegram was popularly reported to have declared that no support could be counted upon from the Colonial Office unless the movement took place under the British flag, and that assurances were necessary from Mr. Rhodes that such would be the case. That report, however, true or false, was one among the many elements throwing suspicion upon the Colonial Office, which the South African Committee did nothing to dissipate. The series of cablegrams furnished by the cable company contained no copies of the dispatches that were sent by way of Durban, so that not even for the month of November did the Committee obtain a complete set of the messages interchanged between Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Harris. It will be seen, however, that

those which were produced assume on both sides that constant communication was going on between Dr. Harris and the Colonial Office. Dr. Harris was, in fact, Mr. Rhodes's ambassador. Mr. Rhodes sent him his instructions and received his reports evidently in absolute good faith. Mr. Rhodes's telegrams are very characteristic, and certainly show no trace of having been cooked for the purpose of influencing public opinion, if ever they came to be published. The same is almost as obvious in the case of Dr. Harris's dispatches. I quote the cablegrams, from the Appendix to the Report of the South African Inquiry. The number quoted is the number affixed to the telegram in the Blue Book. All these telegrams of November are either from Dr. Harris to Mr. Rhodes or from Mr. Rhodes to Dr. Harris. Mr. Rhodes was not examined concerning any of them, as he had left the country before the cablegrams were produced. Dr. Harris was examined very closely upon them all, and did his best to minimize their significance, and explain away anything that might appear to compromise the Colonial Office; but, notwithstanding this, his evidence, taken with the cablegrams, is certainly very far from justifying the confident Report of the Committee.

No. 1.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 2nd, 1895.

**Very Confidential.**

If you cannot carry out the plan of Dr. Jameson, have every reason to believe J. Chamberlain intends active policy Imperial with intention to federation British sphere of influence in his way and he will expect you to adopt his views.

The plan of Dr. Jameson, Dr. Harris explained (8197), was the shortest way of expressing in cable language the intention of placing a British force on the frontier, to act if Mr. Rhodes decided it was necessary in the event of a revolution occurring at Johannesburg. Dr. Harris could not remember the grounds upon which he based his statement that he had every reason to believe that Mr. Chamberlain had the intention of pursuing a more active Imperial policy in South Africa, but he evidently believed that the Colonial Secretary was prepared to carry out a policy of his own, if Dr. Jameson's plan could not be carried out, the object of both policies being the same—that of the federation of South Africa. Should the Jameson Plan miscarry, Mr. Chamberlain would expect Mr. Rhodes to adopt his views. There was evidently some jealousy on the part of Dr. Harris as to a possible supersession of Mr. Rhodes as the leading factor in South African politics by Mr. Chamberlain, and he warned his chief that if the Jameson Plan failed, for which Dr. Harris had come to secure Mr. Chamberlain's support, or if it was not carried out, Mr. Chamberlain would expect Mr. Rhodes to support his policy. In reply to a question as to whom he learned this from, Dr. Harris replied (8291): "We (Mr. Maguire and myself) consulted together, and that was our impression at the time. I really cannot say whom I learnt it from. That was merely information conveyed to our chief." They knew that the Imperial garrison in South Africa was being reinforced (8293), and as it had been up to that time an axiom with Mr. Rhodes that there should not be direct Imperial intervention in South Africa, unless it absolutely could not be helped, they did not send this information (8297) with any feelings but those of regret. To this telegram Mr. Rhodes does not seem to have made any reply by wire.

No. 2.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 2nd, 1895.

Confidential.

Earl Grey held an interview with J. Chamberlain we have seen Native chiefs decline our proposal but we hope they will make counter proposal. J. Chamberlain will put pressure upon them to settle. Fear we must increase Khama's boundary. Large breakfast to be given Khama 4th November, London. Fear speeches will damage British South Africa Company, but R. Maguire Dr. Harris hold an interview with speakers to-morrow, hoping to influence these. Country press very much in favour of Khama.

The date of the interview between Lord Grey and Mr. Chamberlain is somewhat in doubt. It must have been before the 2nd, but just at that time Mr. Chamberlain appears to have been in Birmingham, and did not return to London till after the 4th (8204).

The objection of Khama to come under the Chartered Company was the one great stumbling-block in the way of the cession of the jumping-off place. The missionary public was strongly in favour of Khama, and Mr. Maguire and Dr. Harris were doing their utmost to counter-work the agitation in favour of the one South African chief who was known and liked in this country.

No. 3.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 2nd, 1895.

Willoughby and Khama state you had promised them land up to Panda Ma Tenka. I have been trying for Sir Charles Warren may position. Telegraph authoritative denial.

"Willoughby" was the Rev. Mr. Willoughby, who was personally conducting the African chiefs round England. The "authoritative denial" asked for is not produced.

No. 4.

Harris to Charter Capetown.

November 2nd, 1895.

Communicate the following to Dr. Jameson I have obtained you Ikanning, and will probably get Protectorate. Can you carry out your plan or can you not.

Ikanning was a chief of the frontier territory on which the troops were to be stationed, and which was to serve as the jumping-off place into the Transvaal. The telegram was sent in order to get definite information from Dr. Jameson, so that they might be in a position to know how soon the negotiations as to the transfer of the Protectorate must be concluded (8206).

It will be seen that there were four cablegrams on Nov. 2nd. There is a lapse of two days, and then there are three on Nov. 4th.

No. 5.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 4th, 1895.

Registered address of Earl Grey is Gothical London. You must register this on your side at once.

Lord Grey's address was registered because Mr. Beit and Dr. Harris were intending to go out to the Cape, and they thought it well to give Mr. Rhodes Lord Grey's address. Lord Grey does not, however, appear to have sent any telegrams to Mr. Rhodes, nor did Mr. Rhodes send any telegrams to "Gothical."

No. 6.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 4th, 1895.

Your telegram of 3rd received E. Fairfield we shall see him and explain in return for transfer at once Protectorate the police are prepared to deal liberally land we have offered already if they grant now police and balance Protectorate we will leave natives reserves entirely under Imperial rule for a period of years. They are native chief's wishes more than more land. Will you agree to? Have telegraphed Earl Grey must come London. You have not chosen best man to arrange with J. Chamberlain. I have already sent Flora to convince J. Chamberlain support "Times" newspaper and if you can telegraph course you wish "Times" to adopt now with regard to Transvaal Flora will act.

Mr. Rhodes's telegram of the 3rd does not appear in the series of telegrams produced by the Cable Company, so we are left to imagine its contents. Mr. Fairfield was the Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office charged with the conduct of African affairs. The first part of the telegram deals exclusively with the arrangements which it was proposed to make with Khama, and the other chiefs, so as to secure the handing over of the Protectorate to the Chartered Company. Dr. Harris would have preferred that Mr. Maguire had been entrusted with the negotiations with Mr. Chamberlain rather than Earl Grey, as Mr. Maguire was constantly in London, whereas Earl Grey was often down at Newcastle, and they could not always get hold of him (8211).

"Flora" in this telegram is Miss Flora Shaw, and Dr. Harris explained that his statement in the cablegram about her meant that if Mr. Rhodes would keep Miss Shaw informed of the strained position between the Transvaal and the Cape Colony, and the details of it, she would be in a position to support British and Colonial interests (8613-4).

When Miss Shaw was under examination she indignantly repudiated the assumption that Dr. Harris could send her anywhere. Dr. Harris explained that when he said, "I have already sent Flora to convince Mr. Chamberlain," that was "hyperbolic, for he had not sent her to convince Mr. Chamberlain" (8605).

The precise meaning of the last clause in this telegram is buried in mystery. It is important, however, as being the first evidence that is obtainable which proves that Dr. Harris regarded Miss Shaw as his ally, who could be relied upon to act as an intermediary between Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Chamberlain and the *Times* newspaper. Whatever meaning may be attached to it by the sender, it could only be read by Mr. Rhodes as meaning that if he sent timely tips to Miss Shaw, she would support his Transvaal policy in the *Times*, and would convince Mr. Chamberlain that in supporting Mr. Rhodes he could count upon the support of the *Times*.

No. 7.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 4th, 1895.

J. Chamberlain he does not return London until to-morrow. I have spoken open E. Fairfield, and I have accepted, if Colonial Office (they) will transfer to us balance Protectorate with police 7 Nov. we will agree to any liberal native reserves for native chiefs also remain under Imperial rule for a period of years, and we give up railway subsidy two hundred thousand pounds last bargain E. Fairfield he does press if you cannot approve let us know about this as soon as possible by telegram. We believe E. Fairfield will carry out promises. Regret to inform you that J. Chamberlain he does continue punching Consul General Transvaal with regard to drifts E. Fairfield he is anxious Johannesburg if they take steps in precedence of.

Note, this telegram is the only one in which there is the explicit statement made that the Colonial Office was informed of Mr. Rhodes's plan. The phrase "I have spoken open E. Fairfield" was thus explained. I mentioned to Mr. Fairfield "that one of the reasons why Mr. Rhodes was anxious to get the Protectorate was that he considered it imperative to have British force on the borders, so that in the event of disturbances taking place at Johannesburg he could be in a position, if he deemed it right, to use that force in connection with it" (8586).

He added that the first interview in which he made this statement to Mr. Fairfield took place in August, and that Mr. Hawksley was present. He said, "It is within the knowledge of other gentlemen that I spoke more openly to Mr. Fairfield than that" (8689). It was not that he had told them, but "I knew from them that they had knowledge apart from my telling them that Mr. Fairfield knew this" (8703). Dr. Harris refused to name the gentlemen; he said the names would come, no doubt, when "you have examined some other gentlemen" (8689). As the only other persons to be examined were Mr. Hawksley, Mr. Beit, and Mr. Maguire, the names of the gentlemen to whom Dr. Harris referred are not far to seek; but, strangely enough, not one of the three was asked whether or not they were aware of Mr. Fairfield's knowledge of the Jameson Plan. Dr. Harris was asked if he thought that Mr. Fairfield understood his statement that the force on the border might be used in connection with events at Johannesburg. He replied, "Yes, I think so. I am sorry to say I do think so" (8708). Mr. Fairfield did not seem astonished. On the contrary, "I do not think it seemed much more to him than what had been thought of before in 1894" (8710). Mr. Chamberlain pressed Dr. Harris with suggestions that Mr. Fairfield being deaf might not have understood him. Now Dr. Harris had many conversations with Mr. Fairfield (8709), and when he was asked by Mr. Chamberlain, "Do you think he heard all he said to him? Can you say or have you any reason for saying that he heard what you said to him?" Dr. Harris replied, "Of course I think so. He was very deaf, it is true, but I think he understood thoroughly" (8714).

Mr. Chamberlain, finding himself confronted with the cablegrams and the positive statement of Dr. Harris as to the communications which he made to Mr. Fairfield, produced a letter dated Nov. 4th, 1895, which was written to him at Birmingham:—

"DEAR MR. CHAMBERLAIN,

"You will see that events are moving rapidly in South Africa. Rhodes, having accepted the responsibilities imposed on him, is naturally very keen to get the Protectorate question settled, and has been telegraphing all day to this end. I am sorry I cannot send you the Protectorate papers to-night, but I sent them to Lord Selborne on Saturday, and he has not returned them. I have now telegraphed to him asking him to send them up to-night, so that they may be here by first post to-morrow. The matter seems in train for settlement. Khama is utterly obdurate as regards the Company, and will grant them nothing whatever; but will (so the missionaries say) grant anything to you in reason. They and the Company contemplate this mode of procedure, that you should meet both parties, be informed of the deadlock (they deadlocked finally on Saturday), then give Khama a blue-pencil boundary on the map, which he will show you how to trace, and ask Khama & Co. to give up the rest of their country to you (it being perfectly understood that you are going to give it

to the Company). This, according to the missionaries, the chiefs will agree to. Rhodes has authorized Harris to agree that the lands reserved to the chiefs shall be *wholly* under the Crown, to give up a demand for Sekhonié's Lake Ngami country, and to give us an indemnity for the whole of our liability for the railway subsidy (£200,000). The result of all this will be that the chiefs and our commissioners will be in cotton-wool, having no frontier, the Company being on each side of us. There will be no occasion to keep up the Bechuanaland Border Police, but only a small body-guard for the Commissioner, and a native police (very cheap) of about sixty to keep down the drink traffic. Rhodes wants you then to authorize the Bechuanaland Border Police to enlist with the Company. This they would be delighted to do, as we are strict masters. He is urging a speedy settlement, and the Company want to beg you to see the chief and polish off the business on Wednesday. I said I would lay this before you; in fact, Rhodes, very naturally, wants to get our people off the scene, as this ugly row is pending with the Transvaal. That, I think, is also our interest. The Queen's Orders in Council annexing the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland border to the *Cape* have been some days in Robinson's hands; but before things were in a critical state he had asked and obtained leave to defer their publication until the 1st of December, so that he might have leisure to settle up some trifling financial questions; but in the present state of affairs I am inclined to think that the publication should take place at once. The financial business can be settled afterwards, being of no importance. I do not think there can be any doubt but that the Transvaal will give way on the immediate question of the drifts; but that will not end the political 'unrest.' They will have in their hands to-night or to-morrow morning a letter from Montagu White, written after Lord Salisbury's message to him, warning them that the British Government is in deadly earnest.

"Yours truly,  
E. FAIRFIELD" (8579).

"(Sd.)

This, however, merely refers to the later stages of the negotiations, and makes no reference whatever to the communication made in August, excepting the significant passage, "Mr. Rhodes very naturally wants to get our people off the scene, as this ugly row is pending with the Transvaal. That, I think, is also our interest." When reading this letter to the Committee, Mr. Chamberlain interpolated the altogether erroneous and misleading remark after the words "ugly row": "That, of course, refers to the drifts," an observation which the context proves to be entirely erroneous, for Mr. Fairfield later on in the letter expresses a confidence that the Transvaal will give way on the drifts question, so that there would be no "ugly row" about that; and further, it is obvious that if the Transvaal Government had not given way, it could not be to the interest of the British Government to get their Imperial troops off the scene by removing them from the very place where they could operate most effectively against the Transvaal. After this letter was read, Dr. Harris was asked whether he regarded this letter as being a fairly good report of what he had said to Mr. Fairfield. He replied: "I cannot say that that is solely what I said to Mr. Fairfield" (8583). "Then will you say in what you differ from him?" "I am bound to say that both in regard to my own reputation and Mr. Fairfield's it is within the knowledge of other gentlemen that I spoke more openly to Mr. Fairfield than that. Mr. Hawksley was present when I spoke to Mr. Fairfield some time before then. That was the second occasion" (8584).

When Mr. Hawksley was called as a witness, no question was asked him as to whether he was present at the interview referred to, or whether he could confirm or contradict the statement made by Dr. Harris.

It is worth while noting that Mr. Fairfield in his letter admits knowledge that Mr. Rhodes was telegraphing Rhodes "has been telegraphing all day."

There is no need to enter at this moment into the details of the settlement, but we come to the last sentence in the cablegram, in which Dr. Harris expresses his regret that Mr. Chamberlain is putting pressure upon the Transvaal with regard to the drifts. Dr. Harris regretted this, because he and Mr. Maguire believed that this was opposed to Mr. Rhodes' policy. They did not know that Mr. Chamberlain was acting in accord with the Cape Cabinet, "and naturally, as Mr. Rhodes was our chief, we hope his view would prevail as regards the matter" (8297-8).

Dr. Harris's belief was that Mr. Fairfield was anxious that Johannesburg should not take any active steps in the way of tearing up the Netherlands Railway, as such a measure would interfere with negotiations then going on (8219).

At this point Mr. Chamberlain again interposed, and produced from his wallet another document, written by Mr. Fairfield after a copy of this cablegram had been shown to him in June, 1896. The following is the memorandum:—

"There is one of the telegrams, that of Nov. 4th (No.     ), in the series which I should ask leave to notice. It is as follows: 'Regret to inform you Secretary of State for the Colonies is still punching Consul General of the Transvaal about the drifts. Fairfield he is anxious Johannesburg, they take steps in precedence.' Not understanding the passage, I have applied to a gentleman likely to know what was its meaning, and I informed that the English of it is this: 'I regret to inform you that Secretary of State for the Colonies is still bringing pressure on the Consul General of the Transvaal as regards the drifts question. Fairfield thinks that Johannesburg should take precedence,' meaning that I did not agree with the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and thought that the grievances of Johannesburg had a prior claim to those of the Cape Railway Department on the diplomatic services of the Imperial Government. My recollection of the matter is that I told Dr. Rutherford Harris, who is doubtless the author of this telegram, that a friend of the Transvaal had said that it would have been more to the credit of the British Government if they had used their diplomatic influence to try and obtain redress for the dynamite, educational, and other grievances of the Johannesburgers, than to have taken up the drifts question at the bidding of Mr. Rhodes, so as to enable him to get the better of the Netherlands Railway Company in a purely local and commercial squabble. This was said merely as a piece of gossip, and I expressed no opinion of my own on the merits of the question.' That is signed "E. Fairfield, June, 1896."

Dr. Harris said he absolutely accepted what Mr. Fairfield said, but he had an impression that there was a fear that Johannesburg might complicate negotiations by taking steps on their own account (8299).

Note that Mr. Chamberlain had a memorandum from Mr. Fairfield in his possession upon this cablegram, and therefore presumably had similar memoranda upon other cablegrams, which he never produced.



No. 8.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 5th, 1895.

We have seen E. Fairfield, Hon. R. H. Meade, Colonel Gould Adams, and we have agreed to what land we give native chiefs. Secretary of State for Colonies holds an interview with us to-morrow afternoon three, and after native chiefs if they are satisfied and they will be present. Secretary of State for Colonies he will grant British South Africa Company balance protectorate with police. We reported your letter to A. Beit during the month of August to these and Flora we have these solid.

This telegram was important as marking the cession of the jumping-off place for which they had been in negotiation so long. In August, Mr. Chamberlain had said he could not give them the land or the police for two years. On Nov. 5th we see the vital question is settled, and the necessary cession is promised from which they will be able to support the Johannesburg insurrection from the outside. With reference to the last clause in this telegram, I should mention that this letter of Mr. Beit's is one of the unexplained mysteries. When asked about it, Dr. Harris said it bore on the question of the transfer of the Protectorate. There might have been other matter in it, but Dr. Harris's memory utterly failed him. He could not say what it was. That it was important is evident. All the contents were communicated to Mr. Fairfield and to Miss Shaw, but only part of them were read to Colonel Gould Adams (8317).

The phrase as to having "these and Flora solid" was elaborately explained without shedding much light upon the question. Dr. Harris explained that "*these*" referred to Fairfield, Gould Adams, and Meade, but he afterwards said that Sir R. Meade did not know about it (8318.) The implication of course is that Mr. Fairfield, Gould Adams, and Miss Shaw were solid in support of the Jameson plan. If this is not the meaning, it would be interesting to know what meaning it could have. Miss Shaw volunteered the explanation that "*these*" did not refer to her in the least. It was the first of the extraordinary expositions by which Miss Shaw achieved a unique reputation before the Committee. When Mr. Beit was called, he does not seem to have been asked any questions as to the contents of this letter.

No. 9.

Rhodes to Harris.

November 6th, 1895.

As to English flag they must very much misunderstand me at home. I of course would not risk everything as I am doing excepting for British flag.

This is the first telegram from Mr. Rhodes which appears in the collection—a very significant telegram it is. The key to this telegram is missing. Dr. Harris's explanation given before the Committee was merely that two sections of people at home—"people one meets in ordinary daily life"—(8322) differed in opinion concerning Mr. Rhodes's action. One section doubted Mr. Rhodes' loyalty somewhat. Another section knew he was absolutely loyal, but they doubted whether he would have sufficient influence with the leaders of the movement at Johannesburg to secure that the movement should be turned to the advantage of Great Britain (8320).

Dr. Harris, as usual, could not remember the words of his telegram, and as all the telegrams up to Oct. 31st had been destroyed (8328), no evidence can be obtained as to what Dr. Harris sent, but the statement freely made in Africa at any time since that telegram was dispatched is to the effect that Dr. Harris telegraphed warning Mr. Rhodes that he

could have no support for Jameson's plan, unless he could give Mr. Chamberlain as a sure guarantee the presence of the British flag. What is quite clear is that some one of sufficient authority and influence in London raised the question, and by raising the question spoiled everything. Sir William Harcourt cross-examined Dr. Harris upon this at considerable length (8319-8368). Sir William Harcourt's chief point was to fasten upon Mr. Rhodes an imputation of double-dealing in that he assured Dr. Harris that he was risking everything for the British flag at the same time that he had entered into a definite arrangement with the Transvaal Committee that the insurrection should take place under the Transvaal flag, and not under the British flag. As usual, Sir William Harcourt was led by a red herring off the real scent. There was nothing whatever incompatible in Mr. Rhodes's assurances to Dr. Harris for the reassurance of Mr. Chamberlain and his agreement with the Transvaal Committee. If the Jameson Plan had succeeded and the insurrection had replaced President Kruger by a more reasonable President, the Transvaal, still retaining its flag, in accordance with Mr. Rhodes's well-known principle, would have united with the other States in a federation of South Africa, which would naturally have been carried out under the protection of the Union Jack. Dr. Harris was never asked whether any of the persons to whom Mr. Rhodes referred as those "who must very much misunderstand me" included the Colonial Secretary. Dr. Harris's explanation was a model of lucidity (8472).

"Mr. Sydney Buxton: Referring to the cablegram No. 9, printed 'As to English flag, they must very much misunderstand me at home.' I did not quite understand whom the 'they' meant. Dr. Harris: I have explained that that was the people of whom we heard one would say one thing and another another. That did not refer to any actual body of people, but, as you say those people and those people, it was they."

No. 10. (Extract.) Rhodes to Harris.

November 8th, 1895.

I warmly thank you for your work.

The rest of the telegram has no bearing upon the question.

No. 11. Harris to Rhodes.

November 8th, 1895.

See cable to acting High Commissioner from E. Fairfield releasing police and give us balance of Protectorate are you satisfied with?

No. 12. (Extract.) Rhodes to Harris.

November 8th, 1895.

Do we get ownership on ten mile strip I suppose we shall get land as far as to Transvaal Border up to Palla as it would be absurd to have few miles native territory between us and border.

The rest of the cablegram relates to details concerning native reserves, and need not be quoted. The only thing to note in this telegram is Mr. Rhodes's insistence upon the necessity of having the ten-mile strip conterminous with the Transvaal border.

No. 13. Harris to Rhodes.

November 8th, 1895.

Thanks they do not misunderstand you but feared if you should have power insist upon it.

This is a reply to the famous cablegram (No. 9) concerning the British flag. Here again we have the mysterious "they." Who are "they"?

Current rumour said that "they" meant Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office. Mr. Chamberlain, who was suspicious of Mr. Rhodes, was said to want the flag to go in as his security. Without that he did not think it possible to count upon the support of the British public. Mr. Chamberlain's suspicions, if he entertained them, were undoubtedly justified by the facts, for the attempt to secure that guarantee to satisfy the British public wrecked the whole conspiracy.

No. 14.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 11th, 1895.

Private native chiefs sailing intermediate steamer 23rd Nov. I am returning with Bailey and others 29th Nov., will it be in time reply by telegraph. Native chiefs and Willoughby acted like pigs.

This telegram is important as showing that Dr. Harris feared the insurrection in Johannesburg might be brought to a head early in December. He therefore wished for direct information from Mr. Rhodes as to whether, if he left London on the 29th, he would be in time.

No. 15. (Extract.)

Harris to Rhodes.

November 11th, 1895.

Held an interview with E. Fairfield.

Telegram continues to give details as to the administration of strip of Transvaal border.

E. Fairfield he will advise any natives resident must remove to reserve in the usual way in South East Africa therefore leaving British South Africa Company ownership clear except in case of foreign natives it does not affect your arrangement Linchwe Ikanning and Montsioa therefore no native administration between you and Transvaal and you are border authority.

After more details, chiefly geographical, the telegram concludes as follows:—

After consultation with E. Fairfield we have made an offer verbally as follows that we will give up 200,000 l. in exchange for ownership strip and ownership balance Protectorate as far as regards three native chiefs and with the addition of public buildings and lines at Gaberones as in case of British Bechuanaland to Cape Colony but we will pay for horses and equipment Bechuanaland Border Police at valuation not at cost price.

No. 16.

Rhodes to Harris.

November 12th, 1895.

29 Nov. will be in time.

This was the answer to Dr. Harris's telegram No. 14 on the previous day.

No. 17. (Extract.)

Rhodes to Harris.

November 12th, 1895.

I note your verbal offer 200,000 l. you must have ownership land in return otherwise besides saving British Government 50,000 l. a year we shall have got nothing you must consider shareholders. It is humiliating to be utterly beaten by these niggers they think more of one native at home than the whole of South Africa.

After explaining that they had got ownership of all land outside native reserves, Dr. Harris continues :—

No. 18. (Extract.) Harris to Rhodes.

November 13th, 1895.

Native chiefs with Lord Loch and temperance carried England with them and your repeated instructions to acquire police by 7th Nov. crippled British South Africa Company terribly. Referring to your recent telegram to grant 200,000 l. and more if necessary to secure date of course we might have done better if we had been given time.

Dr. Harris was examined at some length by Mr. Blake on this telegram. From Dr. Harris's statements it would appear that Mr. Rhodes had been telegraphing repeatedly and urgently to get the jumping-off strip and the police at any cost, and his extreme urgency that the transaction should be completed by Nov. 7th hampered him in the negotiations with the Colonial Office. Dr. Harris explained Mr. Rhodes's urgency on two suppositions: first, that he wanted to spur them on; and secondly, that Mr. Rhodes thought, owing to the Drifts question and the strained position with the Transvaal, the rising at Johannesburg was then imminent almost immediately (8520).

Telegram No. 19 is of no importance.

No. 20. (Extract.) Rhodes to Harris.

November 15th, 1895.

High Commissioner in South Africa received this morning boundary reserve from Colonial Office you have got nothing and you have given Matabeleland to Khama. .... There is nothing got for 200,000 l. excepting worthless strip along German Border. Settlement is a scandal.....

Mr. Rhodes was evidently wrath, and this expostulation on his part led to explanations and justifications on the part of Dr. Harris, as we shall see.

No. 21. Harris to Rhodes.

November 18th, 1895.

Your telegram of the 16 received, referring to your telegram of Oct. 26 referring to your telegram of Nov. 3 referring to your telegram of Nov. 5 we believed you considered immediate settlement securing administration railway strip with Bechuanaland Border Police of the utmost importance, and to be secured at any sacrifice referring to your telegram of 5th as to final boundary Khama reserve from which we are trying hard to exclude everything within our customs line. Do you know that Colonial Office have never yet brought our administrative line down to customs line.

This cablegram speaks for itself. It shows that Dr. Harris considered that his one duty was to obtain the jumping-off strip and the police necessary for the support of Jameson's plan, the supreme object which Mr. Rhodes desired, and that in order to obtain it he was prepared to make any sacrifice. The cablegram is also important as containing references to three telegrams from Mr. Rhodes on Oct. 26th and Nov. 3rd and 5th, all of which have disappeared. Their nature, however, is not in doubt. They were pressing Dr. Harris to obtain the jumping-off strip and the police at any cost. Dr. Harris explained them in this sense. He

said the subject-matter of the telegrams evidently was the urgency of getting the transfer settled by Nov. 7th (8237-9). Again, in answer to Mr. Blake, he said that the object and reason of the urgency was that Dr. Jameson might have his force on the border in time to support the insurrection in Johannesburg (8526).

No. 22. Harris to Rhodes. November 19th, 1895.

In consequence of your telegram 16 Nov. I shall withhold for the present any definite offer of 200,000l. and endeavour to drift and we presume that railway strip and police sufficient for Dr. Jameson plan which you telegraphed was principal object.

This telegram explains the interpretation attached to No. 21.

No. 23. (Extract.) Rhodes to Harris. November 20th, 1895.

Your telegram of 19 received. Quite understand your difficulty but you must fight for retention country between customs line and the newly proposed boundary.....

No. 24. Rhodes to Harris. November 22nd, 1895.

I want customs line as to 200,000l. you can take high tone and let them have it Sir Hercules Robinson recommended 200,000l. in the belief we would obtain whole Protectorate Bechuanaland border police.....been handed over but they are coming down to Mafeking from different stations.

(After "police" there is a word undecipherable.)

This is the first intimation that the border police were coming down to Mafeking. The date is important, because Miss Flora Shaw afterwards stated that it was the movement of these police (on Nov. 22nd, be it remarked) which, in August, led her to make inquiries which brought her upon the track of the Jameson plan (8874).

No. 25. (Extract.) Harris to Rhodes. November 22nd, 1895.

Held an interview with the Colonial Office will have no difficulty as to our ownership and administration of uninterrupted railway strip..... Having agreed to all this and given you Bechuanaland Border Police and Gaborones by date fixed by you is essential to your policy Secretary of State for the Colonies claims indemnity for subsidy forthwith and says our not doing so is breach of faith. We are writing therefore Secretary of State for the Colonies letter giving the 200,000l. but subject to our conditions. Do you approve? reply immediately by telegram.

This cablegram, which is one of the most important of all those which were brought to light, seems to have escaped the attention of the South African Committee. There is evidently here a dispute between Mr. Chamberlain and Dr. Harris as to the money to be paid by Mr. Rhodes in return for the concessions made to him by the Colonial Office. We have plainly set forth here in a few lines what is virtually an admission of the whole case. Let me briefly recapitulate the facts. When Dr. Harris first asked Mr. Chamberlain for the cession of the territory and the police, Mr. Chamberlain refused, and said he could not have it for two years. Subsequently, under pressure of urgent telegrams, Mr. Chamberlain gives in and consents to give the police and the territory by the date fixed by Mr. Rhodes as essential to his policy—the Jameson

Plan, to wit; and Mr. Chamberlain is so full of the importance of the concession which he has made to Mr. Rhodes that he regards him as guilty of breach of faith, unless he pays up £200,000 indemnity. In plain English, the Colonial Office drove a smart bargain with Mr. Rhodes, as they knew that he must have the land early for ulterior objects. Now for Mr. Rhodes's answer.

No. 26.

Rhodes to Harris.

November 23rd, 1895.

Yes you can give 200,000l. we would sooner not have it as I do not wish English people to think we have made pecuniary bargain which is unfair to them I never objected to this part of agreement but I do object to being beaten by three canting natives especially on score temperance when two of them Sebele Bathoen they are known to be utter drunkards the whole thing makes me ashamed of my own people you must take legal opinion whether surrender of 200,000l. affects prospectus Bechuanaland Railway Company Limited you could meet difficulty by putting 200,000l. B.S.A. Coy. fund in English consols in the name of trustees.

No. 27.

Rhodes to Harris.

November 23rd, 1895.

Confidential Mr. Rhodes says if you like you can read to-day's cable to J. Chamberlain.

The South African Committee elicited very little information, but one thing it did elicit. It was the only slip which Mr. Rhodes made in the whole course of his examination, and he made it inadvertently in answer to a question from Mr. Chamberlain. We have seen from these cablegrams how angry he was at having to lose £200,000, and how Dr. Harris justified himself for offering the money on the ground that Mr. Chamberlain was entitled to have it because he handed over the land and police at the date necessary for the execution of the Jameson plan. In his examination of Mr. Rhodes on March 5th, 1897, Mr. Chamberlain led him over the whole of the financial equivalent exacted by the Colonial Office for completing the cession of the territory. Mr. Chamberlain was endeavouring to make out what an excellent bargain the Colonial Office had made in handing over this territory. Mr. Rhodes admitted that they had saved the whole cost of the police, amounting to nearly £60,000 a year, and then come the following questions:—

(2046.) Mr. Chamberlain: We also saved did we not, or we were to save, if the agreement had been carried out, a sum of £200,000, which had been promised to you by my predecessor as a subsidy for the railway?

Mr. Rhodes: Yes, you made a most excellent bargain.

(2047.) Mr. Chamberlain: And, perhaps, you were the more ready to make a good bargain because you had some other views?

Mr. Rhodes: **I AM AFRAID YOU TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THEM.**

Here we have the cat out of the bag, and no mistake! Mr. Rhodes in face of the South African Committee in this answer told Mr. Chamberlain quite plump and plain that the reason why he was able to make such an excellent bargain at Mr. Rhodes's expense was, because at the time Mr. Chamberlain knew the "other views"—the Jameson plan, to wit—entertained by Mr. Rhodes, and took advantage of them accordingly. There we have a frank admission indeed! It was inadvertent, no doubt, but all the more valuable on this account.

No. 28. (Extract.)

Harris to Rhodes.

November 23rd, 1895.

Our long cable of 22 Nov. and yours 22 Nov. crossed. We are forwarding letter to Colonial Office accordingly.

The rest of the telegram relates to Khama's customs line.

No. 29.

Rhodes to Harris.

November 24th, 1895.

Dr. Jameson back from Johannesburg everything right my judgment is it is certainty we think A. Beit (he) must come with you 29 Nov. on score of health you will be just in time A. Beit to stay with me here and go up with us and the Governor. A. Beit must not consult Phillips who is all right but anxious to do everything himself and he does not wish to play second fiddle inform A. Beit he must come.

This cablegram shows that the plot was ripening. Dr. Jameson, on his return from Johannesburg, reported that everything was all right, and that the rising was a certainty. It was necessary that Mr. Beit and Dr. Harris should hurry back to Capetown. He would be just in time. Mr. Beit was needed to go up to the Transvaal with Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner. It was always part of the plan that the High Commissioner had to proceed to Pretoria to "see fair," and settle matters in the interests of peace—and against President Kruger. Dr. Jameson had talked to the High Commissioner in parables, and had obtained from him a more or less definite statement as to what he might do in the hypothetical case of an insurrection occurring in Johannesburg. The Imperial Secretary, who was the virtually Acting High Commissioner, had already been told at the end of October (2525), but the full disclosure of the plan to Sir Hercules Robinson was deferred until Mr. Rhodes could inform him fully of the part which it was necessary he should play in the drama. That Sir Hercules Robinson would have made no objection to have followed on the line already laid down for him by his predecessor, Lord Loch, none of the conspirators entertained any doubt. Phillips was Mr. Lionel Phillips, Mr. Beit's partner in Johannesburg, extracts from whose correspondence figure conspicuously in the Transvaal Green Book. It was he who had the conversation with Lord Loch about the rifles. He, in 1894, did not "think many people cared a fig about the franchise" (*Cape Inquiry App. A*, No. 1). It was he also who was very loth to consult Mr. Rhodes until he had received positive assurances from Mr. Beit that Mr. Rhodes was to be trusted (*Ib.*, No 2). Mr. Beit, according to his evidence (9221/30) acted in accordance with Mr. Rhodes's wishes, telegraphed to Mr. Phillips, and went to the Cape.

No. 30.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 25th, 1895.

This, although marked "very confidential," solely relates to the settlement of the natives.

No. 31.

Rhodes to Harris.

25th November, 1895.

See Flora and get some one to review book *Three Great African Chiefs* by Missionary Lloyd just published by Fisher Unwin.

Dr. Harris spoke to Miss Shaw about this book, and in his easy-going way imagined that she had had it reviewed, according to instructions in the *Times* (8254). Miss Shaw, however, was at pains to inform the Committee that no review of the book had ever appeared in the *Times*, for if

there is one thing that Miss Shaw resented more than anything else in this business, it was the suspicion that Dr. Harris had her solid, and could send her hither and thither at his bidding, or could secure the insertion of anything in the *Times* that he pleased, if he sent her a word of command (8825).

No. 32.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 26th, 1895.

Very confidential of course it is great pleasure to read your cable to J. Chamberlain I as near as possible warned C. J. Rhodes last week from information received know there is great danger Phillips Leonard they can or may be doing business without assistance from British South Africa Company and also independently British flag it would have serious effect on your position here I say this very confidential You must telegraph present reply Dr. Harris, Monomotapa only Dr. Harris will leave 30 of this month without fail. Flora suggest 16 Dec. celebrate Pretoria district 1880. I will try make best possible terms J. Chamberlain for 200,000*l.* which I was compelled abandon thus could only secure English position.

Here we have once more the reflection of the dread which prevailed in some official quarters—popularly believed to be Mr. Chamberlain's room in the Colonial Office—that the Johannesburg movement might take place under the Transvaal flag. There were many questions asked Mr. Harris concerning this telegram, but with the ineptitude which characterized the proceedings of this extraordinary Committee, no one asked Mr. Chamberlain what cable it was that was read to him, whether it was the cable of Nov. 23rd, or whether, as is more probable, the reference is to another telegram, of which all trace has disappeared. The terms in which Dr. Harris refers to it would imply that the latter is the case, for there could have been no great pleasure to Dr. Harris in reading to Mr. Chamberlain the growling, grudging telegram consenting to pay him the smart-money which the Colonial Office had exacted in return for conceding the land in time to be used in executing the Jameson plan.

From the context also it would seem to have been some kind of assurance from Mr. Rhodes which was calculated to please Mr. Chamberlain, and may have related to the flag. Dr. Harris seizes the opportunity to renew his solemn warnings to the effect which the absence of the Union Jack at Johannesburg would have upon Mr. Rhodes's position here. What does that mean? It cannot mean his position with the South Africa Company or with his fellow-conspirators, for they all knew Mr. Rhodes too well to make any difficulty about this trivial question of a flag. Does it not suggest that there may have been something in what seemed to be the exaggerated rumours that the Colonial Secretary was pressing for the conversion of what Mr. Leonard and Mr. Phillips regarded as a perfectly moral and legitimate attempt to substitute an honest for a dishonest Republican Government, into the virtual seizure of the Transvaal by England? This telegram, together with all the rumours which were current at the time, and which have been deepened by every effort made to remove them, is at least not incompatible with the story that while the Outlanders were anxious to make an honest revolution at Johannesburg which would leave the Transvaal Republic still a Republic in the hands of its citizens, Mr. Chamberlain would have preferred to use this revolutionary movement for the purpose of destroying the independence of the Transvaal and reducing the Republic to the status of a British Colony? This statement was frequently alluded to as a matter of common knowledge in those days, but I did not know until I came to look more



closely at the cablegrams for the compiling of this book how entirely it fits in with the references which are made to the subject in these cablegrams. Dr. Harris was in a perfect terror lest the movement in Johannesburg should—as a matter of fact it did—refuse to come off under the British flag. The story at Johannesburg was that Mr. Chamberlain would support nothing that was not done under the Union Jack, and it is certainly difficult to see what other person was sufficiently powerful to thwart Mr. Rhodes's plans and put Dr. Harris in such terror at a refusal to make the insurrection under the British flag. It is obvious, too, that Dr. Harris, or Miss Shaw, or some of the conspirators are constantly seeing Mr. Chamberlain, are well aware of his views, and read him cables from Mr. Rhodes.

The only other passage in this telegram that calls for comment is that "Flora suggest 16 December celebrate Pretoria district 1880." This is the first of three attempts by Miss Shaw to expedite the outbreak of the insurrection. The others will be recorded in due course when I come to deal with her telegrams. When examined upon this subject Dr. Harris explained that he sent Miss Shaw's suggestion that the insurrection should break out on the 16th December, which was Dingaan's Day. When Miss Shaw was asked about this, she explained—for the lady was good at explaining—that it was merely a remark made by her in the course of "an idle conversation" with three or four people who were discussing in her presence when the rising was likely to take place, saying that it ought to be at a date between the 12th December and the 25th, and then, having in her memory that the 16th was the day on which the Boers had declared their independence of English authority in 1880, "I remarked there would be a certain historic justice in a section of Englishmen declaring their independence on the same day" (8826). The names of the three or four persons with whom Miss Shaw was discussing so confidentially the right date for springing the revolution under the feet of President Kruger were never asked for. Had the question been asked and answered correctly, we might have learned something as to the status of the persons with whom Miss Shaw holds "idle conversation" as to the date of forthcoming insurrections. She was three times a week at the Colonial Office in those days, and had frequent discussions about the contemplated insurrection (9708) with Mr. Fairfield, Sir Richard Meade, and, possibly, with Mr. Chamberlain also, although upon this point the Committee prudently left the veil of secrecy drawn very tight.

No. 33.

Harris to Rhodes.

November 29th, 1895.

We have given British South Africa Company code to Flora. She has been registered telemones, London. Register on your side this address telegrams go direct. Keep her well informed.

This is the last of Dr. Harris's cables. In it he appears to make over his function as confidential reporter to Mr. Rhodes, and confidential intermediary between Mr. Rhodes and the Colonial Office to Miss Flora Shaw, who certainly possessed many qualifications eminently fitting her for the post. She was extremely intelligent, and, like Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Garrett, she received her early training in journalism under my direction at the *Pall Mall Gazette* office, and only the other day I came upon a very interesting interview which I had with General Joubert, when he was last in London. I lunched with him on 7th August, 1890, at the Cape Agency. Miss Shaw had interviewed Joubert that morning, and I find in my notes the following curious passage:—

“Both Joubert and Mills were loud in their praise of Miss Shaw. Joubert had dismissed two Dutchmen from Holland in order to receive Miss Shaw, and was much struck with her intelligence. He said, ‘Of all people who have ever interviewed me, no one ever put such sharp questions. She is intelligent; she understands politics.’ Mills was so enthusiastic in her praises that he would hardly allow any one else to say anything, always calling her ‘that dear little girl.’”

Of course, I naturally concurred, and quote the tribute to that “dear little girl” as a fair presumption that this extremely sharp interviewer and cross-questioner did not visit the Colonial Office two or three times a week (8870 and 9707), and have long conversations, varying from five to fifty minutes, with Mr. Chamberlain and his officials (9844), without giving him to know what she was thinking of. She was also in charge of the Colonial Department of the *Times* newspaper, and was hand-and-glove with Mr. Moberly Bell, the manager-editor as he may be called, in distinction to Mr. Buckle, who was only editor-editor. Over those mysteries of Printing House Square Miss Shaw piteously appealed to the Committee to draw a veil, a request with which they at once complied (8903).

Having thus handed over the secret cipher of the Chartered Company to the custody of this accomplished journalist with the run of the Colonial Office and the control of the thunderbolts of Printing House Square, Dr. Harris sailed for Capetown, feeling he had left the interests of his master in sure hands.

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE "FLORA" CABLEGRAMS.

WE now come to the second series of telegrams, which were not included in the collection submitted by Mr. Hawksley to Mr. Chamberlain on June 7th. Although Miss Flora Shaw sent her telegrams with the aid of the cipher of the South Africa Company, she does not appear to have communicated the contents of her telegrams to Mr. Hawksley or Mr. Beit. It was only when the cable company was induced to give up her telegrams that the world became aware of the fact that this lady, who was and is still virtually colonial editor of the *Times*, and who had and has the free run of the Colonial Office, had not only undertaken to receive information from Mr. Rhodes, but had, very much in the old *Pall Mall* style, undertaken the direction of the South African Revolution. I remember Mr. Morley asking me scornfully once, whether I considered it was the duty of a journalist in Northumberland Street to direct the movement of the Mediterranean Fleet. I promptly replied that on that occasion it was, and I still think I was right. Miss Shaw was trained in that school. Hence she was no sooner armed with the cipher than she assumed, with the confidence natural to the trusted intermediary between two such great potentates as Mr. Cecil Rhodes and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, that it was her duty and her privilege to play a leading part in the conspiracy. But I forgot. Miss Shaw had declared on oath before the Committee that she was not in the conspiracy. She only interested herself in it as a journalist, who had to chronicle the evolution of events.

(9784.) I did not regard myself as being in any way connected with the conspirators.

(9785.) Then you do not consider that in any way you were connected with the conspiracy?—Certainly not in any way.

It is useful to have an explicit statement that she was not connected with the conspiracy, because it enables us to understand the value of any statement she might make as to the non-complicity of Mr. Chamberlain. For if it was possible for a person to be privy to all the secret counsels of conspirators, to be reported as "solid" with the conspiracy, to be trusted with the duty of confidential cabling in cipher to the chief conspirator, and to transmit any information which he might send to other conspirators, and to undertake the responsibility of urging forward the outbreak of the conspiracy and generally to act as intelligence department for the conspiracy—if all this can be done and a person can still not be connected with the conspiracy, then it is quite possible for that person to say that Mr. Chamberlain knew nothing about the Jameson plan, and had neither part nor lot in the conspiracy. Her statement as to her own complete freedom from all complicity in the conspiracy affords us a test of the standard by which she gauges the complicity of conspirators.

The first cablegram which Miss Shaw sent to Mr. Rhodes showed the zeal and thoroughness with which she entered into her duties. The cablegram is as follows:—

No. 73.

Miss Shaw to Rhodes.

10th December, 1895.

Can you advise when will you commence the plans, we wish to send at earliest opportunity sealed instructions representative of the London Times European capitals; it is most important using their influence in your favour.

In cross-examination Miss Shaw stated what she meant by this. She knew of the Jameson plan. She knew that an insurrection was about to break out in Johannesburg, supported from the outside by Mr. Rhodes or by Dr. Jameson and his men from the territory which had been handed over by Mr. Chamberlain for that purpose a year and ten months before the time when he would have handed it over if there had not been the need for supporting the insurrection. She knew that whenever this event came off it would have a very bad look abroad, and it was most desirable that she should have a timely tip from the chief conspirator in order that she might send round confidential information betimes to the *Times* correspondents in foreign parts, so that they might know what to say when the movement culminated. This was undoubtedly an excellent thing to do from the point of view of the conspiracy. It was an admirable thing to do also to have the vast reticulation of the *Times* agents all over Europe properly posted as to the true inwardness of a movement which was extremely likely to be misunderstood. No one, therefore, can in the least blame Miss Shaw for serving so zealously and well a cause of the justice of which she was convinced, and the leader of which she enthusiastically admired. Like many excellent schemes which are much more complete on paper than when carried out in reality, Miss Shaw's project was never realized in its entirety. She drew up a confidential letter of information, and sent it to the correspondent at Belgium, of all places in the world (9797), and at some other minor State. Why the great correspondents at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and St. Petersburg were not deemed worthy of the timely tip Miss Shaw did not explain. She ventures upon much more dangerous ground in the next telegram:—

No. 164.

Shaw to Rhodes.

December 12th, 1895.

Delay dangerous sympathy now complete but will depend very much upon action before European powers given time (to) enter a protest which as European situation considered serious might paralyze Government: general feeling in the Stock Market very suspicious.

This is the first of two telegrams which were sent to Mr. Rhodes from London by a person in touch with the Colonial Office, urging him to expedite the outbreak of the revolution. Let any impartial reader ask himself what Mr. Rhodes must have thought when he received that cablegram. Mr. Rhodes knew Miss Shaw very well. He knew that she was extremely intelligent, thoroughly acquainted with all the secrets of the conspiracy; he knew also that every other day she was at the Colonial Office, and that she was every day at the *Times* office; that is to say, she was, as she proudly declared before the Committee, at the heart of things, whereas Mr. Rhodes was at the outskirts (9818). Being at the heart of

things, with her finger upon the pulse of the world at Printing House Square, and having every other day an opportunity of discussing intimately in conversation, lasting from five to fifty minutes, with Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Fairfield and Sir Richard Meade, the true inwardness of things political, she sends to Mr. Rhodes, using a cipher, which was itself the mark of his confidence, a telegram urging him not to delay. Could he have thought anything else, excepting that the Colonial Office was urging him on to precipitate action?

No. 106.

Shaw to Rhodes.

December 17th, 1895.

Held an interview with Secretary Transvaal, left here on Saturday for Hague Berlin Paris fear in negotiation with these parties. Chamberlain sound in case of interference European Powers but have special reason to believe wishes you must do it immediately.

This telegram must have removed any doubt which Mr. Rhodes might have entertained as to the origin and authority upon which Miss Shaw had sent her previous telegram. Here we have it specifically stated by a trusted friend and fellow-conspirator that Mr. Chamberlain wishes the insurrection to come off at once. The state of foreign affairs was threatening no doubt, as President Cleveland's message concerning Venezuela had startled the world with a prospect of a conflict between the United States and Great Britain. Miss Shaw, who is in the closest confidential touch with Mr. Chamberlain, leaves the Colonial Office, where she had had a long talk with Mr. Fairfield as to the outbreak of the insurrection, and where she has been told by him that "if the Johannesburg burghers are going to rise, it is to be hoped they will do it soon" (9657); so she at once sits down and cables in cipher to Mr. Rhodes the positive statement that she has special reasons for knowing that Mr. Chamberlain wishes the insurrection to take place at once. Remember, also, that Mr. Rhodes, from previous telegrams which have not been disclosed, together with those upon which I have already commented, was absolutely assured that Mr. Chamberlain not only knew the insurrection was going to take place, and that he, Mr. Rhodes, was going to support it from the outside, but that Mr. Chamberlain had driven a very hard bargain with him, by virtue of his possession of that knowledge, before he could hand over the territory and the police with which that support was to be given. Remember, too, that Mr. Rhodes had received urgent telegrams from his agents in London, who were in touch with the Colonial Office, which impressed upon him the necessity of bringing the British flag into it, and had been assured that it would weaken his position immensely if he did not take the British flag in. Rightly, or wrongly, Mr. Rhodes must have been positively convinced, as we know as, a matter of fact, he was convinced, from his communications to Dr. Jameson and others, that Mr. Chamberlain knew of the Plan and wished it success. Under those circumstances, what could Mr Rhodes think of a telegram from Miss Shaw saying that Miss Shaw had special reasons for knowing that Mr. Chamberlain wishes it done immediately? Obviously Mr. Rhodes must have regarded that telegram as declaring the necessity for hurrying things forward at Johannesburg. Miss Shaw admits in so many terms that Mr. Rhodes could only mean it to be accepted in that sense, and she had justification for what she said.

The special reason she explained as follows to the Committee :—

I would like to say quite frankly that about that period, having to go to the Colonial Office, and having to discuss South African affairs. . . .

The CHAIRMAN: That period being about the middle of December?—About the middle of December. I cannot remember exactly. Anyhow, the whole of that autumn South African questions were frequently under discussion. . . . At the Colonial Office, of course, as elsewhere, when South African affairs were taken into consideration, the hypothetical possibility that there would be a rising at Johannesburg was at times discussed. About that time, then, having occasion to discuss South Africa, not with Mr. Chamberlain, as I said before, but with one of the Under-Secretaries, it was said to me, in the course of a conversation, "Well, if the Johannesburg burghers are going to rise, it is to be hoped they will do it soon." That expression was used.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT: You must tell us, please, who said that.—If you ask me I will reply at once. It was Mr. Fairfield, who in discussing South African affairs use that expression (9555 to 9657).

Therefore it was she felt justified in sending that telegram as to special reasons to believe that Mr. Chamberlain wished the British to make their rising immediately, for, as she said, "When I say, 'You must do it immediately,' I mean the British must make their rising immediately. I had no other meaning at all" (9659).

What other meaning she could have had it is somewhat difficult to see. The Chairman is examining.

(9652.) Just to make it clear, let me ask, did you intend to convey by that that you had special reason to believe that Mr. Chamberlain wished them to do it immediately?—I meant to convey that I had special reason to believe that the Colonial Office would wish to have it done immediately.

When asked as to her special reasons, she said, first of all, there was her own knowledge of the situation, which led her to believe that any rising at Johannesburg at that juncture of foreign affairs would be extremely inconvenient to the Colonial Office. Then she proceeded:—

I could not help seeing, and every one who had the knowledge I had must have been aware, that there could hardly have been a more inconvenient time for such a thing to appear.

This, of course, was obvious, for Miss Shaw explained again and again with great volubility that the essence of the Jameson Plan was the support which was to be given to it by the Imperial Government. It was all important, as she said,

that the Imperial Government should be free to deal with the movement fully, and in a satisfactory sense when it took place (9635).

Miss Shaw never for a moment doubted, justified presumably by her frequent communications with Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office, that the Imperial Government would take the part allotted to it by the conspirators, for she says:—

I thought the Government would interfere after the movement had been initiated, because you see the plan as it was laid before me was this, to put it in one sentence—that the whole intention of the plan was that the English in Johannesburg were going to appeal from the local authority to the suzerain power. They regarded the Imperial authorities as the suzerain power. Their plan, as it had been explained to me, was that the very moment they were going to place it in the hands of the High Commissioner, that is to say, in the hands of the Imperial Government. I thought if a European situation of any difficulty was to declare itself in the meantime, or if the European Powers were to protest against the English movement in Johannesburg, it might paralyze the Government in dealing with that situation (9637).

She further explained that her reference to the "general feeling on the Stock Market very suspicious,"

was intended to explain that the thing was coming out, that it was an idle idea that they could keep as an absolute secret a thing known to so many people, and it was in view of its coming out that I thought the European Powers might make a protest which would render it more than ever difficult for Her Majesty's Government to take a free line when the time came (9640).

The "free line," of course, as has been frequently explained, was that when the insurrection took place the High Commissioner was to go down as representative of the suzerain power, and to carry it to the destined end, namely, the overthrow of President Kruger, and the establishment of a Government which would act in the interests of Great Britain. Upon this point Miss Shaw was very distinct. She repeated it again and again. In answer to the Chairman, she said that while there had been endless modifications in the details of the Plan after she had been told about it in September,

what I would point out is, that whatever modifications there may have been in detail (I do not know how great or how small these were), one thing remained, quite distinct and quite continuous, and that was that the instant the movement was initiated it was to be placed in the hands of the Imperial Government (9660).

She then read a telegram sent from Colonel Rhodes to his brother at Capetown on Dec. 21st. The telegram runs in this way :—

Charter, Cape Town, Dec. 21.—Please inform C. J. Rhodes it is stated that Chairman (we all know that Chairman was the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson) will not leave unless special letter inviting him. Definite assurance has been given by all of us that on the day of flotation you and he will leave. There must absolutely be no departure from this, as many subscribers have agreed to take shares on this assurance (9662).

"The movement, therefore, for me ever had any other significance at all except that the Johannesburgers meant to appeal from the local authority of the Transvaal to the suzerain power of South Africa, and they felt they had the right to do that. Of course it is a matter of opinion whether they did or did not" (9662).

In other words, this conspirator lets us see quite plainly that, from first to last, during the whole time that she was having confidential conversations with Mr. Chamberlain and the Colonial Office, one thing was never absent from her mind, namely, that the essential part of the Jameson Plan was that after the "put up job" had been carried through by the local conspirators in Johannesburg, encouraged thereto by the presence of Dr. Jameson with armed forces on the jumping-off strip handed over to them for that purpose by Mr. Chamberlain, the High Commissioner, acting of course under instructions from Mr. Chamberlain, would carry the thing through to its destined end. This is the vital and essential part of this telegram.

As to the rest of a message, she explained that she had held an interview with Dr. Leyds, and drew the inference from the fact that he expressed such extreme ignorance of the whole position that he really knew all about it (9647). The phrase as to Chamberlain being "sound in case of interference European Powers" she explained by saying that she knew that people in South Africa had fear of the Colonial Secretary, because they thought he was a Little Englander, so she telegraphed to them this message, in order to reassure them, because "I felt there was no reason to suppose Mr. Chamberlain would, under any circumstances, tolerate interference by a European Power" (9646).

"Remember," she told the Committee, "I imagined myself to be speaking in absolute confidence to Mr. Rhodes, and Mr. Rhodes alone. I thought he would perfectly understand it" (9649). A supposition which does credit to Miss Shaw's appreciation of the keen intuition of Mr. Rhodes, for there is every reason to believe he did understand it in exactly the same sense in which every one else did. She says, "I telegraphed in the *bonâ fide* belief that Mr. Rhodes would take it exactly as I meant it, as a private assurance from me of what I believed Mr. Chamberlain's views to be" (9650).

No. 402.

From Harris to Shaw.

December 20th, 1895.

Thanks. Are doing our best, but these things take time. Do not alarm Pretoria from London.

This is the first telegram from Capetown to Miss Shaw which appeared in the cablegrams produced by the Cable Company, but she told the Committee that there had been a previous telegram in reply to her inquiry of the 10th December as to when the plans were to be commenced, which she thought in substance ran thus:—"We think about the beginning of the New Year" (9631). In cross-examination upon the 20th December cablegram she said that the warning "do not alarm Pretoria from London" had no particular significance that she could remember. It may have had reference to the fact that the thing was leaking out (9665). She repudiated indignantly the suggestion that Mr. Rhodes could have supposed for a moment that she would have communicated any hint as to Jameson's plan to Mr. Secretary Leyds (9668).

No. 941.

From Harris to Shaw.

December 27th, 1895.

Everything is postponed until after 6th Jan. We are ready, but divisions at Johannesburg.

This cablegram needs no explanation, excepting to recall the fact that divisions at Johannesburg had arisen over the question of flag, which had been brought into such prominence by messages from London, the origin of which probably no one knew better than Miss Shaw herself.

On Dec. 30th Miss Shaw calling at Mr. Beit's office, which was the headquarters of the conspiracy in London, was shown a telegram: "Jameson has disregarded instructions and crossed border with 400 men." This was in the afternoon, between 2 and 4 o'clock. She thereupon went at once to the Colonial Office and told Sir Robert Meade, who telegraphed at once to Mr. Chamberlain at Birmingham. She then went home and went to bed (9747). In the morning when she woke she received two telegrams:—

No. 1503.

Harris to Shaw.

December 30th, 1895.

Strictly Confidential.

Dr Jameson moved to assist English in Johannesburg because he received strong letter begging Dr. Jameson to come signed by leading inhabitants. This letter will be telegraphed to you verbatim to-morrow. Meantime do not refer in Press. We are confident of success. Johannesburg united and strong on our side. Dissensions (they) have been stop(ped) except two or three Germans.

No. 1557.

Harris to Shaw.

December 30th, 1895.

Following letter was received by Dr. Jameson before he decided to go but if you must not use letter for Press until we cable authority, it is signed by leading inhabitants of Johannesburg.

Here follows, not in cipher, the famous women and children fake telegram, which was drawn up in advance to be used after the insurrection had broken out.

These telegrams were handed to her when she woke in the morning of the 31st (9747). With these telegrams in her hand she was at once received by Mr. Chamberlain at 10 in the morning (9751), and it is presumed she communicated their contents to Mr. Chamberlain.



What Mr. Chamberlain said to her or what she said to Mr. Chamberlain was a subject on which it might have been expected the South African Committee would have desired to have some information, but although both Mr. Chamberlain and Miss Shaw were before them, neither was asked any question on the subject.

Later in the day came the next telegram :—

No. 1687. From E. Seccull, or Secretary to Shaw.

December 31st, 1895.

**You can publish letter.**

Published accordingly in the *Times* it was next morning, together with an article deprecating the action taken by Mr. Chamberlain in telegraphing to the High Commissioner to stop Jameson. On this point there is a curious discrepancy between what Miss Shaw declares was the order in which the telegrams were received by her, and the order in which they were dispatched from Capetown, and their apparent delivery by the Cable Company in London. According to the return of the Cable Company, they had received and sent out before the telegrams 1557 and 1687 another cablegram, No. 1556, dated Dec. 30th, 1895. Miss Shaw stated to the Committee that she had gone down to the Cable Company, and had no doubt at all, after looking at the record of the hours at which the cablegrams were delivered, that 1556 was not sent out until 6.22 p.m. on 31st Dec. (9605). Why the Cable Company should have dealt in so extraordinary a fashion with this cablegram as to have held it back for a whole day is not stated, nor have we any statement on the subject from Mr. Pender himself. It is difficult to accept Miss Shaw's story about this telegram implicitly. When she first appeared before the Committee, she stoutly denied that she had received any cablegrams whatever from Mr. Rhodes, with the exception of the fake letter about the women and children in danger.

(8848.) You wish the Committee to understand that the telegrams to which you have referred, three telegrams in all, and the substance of which you have given as nearly as you remember, were the only telegrams that passed between you and Mr. Rhodes?—These are the only telegrams that passed between me and Mr. Rhodes.

(8849.) I think you have previously said that you did not use this code for any telegrams except to Mr. Rhodes?—I used the code for no other purpose at all except for these three short cables I have described, except that I also used it for the purpose of decoding a telegram sent to me on the 1st January. The telegram appeared in the *Times* announcing that Dr. Jameson had crossed the border with the troops, and giving the cabled letter about the women and children. That was not coded, it was given to me in full.

(8851.) Those were the only telegrams you received?—Those were the only telegrams I received, and the only occasions on which I used the code for any purpose whatever.

When the other telegrams from Mr. Rhodes were produced by the Cable Company Miss Shaw was recalled, and said :—

There are two telegrams on this paper, namely 1556 and 1877, of which I had absolutely forgotten the existence. I am extremely sorry for it, but they entirely slipped my memory. They came after the others in the middle of a great pressure of work. Finding them here, I remember them now, but I had entirely forgotten them at the time I gave my evidence. (9603.)

Considering the extreme importance of the telegram (1556), this slip of memory was unfortunate.

No. 1556.

Rhodes to Shaw,

December 30th, 1895.

Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right if he supports me, but he must not send cable like he sent to High Commissioner in South Africa. To-day the crux is, I will win, and South Africa will belong to England.

Signature of sender, F. R. Harris for C. J. Rhodes, Premier.

The question when this telegram arrived is of considerable importance, because if it had been delivered in due course it must have reached Miss Shaw before the telegrams sent on Dec. 31st, which she received when she woke on the morning of that day, and she must have had it in her possession before she went to the Colonial Office to see Mr. Chamberlain. That, at least, seems to be the obvious deduction from the evidence supplied by the telegrams themselves, as they stand without any of her explanations. When asked how it was that the 30th December telegram came after the 31st December messages, she attributed it to a cable block. "There was a block on the cables lasting from the 1st to the 5th January" (9614), which may be true, but it hardly explains how telegrams sent out on Dec. 31st reached there earlier than a telegram sent out on the 30th, two days before the block on the cables began. However, let that pass. Whatever time she received it, Miss Shaw declares that the moment she saw the telegram she said to herself, "This is not Mr. Rhodes, it is Dr. Harris, and I attach to it exactly the amount of importance which I think ought to be attached to Dr. Harris's impression of the situation" (9676). So she "took no action whatever, and dismissed that one entirely her from consideration" (9679). Taking it even at that estimate, here was a telegram from Dr. Harris, sent out after Dr. Jameson had crossed the frontier, and after Mr. Chamberlain had telegraphed to the High Commissioner on Dec. 29th, ordering him to intimate that "if Dr. Jameson had attempted to force matters at Johannesburg to a head by an advance from Bechuanaland Protectorate with police, in your opinion he would not have my support, and point out the consequences which would follow." This was the telegram to the High Commissioner of which Mr. Rhodes or Dr. Harris complained. The telegram of Dec. 30th appears on the face of it a confident, but somewhat aggrieved, appeal from one of the conspirators to another not to spoil his little game, and it is difficult to believe that Miss Shaw, if she had that cablegram in her possession, could have seen Mr. Chamberlain immediately afterwards without informing him of its contents. That Miss Shaw sympathized with Mr. Rhodes or Dr. Harris in his objection to Mr. Chamberlain's action appears to be clear from the line the *Times* took on Jan. 1st in rather objecting to the course which Mr. Chamberlain had taken in so suddenly endeavouring to stop the Raid. What passed between Miss Shaw and Mr. Chamberlain is buried in mystery, but of one fact Miss Shaw has herself assured us, for on Jan. 1st she sent a fourth message to Mr. Rhodes for which she paid £2 15s. No copy of that telegram is to be found in the archives of the Cable Company, nor did Miss Shaw remember its full contents, but she remembers that she told Mr. Rhodes that Mr. Chamberlain was "awfully angry," or "extremely angry." Here again we come upon a curious discrepancy in Miss Shaw's evidence. She first told the Committee that she regarded telegram (1556) as having nothing to do with Mr. Rhodes at all. She held that it emanated from Dr. Harris, and she took no action upon it whatever, and sent no reply. But immediately afterwards, when she was asked why she sent the telegram to Mr. Rhodes that Mr. Chamberlain was "awfully angry," she gave the following explanation:—

(9690.) I thought as Mr. Rhodes had used the expression "unless you can make Chamberlain do so and so, it was as well that Mr. Rhodes should understand that Mr. Chamberlain was not to be made to do anything, and that he had better understand that Mr. Chamberlain's attitude was not exactly sympathetic to him at that moment.

(9691.) Chairman: You did not think that your telegram would convey to Mr. Rhodes the impression that you had seen Mr. Chamberlain?—No doubt Mr. Rhodes would think that, because he would not know that I might have seen Mr. Chamberlain; but I

did not mean to be in any way a communication between Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Rhodes in the slightest degree.

(9692.) You tell the Committee that, as a matter of fact, it was simply your own view, and not founded upon any communication you had had from Mr. Chamberlain?—It was founded upon no communication whatever, except that I had the privilege of seeing Mr. Chamberlain that morning.

Mr. Chamberlain no doubt was “awfully angry,” and rightly, for Dr. Jameson had upset his appercart as well as Mr. Rhodes’s. Mr. Rhodes was bound by close and intimate ties of personal friendship to endeavour to screen Dr. Jameson. As Mr. Schreiner told us at the interview that took place with Mr. Rhodes immediately after the news came that Dr. Jameson had crossed the frontier, Mr. Rhodes was utterly broken down. “I said, why do you not stop him? Although he has ridden in you can still stop him?” He said, “Poor old Jameson, twenty years we have been friends, and now he goes in and ruins me. I cannot hinder it. I cannot go and destroy him” (*Cape Inquiry into the Raid*, p. 217). Mr. Chamberlain obviously had no such reasons for compunction, for Dr. Jameson by making the Raid had ruined everything, and Mr. Chamberlain naturally went for Dr. Jameson, being moved thereto by the double motive of clearing himself from all complicity in the plan to which he was privy, and also by his obvious duty as Secretary of State for the Colonies. His course for that movement was quite clear. Hence Miss Shaw was undoubtedly right in giving Mr. Rhodes a plain intimation that he had nothing to expect from Mr. Chamberlain by way of saving Jameson.

But before this telegram about Mr. Chamberlain being “awfully angry,” there came another telegram from Mr. Rhodes to Miss Shaw:—

No. 1877.

Rhodes to Shaw.

December 31st, 1895.

Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the High Commissioner to proceed at once to Johannesburg the whole position is lost. High Commissioner would receive splendid reception, and still turn position to England advantage, but must be instructed by cable immediately. The instructions must be specific as he is weak and will take no responsibility.

Miss Shaw says of this telegram that it was sent to her for information, although if ever there was a cablegram in the world which was sent to her for instruction as to action this was the cablegram. She says, however, that she took no action on it whatever. She showed it in the *Times* Office, but never sent it to the Colonial Office. Miss Shaw said that every one in South Africa, believed that Sir Hercules Robinson should go up, and quotes a dispatch from Sir Hercules to that effect. What she omitted to call attention to is that Mr. Rhodes’s appeal to Mr. Chamberlain to order the High Commissioner up was in order that the High Commissioner should turn the matter to “England’s advantage.” In other words, an order that he should go at once to the Transvaal in order to carry out the original plan. Even on Jan. 2nd there was a possible chance that this plan might have been carried out, for there was a kind of rising in Johannesburg. As soon as the news to that effect reached the High Commissioner, he telegraphed asking President Kruger if he would wish to come to Pretoria to co-operate with him in endeavouring to bring about a peaceful settlement. President Kruger replied that Dr. Jameson had fired upon his burghers, but to prevent further bloodshed he accepted the High Commissioner’s offer to come to Pretoria. Rhodes and his Ministers, with the Chief Justice and Mr. Hofmeyr, were all

in favour of this step, which was approved of by Mr. Chamberlain and ultimately carried out. The approval of Mr. Hofmeyr and the Chief Justice, however, was given subject to the condition that President Kruger invited the High Commissioner. Such an invitation from President Kruger was very different from the original idea, by which the High Commissioner was to appear as the representative of the suzerain power in response to the appeal of British subjects in order to secure the success of the insurrection. It is not surprising that Sir Hercules Robinson shrank from taking the responsibility of carrying out that project; but it is significant of the confidence which Mr. Rhodes had in Mr. Chamberlain's readiness to support his plan and carry it through, that he should have sent those two telegrams to Miss Shaw in the confident expectation that Mr. Chamberlain would play up and make the Governor take his allotted part.

We have now done with Miss Shaw's telegrams and with Miss Shaw's still wonderful explanations.

It is now necessary to pay a little attention to what was done in South Africa, showing how absolutely the conspirators relied upon the support of the High Commissioner, and at the same time how fatal to the success of the movement was the insistence, popularly attributed to Mr. Chamberlain, of the introduction of the British flag. On Dec. 26th Mr. Jameson of Johannesburg telegraphed to Dr. Jameson at Pitsani:—

It is absolutely necessary to postpone flotation through unforeseen circumstances here altogether unexpected, and until we have C. J. Rhodes's absolute pledge that authority of Imperial Government will not be insisted upon. Charles Leonard left last night to interview Rhodes.

While Mr. Leonard was still on his way to Capetown, Mr. Phillips telegraphed from Johannesburg:—

Beit, Capetown.—It is absolutely necessary to delay floating. If foreign subscribers insist on floating, anticipate complete failure.

Whoever insisted upon "floating without delay"? The only pressure in that direction, except Dr. Jameson, came from London from the confidential emissary to the Colonial Office, who telegraphed that "delay was dangerous," and who had special reasons for knowing that Mr. Chamberlain wished it done immediately. "The London *Times* also cables confidentially to that effect, postponement of meeting would be most unwise course."—Dec. 31st, *Cape Inquiry Report*, p. 213. There is a telegram from Dr. Harris dated Dec. 28th, Capetown, addressed to Dr. Jameson at Pitsani, in which he used the words "foreign friends," as referring to quite distinct persons from "foreign subscribers." Dr. Harris explained to the Committee that when he used the words "foreign friends" he meant the people in Johannesburg, and this indeed is obvious from the text of his cablegram. Speaking of the proposed insurrection, he says, "All our foreign friends are now dead against it, and say public will not spend one penny towards it, even with you as a director.—Ichabod."

Dr. Jameson, however, took the bit between his teeth and decided to go in, and rely upon Mr. Rhodes to bring the High Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to Johannesburg. Dr. Jameson told the Committee that he had arranged with Mr. Rhodes that when the rising took place he should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal Government and the Outlanders. "From my own conversations with the High Commissioner I knew that when the rising took place he would go to Johannesburg or Pretoria" (4513). Dr. Jameson also said:—

I know his idea was that this is so from a conversation with the High Commissioner, that if there was a rising in Johannesburg, if he had gone there to mediate, it would be a

good thing to take a plebiscite of the people. That would have satisfied me and everybody in Johannesburg. I knew from the conversations that have occurred if such things had occurred that would be a good thing to do.

"You mean that he thought so?" asked Mr. Labouchere. "Yes," said Dr. Jameson (5760).

When Dr. Jameson crossed the frontier he expected Mr. Rhodes would bring up the High Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr, and he told his officers that they would probably be there as soon as they were. Dr. Jameson's idea was to seize Pretoria. He was asked, if he had done so, what he expected the High Commissioner to do. He replied: "Naturally, he would tell me to give Pretoria up to him, and then it would have been in his hands as representing Her Majesty's Government." "And he would restore it?" asked Mr. Labouchere. "I cannot say whether he would restore it or not," said Dr. Jameson (5764).

Great, therefore, was the dismay when the High Commissioner issued an emphatic proclamation against Dr. Jameson. This proclamation, according to the statements made in evidence, was extorted from the High Commissioner by Mr. Hofmeyr, who threatened that if it was not drawn up and issued he would beat the Afrikaner drum throughout the whole of Cape Colony. Dr. Harris telegraphed to Captain Spreckley at Bulawayo on Jan. 2nd: "Rumour from Johannesburg states that Jameson has had a fight and won. I believe he is now safe with friends in Johannesburg. You may be quite sure that no one who knows him will leave him, even with fifty proclamations against him."

Still more significant was the telegram sent on New Year's Day by Mr. Garrett to the editor of the *Star* at Johannesburg. This telegram runs as follows:—"You must expect and not misunderstand a proclamation putting Jameson formally in the wrong. Imperial authorities have no other course. Don't let this weaken or divide you. This is merely for your information."

When examined before the Cape Committee, Mr. Garrett explained that the Imperial Government was absolutely bound to hold itself impartial, and to proclaim or disavow Jameson. Mr. Garrett added: "I won't say, nor do I want to pretend, that it was not present to my mind that that telegram would perhaps slightly detract from the proclamation in the mind of the person who received it."

Mr. Garrett's one point was to keep distinct the Raid and the Revolution.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE STAIN ON ENGLAND'S HONOUR.

IN the first chapter of this pamphlet I discussed the question of a moral meridian from a point of view of one endeavouring to ascertain how far it is possible to excuse revolutionary tactics in a border country in consideration of the environment of the actors. In looking back over the strange and scandalous narrative which I have just completed, we come upon another question of moral meridian. When we have to judge things not from the standpoint of a State whose President passed his apprenticeship as a filibuster, and his mature age in profiting by the results of raids, we are confronted with a very different problem in a very different latitude. I shall have done my work very badly if I have not made it clear that in the proceedings of the South African Committee at Westminster we have a scandal a thousandfold more scandalous than the worst that can be said concerning the indiscretion of Dr. Jameson or the conspiracies of Cecil Rhodes.

It is true that at Westminster not even three Boers or eighteen troopers were killed, as was the case in the ill-timed adventure of Dr. Jameson. But even in this matter of slaughter, the South African Committee has had a far more bloody sequence than Dr. Jameson's Raid. As the result of the South African Committee and the conspiracy to suppress the truth and hush up the comparatively trivial misdeeds of the Colonial Office, we are now involved in a war which has necessitated the movement of more troops than those which sent to clear Bonaparte out of the Peninsula or to fight under Wellington at Waterloo. It is not so much for the consequences, terrible and odious as they are in the waste of blood and treasure, that we are mostly concerned at the present moment. For what we have sorrowfully to admit in sack-cloth and ashes before the civilized world, is that, in the very sacred arcanum of national honour, Dishonour has been enthroned. In place of truth we have falsehood; in place of frank confession of error we have an elaborate conspiracy to falsify facts, to suppress evidence, to justify a finding, the falsehood of which is attested by the unfortunate man who is the central figure in this tragic drama. When the sow was sacrificed by Antiochus Ephiphanes in the Holy of Holies of the Jewish Temple, he committed an outrage analogous to that in which we have been the silent but indignant spectators. For the House of Commons at Westminster is the august mother of Parliaments. It has not been without cause that every member of that body is entitled always to be addressed as the Honourable Member, and it was only the other day that Mr. Chamberlain, for the first time in the Parliamentary annals, drew a distinction between honourable members by courtesy and honourable men. What irony to think that such a distinction should come from such lips! But this very central seat and shrine of national honour has been dishonoured by the

conduct which we have just described. Where now is that chastity of honour which feels a stain like a wound? How can we look neighbouring nations in the face and speak to them of honour and good faith? For what has happened has not been the escapade of a single border officer, misled by telegrams and goaded by injunctions from London "to hurry up"; it is no deed of sudden passion or of individual recklessness. The mournful spectacle which is now presented to the civilized world was carefully prepared and deliberately carried out after ample time had been afforded for reflection, and the consequences of such a crime had been repeatedly pointed out and insisted upon with the utmost vehemence by those whose moral sense recoiled in horror from the deliberate deception of Parliament in the interest of a party leader and of a Government department. Seldom has a national sin been committed under less temptation and under circumstances of greater aggravation.

Granting everything that may be said concerning the innocence of the accused, granting that he was as unfortunate in the vindication of his own character as he was in explaining the real meaning of his despatches to the Government of the South African Republic, the fact remains that everywhere outside our own country there is only one opinion as to the fell significance of the proceedings at Westminster. The pity of it! To think that Britain should have been displayed before the world as the canting Pharisee, who made broad the phylacteries in order to cover an offence against International Law. We have not even the excuse of having greatly sinned under the pressure of a tremendous temptation. If the truth had been told frankly and fully, and every one had borne like a man his own burden of responsibility, no doubt Mr. Chamberlain's career would have undergone a temporary eclipse; but in the long run he would have gained more by the confidence which his confession would have commanded than he would have lost by a temporary absence from the Ministry. The straight course, the path of truth and honesty, along which every consideration, both of personal and national honour, urged him to walk, would have brought him out into a safe place, for the public, especially in this country, is ever quick to forgive and forget when an error has been frankly confessed and the consequences patiently and bravely borne. The justification, or, if that is too strong a word, the excuse which Mr. Chamberlain could have made for himself was such as to have appealed irresistibly to the chivalrous instincts of the democracy. All that he had to admit was that he had followed the example of Cavour and of Alexander II. under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, in which an error of judgment was exceedingly natural; he was new to the Colonial Office; he had had no previous training in the niceties of international intercourse; he was dealing with men who lived in the moral meridian of Pretoria, and he acted under the fascination of the commanding personality of Mr. Rhodes, the greatest of our Colonial statesmen. That, of course, is no defence from the point of view of International Law, for a constitutional Minister is not warranted in taking a part in a revolutionary conspiracy—at least when the revolution has miscarried and the facts were brought to light. There are probably none of the great statesmen who have remodelled the map of Europe but at one time or another in their careers were compromised much worse than Mr. Chamberlain would have been, had he but faced the music and told the truth to his countrymen. Unfortunately, he lacked that moral courage, and elected to take the tortuous road which culminated in the Report of the South African Committee, plus his certificate of the unstained personal honour of Mr. Rhodes.

Some of the consequences are before us in the wide-wasting war which is desolating South Africa, and it may be that far more wide-reaching miseries are still to come. It is in vain for us to pretend that this policy of deception is not responsible for the present war. The answer to that is printed in large capitals in every page of the Blue Books which tell the melancholy story of the negotiations. As Mr. Hofmeyr bitterly declared, it was the light shed by the South African Committee upon the conception of honour and good faith which prevailed in the Colonial Office and in Westminster which convinced the Dutch of South Africa that they had to do with a Minister in whose word no confidence could be placed, backed by a Parliament which seemed to have lost all sense of the importance of truth in international relations. That fatal distrust marred all the efforts to maintain peace or to secure reform. The Boers knew that they were dealing with a man whose word they could not trust, and with a nation which had substituted for the supreme duty of doing right and speaking truth, a cowardly readiness to conceal misdeeds by falsehood, and to baffle the demands of justice by mendacious certificates of immaculate virtue.

Let me once more say that the Boers may have been mistaken, and that the proceedings of the South African Committee may not have been governed from first to last by a determination to hush up the truth. All that I maintain is that to the Boers, as to all other outside observers, this was not the case. The unknown is always terrible, and evidence which is suppressed is certain to be regarded as much more damning than it is in reality. No amount of special pleading can explain away the facts which are set forth in the preceding pages, verified by references to the official record. That narrative proves that, under the guise of a public national investigation into the truth of allegations freely made and generally believed as to the complicity of the Colonial Office in the conspiracy against the South African Republic, almost everything was done that was calculated to prevent the discovery of truth, and hardly anything was done that was calculated to bring the facts to light.

I need not recapitulate at any length the salient features of this travesty of investigation, in which the accused sat as one of the members of the investigating tribunal, surrounded by a majority of his own partisans. But not even the stoutest advocate of the Committee can deny the following facts:—

First, that Mr. Chamberlain, instead of presenting himself as the first witness, and producing before the Committee all the written evidence in the possession of the Colonial Office as to the communications which had taken place between himself and the conspirators, allowed the inquiry to go on for weeks before he produced any of the letters in his possession. When concealment was no longer possible, he made a very partial statement as to facts within his own knowledge, and, despite repeated challenges, still refuses to produce correspondence in his possession which would have shown beyond all doubt what the conspirators thought of his share in their enterprise.

Secondly, that although the Cape Committee reported that cablegrams vital for the elucidation of the truth had passed and re-passed between London and Capetown, no steps whatever were taken to prevent the destruction of these cablegrams by the Telegraph Company, and the demand for the production of those which still remained in existence, instead of being insisted upon by the Colonial Secretary, was with the utmost difficulty forced upon the Committee at a late stage in its proceedings.



Thirdly, that after a sufficient number of cablegrams had been produced to afford, to say the least, a very strong *prima facie* case that the Colonial Office had a close, continuous, and interested acquaintance with the plans of the conspirators, no effective measures were taken to compel the custodian of the copies of the cablegrams to produce them for the information of the Committee.

Fourthly, that when three witnesses, whose evidence was of the first importance, were smitten with what proved to be mortal illness—namely, Lord Rosmead, Sir R. Meade, and Mr. Fairfield—Mr. Chamberlain took no steps whatever to have their evidence taken on their sick-beds. Even the tribunal at Rennes made more pretence of endeavouring to ascertain the truth when it sent a Commission to take the statements of Colonel Du Paty de Clam, than the Colonial Office showed when the matter at stake was not the innocence of a single officer, but the reputation of a whole department of the Government.

Fifthly, that when Mr. Rhodes's solicitor, who not only held possession of the cablegrams, and therefore was well aware of their contents, but who also had been the constant and trusted intermediary between Mr. Rhodes and the Colonial Office, was called to give evidence, he was dismissed from the stand the moment it became clear that he was prepared to speak the truth on his oath. Mr. Labouchere in vain endeavoured to secure the recall of this chief witness, but all to no purpose.

Sixthly, that no steps were taken to obtain the evidence of Lord Grey, who was sent to Bulawayo as Governor of Matabeleland, and whose evidence, as that of the only director who was in close personal relations with Mr. Chamberlain, was vital to the completeness of the inquiry.

Seventhly, that when the emissaries of Mr. Rhodes, who formed the nexus between the conspirators in Africa and the Colonial Office in London, were summoned for examination, in only one case (that of Dr. Harris) was there any examination that was not ludicrously inept and incomplete. There is not a man in the street who could not have examined Mr. Maguire, Mr. Beit, and Miss Flora Shaw to more purpose than the picked men of both parties. The most obvious questions were left unasked, to the amazement not merely of the spectators, but even of the witnesses themselves.

Eighthly, that the whole inquiry, instead of being conducted with a single eye to the main purpose—that of clearing up the mystery as to the complicity of the Colonial Office in the conspiracy—permitted every question but that to be introduced and discussed to any extent. Dooley's narrative of the proceedings of the Dreyfus Court-martial at Rennes is hardly a greater burlesque than the official record of the method in which the South African Committee conducted its investigation into the question remitted to it by the House of Commons.

Ninthly, that although several members of the Committee had read the cablegrams and could have given valuable information to the Committee as to their nature and contents, not one of the three afforded the slightest information to their colleagues as to whether or not the effect of those cables was to confirm and deepen the impression that the Colonial Office was not only kept advised by the conspirators of what they were doing, but that it took a more or less decided part in directing the actions of the chief conspirator in Africa.

Tenthly, that when in the last sitting the evidence of Dr. Rutherford Harris was admitted, even by the Committee itself, to be imperatively needed, in order to explain one damning cablegram sent in the name of Mr. Rhodes, but which its recipient declared had emanated from Dr.

Harris, it was found to be impossible to secure his attendance. Dr. Harris had disappeared into space, and no steps whatever were taken to find him.

Eleventhly, that after Mr. Chamberlain, as member of the Committee, had signed the report which accused Mr. Rhodes of lying and of acting with bad faith, not only to the Imperial Government, but to his colleagues and subordinates, by inducing the latter to believe that the Colonial Office was a consenting party to the conspiracy, Mr. Chamberlain twice over declared publicly from his place in the House of Commons that nothing whatever had been proved against the personal honour of Mr. Cecil Rhodes.

Twelfthly, that when the press of the world and a large proportion of the English press was crying out in amazement and disgust at the way in which the whole matter had been hushed up, Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, did not hesitate publicly to declare at a meeting in his constituency that the conduct of the Liberal members of the Committee was worthy of praise, because they had acted as Englishmen always do act when in responsible positions, as they had refrained from pushing an inquiry to the point when it might have endangered British supremacy in South Africa.

I might have extended this list, but these twelve heads of indictment will suffice. It may be possible to explain away one, two, three, or four of these points, but the cumulative effect of those that will remain, even if it be not sufficient to carry instant conviction to any impartial mind, must in the opinion of our neighbours confirm their worst suspicions as to *perfidie Albion*. Especially was this the case in South Africa, where our Dutch fellow-subjects naturally followed the inquiry with much closer and intenser interest than was paid to it by the people in other lands.

In setting forth this plain, straightforward narrative of what was actually transacted before the eyes of the astonished world at Westminster, I cannot be accused of acting from party motives. I wish, indeed, from the bottom of my heart, that the whole of the Committee had been Liberals, if only the reputation of one party in the State could have been saved intact from the reproach which now attaches to both. It is, of course, true that many members of the Committee played a very subordinate rôle, and were content to follow their leader without venturing to ask whether those leaders were leading them into the morass in which their reputation is weltering. I am also willing to admit the full force of the excuse which may legitimately be brought forward in defence of the members of that Committee, especially those who were confused by the bewildering multiplicity of details, and who were not qualified either by training or by native capacity to winnow the wheat from the chaff. That excuse is that being honourable men themselves, brought up in the traditions of the British House of Commons, it was to them absolutely incredible that a Secretary of State and an Honourable Member could have consented for a moment to such a conspiracy as that to which I am referring. There was also a less worthy motive which undoubtedly distorted the minds of some members of the Committee. There was an intense prejudice against Mr. Rhodes, and a desire to use the Committee in order to crush him, if possible for ever, which led them to resent any suggestion that, after all, Mr. Rhodes might be able to shield himself, had he cared to do so, behind the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The very loyalty and self-sacrificing nobility of Mr. Rhodes's nature seemed to them conclusive proof of his

guilt. This, indeed, is affirmed almost without circumlocution in the report, which imputes to Mr. Rhodes the worst motives for objecting to the production of the cablegrams. Had the cablegrams been sufficient evidence to prove the complicity of Mr. Chamberlain, it is asserted they would at once have been brought forward by Mr. Rhodes. Those who knew Mr. Rhodes would have come to an exactly opposite conclusion, but to those persons to whom the very name of Rhodes is as a red rag to a bull such a suggestion would seem mere Midsummer madness.

It is upon this, indeed, that Mr. Chamberlain has traded. The Committee, he told the House on Thursday, the 19th Oct., contained members from both sides of the House whose honour and integrity and impartiality nobody could be found to dispute. It is, indeed, the high standard of integrity and honour which has been regarded as one of our national glories which has stood in the way of the discovery of the truth in this matter. The House of Commons itself has been made an accomplice after the fact by virtue of these appeals to what formerly was regarded as the normal standard of English public life.

After the Committee of no inquiry had brought up its white-washing report, as a forlorn hope an attempt was made to induce the House of Commons to pass judgment upon the method in which its proceedings has been conducted. That attempt was thwarted by Sir William Harcourt, who, referring to the suggestion that the Committee had engaged in a plot to suppress evidence and hush up charges, declared that in his opinion such accusations were worthy only of disdain and contempt. He added: "I hope, at least, that I shall not live to see the day when the House of Commons is prepared to declare by a majority that it does not trust the word of its statesmen, and that it has no reliance of confidence in the good faith of this Committee." As I remarked at the time, such appeals may carry divisions, but they are impotent to reverse the verdict which history will record upon the method in which the investigation was carried out. The division which closed the question, so far as the House of Commons was concerned, was neither more nor less than a vote of confidence in their own most honourable selves, a certificate of character granted by the House of Commons to the House of Commons. As Sir William Harcourt said, that Committee was an average sample of the House of Commons, and if the House of Commons are going to pass such judgments as that upon that Committee, they are passing judgment upon themselves. I continued, "Facts are facts, truth is truth, and all findings of Committees and votes of the House of Commons that are in diametrical opposition to the facts are of no more account than the rustling of withered leaves in the autumn wind. The making of such reports and the registering of such divisions only damage those who are parties to this fraud and imposture, which, so far, has been with apparent success hoisted upon the world. The self-respect of the nation is no doubt outraged by the suggestion that a Minister from his place in Parliament could have played it so low down upon the House of Commons and upon the Sovereign as to employ the machinery of a Parliamentary Committee in order not to discover, but to conceal the truth; "but facts are chiefls that winna ding, and daurna be disputed."

It is a grievous and thankless task to set forth such facts as those contained in this narrative before the eyes of my countrymen, and not merely of my countrymen, but of our fellow-men outside our frontiers. But it is far more serious to acquiesce in such a colossal triumph of Pharisaic hypocrisy. The idea that it pays to lie, and that it

is just and right to resort to any expedient to deceive the nation whom you serve, is a deadly doctrine, which, if tolerated, would eat as a cancer into the vitals of our national life. Better any exposure than allow the doctrine to be impressed upon our people that falsehood pays, and that we can afford to lower the high standard of personal honour which has been evolved in the course of the centuries.

I am well aware that an attempt will be made to represent this narrative as the product of personal animosity on my part to Mr. Chamberlain. I am equally well aware that it would be idle for me—no matter how truthfully—to disclaim any such sentiment. When there is no case you can always abuse the plaintiff's attorney, and those who utterly fail to explain away the damning record contained in this pamphlet may be excused, if not justified, when they endeavour to obscure the issue by the imputation of motives. These things do not affect me in the least. This narrative itself is sufficient proof of the fact of my anxious desire to screen Mr. Chamberlain, to minimize to the uttermost the extent to which he was implicated in this matter, and it was only when every effort to shield him was thwarted by the determination to insist upon making both parties in the House of Commons accomplices in this conspiracy that I was driven to speak out. What the consequences may be I do not know, nor is that my business. What I saw at the time was that this resort to a refuge of lies would infallibly entail severe punishment on us as a nation. Already a fine of £10,000,000 sterling has been imposed upon us as the direct consequence of this scandal at Westminster, and the financial penalty is one of the least of the burdens which we shall have to bear. If it were not for the loss of gallant lives worse than wasted in this wicked and criminal war, we might welcome, rather than deplore, the fact that slow-footed Nemesis has so speedily overtaken us, for there is nothing more terrible for man or nation than to put their trust in a falsehood and not to discover their mistake.