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ARE WE IN THE RIGHT?

AN APPEAL TO HONEST MEN.

BY

W. T. STEAD.

“To go to war with President Kruger in order to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his State, in which Secretaries of State, standing in this place, have repudiated all right of interference—that would be a course of action as **immoral as it would have been unwise.**”—*Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain in the House of Commons, May 8th, 1896.*

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PREFACE.

LAST month I issued an appeal to the Conscience of Britain under the title of "Shall I Slay my Brother Boer?"

Although the time was short, some 60,000 copies were disposed of before the slaying began.

Now that war has broken out, the question of its justice becomes more acute. The notion that because fighting has begun, we need no longer trouble ourselves about the right or wrong of the question, is a negation of morality.

I am, therefore, issuing an appeal to the conscience of Britain in another form, which not only brings things up to date, but puts the issues in the simplest and directest fashion, in a way that will help the reader to thread his way through the maze of negotiations recorded in the Blue Books.

W. T. STEAD.

MOWBRAY HOUSE, NORFOLK STREET, W.C.

October 16th, 1899.

ARE WE IN THE RIGHT?

CHAPTER J.

THE APPEAL TO HONEST MEN.

I APPEAL to honest men, because it is only an honest man who will admit that the question whether we are in the right or wrong in this war is not in the least affected by the fact that the immediate cause of the rupture was the Boers' Ultimatum.

To those professors of unctuous rectitude, who pretend that there can be no question as to the justice of this war, because, as the *Standard* actually declared, "we are fighting in self-defence," it is idle to address any appeal based either on reason, conscience, or common sense. But there are many who are incapable of deluding themselves by such cant, and to them I appeal.

Are we in the right in this war? It is a question worth considering. It is not settled by waving the Union Jack,—not even by chanting "Rule Britannia." The attempt to silence its consideration by brutal violence and rowdy clamour is well calculated to give pause to all reflecting men. The Jewish mob which cried out "Crucify Him! Crucify Him!" imagined that they had effectually carried their point. They gained their immediate end no doubt. Not even the pleading voice of the Roman judge could be heard above the din. They got their way and secured the Crucifixion. But it brought them an immortality of infamy, and afforded us the supreme example of the murderous results which are apt to follow when the stormy clamour of an excited mob is allowed to silence the still small voice of reason and justice.

What is the first condition of just judgment? Is it not ability to put ourselves in our brother's place, to consider what we should do if we were standing in his shoes, and then when we have, with a sympathetic imagination, examined the facts, to judge him as we should wish ourselves to be judged?

Put yourself in President Kruger's place, and ask whether you would not do exactly as President Kruger has done—only more so—so far as relates to the Ultimatum. The case is clear as daylight. There is fortunately no dispute as to the facts. Which side is right or which is wrong in the controversy may for the moment be ignored, for the intrinsic merits of the dispute do not affect the simple question which must first be disposed of.

The Boers, rightly or wrongly, believe, and are prepared to die rather than abandon their belief, that the Convention of 1884 did, in the words of successive English statesmen, from Lord Derby to Mr. Chamberlain,

guarantee them an absolute right of internal self-government, which forbade any interference by Great Britain in their affairs.

The British Government, rightly or wrongly, believes that—despite Mr. Chamberlain's explicit repudiation of any right to interfere to force upon the Transvaal reforms in the internal affairs of the State—the time has come when it must for the protection of its subjects interfere directly in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, and finding its interference resented proceeds to enforce its demands by the despatch of horse, foot, and artillery for the avowed purpose of compelling the Boers to submit.

Every additional soldier sent to South Africa since the Bloemfontein Conference was sent out admittedly and avowedly as a menace to President Kruger, in order to induce him by the display of armed force to permit us to dictate our own terms as to the way in which his country should be governed. It is not generally known in this country that as long ago as last August the Boers were plainly told by the British Agent at Pretoria that we should make war upon them if they refused to concede the five years' franchise. The fact, however, stands on record in Mr. Conyngham Greene's telegram of 15th August which is found in Blue Book, C. 9521, page 45. After describing how the State-Attorney came to see him about the franchise, he says:—

I spoke to him very seriously. I explained that I had no idea whether Her Majesty's Government would consent not to press their demand (for the joint inquiry); but that the situation was most critical, and that Her Majesty's Government who had given pledges to the Uitlanders, *would be bound to assert their demands and, if necessary, to press them by force.* I said that the only chance for the South African Republic Government was an immediate surrender to the Bloemfontein minimum."

Thus we see that the Transvaal Government is strictly accurate when in its Manifesto it declares:—

"Great Britain has offered two alternatives—a Five years' franchise or War."

Whether the Boers or the British were right in their original contention, no one questions the fact that the despatch of thousands of armed men from the inexhaustible store of our Imperial resources to the frontiers of the Transvaal was a menace of war. "Do what we tell you, or it will be worse for you! If you don't give in we shall send thousands and ever more thousands of soldiers to surround you, to throttle you, and to compel you to submit." That was our policy. A glance at any of our war-organs will prove the matter beyond doubt. The Boers bore it patiently for a time. But at last they were driven, first to remonstrate, and then to declare that the despatch of any more troops, or a refusal to withdraw those already sent to overawe them, must be regarded as a Declaration of War. And because they did this, we are told that they began the war, and we are fighting in self-defence!

Put ourselves in their place. Imagine that the French had a difference of opinion with us, say as to the evacuation of Egypt.

Our declarations and our pledges on that subject were quite as explicit and as precise—to say the very least—as anything the Boers ever promised about the Outlanders. Suppose that the French intimated that in their judgment the time had come for us to fulfil our obligations, to keep our word, and to clear out of the Nile Valley. We should, of course, object. Suppose, then, that France began despatching ironclad after ironclad to lie off the Suez Canal; suppose that she avowed her intention and had the means to send a fleet twice as strong as any we could muster to Alexandria, with an army large enough to sweep Egypt from the Mediterranean to Omdurman, how long should we be in discovering that such action on the part of France made her the aggressor, and justified us in stopping it by an immediate challenge and

ultimatum? No State in the world would consider itself bound to wait until its neighbour brought up overpowering forces with the avowed object of coercion.

If a highwayman presents a pistol at your head, you do not become the aggressor if you throw up his hand.

Hence I address my Appeal to men honest enough to admit that the Boer's Ultimatum in no way affects the question as to the right or wrong of this war.

If we had been in President Kruger's place we should with one consent have been declaring that the Ultimatum was forced from us by the deliberate and calculated aggression of a State determined to destroy our independence. This is so obvious that argument is wasted upon those who have not sufficient tincture of the elementary virtue of honesty to admit it at once without reserve.

To those honest men and to those alone I address myself. As for the others who in the vein of Mr. Pecksniff are protesting that they are reluctantly driven to make war in self-defence, we might as well discuss the Ten Commandments with a pirate, or discourse to a burglar upon the Sermon on the Mount.

The merits of a policy leading to war, and of a policy which has, unfortunately, culminated in war, are no more affected by the question as to which party first took the responsibility of challenging the intentions of the other, than the merits of the dispute between the American colonists and George III. was affected by the question as to which fired the first shot in the Revolutionary War.

Having thus disposed of the controversy as to the Ultimatum, without more delay I proceed to discuss the question "Are we in the Right in this war?"

CHAPTER II.

CAUSE FOR MISGIVINGS.

WHEN we are summoned to go to war we need always to be reminded that we are sitting as judges in our own case. This is true in all wars, and of both parties to the dispute. It should make us very cautious before accepting the complacent assumptions of flattering self-love or the promptings of interested motive. We need to search narrowly to see that no essential fact is overlooked, that full justice is done to the case of our opponents, and that we have successfully eliminated all prejudice, passion or selfish feeling before pronouncing judgment.

Before we decide to pass what is equivalent to a death sentence upon a foreign state in friendly treaty relations with Her Majesty, we surely ought to approach the discussion of the question with an anxious, nay even a tormenting desire to ascertain whether we are in solemn sad reality shut up to this solution and no other of the question at issue.

If the matter in dispute involved but the life and liberty of one single man, even if he were the basest and wickedest of mankind, the conscience of mankind would not merely demand, but insist, upon suspension of judgment until everything that can be urged by the accused in his own defence had been fully heard, and a verdict returned by a jury of impartial men, who were no parties to the suit, who had no personal animus against the prisoner, and who, above all, had no hope of profit by his condemnation.

How much more, then, is it incumbent upon us to banish from the Judgment Seat whose verdict may doom not one single man, but hundreds and thousands, to a violent death, all motives of passion and prejudice, of personal resentment, or of Imperial ambition, in order that the capital sentence may not be passed, until we have at least afforded the threatened State the irreducible minimum of security against mistaken judgment which the law guarantees the red-handed murderer.

I put it to my reader as an honest man, has this been done? We have had tumultuous and passionate gatherings in Trafalgar Square. Peace meetings have been broken up. Every device known to unscrupulous journalism has been used to excite prejudice against the Boer. Everything, in short, has been done to inflame popular passion and distort judgment, to an extent which would instantly vitiate the legality of any trial in any tribunal in which it was permitted.

The unbridled indulgence in all manner of appeals not to the reason but to the passion of our people, the hoarse cry of vengeance for Majuba, and the cynical reliance upon the coarsest instincts of Imperial ambition and national selfishness, are the most patent features of the present situation. They are the first reason for misgivings whether or not we are in the right in this quarrel. We may be, or we may not be. But we certainly have not taken

the elementary precaution to avoid being misled by the fool-frenzy of popular passion or the sinister promptings of self-interest.

The second cause for grave misgivings is that our history in the past has shown a long and melancholy list of wars into which we have plunged in haste, to repent at leisure with the melancholy reflection that we had made a disastrous and a criminal mistake. Whatever may be said as to the popularity of the present war, its popularity is not to be compared with the popularity of the Crimean War. All the false prophets, as in 1853-54, were noisily blatant in their declarations as to the divine duty of going forth to war with Russia. Micaiah had an even worse time fifty years ago than he has to-day. Zedekiah, the son of Chanaanah, and all the company of the false prophets who lured Ahab to his doom at Ramoth Gilead, combined their forces to launch us into that fatal war.

It was disguised, as this attack on the Transvaal is disguised, as a war in vindication of human liberty, of lofty morality, and the progress of mankind. We now know that "we backed the wrong horse." The war gave a new lease of life to the hideous despotism of the Sultan; it dealt a death-blow to the hopes of a whole generation of Eastern Christians; it cost the lives of 500,000 men; entailed an expenditure of £250,000,000. It began an era of armaments and war, and it shunted Russia through Central Asia on to India. It is difficult to conceive of any war which contrived more absolutely to defeat every high-flown aspiration of those who hounded us into it, than the war in the Crimea. To this day we are still reaping its inexhaustible harvest of mischief. Having made such an irreparable mistake less than half a century since, we shall indeed do well to look carefully lest once again we may not be committing a similar blunder, and perpetrating under the same pharisaic benedictions a similar crime.

We appear to have come round to the period when our nation seems doomed to make an unjust war. Once in twenty years the temptation to slaughter seems to assail with irresistible force great masses of our people. What happened in the Crimean War every one remembers. But little more than twenty years after the Peace of Paris the Jingo fever broke out savagely in our midst. Thanks to Mr. Gladstone its worst consequences were averted. But in Afghanistan we waged two long, bloody and disastrous wars, in which, after slaughtering thousands, and spending millions, we were glad to evacuate a country which it was criminal lunacy to invade. Once more we have reached the moment of fatality. Twenty-one years ago Lord Lytton and Lord Salisbury made war upon the Ameer of Afghanistan. Sir Alfred Milner and Lord Salisbury are now making war upon the President of the South African Republic. The recurrence of the period when John Bull seems to go "must," like an old elephant, is an additional cause for looking well to our path.

I lay no stress upon the fact that many leading statesmen who have held high office under the Crown, and who in all probability will hold high office again, have declared this war to be unnecessary, and therefore criminal. Their criticisms will be discounted by the imputation of party motives. But while laying no stress upon their impeachment, it is at least worth remembering that while the Opposition naturally opposes, that fact neither vitiates the force of its arguments nor weakens the value of its exposition of the facts. Even if we minimise the importance of any Liberal criticisms, the fact that Sir E. Clarke, Mr. Morley, Sir W. Harcourt, Sir H. Campbell Bannerman, Sir R. Reid, and Mr. Bryce should all have united in condemning the policy which led to war should not be forgotten.

But in estimating the probabilities of the question under discussion there

is one element which must profoundly disturb the complacency even of the most moderate optimist. This is that the policy which has brought on the war is a policy which has been repudiated and denounced in advance by the very Minister who is now responsible for its adoption. In my previous pamphlet I reproduced the exact words in which Mr. Chamberlain denounced as "immoral and unwise" the very policy which has landed us in war. I quoted his public declaration that he would never be a party to the very policy which has brought about this war. Mr. Chamberlain, no doubt, has changed his mind. It is a habit of his so frequently indulged in as to suggest that his right name is Chameleon, not Chamberlain. But the fact that the policy which, down to this very year, he publicly declared was the only sound, moral, safe, and wise policy, has now been abandoned, with the immediate result that we are confronted by a war in which we have to face every evil which he then predicted, ought to give us pause. Can a policy be right now which was publicly demonstrated to be so abominably wrong in 1896 and in 1897? Circumstances alter cases, no doubt. But if we had no right to offer President Kruger anything more than "friendly counsel" in 1896, how comes it that we have now a right to do what successive Secretaries of State have constantly repudiated, viz., to go to war to force reforms upon a State with whose internal government we have admitted over and over again we have no right to interfere?

Another reason for entertaining grave misgivings as to the justice of our quarrel is the fact that even if we are right, the letter of the law is unmistakably against us. We guaranteed the Boers complete freedom and independence in their internal affairs. The Convention of 1884 is absolutely clear on this point. Lord Derby, who negotiated it, assured the Boers when he signed it, "Your Government will be left free to govern the country without interference." He reported to the Acting High Commissioner at the Cape that the Convention granted "the same complete internal independence in the Transvaal as in the Free State." Mr. W. H. Smith, when leader of the Government in the House of Commons, declared in the most positive fashion:—

It is a cardinal principle of that settlement (the Convention of 1884) that the internal government and legislation of the South African Republic shall not be interfered with.

Mr. Balfour in 1896 (January 15th) declared that "the Transvaal is a free and independent Government as regards its internal affairs;" and Lord Salisbury sixteen days later declared explicitly that "the Boers have absolute control over their own internal affairs."

The war has been brought about by a departure from this "cardinal principle," and by an assertion of a right to dictate both as to legislation and administration in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. This may be all right; but the Boers have a strong *prima facie* case that it is anything but right. The war may be just or unjust, but there is no doubt at all that it is directly and immediately due to what is, on the surface, at any rate, an absolute reversal of the principles which have heretofore been recognised as binding upon us.

When we come to ask on whose authority this revolution in our South African policy was brought about, we are confronted by an astounding fact, one which indeed more than justifies the very worst misgivings honest men entertain with regard to this war. We are told that it is Sir Alfred Milner's war, and we must accept it on his authority,

But those who make the appeal forget that the fact that we are at war not merely with the Transvaal, but with the Orange Free State, is the final,

conclusive and absolutely unanswerable refutation which facts have made to the claim of Sir Alfred Milner to be regarded as a man who knows what he is dealing with. Until war broke out there was a chance that Sir Alfred Milner's reputation might survive. Now it has disappeared. He has been weighed in the balances, and has been found wanting. We gave him a free hand. We clapped the telescope to our blind eye in order to let him do as he pleased without criticism, much less control. Never was any High Commissioner more blindly trusted, more loyally supported. We thought we could trust him to know the kind of men he was dealing with, and that he saw his way to keep South Africa in peace. We can think that no more. He has led us into a bloody quagmire by assurances that we had only to follow him unhesitatingly to come out safe and sound and dry on the other side. Every prediction the Milnerite party made has been falsified by the fact. Mr. Chamberlain has himself no small cause for resentment at the way in which he was misled by the High Commissioner as to the possibility of pursuing a policy of bluff without having to pay the penalty of war. From Cape Town there came to London a constant flood of pacific assurances. "I give you my word of honour," said the fogleman of the bluffers, "that I am not playing for war." Nearly every mail brought the most vehement declarations that if we only gave Milner his head there would be no war. Mr. Chamberlain repeated these assurances to the Cabinet. Nay, it is even said he repeated them to the leaders of the Opposition. If Ministers under Mr. Chamberlain's guidance forsook the well trodden familiar path of no interference and strict observance of the obligations of the Convention, it was because Sir Alfred Milner and his friends at Cape Town had satisfied Mr. Chamberlain that they could put the thing through without war. Believing this, Sir Alfred Milner was allowed to have his chance, and as a result he has landed us on the very war of races which it was his first duty as High Commissioner to avert. Not all the king's horses and all the king's men can ever set up Sir Alfred Milner's reputation in the opinion of his countrymen. He advised us to change our road, assuring us that he would take us a short cut across ice which was quite strong enough to bear our weight. We believed him. We left the old road. We ventured upon the thin ice at his bidding. It has not supported our weight. On the contrary, it has broken under our feet, and we are now floundering in the waters. "Milner, I love thee, but never more be an officer of mine." Never again can we trust his judgment, or pay the slightest regard to his diagnosis of a political situation.

The first fundamental question to be asked of anyone in Sir Alfred's position is whether or not he can discern the real nature of the forces with which he is dealing. The essential question in this Transvaal business was whether you could bluff or bully or squeeze President Kruger into conceding what we demanded, without going to war. Milner evidently believed we could. Mr. Rhodes certainly proclaimed aloud that we could. But the result proves that on this fundamental vital fact upon which everything turned, they did not know their man. They have put their judgment to the test, and it has proved to be worthless.

If, in May last, Sir Alfred Milner had told the Cabinet that he was going to take up a new policy in the Transvaal which would compel them to summon Parliament in October, call out the reserves, ask for £10,000,000 vote of credit, and necessitate the dispatch of 70,000 men to South Africa, they would have dismissed him on the spot rather than face such a prospect. But they were never warned. They were indeed continuously deceived: honestly, no doubt, for Sir Alfred Milner first misled himself. But the facts having proved the High Commissioner to be utterly incapable of appreciating the funda-

mental factor of the situation, how can any honest man fail to feel grave misgivings as to a policy launched under such auspices which, at its very inception, has falsified all the predictions of its author?

Finally, to all other causes for misgivings as to the justice of our quarrel add this. That in the opinion of every outsider we are as hopelessly, and as manifestly, in the wrong as the French General Staff were in their quarrel with Alfred Dreyfus. We may, of course, scoff at the opinion of the foreigner, when it is adverse to ourselves. We sang a very different tune when the opinion of the foreigner condemned the persecutors of Dreyfus.

Then the amazing uniformity of the opinion of everyone outside France was acclaimed as an overwhelming demonstration of the unanimity of the opinion of the intelligence and conscience of mankind. It will hardly do immediately after magnifying the opinion of foreigners in the case of Dreyfus to belittle it when, as it happens, it is equally unanimous in condemning us in the case of the Transvaal. We may not like it, but the fact remains.

Outside the English-speaking world there is only one opinion as to the criminality of our policy in the Transvaal. Opinions may differ as to whether we are animated by lust of gold, Imperial ambition, or a desire for vengeance, but there is no difference of opinion as to the turpitude of our conduct. That we have deliberately plotted to bring about this war in order that we may steal their country from the Boers is an article of faith even among our warmest friends on the Continent. It is strange, if our conduct is actuated solely by such noble, self-sacrificing motives of the loftiest morality, that our good should be everywhere so evil spoken of. The fact, however, is unfortunately only too manifest. If the voice of the foreigner anticipates the verdict of posterity, then we have a poor look-out at the hands of History. For the verdict of the foreigner is that in levying war on the Transvaal, Britain is acting as the Pharisaic Pirate of the World.

For all these reasons therefore it seems to me that an honest man anxious to do justice, and to avoid imbruing his hand in his brother's blood may well feel more than dubious as to the answer he should return to the question:—
Are we in the right in this war?

CHAPTER III.

WRONGS "INTOLERABLE," AND OTHERWISE.

It is often asked by indignant patriots whether we are indifferent to the wrongs of our fellow countrymen in the Transvaal. They seem to imply that those who object to light up the flames of a civil and servile war in South Africa are shamefully lacking in the sense of obligation to the cause of humanity. It is true that the headstrong blundering of would-be redressers of the wrongs of the Outlanders has already inflicted upon those Outlanders a thousand times more wretchedness than Boer misgovernment would have caused them in ten years to come ; but I do not insist upon that point. It will take a great deal of redress born of franchise to make up to the helpless crowd of 50,000 refugees at Cape Town, now being fed from day to day by public charity, the hardships which they are enduring as the result of Mr. Chamberlain's policy.

What I would rather dwell upon is the comparative urgency of rival claims upon our philanthropic zeal. The Outlanders in the Transvaal are not the only people in the world whom it is our duty to defend and whose grievances we ought, if possible, to redress. To hear some people talk the Outlanders are the only class of persons in the whole wide world who suffer from unjust laws and tyrannous oppression. But the fact is otherwise. There are many people to whom we are under solemn obligations whose sufferings are immeasurably greater than those of the Outlanders. Yet to-day no one says a word as to our duty to them. It may be worth while recalling briefly some facts which are at present completely ignored.

Lord Rosebery speaks of the "intolerable conditions of subjection and injustice" to which the Outlanders are subjected in the Transvaal. The conditions are not good, but to speak of them as "intolerable" is to trifle with the English language. Not only were they tolerable, but every Outlander in the Transvaal has shown by his presence there that he is willing and able to tolerate them. They do not like them any more than they like the African sun, but they put up with both for the sake of the golden treasure found beneath the soil.

They are part of the disagreeables of life, part of the price which they pay and are willing to pay for the chance of making their fortunes in the El Dorado of Africa. Paradoxical though it may sound, it is nevertheless perfectly true that the Outlanders, one and all, would regard it as a far more intolerable grievance to be shut out from the Transvaal than to be compelled to submit to the very worst wrongs for which they seek redress.

No Outlander need be in the Transvaal unless he deliberately chooses it as his residence. Most of them have travelled thousands of miles by sea and land in order to take up their abode under the very conditions of subjection and injustice which Lord Rosebery describes as "intolerable," and none of them have shown any passionate desire to risk their lives in order to purchase their liberties.

Not only are the Outlanders one and all voluntary victims of Boer "subjection and injustice," but there are very few of them. They are, all told, not more than 150,000, of whom the adult British subjects sufficiently aggrieved to sign the Petition to the Queen only number 23,000. Of these there are very few who are not very much better off than they were at home.

Mr. Morley's description of the lot of these victims of intolerable "subjection and injustice," taken from a letter written by an M.P. in Africa, is worth quoting here:—

The Transvaal labourer is more or less content to go on with his high wages of from 15s to £2 a day. The return of the wages for 1898 gives an average of over £1 a day to each white man, and 80 per cent. of them have rooms in addition free, and though living is dear yet the figures leave a large margin to put by or send home. With these earnings the worker is naturally fairly satisfied, for the political condition does not yet, to his knowledge, touch him. He has not yet suffered much, if at all, from the way the law is administered; he does not yet directly feel taxation, and he has rather a dread of a change which, while bringing rest and progress, might, he fancies, and possibly with truth, tend to lower prices, and with that wages.

When we come to examine into the conditions of "subjection and injustice" which are so "intolerable," what do we find? That it takes under the new franchise law about twelve months longer for a foreigner to get a vote in the Transvaal than he would in this country! When he gets his vote he can elect, not only members for the Second Volksraad, but for the First and also for the President and Commandant-General—a privilege never allowed to naturalised foreigners in this country. As for taxation, he pays 10 per cent. on his imports, whereas the Cape and Natal charge 15 per cent. His police is perhaps as corrupt as that of New York—although that is doubtful, and the Ring that battens on monopolies and concessions is no worse than Tammany Hall. They have a press practically free almost to the point of license, absolute freedom of religion, and open courts.

Not even the worst enemies of the Boers allege that any Outlander women have suffered outrage at their hands, and as for attacks on life, the fact that for twelve months past the Outlanders can only point to the deaths of Edgar and Mrs. Applebee is the most conclusive proof that the Transvaal is singularly free from the worst form of violent crime. Probably this immunity from murder would not continue if the Outlanders were permitted greater license in the procuring of weapons, but we need not enter into that. The Outlanders belong to all nationalities. It is only our own British Outlanders who make serious complaints of subjection and injustice. So far from regarding the Transvaal Government as an intolerable tyranny, Americans, Irish, Germans, Dutch, and French Outlanders have volunteered to fight in the ranks of the Boers against our soldiers. Not a single Government in the whole world has deemed the wrongs of its subjects in the Transvaal worth even a diplomatic representation. Everybody in the world, excepting ourselves, agrees that the state of things in the Transvaal, although far from ideal, is certainly not bad enough to call for any interference from without.

Yet, in order to redress these most "intolerable" wrongs suffered by a mere handful of voluntary victims, we are spending £10,000,000, and putting into the field a larger army than we sent to the Crimea. And Lord Rosebery says we must "close our ranks" and say nothing in criticism of this astonishing enterprise.

Leaving this well-to-do handful of self-sacrificed victims in Johannesburg, let us turn our gaze eastward, to another class of victims whose sufferings are so much greater than those of the Outlanders that it is almost an outrage to name them in the same breath. In Macedonia there are living at present

not 100,000, but a million and a half fellow Christians under the direct rule of the Turk, who but for our action at the Congress of Berlin would have been free self-governing citizens of the Principality of Bulgaria. For objects of our own, we thrust them back into servitude. Russia had freed them. England with the ready aid of Austria re-enslaved them. But as a salve to our conscience we undertook the responsibility of seeing that they were provided with some kind of autonomous institutions which would secure their lives, their property, and the honour of their women from the lawless outrages of the Turk. It is 21 years since we solemnly undertook that obligation. Repeatedly in more or less ineffectual fashion we have admitted our responsibility to the wretched Macedonians. But from 1878 to 1899 nothing has been done. The Pasha and the Bashi Bazouk are as supreme in Macedonia to-day as they were before the great war of Liberation. Nor is Macedonia the only region where there are grievances crying aloud for redress a thousand-fold more grievous than the worst that is alleged against the Boers. Have we already forgotten Armenia?

The tragedy of that unhappy race was only a year or two ago painfully familiar to us all. Within the last few years the Turks and their Kurdish allies have massacred more Armenians than all the Outlanders who are claiming the franchise in the Transvaal. In the same period, Armenian women more than twice or thrice the number to the whole female Outlander population in the Transvaal have been subjected to the last extremity of bestial outrage at the hands of savages whose lust was whetted by fanaticism. These wretches were our proteges in a far more real sense than is the Outlander who wanders to the Rand to make his fortune.

The Armenians and Macedonians number probably a hundredfold the total number of British subjects in the Transvaal. Not one of them is where he is by his own deliberate choice. They were born in the land where they suffer, and escape for all but a few individuals is impossible. They are denied all the liberties which the Outlanders possess. They are robbed by extortionate tax-gatherers, and fleeced by a lawless soldiery, without hope of redress in the Courts. They are treated as dogs by every strolling Moslem; proscribed, hunted, persecuted, they are of all men most miserable. Here, indeed, are conditions of subjection and injustice "intolerable," if you please.

But when all England, thrilled with agonised sympathy for the wrongs, the really intolerable wrongs of these fellow Christians of ours, who owe their miserable plight to the meddling and mischievous diplomacy of our own Government, Lord Rosebery clapped an extinguisher upon the agitation. For Lord Rosebery recoiled in horror from war, even from the risk of war when it was a question of delivering millions from the bondage of Hell. He may have been right.

War is too terrible an argument to be lightly employed even to save millions of men and women from the atrocities of the Turks. But now when war is being let loose in order to redress the two-penny-halfpenny grievances of a handful of Englishmen who have voluntarily expatriated themselves for the sake of making money, Lord Rosebery says—what?—"In face of this attack (*sic!*) the nation will I doubt not close its ranks, and relegate party controversy to a more convenient season!" Lord Rosebery should surely leave this kind of thing to the Pecksniffs of Patriotism. "Attack" forsooth!

How eloquently Lord Rosebery discoursed in former days upon the "Angel of Death, which would appear in every hamlet, every village, every town of the United Kingdom to summon your sons or brothers, the flower of your youth and manhood, to lose their lives in this European conflagration."

We could well have done with a little of the same pious zeal in protest against the new war, the first which we have waged with white men since the Crimea. As for the unfortunate Macedonians and Armenians—what chance is there now of our being able to ameliorate their miserable lot? To lock up 70,000 of our best fighting men in South Africa by a policy which confirms every foreign Power in the conviction that we are absolutely untrustworthy is the very worst way in the world to help the Christians of the East. All our energies, all our attention will be absorbed in the civil war which Mr. Chamberlain has kindled in South Africa. And so, in order to smooth the rose leaf under one Outlander in the Transvaal we leave a score of Christians to writhe under the horrors of the despotism of the Turk.

CHAPTER IV.

HOW THE WAR CAME ABOUT.

IN this chapter I confine myself to simply stating with the utmost brevity the rock upon which the negotiations foundered.

Let it be taken for granted that the Outlanders in the Transvaal had many grievances, and let it be also admitted that the best way of redressing these grievances was to give them the franchise, which in the Transvaal means giving them not only the ballot, but the Mauser rifle and as many cartridges as they want. This, at least, was Sir Alfred Milner's opinion, and we all accepted his dictum as the word of infallible wisdom.

About ten years ago the Transvaal Government, finding itself flooded with gold seekers of all nationalities, raised the period of residence necessary to qualify for citizenship from five years to fourteen.

No protest was made against this by the British Government. It was recognised as a matter lying absolutely within the discretion of the South African Republic. Neither were any protest made when national obstacles were placed in the way of the Outlander seeking citizenship. When in 1894 Lord Ripon offered the friendly counsel that the franchise should be given after five years' residence, the advice was not acted upon. In the next year the conspiracy at Johannesburg indisposed the Boers still more towards a policy of enfranchisement.

When Sir Alfred Milner met President Kruger at Bloemfontein in May, the term of residence necessary to qualify for the franchise was still fourteen years. The President had been discussing with the burghers the policy of reducing it to nine. A nine years' franchise, he said, would raise the number of burghers from 30,000 to 70,000. When he met Milner at Bloemfontein he was confronted with a demand for a five years' franchise, and at least seven seats in the Volksraad. He hesitated, but after a while came down to a seven years' franchise with limitations, which Milner at once declared to be unacceptable.

Nevertheless, President Kruger proposed to the Volksraad to pass his seven years' franchise Bill with many objectionable limitations. Thanks to the intervention of the Cape Dutch, the Volksraad passed the Bill in an amended shape, conferring the franchise upon all who had been seven years in the country. President Kruger is said to have estimated this would add 50,000 new burghers to the electoral roll.

Mr. Chamberlain welcomed the new law as affording a basis for settlement, and proposed that a Mixed Commission should be appointed to ascertain whether the new law did in truth give immediate and substantial representation to the Outlanders.

The Boers, after bringing forward an alternative proposition, which Mr. Chamberlain rejected, accepted Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, only to be told that the Government had gone back on their word, and repudiated the very proposal which they had made six weeks before.

The whole story of this discreditable change of front is told in another chapter. Here it is sufficient to say that this going back by Mr. Chamberlain on his own word was the last stroke which made war inevitable.

Ministers may make excuses as they please. The facts on record convict them of having made proposals which were no sooner accepted than they were cynically repudiated, and fresh and unacceptable proposals pressed upon the Boers. I do not say that this was done by the Ministers with the fixed purpose, with malice aforethought of provoking war. War, however, was the result.

Mr. Chamberlain, like Mr. Garrett, may pledge his word of honour that he was not playing for war. All that need be said is that if he was working for peace he has dismally failed in his efforts, while if he was deliberately playing for war he could not have played a very different game from that which has plunged South Africa into bloodshed.

CHAPTER V.

PRETEXT FOR SLAUGHTER.

WHY are we at war? Ask this question and note the answers.

(1) FOR THE FRANCHISE.

From a diplomatic point of view the answer is because Mr. Chamberlain and President Kruger, while agreeing on a Mixed Commission to inquire into the extension of the franchise necessary to give immediate and substantial representation to the Outlanders, could not agree as to the nominal point where the inquiry should begin.

President Kruger wanted it to begin at the existing seven years' franchise. This Mr. Chamberlain accepted in July as a "basis of settlement," and repudiated in September in order to insist upon the inquiry beginning with a five years' franchise as a basis.

Common sense would surely have suggested that as there was agreement that the franchise should be fixed so as to enfranchise immediately a substantial number of Outlanders, and also an agreement to have the matter investigated by a Mixed Commission on the spot, there was no need to quarrel over the point from which we should begin our inquiries.

Get the Mixed Commission to work, and let it make a report as to how many Outlanders would be enfranchised if the period of residence was fixed at one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven years. Then if those enfranchised by the existing law were not numerous enough, we should know exactly how much the term would need to be shortened to bring up the number of new Outlander burghers to the desired standard.

Hence we are to slay our brother because Mr. Chamberlain, having got from the Boers an acceptance of his proposition for a Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise, went back upon his word, and refused to appoint the Mixed Commission, unless it had, as its starting point, the concession of a five years' residential franchise.

Is that good enough for the Day of Judgment? When our brother's blood cries to Heaven, like the blood of Abel, against us, will it stand us in good stead to say, We slew him because Mr. Chamberlain would not stand to his word, and raised his demands as soon as President Kruger had given in to his proposition?

A thimblerrigging diplomacy is a poor justification for wholesale homicide.

But from the point of view of diplomacy the actual matter of quarrel is this difference about the five years or the seven years as the point from which the Commission of Inquiry should begin.

Is that not too thin to justify our cutting our brothers' throats?

Let us look at the matter from a practical point of view.

The difference between the number enfranchised by a five and a seven

years' franchise may possibly be 10,000. It would probably be much less, but let us admit the larger number.

If we had accepted President Kruger's proposition, 10,000 Outlanders might have had to wait till 1901 before they got the franchise, instead of getting it this year. That is the very outside estimate of the difference it would make.

Do you think that is sufficient to justify us in killing the 10,000 able-bodied men who will perish in this war? To send 10,000 men to bloody graves in order that 10,000 other men may have the franchise two years earlier than they would have it under the existing law?

And who are the men who propose this horrible holocaust?

Who are these Reformers in such a desperate hurry that they would purchase the immediate enfranchisement of 10,000 Outlanders by the slaughter of 10,000 men?

They are the men who blocked the extension of franchise to our own people for years, and who, by their opposition to a reform of registration laws are preventing the enfranchisement of far more Englishmen in England than all the Outlanders, men, women, and children, in the Transvaal.

When you hear people talk about the franchise as an excuse for war, remember it means the sacrifice of a life for a vote.

Had we not better let 10,000 men have waited two years longer for their vote rather than have hurried up registration of the new voters by deluging South Africa with blood?

The case is even stronger than that. The Outlanders are not all British subjects. The crux of the whole question was the wrongs of the British subjects in the Transvaal. Their number is unknown, but as 21,684 signed the petition to the Queen this may be taken as representing their total strength. Of these 21,684 about 5 per cent. were women who have no votes even in England. Sir Alfred Milner estimates that three-fourths only were men of pure European race.—(Blue Book 9345, p. 184.) Many of the signatures were obviously in the same handwriting—a phenomenon ingeniously attributed to the use of the same fountain pen! But allowing these to stand, we have about 15,000 male Englishmen above sixteen years of age for whom we have been summoned to go to war. It is probably an outside estimate to conclude that one-half of them had any intention of settling in the Transvaal. One-half at least will return after they had made their little pile. That leaves 7,500 persons who might be eligible for the franchise if it were given freely to every adult male. It is very doubtful whether more than half this remnant has been five years in the Transvaal, but let us admit that there were so many—say, 4000, who would have been entitled to full burgherhood if the Bloemfontein irreducible minimum had been conceded. At least one-half of these 4000 would have been enfranchised by the seven years' franchise law, and the other half would have been enfranchised two years later. Therefore it comes to this, that the party which made the English working man wait many weary years for the franchise in his own country, is now spending £10,000,000 and preparing to slay 10,000 men in order to compel President Kruger to give the franchise to 2000 British subjects in 1899 instead of 1901!

That in simple figures is what this war for the franchise comes to when we cipher it out. Ten thousand men to be killed to give 2000 other men the vote two years sooner than they would get it under the existing law. For this £10,000,000 each of the Outlander's deprived of a vote might have received a bounty of £5,000 in consideration of postponing his claim. Such a payment would have cost the British Government no more than the

£10,000,000 which is the lowest estimate of the cost of a war with the Transvaal, and it would have saved the £10,000 lives.

We might have had the five years' franchise if we would have given up the pretension that we had vague and indefinite rights of interference, based upon the suzerainty conceded in the preamble of the Convention of 1881 and given up by the Convention of 1884.

(2) FOR THE SUZERAINTY.

Lord Derby and Lord Rosmead, who negotiated the Convention of 1884, believed that they had given up the suzerainty of 1881. They told the Boers so, and the Boers accepted their word for it.

We took the word out of the Convention of 1884, because it was a vague word which no one could define, and because it offended the susceptibilities of the Boers. There is no doubt about this; Lord Derby, who was responsible for the Convention, said in the House of Lords, when he was challenged on this point:—

Then the noble earl (Earl Cadogan) said that the object of the Convention had been to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. The word "suzerainty" is a very vague word, and I do not think it is capable of any precise legal definition. Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not easy to define. But I apprehend, whether you call it a Protectorate, or suzerainty, or the recognition of England as a paramount Power, the fact is that a certain controlling power is retained when the State which exercises this suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiations into which the dependant State may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever suzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria, the condition of things which it implied still remains; although the word is not actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have abstained from using the word because it was not capable of legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word which was likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding.—(Hansard, vol. 286, p. 7, March 17th, 1884.)

Here we have it laid down (1) that the substance of suzerainty is retained in the right to veto negotiations with foreign Powers, and (2) that the word was dropped out for the very purpose of avoiding misconception and misunderstanding.

The Boers believed the word of an English statesman and minister of the Crown. From 1884 to 1897 no one ever dreamed of alluding to the survival of the suzerainty of 1881. Tories and Liberals alike treated it as dead and buried. But in 1897 Mr. Chamberlain raised its ghost from the grave, and scared the Boers with the spectre which they thought had been laid for ever.

The arguments justifying this scandalous breach of faith are worthy a Shylock. Because the suzerainty was not repudiated in set terms in a formal article it is said we are justified in reviving it, although it is not denied that the Boers consented to sign the Convention of 1884 in consideration of Lord Derby's pledged word that the suzerainty was given up.

But Shylock was more honest and straightforward than Mr. Chamberlain. As Mr. Mackarness pointed out in the *Times* of October 10:—

In order to understand the meaning of the 1884 Convention, you must find out the intention of those who were parties to the making of it, and in order to do that you must examine what they said and did at the time. Such an examination has left no doubt in my mind that Lord Derby meant the Convention of 1884 to be "substituted" for the Convention of 1881, for he said so in a letter to the Boers. It has left no doubt in my mind that the preamble in particular of the latter was meant by him to disappear, because, besides drawing a new preamble, he eliminated that and other express references to a reservation of British suzerainty with his own pen in the draft of the new treaty which he sent to the Boers, and because he made statements to the Boers and to the public wholly inconsistent with the retention of any part of the Convention of 1881. Mr. Carver, if he has read these things—of which his letter shows no trace—thinks they may all be disre-

garded. I differ from him, not merely as a lawyer, but more strongly as an Englishman who declines to believe that British statesmen like Lords Derby and Rosmead could be parties, by the use of the word "articles" in the new preamble, to a piece of "smart drafting"—as I have heard it described—to hoodwink the Boers. And if Mr. Carver is right in his startling contention that not merely the preamble, but the whole Convention of 1881 "has never ceased to operate," I cannot help asking what the unfortunate Boers gained by their new Convention in 1884. They came all the way here and spent months away from their own country only to impose upon themselves two Conventions instead of one, and to subject themselves to a suzerainty more dangerous in its indefiniteness than the one they wanted to get rid of. That they should do this with their eyes open is, of course, incredible. To me it is not less incredible that they should have been induced or allowed by Lord Derby to do it with their eyes shut.

Moreover, if Mr. Carver is right in thinking that the Conventions between Great Britain and the Transvaal Boers are to be interpreted according to the rigid rules of evidence applied by municipal Courts to ordinary written contracts, and that we are to look at nothing outside the documents themselves, he cuts away a serious part of the Government's case against the Boers. In his indictment of the Boer Government in the Commons on July 28 last Mr. Chamberlain relied strongly on a conversation between President Kruger and Sir Evelyn Wood which took place in 1881 before the Pretoria Convention, and in which the President promised that British subjects should have burgher rights. Lord Salisbury, in the Lords, also mentioned this promise. The breach of this promise was alleged by the Colonial Secretary to be one of the justifications for our present interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. But no such promise was incorporated either in the 1881 or the 1884 Conventions, and, according to Mr. Carver's view, no reference ought to be made to it.

But all agree that the suzerainty of 1881, although it scares the Boers, gives us absolutely no hold upon them which we do not possess already by virtue of the London Convention of 1884, and the general right of international law possessed by every nation to protect their subjects in foreign lands.

Why then should we sacrifice 10,000 of our brethren as a hecatomb before this unhallowed ghost which Mr. Chamberlain persists in reviving?

Is it a pretext that will avail in the great day of account that we killed our brother because he believed that we dealt honestly with him in 1884, whereas we wish to make out that we swindled him by a piece of sharp practice which would bring the blush to the cheek of an Old Bailey lawyer?

Fraud is no excuse for murder, and an attempt to cheat instead of excusing war only makes it more criminal.

(3.) THE SOVEREIGN INTERNATIONAL STATE.

But it is said that the Transvaal claims to be a Sovereign International State, and this is a defiance of Britain.

But in the first place, subject only to one limitation, the Transvaal is a Sovereign International State.

By the Convention of 1884, as Lord Derby expressly stated, "the conduct and control of foreign diplomatic intercourse" was conceded.

That gives it an international character. It is as sovereign in its international dealings, with one single exception, as the British Empire itself. It can, if it pleases, make war without saying by your leave to England. There is no higher form of the exercise of sovereignty in international relations than the levying of war. We have no check on that in the case of the South African Republic.

The only limitation—a limitation which the Boers have loyally observed—is that their treaties and engagements with foreign States must be submitted to us on completion, so that they may be vetoed by us if within six months we notify that they are in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or of any of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa.

The Transvaal was permitted by Lord Salisbury to become a party to the Geneva Convention, and will be invited as a signatory to that International Convention to take part in the next International Conference which is to revise that Convention.

Mr. Chamberlain himself defined the South African Republic in his despatch of December 31st, 1895, as "a foreign State which is in friendly treaty relations with Great Britain."

A similar interpretation of the status of the Transvaal was held by the English Courts of Justice at the trial of Dr. Jameson.

A foreign State cannot be a vassal State. It must be a sovereign International State, not absolutely sovereign, but sovereign subject to one solitary stipulation, to which the Boers have always been loyal. But even if the Boers are mistaken in the correct name by which to describe their exact political status, is that good enough reason for spending ten millions and cutting 10,000 throats? English monarchs styled themselves Kings of France for centuries after they ceased to reign over an inch of French territory. But the French did not slaughter us for that inaccuracy of nomenclature. Dare we stand before the throne of the Eternal with hands reeking with our brother's blood and justify our slaughter by the plea "I killed him because he called the South African Republic 'a Sovereign International State,' whereas we believe that he ought, as a matter of political etymology, to have said it was something else?"

(4.) PARAMOUNTCY.

We are told impatiently that all these questions are merely on the surface. The war is not a war for the franchise or the suzerainty or any other of such items of leather and prunella, it is a war to establish our ascendancy, paramountcy, supremacy, authority, preponderance, I know not what. In other words the Briton and the Boer are fighting out the question who is to be cock of the walk. It is a war of races, the struggle for power. Which is to be boss Dutchman or Englishman? So we must fight it out.

To all which incentives to the spirit of the cockpit, I reply that this is of the devil devilish, and a war for any such cause is hatched in hell. To use less theological language, I would say that the notion that either Dutchman or Englishman must sit upon the head of the other, is absolutely opposed to every principle of sound statesmanship or enlightened Government. The whole doctrine of ascendancy is utterly wrong. The fatal fascination of Protestant ascendancy has been the curse of Ireland. If we were to introduce into this country even now the notion of English paramountcy, over Scotland we should have civil war in a year. What preponderance there is in the nature of things, in superior numbers, wealth, acreage and trade, the English have over the Scotch. But is there a Scotchman living who would brook being treated as an inferior race, who was compelled to recognise the authority and paramountcy of the South Briton? And if the Scotch would not stand it, why should we expect the Dutch to tolerate any such pernicious nonsense? In South Africa the natural force of things—area of territory, number of subject races, wealth, power, enterprise, commerce, shipping, and the prestige of Imperial position—all tell in favour of the British. But the Dutch, who are our equals in numbers, who are the pioneers and the agriculturists, naturally resent the arrogance which would thrust them all into an inferior position. The only sound principle of government within our Empire is to know neither Dutchman,

Scotchman, or Englishman, but to regard all men as equally loyal subjects of the Queen.

There is not a Colony in the whole Imperial circle which would not revolt if we were to attempt to base upon our paramountcy any pretension to interfere in their internal administration. Even in South Africa, Mr. Chamberlain, for all his paramountcy, protests that he cannot compel the self-governing Colony of Natal to give the franchise to Her Majesty's Indian subjects. It is only in dealing with a free and independent Republic that he dares to demand the franchise in the name of paramountcy.

War for paramountcy is war for a phantom—a vampire phantom, and no one would sooner revolt against any attempt to enforce it than the very Outlanders themselves as soon as they got the vote.

(5.) EQUAL RIGHTS.

Paramountcy will not do. What then do we say to war for equal rights?

We are all for equal rights, even in England where a House of Lords exists as a kind of Oligarchical first Volksraad in the election of which not a single citizen has a vote; but let us discriminate a little. What does this cry for equal rights come to?

It is not a cry for equal rights for citizens of the state at all; but naturalisation of foreigners. The Transvaal gives only so much less "equal rights" as its naturalisation period exceeds that of the other states, and it is not a question of Dutch not giving equal rights to British, for the same exclusiveness prevails with regard to the Dutch British subjects from the Cape and Natal. Equal rights do exist in the Transvaal, and it is merely a question of expediency as to naturalising foreigners, not a question of right at all.

But waiving that point and accepting equal rights as meaning granting naturalisation to foreigners, let us look how the matter stands.

In all South Africa, in the Cape where the Dutch are nearly in a two to one majority, in the Free State where they are absolutely supreme, as well as in Natal and in Rhodesia, the principle of equal rights prevails universally. There is only one state where the salutary rule has not yet been applied. That state is the Transvaal. There the principle of confining political rights to one race survives as a relic of a bygone generation. It is an anachronism which exists chiefly owing to three things. One is the personality of an old man of seventy-five; the second, the impatience and arrogance of the British; and the third, the existence of the goldfields of the Rand. When Kruger passes, the system with which he is identified will break up. Even while Kruger lived, if we had treated him decently instead of constantly threatening him with extinction, and bulldozing him with an ultimatum one day and a raid the next, we could have prevented things ever coming to this pass. Even after all that has passed, a single conference with the High Commissioner broke down the fourteen years' franchise and opened the constitution to all Outlanders who had been seven years in the Republic. The goldfield, although it attracted the multitude whose inroad led the Boers to safeguard their Republic, would inevitably break down in time the rustic oligarchy of the Boers.

The inequality of races still surviving in the Transvaal was therefore a passing phenomenon. A little patience and Kruger would have been gathered to his fathers. A little persistent pressure and the Outlanders would have had the casting vote, both in the Volksraad and in the Presidential election. If the old fable of the contest between the sun and the wind as to which could first compel the traveller to part with his cloak had been taken to heart

by our authorities, equality of rights for all white races would have long ere this been in a fair way to be established in the Transvaal as it is in the Free State. That inequality has been perpetuated so long is the natural consequence of the constant menace of the extinction of their independence. To endeavour to force equality by invasion was suicidal, you might as well try to ripen pineapples by snowstorms. There is nothing in the Dutch character that is antagonistic to equal rights. The Hollanders were precursors of liberty and equality in the Old World. In the Free State, where no goldfield acts as a lodestone for all the adventurers of the world, there are no complaints of inequality. In the Transvaal, and in the Transvaal alone, the principle of inequality has found a temporary lodging. But the irresistible force of events, the law of progress, the conditions of its environment would inevitably have caused the anachronism of the Boer oligarchy to disappear like an ice floe in the Gulf Stream. But, no! The champions of British paramountcy masquerading as the crusaders of equal rights are now about to carry fire and sword into the Transvaal in order to enable the Briton to boss the Boer.

Was there ever a more colossal illustration of cant made manifest before the eye of mortal man?

(6.) VENGEANCE FOR MAJUBA.

This is the real and openly avowed motive of multitudes. Remember Majuba! is the rallying cry of the ruffians who smash up public meetings. It is the inspiring watchword with which our soldiers start for the seat of war. Because a gallant handful of British soldiers were worsted in fair fight nearly twenty years ago, we let slip the sleuth hounds of our army upon the Boer! Was there ever more unworthy motive to inspire the noble rage of a great nation. Whatever we may think of the merits of this war, no one can deny that to the most of those who exult in the prospect of battle, the dominating impulse is vengeance.

Now of this it is unnecessary to say more than that war for revenge is morally indistinguishable from wholesale murder.

(7.) FOR PANIC FEAR.

I come now to the last and the most abjectly miserable of all the pleas that are urged for this war against the Transvaal. The wolf, we are told, must really eat the lamb, because if he does not devour the lamb, the lamb will infallibly devour him. In other words the most contemptible refuge of lies in which the war party seeks shelter is the amazing assertion that the 30,000 herdsmen of the Transvaal are plotting the overthrow of the British Empire! I have heard men, otherwise sane, gravely assert that the Transvaal burghers of whose ignorance and almost incredible stupidity we hear every day, have planned the destruction of the British Empire in Africa, and the conversion of Cape Town into a Dutch Portsmouth, from which a supreme Dutch navy would steam to challenge our Empire of the Seas! There seems to be literally no limit to the self-hypnotising capacity of the human mind. The most valiant gamecock can be reduced to a condition of helpless catalepsy by a straight stroke of chalk on a board before his beak, and there are Englishmen who seem to be equally liable to a paralysis of their reason from equally trivial causes. The men who believed in the lies of Titus Oates and those who shudder at night at the thought of Jesuit conspiracies have their counterpart in the believers in this latest bugaboo of the political alarmist—the great Pan Africander Dutch plot

to erect a Dutch Republic upon the ruins of the British South African Empire! We have all marvelled at the insane terror which possessed the French who shivered at the thought of the Dreyfus syndicate. But the Jews and their millions are at least a solid reality, whereas this Dutch conspiracy is but the shadowy nightmare of the dyspeptic Jingo. That some Dutchmen in Africa have dreamed dreams of founding a great Federation of States under the shelter of the Union Jack which would be as predominantly Dutch as Quebec is predominantly French is true enough. We should despise them if they did not indulge in these political reveries. Nor should we in the least object to the realisation of their dreams if they can win their predominance. As they have won it in the Cape by proving that they were better workers, better politicians and more numerous than the British.

We no more object to Dutch supremacy in Africa, if the Dutch are the majority, than we object to French supremacy in Eastern Canada. If they are in the majority, how can they help being supreme, and how can we prevent it, except by killing them out, or by denying them the right to Parliamentary government? What we have to do is to have a little faith in the vigour of our race and the sound principles of democratic government. But the war party, finding all other pretexts fail them, have no other refuge left but this—that the English race and the British Empire are so decrepit and so weak that we cannot hope to hold South Africa, unless on any pretext or on none we proceed incontinently to put to the sword some thousands of our Dutch fellow-subjects.

Is there an honest man alive who would consent to hold South Africa on such terms?

For those who deliberately advocate war on such grounds deserve not the sceptre of Empire but the gallows of the murderer.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

I AM appealing to honest men who are in doubt as to whether this war is just. I am, therefore, most anxious to set out the matter as simply and clearly as possible, furnishing the reader in every case references to the original sources of information. I think that if anyone takes the trouble to read this pamphlet he will, at least, have a clear view of the differences which have been allowed to lead us into war. He will form his own opinion as to whether they justify the abandonment of negotiations. It is enough for me to furnish him with materials for judgment. I have been compelled to summarise and extract, but as I refer in every case to the official documents, the reader can verify for himself the accuracy of my quotations.

The subject may be said to open with Sir Alfred Milner's despatch of May 5th, in which he proclaimed the policy of demanding the franchise as "the true remedy" which would "strike at the root of all those evils."

The gist of his despatch was contained in the statement that—

The spectacle of thousands of British subjects kept permanently in the position of Helots, constantly chafing under undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her Majesty's Government for redress, steadily undermines the influence and reputation of Great Britain and the respect for the British Government within the Queen's dominions. ("Blue Book," c. 9345, p. 211.)

How many thousands were in this position of Helots, Sir Alfred Milner has not stated—because he does not know. An accurate or even approximate estimate of the number of Outlanders who are at once British subjects and political Helots, with a statement as to the number of years they have been in the country, ought surely to have been ascertained before negotiations were opened. But no authentic figures are obtainable, nor even to this moment have the High Commissioner or the Outlanders' Council afforded us anything but random guesses or hypothetical calculations as to the actual numbers of those on whose behalf we are now at war.

Sir Alfred Milner on May 22nd proposed to Mr. Chamberlain to ask President Kruger that Outlanders who had been five years in the country should have the franchise, and that they should have at least seven seats, or one-fifth of the Volksraad. (*Ib.*, p. 242.) Mr. Chamberlain approved, but recognising the possibility that President Kruger might object to such a reduction of the franchise, suggested that as an alternative proposition we should press for Home Rule for Johannesburg and the Rand. (*Ib.*, p. 243.)

The Conference between Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger began at Bloemfontein on May 31st. Sir Alfred Milner asked for the five years' franchise. President Kruger objected. He said:—

Can His Excellency not understand that if I should give in to what he proposes, I would be practically giving my land away? I have to consider my Volksraad and my burghers, principally my burghers, and if I have to go back and convince them, I must tell them that something has been given in to me, if I give in to something.

But nothing was offered him. President Kruger said he had only 30,000 burghers; he objected to their being swamped by the new-comers, who numbered from 70,000 to 100,000. (Blue Book, c. 9404, p. 19.) This, of course, was exactly what the Outlanders wanted. Mr. Rhodes in the Cape Parliament described the result of the concession of the franchise in almost the same terms as President Kruger. "There will be peace," he said, "because Mr. Kruger, yielding to irresistible force, will climb down, and be obliged to virtually deliver the Transvaal into the hands of the Outlanders."

"Practically giving my land away," says Mr. Kruger.

"Virtually delivering the Transvaal into the hands of the Outlanders," says Mr. Rhodes.

There is here at least absolute agreement as to what the effect of the concession of the five years' franchise would be and was meant to be.

It was a proposal to disestablish the Boer Government, and to hand over the government of the Transvaal to the Outlanders. In 1896 Mr. Chamberlain admitted that "there was some reason in the objection" that for Mr. Kruger an extended franchise meant political suicide, and therefore it was he proposed Home Rule for Johannesburg, a proposal to which he again reverted in May this year. But even this suggestion he submitted with the intimation that President Kruger would be right in rejecting it if he thought it would jeopardise his position.

"The question is whether President Kruger will consider that that proposal will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does he will be perfectly justified in rejecting it."

Sir Alfred Milner, in his conversation with President Kruger, endeavoured to reassure him on this point. He said when proposing the five years' franchise:—

There are two things I have to consider. I have got to consider the prejudices of the old burghers. I know that even if I were to convince the President himself, he might have difficulty in convincing other people; therefore I must in proposing anything, propose something which it can be made absolutely clear to the old burghers will not swamp them. (*Ib.* p. 51.)

Unfortunately he never succeeded in making it absolutely clear even to President Kruger that the old burghers would not be swamped.

If His Excellency would only see that difficulty and bear in mind how small our number of burghers is. They paid for that country by their blood, and they would be outvoted if your proposal was accepted.

His Excellency.—They would not be outvoted by my plan.

President.—I know they will be outvoted; they work with money which they use freely, and we would be outvoted. (*Ib.* p. 41.)

After much hesitation President Kruger at last offered to go halfway to meet the friendly counsels of Sir Alfred Milner. He offered to reduce the term of residence from 14 years to 7, provided that he was allowed to limit the concession by as many limitations as Mr. Disraeli proposed to limit the operation of household suffrage in his first Reform Bill. Mr. Kruger is a typical Conservative, and he acted exactly as our Tories have always done when confronted by a demand to extend the franchise. He fought shy of it, opposed it altogether at first, then proposed to make illusory concessions, and finally, steady pressure being kept up, gave way altogether. Unfortunately, not even his surrender was able to save him from his foes.

The following were the limitations by which Mr. Kruger spoiled the effect of his offer (*Ib.* p. 52):—

In the first place, every new-comer had to register himself within fourteen days after his arrival. He could then obtain naturalisation after two years on

complying with the following conditions : (1) Six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalisation. (2) Two years' continuous registration. (3) Residence in the South South African Republic during that period. (4) No dishonouring sentence. (5) Proof of obedience to the laws : no act against Government or Independence. (6) Proof of full state citizenship and franchise or title thereto in former country. (7) Possession of unmortgaged fixed property to the value of £150, or occupation of house rented at £50, or yearly income of at least £200. (8) An oath similar to that of the Orange Free State.

After being naturalised, in five years they could obtain the full franchise on condition of : (first) continuous registration for five years after naturalisation : (secondly) continuous residence during that period, &c.

Residents in the Transvaal before 1890, who naturalised themselves within six months after the passing of the proposed new law, could obtain the full franchise in two years after naturalisation. This was as far as President Kruger declared he could go.

Sir Alfred Milner naturally refused to accept a seven years' franchise so limited, as meeting the necessities of the case. This Conference broke up, and each negotiator went home.

Mr. Kruger went to Pretoria and on June 12th he introduced a franchise Bill with nine years' retrospective and seven years' prospective qualifications. (Blue Book, C. 9415, p. 240.) He also proposed to limit the concession by the stipulations to which the High Commissioner had objected. The Bill was treated by the Volksraad as Mr. Disraeli's Reform Bill was treated by the House of Commons. Acting under the influence of the Cape Dutch and the Orange Free State, the majority in the Volksraad re-modelled the Bill ; made it seven years' both retrospective and prospective, and stripped it of some of the limitations and conditions which robbed it of its value.

On July 17th, speaking with reference to the plan proposed to the Volksraad and approved by it, Mr. Chamberlain said :—"These proposals are in advance of previous concessions, and leave only a difference of two years between Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger. Happily, each new scheme seems to be an advance on that which preceeded it, and Her Majesty's Government hope that the latest proposals may prove a basis of settlement on the lines laid down by Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein." What was wanted, he explained, was "a substantial and immediate representation of the Outlanders, such as will enable them to put forward their views and grievances, to secure that public opinion shall be directed to them, and perhaps in the long run to obtain satisfaction and sufficient redress."

Mr. Chamberlain then proposed that the two governments should unite in appointing a Mixed Commission of Inquiry to ascertain whether the new law really did secure for the Outlanders that "substantial and immediate representation" which Sir Alfred Milner insisted upon.

The Boers did not like this suggestion. They remembered, ruefully, that a Mixed Commission of Inquiry had in 1877 preceded the annexation of the Republic. "Such an inquiry," they said, "would prejudice right of full independence in internal affairs repeatedly recognised by Great Britain." Mr. Conyngham Greene our agent at Pretoria, and Mr. Smuts, the State's Attorney, discussed matters. After talking the matter over, Mr. Greene promised to recommend to Sir Alfred Milner, for acceptance by Her Majesty's Government, an alternative proposal, by which, in return for three conditions—(1) No interference ; (2) no assertion of suzerainty, and (3) arbitration—the Boers would concede the five years' franchise, and allow the Outlanders to have eight seats on the Volksraad.

As there is some dispute as to what assurances Mr. Conyngham Greene gave to Mr. Smuts, I quote Mr. Greene's own words:—

I have not in any way committed Her Majesty's Government to acceptance or refusal of proposal; but I have said that I feel sure that if, as I am solemnly assured, the present is a *bona fide* attempt to settle the political rights of our people once for all the Government of the South African Republic need not fear that we shall in the future either wish or have cause to interfere in their internal affairs. I have said as regards suzerainty that I feel sure that Her Majesty's Government will not and cannot abandon the right which the preamble to the Convention of 1881 gives them, but that they will have no desire to hurt Boer susceptibilities by publicly reasserting it, so long as no reason to do so is given them by the Government of the South African Republic. (Blue Book, c. 9521, p. 45.)

Here it will be seen our agent expressly declares that the Government "will not and cannot" abandon the suzerainty asserted in the preamble of the defunct Convention of 1881, although Sir Alfred Milner had previously declared

I am unable myself to see anything very material in this controversy (that is, the suzerainty). Both parties agree that the Convention of 1884 determines their mutual relations. (Parliamentary Paper, c. 9507, p. 6.)

and not the preamble of the 1881 Convention. Such, at least, is the natural inference from the High Commissioner's declaration, which is quite at variance with Mr. Greene's insistence upon "the right which the preamble to the Convention of 1881 gives them."

This, however, is not the only point to be noted before we examine President Kruger's offer of the five years' franchise. Before submitting it, the Boers inquired whether Mr. Chamberlain would consent to consider it without prejudice to the question of the Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise, which they wished to keep open in case their alternative proposition was not accepted. Mr. Chamberlain replied by wire:—

If the Government of the South African Republic were to put forward such a proposal **this Government would not consider it a refusal of the joint Commission**, but would be prepared to consider it on its merits. (Blue Book, c. 9521, p. 46.)

Mr. Conyngham Greene explained this in the following terms, according to Dr. Smuts:—

You can see they are inviting your proposal, and they never would have done this unless they were prepared to accept it.

Which would no doubt have been a fair enough inference from the Colonial Secretary's telegram if he had been any other person than Mr. Chamberlain. But the Boers did not understand "the new diplomacy." They made their proposal, and had it flung back in their face. They received the intimation with deep regret, for, as Mr. Reitz wrote:—

The proposal which has now lapsed contained in the letters of this Government of August 19th and August 21st was induced by suggestions given by British Agent to State Attorney, and these were accepted by this Government in good faith, and on express request, as equivalent to an assurance that the proposal would be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

But it is necessary to examine more closely the exact nature of the negotiations upon this question. For I think every honest man who reads the despatches will come to the conclusion that if there had been any real desire to settle the matter peacefully on the part of the Colonial Secretary, he could have gained all and even more than all that Sir Alfred Milner had demanded. The story of how Mr. Chamberlain thwarted the efforts of the friends of peace and made war inevitable will be told in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIVE YEARS' FRANCHISE OFFERED AND REJECTED.

THE offer made by the Transvaal Government in its despatch of August 19th was described by Sir Alfred Milner himself as being "as liberal as anything that I was prepared to suggest." (Blue Book, C. 9521, p. 62). That this was so may be seen from a comparison of what was asked and what was offered.

ASKED BY MILNER.—MAY.
Five years' franchise.
Seven seats in the Volksraad.
A minimum of one-fifth of the representation.

OFFERED BY KRUGER.—AUGUST.
Five years' franchise.
Eight seats in the Volksraad.
A minimum of one-fourth of the representation.

The franchise offered by President Kruger was the full burgher franchise, which carries with it the right of voting not only for the first Volksraad, but also for the President and Commandant-General. (*Ib.*, p. 58.) No wonder Sir Alfred Milner declared that it was as liberal as anything he was prepared to suggest.

This offer was strictly conditional. As Mr. Kruger had explained to Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein, his burghers would not hear of his giving away everything for nothing. He proposed, therefore, that in return for the five years' franchise we should give him the threefold *quid pro quo* which was duly set forth in the despatch. In order to bring out quite clearly the fencing and evasive way in which Mr. Chamberlain met Mr. Kruger's effort to arrive at a settlement, I will print the proposed conditions and Mr. Chamberlain's response side by side.

(I.) INTERFERENCE.

THE TRANSVAAL'S CONDITION.

(1.) That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action, and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place. (*Ib.* p. 46.)

This condition received a very important explanation in a subsequent despatch dated September 2nd, in which the Secretary of State, Mr. Reitz, observed that "with reference to the question of intervention, this Government has neither asked nor intended that Her Majesty's Govern-

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S RESPONSE.

"First, as regards intervention, Her Majesty's Government hope that the fulfilment of the promises made and the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future will render unnecessary any further intervention of their behalf, but Her Majesty's Government cannot, of course, debar themselves from their rights under Conventions, nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilised Power to protect outside subjects in a foreign country from injustice." (*Ib.*, p. 50.)

ment should abandon any right which it really might have on the ground either of the Convention of London (1884) or of international law, to intervene for the protection of British subjects in this country." (*Ib.*, p. 53.)

Now, as it is evident from the above quotations that no one had asked Her Majesty's Government to do anything of the kind, this elaborate setting forth of the suspicious and grudging attitude of mind which prevails at Downing Street was naturally calculated to have the worst effect.

Mr. Reitz commenting on this reply, made the remark that the stipulations asked for were "most reasonable, and demand on the side of Her Majesty's Government no abandoning of existing rights, but solely the obtaining of the assurance that Her Majesty's Government would in future, as regards the Republic, simply abide by the Convention of London (1884)." (*Ib.* p. 53.)

(2.) SUZERAINTY.

(2.) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on the subject being allowed tacitly to drop. (*Ib.* p. 46.)

This, again, was explained in the subsequent despatch, as follows: "As regards the assertion of suzerainty, its non-existence has, as this Government ventured to think, already been so clearly stated in its despatch of 16th April, 1898, that it would be superfluous to repeat here the facts, arguments, and deductions stated therein. It simply wishes to remark here that it abides by its views expressed in that despatch." (*Ib.* p. 53.)

"Her Majesty's Government would refer the Government of the South African Republic to the second paragraph of my despatch of 13th July." (*Ib.* p. 50.)

This paragraph runs as follows:—

"Her Majesty's Government concur generally in the views expressed in your despatch, and have no intention of continuing to discuss this question with the Government of the Republic, whose contention that the South African Republic is a sovereign International State is not, in their opinion, warranted either by law or history, and is wholly inadmissible." (*Parl. Paper C. 9507, p. 34*)

Here again was an evasion. If Mr. Chamberlain had said that the preamble of the Convention of 1881 would never be quoted as justifying any claim to authority over the Transvaal, he would have satisfied the Boers. Their suspicions had been roused by the despatch of October, 1897, in which he had refused to listen to any proposals for arbitration. He had written:—

Her Majesty towards the South African Republic holds the relation of suzerain who has accorded to the people of that country self-government on certain conditions, and it would be incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the construction of the conditions on which they granted self-government to the Republic. (Despatch October 16, 1897, quoted Parliamentary Paper C. 9507, p. 16.)

It was in vindicating their claim to be allowed to appeal to arbitration that the Boers used the phrase about the Sovereign International State, which was fastened upon at once by Mr. Chamberlain for the purpose of evading the demand that we should not reassert the existence of the

suzerainty of 1881, which everyone believed was dead and buried ever since 1884.

(3.) ARBITRATION.

(3.) That arbitration, from which foreign element should be excluded, would be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme became law. They wished, however, to know whether the Government was willing that burghers of the Orange Free State should be eligible for appointment as members of such a Court of Arbitration. What subjects should be regarded as arbitrable and what should not—the object aimed at being the automatic settlement of all points, both those which are in dispute at present and those which may arise hereafter. — (Blue Book C. 9521, p. 46.)

(3.) "The Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a tribunal of arbitration from which foreigners and foreign influence were excluded. Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two governments which will not be settled by the grant of the political representation to the Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration."—(*Ib.* p. 50.)

Grudging as was this acceptance of the principle of arbitration, the Boers made the best of it, apparently thinking that they were nearer to an agreement on that point than on the others. But they regarded Mr. Chamberlain's reply as a rejection of their proposal.

They could hardly have come to any other conclusion from the exceeding ill-grace with which their offer itself had been received. This is hardly the kind of response which they expected to an offer to concede fully and frankly more than the whole of our demand as to the franchise.

The Boers, finding their offer flung back in their faces, then fell back upon the original proposal of Mr. Chamberlain, and accepted the Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise law. But instead of welcoming this reluctant acquiescence in his demands, Mr. Chamberlain went back on his own proposals, and repudiated his own proposition the moment it was accepted by President Kruger!

If the rejection of the conditions of Mr. Kruger prevented the immediate concession of the five years' franchise, the repudiation by Mr. Chamberlain of his own proposal for a Mixed Commission of Inquiry into the seven years' franchise precipitated the war.

This is so vital a matter that at the risk of repeating myself, I reproduce all the vital passages in consecutive order.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MIXED COMMISSION ACCEPTED AND REPUDIATED.

It is worth while to look into this matter more closely, for this is the pivot of the negotiations. I shall, therefore, quote textually from the despatches bearing upon this subject, from which it will be seen, that if President Kruger may be condemned for the lack of clearness in his reply, he is not without considerable justification in the curiously involved way in which the proposal of the mixed Commission was made to him.

When President Kruger introduced his new Franchise Bill to the Volksraad, and the bill was amended in a liberal direction, Mr. Chamberlain sat down at the Colonial Office on the 27th July and wrote a long despatch to Sir Alfred Milner. In this despatch he said that it was a matter of satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to learn that the Volksraad had now agreed to a measure intended to give the franchise immediately to those who had been in the country seven years as well as those who would in future complete this period of residence. This proposal, said Mr. Chamberlain, "is an advance on previous concessions, and leaves only a difference of two years between yourself and President Kruger so far as the franchise is concerned." (Blue Book C 9518, p. 10.) He then pointed out that everything depended upon the conditions attached to the acceptance and exercise of the franchise, and then continued as follows:—

Her Majesty's Government feel assured that the President, having accepted the principle for which they have contended, will be prepared to reconsider any detail of his scheme which can be shown to be a possible hindrance to the full accomplishment of the object in view. They trust, therefore, that many of the conditions now retained may be revised, and that the residential qualification may be further reduced, since, in its present form, it will differentiate unfavourably the conditions of naturalisation in the Transvaal from those existing in other civilised countries.

Her Majesty's Government assume that the concessions now made to the Uitlanders are intended in good faith to secure for them some approach to the equality which was promised in 1881; but the points they have still to urge for the consideration of the Government of the South African Republic are of great importance, and require a further interchange of views between the two Governments. These points involve complicated details and questions of a technical nature, and Her Majesty's Government are inclined to think that the most convenient way of dealing with them would be that they should in the first instance be discussed by delegates appointed by you and by the Government of the South African Republic, who should report the result of their consultation, and submit their recommendations to you and to that Government.

After the discussion by delegates, as already proposed, of the details and the technical matters involved in the points which Her Majesty's Government desire to urge for the consideration of the Government of the South African Republic in relation to the political representation of the Uitlanders, it may be desirable that you should endeavour to come to an agreement with President Kruger as to the action to be taken upon their reports by means another personal Conference. (*Ib.* p. 12.)

But the proposal of a Mixed Commission was not submitted to the Transvaal Government until later. On the 31st July, Mr. Chamberlain instructed Sir Alfred Milner to invite President Kruger to appoint the Mixed Com-

mission. This invitation was given by Sir Alfred Milner to the Transvaal Government on the 1st August in the following terms:—

Her Majesty's Government authorise me to invite President South African Republic to appoint delegates to discuss with delegates to be appointed by me on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, whether Uitlander population will be given immediate and substantial representation by franchise law recently passed by Volksraad, together with other measures connected with it, such as increase of seats, and if not, what additions or alterations may be necessary to secure that result. In this discussion it should be understood that the delegates of Her Majesty's Government would be free to make any suggestions calculated to improve measures in question and secure their attaining the end desired. Personally I wish to add the expression of my earnest hope that Government South African Republic may accept this proposal, and that we may proceed to discuss the composition of the proposed Commission, method of procedure, and place of meeting at once. Government of South African Republic will, I feel sure, agree with me that, if proposal of Her Majesty's Government is accepted, the inquiry should be held as soon as possible. (*Ib.* p. 30.)

It was in reply to this invitation that President Kruger made his alternative proposal. On the 15th August, Sir Alfred Milner transmitted to Mr. Chamberlain two telegrams from Mr. Greene, the first of which begins— "The South African Republic will write me a note to the effect that they were willing to make the following proposals to Her Majesty's Government providing that Her Majesty's Government are willing not to press their demand for the proposed joint Commission of Inquiry into the political representation of the Outlanders." The second telegram sent on the same day amplified this. Mr. Greene stated that he had told the State Attorney that Her Majesty's Government had given pledges to the Outlanders, and would be bound to assert their demands, and, if necessary, press them by force (*Blue Book*, C. 9,521, page 45.) The only chance for the South African Government was an immediate surrender to the Bloemfontein minimum. Thereupon the State Attorney went away, but came back next day offering a five years' franchise, on conditions which "I promised," said Mr. Greene, "to recommend to you for acceptance by Her Majesty's Government in return for waiving the proposal of a joint enquiry." There must have been some other negotiations which do not appear in the *Blue Book*, for on the 17th August, Sir Alfred Milner informs Mr. Chamberlain that he has sent the following reply to Mr. Greene:—

I have instructed British Agent as follows, as a first step:—

If the South African Republic Government should reply to the invitation of a joint inquiry put forward by Her Majesty's Government by formally making the proposals described in your telegram, such a course would not be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a refusal of their offer, but they would be prepared to consider the reply of the South African Republic Government on its merits. Please see State Secretary and inform him accordingly. (*Ib.* p. 46.)

Having received this positive assurance that their alternative proposal would not be regarded as a rejection of the invitation to a Joint Enquiry, State Secretary Reitz sent to Sir Alfred Milner a note embodying the terms of the alternative proposal. This was dated on the 19th August, but being posted it did not reach Sir Alfred Milner until the 22nd, when it was followed up by a telegram from the State Attorney emphasising the conditional character of the proposition. When Mr. Chamberlain received this alternative proposal he telegraphed to Sir Alfred Milner to deliver the despatch of the 27th July, which was accordingly sent on to the Boers on the 23rd August, two days after they had submitted their alternative proposition. (*Ib.* p. 48.) Then on the 28th August Mr. Chamberlain rejected the suggested alternative and substituted for the original proposal of a joint commission a suggestion that an enquiry should be made by the British Agent at Pretoria. He wrote:—

Her Majesty's Government are unable to appreciate the objections entertained by the Government of the South African Republic to a Joint Commission of Inquiry into the complicated details and technical questions upon which the practical effect of the proposals depends. Her Majesty's Government, however, will be ready to agree with the British Agent, assisted by such other persons as you may appoint, shall make the investigation necessary to satisfy them that the result desired will be achieved and, failing this, to enable them to make those suggestions which the Government of the South African Republic state that they will be prepared to take into consideration. Her Majesty's Government assume that every facility will be given to the British Agent by the Government of the South African Republic, and they would point out that the inquiry will be both easier and shorter if the Government of the South African Republic will omit in any future Law the complicated conditions of registration, qualification and behaviour which accompanied previous proposals, and would have entirely nullified their beneficial effect.

Her Majesty's Government hope that the Government of the South African Republic will wait to receive their suggestion founded on the report of the British Agent's investigation before submitting a new Franchise Law to the Volksraad and the Burgers. (*Ib.* p. 50.)

President Kruger had thus before him three despatches dealing with the question of the enquiry into the seven years' franchise. The first in order of time was the second submitted to the Boers, and the Transvaal Government replied on the 2nd September, to all three despatches in a note in which, after noting the rejection of their alternative proposal, they maintained that they accepted the mixed Commission of Enquiry. The clauses bearing upon this question in reply to the Boers are as follows:—

This Government wishes to remark, with reference to observation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Her Majesty's Government is unable to perceive the objections entertained by Government of South African Republic against a joint commission of inquiry as proposed, that the objections to the invitation as given in the telegraphic despatch of 2nd August, have already been set forth in a communication dated 12th August (sent to your Honour yesterday).

As regards a unilateral (in place of a joint) inquiry as now proposed by Her Majesty's Government this Government wishes to make known its readiness wherever it may appear that the existing franchise law can be made still more effective, to lay before the Volksraad proposals for altering, or making it clearer. If they can be of assistance to Her Majesty's Government with any information or explanation they are always ready to furnish this; though it appears to it that the findings of a unilateral Commission, especially when arrived at before the working of the law has been duly tested, would be premature and thus probably of little value.

Though it can in no wise abandon any of its rights, this Government would nevertheless be glad to convince and satisfy Her Majesty's Government that the franchise law now passed and these extension [?] of the representation with four new seats will immediately have the advantage of giving a substantial representation to the Outlander population, and that for the rest it is its intention to continue working with Her Majesty's Government on a friendly footing. This Government, having regard to the difference that, in their opinion, exists between the invitation as put forward in the telegram despatched on the 2nd August, and that contained in the despatch of the 27th July from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and further, to the fact that in the last named it is stated that the most suitable way of dealing with points involving complicated details and questions of a technical nature would be to discuss them in the first case by delegates appointed by both governments who should report the result of their deliberations and submit their recommendations to the two Governments respectively, and assuming that it is not intended thereby to interfere in the internal affairs of this Republic or to establish precedent, but simply to gain information and elucidations whether the measures already taken are effectual or not, and, if not, to show this Government where such is the case, this Government would be glad to learn from Her Majesty's Government how they propose that the Commission should be constituted, and what place and time for meeting is suggested. (*Ib.*, p. 54.)

To this Mr. Chamberlain replied on the 8th of September:—

Her Majesty's Government cannot now consent to go back to the proposals for which these in the note of 19th August are intended as a substitute, especially as they are satisfied that the law of 1899 in which these proposals were finally embodied is insufficient to secure the immediate and substantial representation which Her Majesty's Government have always had in view and which they gather from the reply of the Government of the South African Republic that the latter admit to be reasonable. Moreover, the presentation of the proposals

of the note of the 19th August indicates that the Government of the South African Republic have themselves recognised that their previous offer might be with advantage enlarged, and that the independence of the South African Republic would be thereby in no way impaired. *Ib.* p. 64.

The immediate response of the Transvaal Government was a protest against what they evidently regarded as an act of bad faith on the part of Mr. Chamberlain. To this Mr. Reitz, the State Secretary of the Transvaal, replied in terms of studied moderation, which hardly conceal the amazement and dismay with which the Boers found themselves tricked by Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Reitz wrote:—

And with a view to the assurance given by the Secretary of State for Colonies that he would not consider the said offer as a refusal in answer to his invitation to a joint inquiry based upon existing franchise law and scheme of representation for Witwatersrand goldfields, it cannot understand why as soon as this invitation was accepted (as was done by this Government in its Note, September 2nd) Her Majesty's Government declares that it cannot any longer agree to the inquiry on this subject and for purposes which that Government itself proposes.

It is also not clear to this Government on what grounds Her Majesty's Government, after having recently by means of its invitation intimated that it could not declare without an inquiry whether franchise law and resolutions taken about representation would afford immediate and substantial representation to the Outlanders in South African Republic, is to-day in a position, without having made any inquiry so far as this Government is aware, before the law can have been tested in its operation, to declare that the measure just mentioned is insufficient for the object contemplated.

It trusts that it will clearly appear from the foregoing that Her Majesty's Government is under a misunderstanding if it supposes that this Government has ever recognised that it has considered the lapsed proposal contained in letter August 19th without the conditions imposed therein, and repeated in the Note August 21st, as a reasonable proposal, or made it as a proposal, and still less that this Government was or is of opinion that its earlier proposal could be extended with advantage to the public without observance of those conditions, or that the Republic would not suffer any violation of its independence.

To that unanswerable remark there has been no reply even attempted. Mr. Chamberlain has not even condescended to waste a word of explanation as to his right-about-face. In view of his express promise to keep the offer open pending the consideration of an alternative scheme, this abandonment of his own proposal the moment the Boers had been brought to accept it, has an ugly look—even in Birmingham. How it was regarded in the Transvaal we need not be told.

But notwithstanding this feeling that they had been jockeyed the Transvaal Government proceeded to declare itself always still prepared to abide by its acceptance of the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to get a Joint Commission composed as intimated in its note of September 2nd.

It considers that if conditions are contained in the existing franchise law which has been passed, and in the scheme of representation, which might tend to frustrate object contemplated, that it will attract the attention of the Commission, and thus be brought to the knowledge of this Government.

Finally this Government continues to cherish hope that Her Majesty's Government on further consideration will feel itself free to abandon idea of making new proposals more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions, and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal for a Joint Commission as first proposed by Secretary of State for Colonies in Imperial Parliament, and subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by it. If Her Majesty's Government is willing, and feels able to make this decision, it would put an end to the present state of tension, race hatred would decrease and die out, the prosperity and welfare of South African Republic and of whole of South Africa would be developed and furthered, and fraternisation between the different nationalities would increase.

These extracts, which cover the whole of this long and complicated correspondence bearing upon this question of the Mixed Commission, show that the consideration of the proposal made by Mr. Chamberlain to the Boers was.

deferred to permit the discussion of an alternative proposal, and that the original proposal was explicitly left open for their acceptance until the alternative suggestion had been dealt with. Immediately after the alternative proposal was rejected the Transvaal Government accepted Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, only to find it flung in their faces with a curt intimation that Ministers "cannot now consent to go back" to their own proposals.

I do not wish to strain any point against our Government, but I would ask the reader as an honest man whether in view of the explicit assurance given by Sir Alfred Milner to the Transvaal Government that the offer would still remain open pending the consideration of an alternative, Mr. Chamberlain's conduct in rejecting their acceptance of his own proposal can be regarded as anything less than a piece of scandalous sharp practice which had its immediate and apparently intended result in closing negotiations and making war inevitable. We may differ as to the wisdom or folly of the rejection of the conditions on which the five years' franchise was offered, but that at least was straight and above board. It is far otherwise with this abandonment of the proposal for a Joint Commission. Though ministerial apologists may paint an inch thick, the black stain of this transaction cannot be covered up. It will for ever cling to Mr. Chamberlain, nor will the nation ever forget that he brought about this war, by what must have appeared to the Boers to be a deliberate act of bad faith.

CHAPTER IX.

THE CABINET TO THE RESCUE.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN had thus spoiled everything. The five years' franchise had been offered him, but he flung away the chance of a pacific settlement. The Boers then accepted his Mixed Commission into the seven years' franchise. And forthwith he went back upon his own proposal. Matters had become so serious that a Cabinet Council was summoned, and a belated effort was made to undo the mischief which the Colonial Secretary had accomplished. The despatch of September 8th was the result.

This despatch, for which the Cabinet was responsible, was probably intended by Lord Salisbury as a conciliatory document. It was even welcomed by Mr. Courtney as if it were an olive branch.

There were no swear words in it, that is true. Mr. Chamberlain's sentiments were clothed in decorous language, but they were his sentiments all the same.

Ministers appear to have imagined that if they made the Colonial Secretary write civilly they had achieved wonders, and that after such a miracle the Boers could not fail to agree to whatever was asked of them.

But the Boers, looking more at the substance than at the form of the despatch, saw to their dismay only too clear a confirmation of their suspicions. Instead of acknowledging their acceptance of the Mixed Commission proposed on July 23rd, and accepted by them on September 2nd, the despatch curtly intimated that it was no use inquiring into the seven years' law. Ministers were satisfied to be dissatisfied with it, and so they repudiated their own proposition. Further, because Mr. Kruger had offered five years' franchise on three conditions, they demanded that he should concede it without any conditions at all, and then they added thereto a demand that the Volksraad should permit the use of English in its debates.

The Boers were in the position of a man who, having offered to pay £20 for his neighbour's horse, finds himself suddenly summoned by the neighbour to hand over that sum with an additional £5, and at the same time is curtly told that after he has paid his money he shall not have the horse. This way of doing business might well bring the blush to the cheek of the most hardened horse-dealer who ever jockeyed his customer at a Yorkshire fair. "We will give you the five years' franchise," said the Boers, "if you will drop the suzerainty and establish a Court of Arbitration." "We won't drop the suzerainty," was the reply, "and as for arbitration, well, we will talk about it. Now then, fork out your five years' franchise, and add thereto the concession that English shall be used as well as Dutch in the debates of the Volksraad." Of course the Boers replied, "We will see you further first. This means war and nothing but war. No matter what concessions we make, it is for you all take and no give. No sooner do we

accept your own proposals than you bring fresh demands upon us. Therefore we cannot do business on those terms."

"Why can you not give us the five years' franchise for nothing, seeing that you have already offered to give it if you get an equivalent?" asked Mr. Chamberlain. To which Mr. Reitz replied:—

This Government cannot disguise from itself that in making the proposals contained in its Note of 19th August it probably ran the danger not only of its being disclaimed by South African Republic Volksraad and people, but also that its acceptance might affect the independence of State by, as therein proposed, giving an immediate vote in the Legislature of the State to a large number of in-pouring Outlanders, but it set against that the continuous threatening and undoubted danger to its highly-prized independence, arising from claim of suzerainty made Her Majesty's Government, from the interference of that Government in the internal affairs of this Republic, and from the want of an automatically working manner of regulating differences between Her Majesty's Government and this Government, and was in consequence prepared to recommend to South African Republic Volksraad and to people to run the danger attached to offer made, in order to avoid the certainty of the greater danger.

Inasmuch, however, as the conditions attached to the proposal, the acceptance of which constituted the only consideration for its offer, have been declared unacceptable, it cannot understand on what grounds of justice it can be expected that it should be bound to grant retreat.

But even then the Transvaal Government did not despair of rousing Her Majesty's Ministers to a sense of the difficulties and dangers of the position. They renewed in the following pathetic closing passage their appeal to the British Government to reconsider their refusal to stand by their word, and to appoint the Mixed Commission, which they had intimated their readiness to accept at Mr. Chamberlain's hands. Mr. Reitz wrote:—

Finally, this Government continues to cherish hope that Her Majesty's Government on further consideration will feel itself free to abandon idea of making new proposals more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions, and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal for a Joint Commission as first proposed by Secretary of State for Colonies in Imperial Parliament, and subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by it. If Her Majesty's Government is willing, and feels able to make this decision, it would put an end to the present state of tension, race hatred would decrease and die out, the prosperity and welfare of South African Republic and of whole of South Africa would be developed and furthered, and fraternisation between the different nationalities would increase.

Alas, the appeal fell upon deaf ears. Instead of responding to this imploring entreaty, Ministers decided to send out 10,000 additional troops from this country, in addition to 10,000 then on their way from India, and then launched yet another despatch. Our papers meanwhile were full of talk of war. Those organs which were in closest touch with the Colonial Secretary ridiculed the idea that any concession on the franchise could settle the question between us. What they desired was something very different from a pacific solution of the franchise question. The Boers must be beaten, President Kruger must be humiliated, the forts must be dismantled, and the independence of the Transvaal destroyed. While the inspired press was bellowing for war and scoffing at the idea of any settlement which did not place the Boer under the heel of the Briton, Ministers drew up another despatch on September 22nd before launching their ultimatum. That which the rest of the Cabinet probably imagined was a message of peace Mr. Chamberlain succeeded in converting into a menace of war.

Mr. Morley recently reminded us that great wars have been waged in times past about a diphthong. We are now, it seems, waging a war in South

Africa over a consonant. In the last despatch addressed to the Transvaal Government the introduction of one letter, the letter "s," made all the difference between a message of peace and a virtual declaration of war. In professing to rebut the allegation that they had asserted any rights of interference in the internal affairs of the South African Republic Her Majesty's Ministers say:—

They have not asserted any rights of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic other than those which are derived from the Conventions between the two countries, etc.

Mark here the use, not for the first time, of the plural "Conventions" instead of the singular "Convention," for in that little letter "s" the whole controversy between us and the South African Republic is bound up. In fact it is hardly too much to say that if when the despatch of the 22nd September was submitted to the Cabinet, Lord Salisbury had marked on the margin of his proof "*dele s,*" the dispute between the two Governments would now have been on the fair way to an amicable settlement. Unfortunately the "s" has not been struck out—rumour indeed asserts, truly or falsely, that the "s" was inserted of set purpose, without reference to the Cabinet—and the despatch has gone to the South African Republic with "Conventions" in the plural, to be read there as indicating the determination of Her Majesty's Government to force matters to extremities unless they will recognize the suzerainty of Great Britain as defined in the preamble of the Convention of 1881.

It is against this definite assertion of an undefined right of intervention or suzerainty under the preamble of the Convention of 1881 that the Boers are up in arms.

Instead of giving the Boers what they asked for, namely, a definite repudiation of the suzerainty of 1881, they put in an offer as part of a complete settlement to give a complete guarantee against any attack upon the independence of the Transvaal either from within any part of Her Majesty's dominions or from the territory of a foreign state.

It offered the Boers something for which they never asked. They did not wish to be guaranteed against any foreign Power, and as for the guarantee against attack from any part of the British dominions, how could they be expected to regard that as worth the paper it was written upon, seeing that the proposal came from the Minister who in 1895 was a party to the stationing of Jameson's men upon the frontier in order to support the insurrection which was anticipated in Johannesburg?

To this despatch the Boers made no reply. The Duke of Devonshire made a speech protesting the Government had no designs upon the independence of the Transvaal, and Mr. Chamberlain at the very moment was busily elaborating the further proposals for a final settlement threatened in the despatch of September 8th, which entailed the destruction of that independence of the South African Republic.

Ministers meanwhile by way of emphasizing their pacific intentions ordered an army corps to be got ready for the conquest of the Transvaal. The Reserves were called out. Parliament was summoned. The despatch embodying the proposals by which the Government intended to establish a right of constant vital and minute interference in the affairs of the Transvaal was sent off. But before it was received at Pretoria the Boers, anticipating the delivery of the threatened attack, launched their ultimatum.

It was dated October 9th. It notes that friendly negotiations had been

broken off by the British Government by the note of September 25th, which intimated that they must now proceed to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement. Quoting the Convention of 1884, and pointing out that it gave no right to the British Government to regulate the franchise laws of the Republic, the Transvaal Government say :—

This Government can only see in the above intimation from Her Majesty's Government a new violation of the Convention of London, 1884, which does not reserve to Her Majesty's Government the right to a unilateral settlement of a question which is exclusively a domestic one for this Government, and has already been regulated by it.

CHAPTER X.

THE REFUSAL OF ARBITRATION.

THE Sixteenth Article of the Hague Convention of Arbitration declares :—

In juridical questions, and, in the first place, in questions of the interpretation or application of International Conventions, Arbitration is recognised by the Signatory Powers as the most efficacious, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling disputes which have not been solved by diplomacy.

Lord Salisbury, Prime Minister of Britain, through his plenipotentiary Lord Pauncefoot, took a foremost part in drafting this solemn declaration which has secured the unanimous assent of all the Governments represented at the Hague. Why then has he not insisted upon resorting to this most efficacious and most equitable means of settling the dispute with the Transvaal? England was one of the Signatory Powers. The South African Republic was excluded from the Huis ten Bosch, but President Kruger has from first to last pressed for a reference of the differences with us to arbitration. "The limitation on the sovereignty of the Transvaal imposed by the Convention of 1884 did not disqualify the Transvaal from taking a part in this Conference, for Bulgaria, which is formally under the suzerainty of Turkey, signed the Arbitration Convention."

Note that in the first place questions of the interpretation of International Conventions are declared to be those in which arbitration is most efficacious and most equitable. The relations between the British Empire and the South African Republic are governed by an International Convention, the Convention of London to wit. Why, then, has this efficacious and equitable method of settling disputes, which diplomacy has failed to deal with, not been employed to stave off the present war?

The answer, written at large in the Blue Books, is a melancholy commentary upon the sincerity of British professions of devotion to arbitration. The melancholy story shows that, from the opening of the whole question in 1897 down to the ultimatum which closed it in 1899, President Kruger has constantly, persistently, even doggedly, demanded arbitration. But England, the leader of the peace and arbitration party in the Parliament of the world, has from first to last dodged, quibbled, evaded, or refused to yield to President Kruger's most reasonable demand.

As this fact, when proved to be a fact, will in the opinion of the plain, honest British citizen damn the Government worse than anything else that can be proved against them, I will take some pains to disentangle the narrative from the chaotic tangle of despatches, telegrams, and enclosures which make up the modern Blue Book.

The trouble began with President Kruger's proposal in May 7, 1897, that matters in dispute between Britain and the Transvaal should be submitted to arbitration. It was in order to defeat this proposal that Mr. Chamberlain revived the ghost of the dead suzerainty of 1881. It did not prove his

case, for arbitration is possible and proper between suzerains and their vassals—as for instance between Bulgaria and Turkey—but it gave him a pretext for refusing arbitration. So he seized at it eagerly and burnt his fingers in so doing. For it was his most maladroit revival of the extinct suzerainty of 1881 which most naturally irritated the Boers and made them horribly distrustful of everything we proposed. A Minister capable of pretending that the preamble of a dead convention which Lord Derby had expressly struck out in order to replace it by another preamble containing no allusion to suzerainty, established the Queen in a position of suzerain over a vassal state was capable of anything. But Mr. Chamberlain risked that in order to clutch at any straw which would help him to refuse arbitration. He said:—

Her Majesty towards the South African Republic holds the relation of suzerain who has accorded to the people of that country self-government on certain conditions, and it would be incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the construction of the conditions on which they granted self-government to the Republic.

Even supposing Mr. Chamberlain was right and that his resurrected suzerainty of 1881 which for sixteen years had lain undisturbed in the tomb had any substance in it, the existence of suzerainty and vassalage does not preclude a resort to arbitration. On the contrary, as those relations rest upon an international convention, nothing, as the Hague Conference declares, is more equitable than that the interpretation of that Convention should be referred to arbitration. As Professor van der Vlugt of Leyden points out in his Commentary on the Dutch address to the British people:—

Suppose: a potentate, who has been my sovereign till now, converts his sovereign right into the minor prerogative of suzerainty by formally granting to me a certain sphere of autonomy, circumscribed within well-defined limits and subject to carefully determined conditions. Why then should such a grant logically imply that he who made it had reserved to himself the exorbitant privilege of being in all the disagreements, which henceforth might rise between himself and his vassal, party and supreme judge at the same time? Thus never even in feudal ages was the nature of vassalage understood. . . . If between a suzerain power and its Vassal-state there arises a conflict as to the obvious sense of any of the bondage-terms, the law of nations, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, places on a level the contentions of both parties.

We have had to pay dearly for this fantastic and illegal contention of Mr. Chamberlain. For it was his resurrection of a dead and buried suzerainty in order to justify his refusal to arbitrate which raised the controversy, in the course of which Mr. Reitz used the expression “a sovereign international state” which the war party instantly seized upon as a “defiance to England”—with such results as we see.

But the Transvaal Government refused to abandon its demand for arbitration. It demolished easily enough the phantom suzerainty of 1881, and renewed its proposal that disputes should be sent to arbitration.

When President Kruger met Sir A. Milner at Bloemfontein, he said he wished “above all” for a promise to refer questions of difficulty to arbitration. “This,” he said, “is the most important point of the four.” (Blue Book 9404, p. 35). Again he said if he could get support on other questions “especially the question of arbitration,” he might be able to induce the burghers to concede more on the subject of the franchise.

Sir Alfred Milner then explained his views on the subject as follows:—

As to the question of Arbitration, which I think is the matter that interests the President most, I am in so far entirely with him that I want if possible to have in future as few questions to discuss with the Government of the South African Republic, as I now have with the Government of the Orange Free State. I feel that the President will need, if he accepts my scheme of franchise, or any other similar proposal, to have some assurance that there shall not be perpetual controversies between him and England, and that if there are controversies, some regular way of dealing with them should be devised. The President

once proposed that some question, or a number of questions, should be submitted to the President of the Swiss Republic. The British Government refused that on the general principle—from which I am sure they will not depart—that they will not have any foreign Government, or any foreign interference at all, between them and the South African Republic. But if some other method can be devised of submitting to an impartial tribunal questions that may in future arise between us, and perhaps even some questions which exist at present—but in any case to provide for the future—if such a plan can be devised and suggested to me, I will lay it before Her Majesty's Government and do what I can personally to assist in a satisfactory solution of the matter. The President must understand that I cannot pledge Her Majesty's Government in any way on this subject. The question has taken me by surprise; I didn't come here contemplating a discussion on it, but I must say if it could be satisfactorily arranged while excluding the interference of the foreigner, it would seem to me to open a way out of many difficulties. But all the same, I adhere firmly to my proposal that we should first try and settle on the scheme which the President would accept as regards the matter which I put forward. If we can come to some understanding about that, then let us consider what we can do in the way of ensuring that this Conference shall be a final settlement of questions between the two Governments, and that future difficulties, if they arise, shall settle themselves by an automatic process. *Ib.* pp. 34-35.

This did not satisfy President Kruger. He said: "His Excellency has not got any nearer . . . on the point of arbitration." Until he did come nearer, Mr. Kruger said, "I should get nothing by coming to an agreement on the point of the Franchise." It is here where for the first time President Kruger lets out his policy of promising to reduce the Franchise if we would concede Arbitration. Here also Sir Alfred Milner lays down the preposterous doctrine that the reference of a question of dispute between England and the Transvaal to a foreign arbitrator "in whose nomination the British Government would have an equal share," involves "foreign interference" between us and the South African Republic. "As Sir Alfred Milner's principle it could be maintained that we had admitted Russian interference between ourselves and Venezuela when we agreed to the appointment of Professor Marten's as arbitrator." At the last sitting of the Conference the subject came up again when President Kruger let us see more clearly than before that in his mind Franchise and Arbitration must go together. In closing the Conference Sir Alfred Milner said:—

I have only one word to say about arbitration and that is this. The matter has been mentioned during this Conference along with other matters, but there is no definite proposal with regard to the method of arbitration before me at the present moment. I have already stated that there are subjects with regard to which Her Majesty's Government clearly cannot arbitrate; there is, again, a certain method of arbitration—I mean by means of a foreign Government, which Her Majesty's Government would never permit. At the same time there is a class of question about which Her Majesty's Government might agree to arbitrate if a suitable method could be found, and if a proposal on that subject is submitted at any time, it can be considered independently of any of the proceedings of this Conference.

As I pointed out to the President the other day, it is not a question which I am authorised to discuss, and all I can say about it is that any definite proposition which he may at any time make, will be submitted to the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

If there is no further matter that the President wishes to refer to, I have nothing more which I think it would be profitable to say.

President.—I will lay the matter before the Volksraad, and as soon as I hear from Her Majesty's Government about arbitration—

His Excellency.—I have nothing to propose to Her Majesty's Government on this point, —I have nothing before me. A general opinion on the subject has been expressed during the proceedings which is recorded in the Minutes of the Conference and will be made known. But I do not regard anything that has passed here as a proposal made to Her Majesty's Government which requires an answer.

President.—I shall be prepared to make a definite proposal later on and send it.

As soon as I get back I will lay arbitration proposals before the Volksraad.

His Excellency.—It is entirely a question within the President's own discretion, but he is linking two questions together which in my mind are in no way linked together.

President.—Yes; I know His Excellency says that for him they are not bound together; but in my mind they do belong together. (*Ib.* p. 44.)

The President then put in a memorandum, from which the following is an extract:—

His Excellency has acknowledged that my request for arbitration by other than foreign Powers, on all points of future difference under the Convention, is reasonable, and that it is altogether desirable to have such differences settled according to an automatic plan.

It is, further, our common opinion that in this case there should be no bargain or compromise made in the matter, as matters which are in themselves desirable ought to be also treated on their own merits. The question of arbitration, therefore, could be arranged apart from the acceptance or non-acceptance by him of my proposal with regard to the franchise.

Arguing on these lines, and as it is my earnest wish that this Conference should not be fruitless, I wish to make the following proposal to His Excellency, viz. :—

As according to his own admission my proposal about franchise is an important step in the right direction, I shall be prepared to lay my proposal before the Volksraad and to recommend it, even though His Excellency does not fully agree with it. From his side I shall then expect that His Excellency will lay before and recommend to Her Majesty's Government my request about arbitration on future matters of difference under the Convention.

His Excellency will, however, readily understand that if Her Majesty's Government should not meet me so far, so as to grant my acknowledged fair request for arbitration, it could be with difficulty expected that the people of the South African Republic would approve of my comprehensive proposal with regard to franchise.

Regard being had to my strong wish to have all differences settled amicably by arbitration, and by so doing to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two Governments, and also with an eye to the peace and friendship between all white races in South Africa, I have not scrupled to go so far that I have conferred with His Excellency in a friendly way even over strictly internal affairs, and my strong trust is that this my wish shall not remain unfulfilled. (*Ib.* p. 59.)

Writing to Mr. Chamberlain after the Conference was over Sir Alfred Milner thus explained the line he took on the subject. He wrote :—

I took the line that, while I had no authority to speak about arbitration, and could not make it a part of any bargain, I certainly desired that, if the present proceedings ended in an all round settlement, we might arrange for the adjustment of future differences by an "automatic process"—by which I certainly meant their reference to some sort of tribunal. It is this remark of mine—a guarded statement of my personal opinion—of which the President afterwards made very unfair use, in saying that I had admitted that arbitration for all questions under the Convention was reasonable, and which appears from the telegrams to have been widely misunderstood in England.

I therefore wish to make a few further observations about it. In the first place I would observe that I expressly guarded myself against the idea that arbitration was applicable to all differences. I was thinking, as I indicated, more especially of the question whether the laws and administration of the South African Republic were fair towards its foreign residents. It is, of course, absurd to suggest that the question whether the South African Republic does or does not treat British subjects resident in that country with justice, and the British Government with the consideration and respect due to any friendly, not to say "Suzerain," Power, is a question capable of being referred to arbitration. You cannot arbitrate on broad questions of policy any more than on questions of national honour. Secondly, I stated quite clearly that Her Majesty's Government would not admit arbitration "by a foreign Power, or any foreign interference," between itself and the South African Republic.

To this extent, therefore, I barred arbitration, nor would I, of my own motion, have referred to it. But as President Kruger brought it in so continually, it would, I think, have been impolitic, and certainly against my own conviction, to take up an absolutely negative attitude with regard to it. I was thinking more especially of the state of things which would arise in the remote contingency of our being able to come to an amicable settlement of all, or our principal, differences. Even in that case it could not be supposed that, in future, questions of difference would not occasionally arise between us—seeing the intimacy and the complexity of the relations between the South African Republic and Her Majesty's South African dominions—where such questions were not general questions of policy, but differences as to the interpretation of a particular clause of a particular document (whether one of the existing Conventions or any new instrument of a similar character which might hereafter be framed). What was to be done to solve them? Arbitration of some sort would appear to be inevitable, although the constitution of a suitable tribunal would always be a matter of difficulty. In any case, all that I committed myself to was a willingness to do what I could personally to arrange for a regular and automatic settlement of future differences, without foreign interference, provided that the main matter then under discussion could be satisfactorily arranged. (*Ib.* p. 5.)

Here we have a further limitation imposed on the use of arbitration. "It is absurd" forsooth to suggest that the question of the treatment of the Outlanders should be referred to arbitration? "You cannot arbitrate on broad questions of policy any more than on questions of national honour." Why not? Every question—notably the Alabama case—involved both broad questions of policy and also questions of national honour. But we arbitrated the Alabama. Why "cannot" we do the same with the more trivial questions arising between two handfuls of Boers and Outlanders?

No sooner did President Kruger return to Pretoria than he got his State Secretary (June 9) to address to Mr. Conyngham Greene a long despatch, in which he submitted the following proposal to Her Majesty's Government:—

1. All future differences between the two Governments arising out of varying interpretation of the London Convention, shall, subject to what is set forth under paragraph 3, at the instance of this Government or of Her Majesty's Government, be referred to an arbitration-tribunal, on the understanding, however, that no matters or differences of trifling importance shall be submitted to arbitration.

2. The arbitration-tribunal shall consist of an arbitrator to be nominated by this Government, and an arbitrator to be nominated by Her Majesty's Government (as for example the Chief Justices respectively of the South African Republic and the Cape Colony or Natal). These two must agree respecting a third person, who shall act as President of the arbitration-tribunal, this person not to be a subject of one of the arbitrating parties; and failing agreement upon this point, the two Governments shall together name a president; the decision in every case to take place by a majority of votes.

3. The Act of submission shall in every case be drawn up jointly by the two Governments, so that each shall have the right to reserve and exclude points which appear to it to be too important to be submitted to arbitration, provided that thereby the principle itself of arbitration be not frustrated.

4. The arbitration-tribunal shall itself decide the place of its sittings, and shall deal as it thinks fit with the condemnation of parties in the costs, unless special arrangement has been made concerning these points in the Act of submission.

5. The regulations of procedure of this arbitration-tribunal can be similar to those agreed to by the Institute of International Law in the Hague in 1875, in so far as they do not conflict with the foregoing provisions, and in so far as they are not amended by both parties in the Act of submission.

6. In order to obtain a test of the suitability of such a tribunal, this Government has no objection to its being agreed that this reference of Conventional differences shall provisionally take place for a period of five years.

If Her Majesty's Government should agree in principle with this Government upon the above-mentioned scheme, it can (with such alterations in detail as may be agreed upon) be secured in a treaty, if necessary, for a fixed period.

In conclusion, this Government desires further to make the following clear. By the acceptance of a scheme of arbitration, more or less like that set forth above, would not only all Conventional disputes which present themselves be amicably solved, but the peaceful development of South Africa would also thereby be advanced in a surprising degree. ("Blue Book 9518," p. 3.)

Mr. Reitz concluded his dispatch as follows:—

In order to reconcile races in South Africa, and to cause old feuds to give way to a new spirit of co-operation and progress, this Government once more makes this appeal for arbitration from its feeling, not alone of right and equity, but also of anxiety for the future of this our beloved portion of the world. (*Ib.* p. 4.)

Sir Alfred Milner replied insisting on franchise first, and as his five years' franchise was not conceded, "I can see no use in approaching the delicate and complicated subject of arbitration at the present time." (*Ib.* p. 5.) Sir Alfred Milner then wrote to Mr. Chamberlain and advised him to reject the whole scheme. "It is a mere skeleton of a scheme," &c.

I cannot see the smallest reason why Her Majesty's Government should not at once reject this particular proposal, and I advise that this course should be adopted. The scheme is, as I have shown, unworkable, but more than this, it does not exclude that "foreign interference between Her Majesty's Government and the South African Republic,"

which Her Majesty's Government have always declared, and which I repeatedly declared at Bloemfontein, that they would never admit.

By Clause 2, the two arbitrators, who are vaguely defined apparently to be South African judges, nominated by the two Governments respectively, "shall agree respecting a third person, who shall act as President of the arbitration tribunal," which is to decide in every case by a majority of votes.

It is evident that this third person will virtually decide everything, and it is provided that he shall "not be a subject of one of the arbitrating parties," *i.e.*, a foreigner.

On this ground alone I feel sure that Her Majesty's Government will not accept the proposal. For every reason I think it is desirable that it should promptly intimate its total inability to entertain it. *Ib.* p. 2.

Here, there is naked and unashamed an almost frantic desire to stamp on the proposal which, however imperfect, was nevertheless an obvious attempt to provide some practical method of securing the settlement of outstanding difficulties by arbitration. Mr. Chamberlain, strange to say, was not so savage in his hostility as Sir Alfred Milner. In his despatch of July 27, while rejecting the proposal to allow a foreigner to be umpire of an arbitration court, he made the following curious observations on the subject:—

Her Majesty's Government recognise, however, that the interpretation of the Conventions in matters of detail is not free from difficulty. While on the one hand there can be no question of the interpretation of the preamble of the Convention of 1881 which governs the Articles substituted in the Convention of 1884, on the other hand there may be fair differences of opinion as to the interpretation of the details of those Articles, and it is unsatisfactory that in cases of divergence of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic, there should be no authority to which to refer the points at issue for final decision.

If, therefore, the President is prepared to agree to the exclusion of any foreign element in the settlement of such disputes, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider how far and by what methods such questions of interpretation as have been above alluded to could be decided by some judicial authority whose independence, impartiality, and capacity would be beyond and above all suspicion. *Ib.* p. 11.

Here we have that fatal suzerainty of 1881 not merely reasserted, but declared to be a thing so *sacrosanct* that it cannot possibly be submitted to arbitration? Mr. Chamberlain seems to have acquired a maladroit expertness in poisoning even his apparently friendly overtures with a virus fatal to any confidence.

On July 17 the Capetown Branch of the Africander Bond passed the following resolution, which brought the matter home:—

This meeting has learnt with great pleasure that the British delegates at the Peace Conference at the Hague submitted important resolutions with the object of securing the application of the principle of arbitration in removing differences between nations and States; it hopes that the same principle will also in future, by means of legal experts, be applied in reference to disputed interpretations of the London Convention between Great Britain and the South African Republic. *Ib.* p. 31.

A month later, when President Kruger drafted his alternative proposition, offering to concede the five years' franchise in return for these concessions, arbitration was again brought to the fore. Mr. Greene, reporting his conversation with the State Attorney, thus described the President's wishes about arbitration:—

Lastly, as soon as the franchise scheme has become law, arbitration, from which the foreign element is excluded, to be conceded. In the meantime, in order that no time may be lost, the form and scope of the proposed tribunal to be discussed and provisionally agreed upon while the franchise scheme is being referred to the people.

As regards arbitration, they are willing that we should have any of our own judges or lawyers, English or Colonial, to represent us, and that the President or Umpire should be equally English, Colonial, or Boer. (Blue Book 9521, pp. 44-45.)

When the note of August 19 was received, the clause relating to arbitration ran thus:—

(c) That arbitration (from which foreign element other than Orange Free State is to be excluded) will be conceded as soon as the franchise scheme has become law. (*Ib.* p. 49.)

On August 23, Sir Alfred Milner writing to Mr. Chamberlain entered in some detail into what questions are arbitrable and what are not.

Assuming that an arrangement is come to with regard to arbitration, some of these questions—like the War Tax and the differences as to the interpretation of the Swaziland Convention—might be left to be decided in that way. But there are others, which are not capable of being submitted to arbitration, and these, so far as they are important, should be dealt with now, or else be now, as part of a general settlement, definitely abandoned. Of the matters which we cannot refer to arbitration and cannot, in my view, without discredit or risk of a speedy revival of difficulties, abandon, I would specially refer to: (1) The position of British Indians; (2) the position of other coloured British subjects; and (3) our claim that all British subjects should be entitled to treatment at least equally favourable with that of the subjects of any other nation. The latter claim has been put forward by us on many occasions, as, for instance, with regard to commandeering, but it has never been formally admitted by the South African Republic, and unless it is so admitted now, I feel certain that we shall have grave difficulties in the future. (*Ib.* p. 63.)

If these are the only three questions upon which Sir Alfred Milner “cannot refer to arbitration,” his objection amounts to nothing. One phase of the Coolie question has already been referred to the arbitration of the President of the Free State. No difficulty would have been raised to conceding as a most favoured nation clause the fair administration of which could have been guaranteed by arbitration. “The other coloured British subjects” alone block the way. They would not have proved an insuperable obstacle.

Mr. Chamberlain replied (August 28) to the Transvaal note of August 19:—

Her Majesty's Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a Tribunal of Arbitration from which foreigners and foreign influence are excluded. Such a discussion, which will be of the highest importance to the future relations of the two countries, should be carried on between the President and yourself, and for this purpose it appears to be necessary that a further Conference, which Her Majesty's Government suggest should be held at Cape Town, should be at once arranged.

“Her Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of the South African Republic that there are other matters of difference between the two Governments which will not be settled by the grant of political representation to the Outlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to arbitration. It is necessary that these should be settled concurrently with the questions now under discussion, and they will form, with the question of arbitration, proper subjects for consideration at the proposed Conference.” (*Ib.* p. 50.)

On September 2, the State Secretary replied as follows:—

(c.) With reference to a Court of Arbitration this Government is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government is ready to enter on negotiations touching the scope and form of such: though it is not clear to it (a) whether Her Majesty's Government is willing that burghers of Orange Free State should be eligible for appointment as Members of such a Court. (b.) What subjects should be referred for the decision of such Court. (c.) What subjects Her Majesty's Government consider should not be submitted to such Court: Her Majesty's Government state that there are such points without specifying them. The object (? aimed) at by this Government, namely, the assurance of a final settlement of all points whether now in dispute or arising hereafter, might it considers be altogether frustrated by these limitations.

(6.) With reference to the suggestion for holding another Conference, this Government will await further information from Her Majesty's Government before it can go further into the matter. (*Ib.* p. 53.)

To this the Cabinet replied in the despatch of September 8 as follows:—

“If it (their present proposal—five years' franchise without conditions) is acceded to they will be ready to make immediate arrangements for a further conference between the

President of the South African Republic and the High Commissioner to settle all the details of the proposed Tribunal of Arbitration, and the questions referred to in the note of the 30th August, which are neither Uitlander grievances nor questions of interpretation, but which might be readily settled by friendly communications between the representatives of the two Governments. *Ib.*, p. 65.

Replying to this communication the Transvaal Government said:—

It merely wishes to remark that it has not yet been made clear to it which are the definite questions which would be discussed [at] proposed Conference, and which could not be subjected to arbitration, but it is pleased to see that Her Majesty's Government thinks they could readily be settled by means of friendly discussions, while it further welcomes with much pleasure prospect disclosed by Her Majesty's Government of the introduction of a Court of Arbitration for the decision of all points of difference and points to be discussed at the Conference, and is ready and willing to co-operate towards the composition of such a Court, and that the more as it is its firm intention to abide entirely by the Convention of London, 1884, as its efforts have been continuously to do.

After this nothing more is said concerning Arbitration, until we read in the first clause of the Ultimatum—

That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government.

Here we have the whole story—and a very melancholy story it is. Her Majesty's Ministers have never once made a single honest attempt to avail themselves of President Kruger's anxious desire for arbitration, or to establish a principle of which at the Hague they were the most conspicuous supporters. Not even the offer of the five years' Franchise in exchange for Arbitration could overcome their reluctance to adopt the most equitable and efficacious means of settling disputes, as a means of settling this dispute. The nearest they could come to making the much coveted concession was to make immediate arrangements for a Conference to settle the details of proposed tribunal. These contributions were throughout strictly negative. They excluded from the scope of arbitration (1) the preamble of the 1881 Convention. (2) All questions of national policy. (3) All questions of national honour. (4) The Coolie question. (5) The treatment of Cape Boys. (6) The question of most favoured nation rights. Then they refused to allow any one to sit as arbitrator who was not British or Africander. And they haughtily refused to purchase franchise with arbitration.

Nevertheless despite all their carping and niggardly objections, President Kruger down to the very last pleaded—alas! in vain—for the reference of the questions in dispute to arbitration. He asked for bread and we have given him a stone, for a fish and we have given him a serpent, for arbitration and England, the peace-loving champion of arbitration, has given him the point of the sword.

CHAPTER XI.

NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITIES.

CAPTAIN MAHAN, writing in the *North American Review* for October, remarks that "the consciences of nations are awake to the wickedness of unnecessary war, and are disposed, as a general rule, to seek first, where admissible, the counterpoise of an impartial judge, where such can be found, to correct the bias of national self-will." The same observation has frequently been made by others, as, for instance, when it is said that, while we are quite prepared to slay our brother, we wish before doing so to exhaust all the resources of civilisation, in order to ascertain that there is no alternative left us. Such was believed to be the feeling of all Englishmen until this last unhappy outbreak. Henceforth it will be difficult for any Englishman to look the foreigner in the face and talk about peace, for we are face to face with the fact that in the Transvaal, so far from eagerly seeking opportunities in order to correct the bias of national self-will, there has been from first to last an obstinate refusal to resort to any form of arbitration for the settlement of the controversy between us. It takes two to make an arbitration, as it takes two to make a quarrel, and unfortunately we have not been one of the two who were willing to arbitrate. Some excellent persons, whose reason is clouded by their passion, have not hesitated to declare that President Kruger was the worst enemy of peace and arbitration in the world. Considering that President Kruger has for years past been pressing, in season and out of season, for a reference of all outstanding disputes between him and us to arbitration, such a statement deserves to be preserved, if only as an illustration of the extent to which the moral law is suspended when the war fever is in the air. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour" is one of the commandments which, it would seem, is more honoured in the breach than in the observance when our country is bent upon forcing a quarrel upon a neighbouring state.

When we examine in the tribunal of our own conscience the question whether or not everything has been done that might have been done in order to avert war, we are confronted at the very threshold of the enquiry by one plain, unmistakable and undisputed fact. We may reason as we like; we may quibble; we may explain it away, and make all manner of excuses we please; but the broad fact remains, after all has been said and done, towering aloft above all controversy, namely, that President Kruger has demanded arbitration, and we have refused it. It will be said, "Of course, we have stated our willingness to discuss what questions could or could not be referred to arbitration." That is true, but on the fundamental question, the question on which peace and war hung, we have not only refused to refer to arbitration, despite President Kruger's repeated appeals, but we have refused even to adopt any one of the many forms of arriving at a pacific settlement which were suggested by the Peace Conference at the Hague. To

read the correspondence which passed between the High Commissioner and the Colonial Secretary on the subject of arbitration, it is difficult to believe that they are speaking in the name of the same Government which sent Lord Pauncefote to the Hague, and which will this month sign the Arbitration Convention. For instead of welcoming an opportunity of referring to arbitration a dispute between the South African Republic and ourselves, the whole drift and purpose of the despatches is to find pretexts for evading the obligation to make any such reference. The first great pretext is that the Transvaal is our vassal, and that therefore it would be impossible for us to refer a dispute to arbitration, seeing that we are the paramount and suzerain Power, and that a vassal has no right to appeal from our decision. Even if we grant to the full the state of vassalage into which Mr. Chamberlain endeavours to reduce the Transvaal, that is no reason why, when a dispute arises between vassal and suzerain, resort should not be had to the decision of an impartial neutral. The doctrine has been laid down and apparently without protest from any people here on our side, that to appeal for the good offices of a foreigner as arbitrator was to admit foreign intervention in our affairs. This is simply preposterous. Arbitration is not intervention. Did Switzerland intervene in the affairs of England when she took part in the Alabama arbitration? Did Russia intervene in the affairs of the British Empire when M. de Martens acted as arbitrator in the Venezuelan dispute? This objection to resort to arbitration because it involves foreign intervention in our domestic affairs is one of the most transparent refuges of lies that ever disgraced British diplomacy.

But there is another point to which the attention of all honest men should be called. Before the question arises as to whether or not we have resorted to arbitration there is the prior question whether we have used ordinary methods of diplomacy to arrive at a settlement. Unfortunately we have done no such thing. The ordinary method of diplomacy is that each Government maintains its trusted representative in the capital of its neighbour, and that this representative is entrusted with the task of making explanations, smoothing out misunderstandings, and generally keeping the peace. The appointment of an accredited ambassador, minister or Consul-General is the well-established method of keeping the peace which is recognised all over the world under the name of diplomacy. It will be a surprise to many good people in this country to know that Mr. Chamberlain, ever since he was at the Colonial Office, refused to avail himself of this well-established and invariable method of diplomatic action. The South African Republic by the Convention of 1884 was expressly authorised to conduct its diplomatic intercourse and shape its foreign policy without any interference on our part, with only one reservation, namely, that treaties inimical to our interests might be vetoed by us within six months of their conclusion. The South African Republic, therefore, was absolutely within its chartered right to appoint its diplomatic representatives to conduct its business with foreign Powers. It appointed Dr. Leyds to represent it in Europe, and Mr. Montague White, who is Consul-General in London. Ever since Mr. Chamberlain has been in office he has refused to recognise either Mr. Montague White or Dr. Leyds as having any authority whatever to speak or act on behalf of the South African Republic. Not only so, but Ministers abroad were expressly forbidden—such at least is the current report—to hold any communication whatever with Dr. Leyds, excepting in his private capacity. The British Government, acting at the instance of Mr. Chamberlain, boycotted Dr. Leyds, and boycotted also Mr. Montague White, Consul-General in London. The consequence is that we were in exactly the same position dealing with the Transvaal that we would be in a dispute

with Russia after having refused to hold any intercourse whatever with M. de Staal or any ambassador accredited by the Russian Government. Mr. Chamberlain had no right to take any such step. It was a gross breach of international good manners. It was a distinct attack upon the diplomatic privileges which we had solemnly conceded to the South African Republic in the Convention of 1884. If the ordinary laws of diplomatic intercourse had prevailed, and our Government had been in constant communication with the duly accredited representative of the Transvaal, as we should be with those of any other "foreign State in friendly treaty relations with Her Majesty," who can doubt but that many misunderstandings might have been removed and peace might have been preserved? Of course it is easy to say that it would not, but the onus of proof lies upon those who have deliberately in the whole of these negotiations deprived themselves of one of the recognised methods adopted by all civilised States for conducting international intercourse. When the account comes to be summed up between Great Britain and the Transvaal, the impartial judge will not fail to lay his finger upon this point as one great leading item in the indictment against Great Britain. It does not matter in the least that Dr. Leyds may be very objectionable to us personally. We have no right, because we dislike an ambassador, to refuse to hold diplomatic intercourse with the country which he represents. Whatever may be said against Dr. Leyds, nothing can be said against Mr. Montagu White. During the whole of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Mr. White was labouring day and night in the cause of peace. He did everything that man could do in order to induce President Kruger to make any and every concession that would avert war; but during the whole of that time he was under an absolute boycott, and the nearest approach he ever made to an interview with any of Her Majesty's Ministers was when he had an informal and strictly unofficial conversation with Lord Salisbury's private secretary. That is not the way in which nations conduct business when they wish to remain at peace. Arbitration comes in when ordinary diplomatic methods have failed, but in this case ordinary diplomatic methods were not tried. This refusal to recognise the representatives of the South African Republic whose status was, from the point of view of international law, securely based upon the Convention of 1884, is significant of the whole spirit in which these negotiations have been conducted. From first to last there has been manifest a hectoring, bullying determination to snub and humiliate the small State, and to refuse it any of the ordinary privileges and rights belonging to an independent Government expressly authorised to conduct its own diplomacy without reference to us, save and except when treaties come to be signed.

It stands on record that our Government has refused indignantly to permit any arbitration as to the question in dispute between us and the Transvaal. It is equally on record that President Kruger has over and over again implored us to adopt that method of settling differences. In the second place, it is the fact that our Government has deliberately denied itself the recourse to the usual diplomatic method of holding personal communication with the accredited representatives of the South African Republic. Even these two counts, heavy though they are, do by no means exhaust the evidence as to the reluctance of our Government to use the most obvious opportunity for arriving at a peaceful settlement. Even supposing we admit that Mr. Chamberlain was right to boycott the diplomatists from Pretoria, granting further that there was solid ground for his objection to avail himself of the services of a foreign arbitrator in the dispute between ourselves and the Transvaal, there still remains a wide field within which he could have found many expedients for

avoiding the catastrophe in which he has at last succeeded in involving the Empire. A reference to arbitration does not necessarily involve a reference to a foreigner. In his endeavour to meet the objections of his implacable adversary, President Kruger was willing to forego any appeal to a foreign arbitrator, being quite content to accept the decision of an arbitral tribunal composed exclusively of British or Afrikanders, but this project met with no more support than its predecessors. The question, we were loftily told, was one of policy, and therefore it was impossible to refer it to arbitration. Let us admit then that, although we have heard similar assertions made not less loftily concerning every subject that ever has been referred to arbitration, there still remain other sources of pacification which were pressed upon the Government, and pressed upon them in vain. In order to prove this, I cannot do better than reproduce here a letter which was published in the *Times* on October 5th, calling attention to the suggestions of the Hague Convention, and pointing out how they might be adopted for the solution of the difficulties which were being used for the purpose of forcing on the war.

“ May I venture to suggest to all those persons who profess to desire peace that similar difficulties to those which confront us in the present situation were carefully considered and provided for by the Peace Conference at the Hague? It is, of course, true that the Arbitration Convention has not been signed by all the Governments as yet, and has not been ratified by any. It is, therefore, in no sense an international document and possesses only the authority which belongs to a carefully drafted statement by the representatives of all civilized Powers as to what are likely to be the most effectual means of avoiding an appeal to the sword. In the drafting of this deliberate judgment of all the Governments our own representatives took a leading place.

We may, therefore, while admitting to the fullest extent the fact that the Hague Convention is at present of no binding force upon anybody, recognise that it nevertheless does express the judgment of the civilized world as to what course ought to be taken when two disputing States arrive at the position in which we stand in relation to the Transvaal. It may also be admitted without qualification or reserve that the differences between the Transvaal Republic and the British Empire do not stand on exactly the same footing as differences arising between two absolutely sovereign and independent States. Nevertheless the Hague Convention contains at least three articles, the principle of which might with profit be referred to as suggesting a way out of the present difficulty. The first is Article 1. This article runs as follows :—

In order to prevent as far as possible the recourse to force in international relations the signatory powers agree to employ all their efforts to bring about the pacific solution of the differences which may arise between States.

Here the agreement on the part of the signatory Powers to employ their efforts to avert war is not limited to the case of disputes arising between the signatory Powers, or even between independent Powers. The undertaking relates to differences which may arise between States without qualification, whether those States are in the position of Bulgaria in relation to the Ottoman Empire or of the Transvaal in relation to ourselves. The suggestion, therefore, of Article 1 is that the signatory Powers should employ their efforts to avert war, which at present so far they do not seem to have done. This, however, we will pass by, and proceed to the clauses which bear directly upon the questions at issue.

Under Article 9 the Powers unanimously agree to recommend as the best

means of reconciling antagonistic views, existing as to questions of fact involved in the dispute, the appointment of international commissions of inquiry. The article runs as follows:—

In disputes of an international character, involving neither national honour nor essential interests, and arising from a divergence of opinion on points of fact, the signatory Powers consider it useful that the parties who may not have been able to agree by diplomatic means should institute, as far as circumstances may permit, an international commission of inquiry, so as to clear up all questions of actual fact by an impartial and conscientious examination.

It would be difficult to have made any suggestion that would have gone more directly to the very root of our chief controversy at this moment with President Kruger. The advantages of such a course of proceeding were recognised by Mr. Chamberlain when he accepted the seven years' franchise law as a basis of settlement, and proposed a mixed commission of inquiry to clear up "by an impartial and conscientious inquiry all questions of fact." This proposal made by Mr. Chamberlain has been accepted by the Transvaal Government, and, therefore, we are in the position of finding both parties to the dispute in entire agreement with the suggestion of Article 9 of the Hague Convention. The only reason why this commission is not at present engaged in making its "impartial and conscientious inquiry" is because our Government has gone back upon its own proposal, and now refuses to accept from the Transvaal Government the proposition which originally emanated from itself.

But, supposing that Ministers persist in their rejection of a proposition which has the unanimous recommendation of all the civilised Powers, we then come to a situation in which the dispute becomes acute, the negotiators on either side having done their best and having failed to arrive at a pacific arrangement. Under those circumstances, the next step is to appeal to the sword, but The Hague Conference, in order to avert so grave a calamity, framed Article 8, providing for special mediation. This Article was drafted by the American delegates and had the hearty support of the British delegates as well as of the Lord Chief Justice of England, who, before the Conference met, had expressed himself strongly in favour of such a method of settling disputes.

Article 8 runs as follows:—

The signatory Powers agree to recommend the application, in circumstances which permit it, of special mediation in the following form:—In the case of a grave disagreement endangering peace, the disputing States each choose one Power to which they entrust the mission of entering into direct communication with the Power chosen by the other side, for the purpose of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. During the continuance of their mandate, the duration of which, unless the contrary is stipulated, cannot exceed 30 days, the contending States shall cease all direct relations in regard to the question in dispute, which is considered as referred exclusively to the mediating Powers. They must apply all their efforts to arranging the difference. In case of the actual rupture of pacific relations, these Powers remain charged with the common mission of profiting by every opportunity of re-establishing peace.

It will be objected at once that in the dispute between us and the Transvaal Republic we cannot allow the intervention of any foreign Power, and therefore that this article does not apply. Admitting to the full, for the sake of argument, that this is the case, we have to ask ourselves whether the principle involved in Article 8 might not be remembered with advantage at the present crisis. The essential principle of Article 8 is that when the original negotiators have done their best and stand face to face and no appeal is left but to the sword, the signatory Powers agree to recommend that a period of thirty days' truce should be interposed between the rupture of the negotiations and the declaration of war, and that during these thirty days

new negotiators should be brought in, who would approach the subject with a fresh mind, free from the prejudices or animosities generated by the long diplomatic wrangle, and that those fresh negotiators should apply all their efforts to arranging the difference. During the time when the matter was handed over to those fresh negotiators, all direct relations in regard to the questions in dispute between the disputing States would cease.

Article 7 provides that the acceptance of mediation need not interrupt mobilisation, war preparations, or current military operations. The right to accept or reject the conclusions arrived at by the new negotiators would, of course, remain in the hands of the disputing States. Now why should not the principle of Article 8 be adopted in relation to our present difficulties with the Transvaal? In view of the unanimous recommendation of all the Powers at the Peace Conference, it would involve no slight either upon Mr. Conyngham Greene or upon Mr. Secretary Reitz, if the Transvaal Republic on the one side and the British Empire on the other were to appoint fresh negotiators. Let us say, for instance, that President Kruger might appoint Mr. Fischer of the Orange Free State, or Mr. Hofmeyr of our own colony, while we might on our part appoint Lord Pauncefote or the Duke of Devonshire, and entrust to them during the period of truce the duty of attempting to arrive at an honourable and pacific settlement."

This suggestion, although cordially supported in influential quarters, met with no response. Ministers having surrendered themselves apparently into the hands of Mr. Chamberlain, reeled helplessly down the abyss into the war which Mr. Chamberlain had made inevitable. The contrast between our professions at the Hague and our actions at the present crisis has naturally led to much cynical comment on the part of those who were our colleagues in the Peace Conference. In proof of this I could only refer to one passage from a speech of the French delegate, Baron d'Estournelles, who took a leading part in supporting Lord Pauncefote at the Hague. Baron d'Estournelles is well known as the man who for years was virtually acting French Ambassador at the Court of St. James's. He has given proof time and again, in trying circumstances, of his friendship for this country. No one can accuse him of any *parti pris* in what he says on this subject. But this is the way in which this distinguished French diplomatist and friend of England spoke on the subject before Mr. Chamberlain's policy had borne its fruit:—

I shall only say one word about England to call to mind that it is to her eminent delegate, Lord Pauncefote, that is due the great honour of having been the first to produce a project for an international tribunal of arbitration. This honour may become an unalterable and brilliant glory if England remains faithful to the initiative which she has taken. A dispute of long standing has just broken out between her and the little State of the Transvaal. This is the crucial test! This is the opportunity for an action strengthening the declarations of the Government. . . . Will England, after three months, take two contradictory initiatives? Will she resort to the machinery of the Hague to declare war at Pretoria? No, that seems impossible. She will not condemn herself. She will not with her own hands tear up the peace-making document which she has hardly drawn up; she will not make the world resound with the noise of battle on the morrow of the day when she held up before its eyes the shining sign so long expected of justice and peace-making.

Alas, what seemed impossible has already come to pass.

CHAPTER XII.

THE CAPE DUTCH AND THE FREE STATE.

IN discussing the question of South African policy it is well to remember what Mr. Chamberlain in his saner moments affirmed; namely, that the key of the situation is held not by the Transvaal, but by the Dutch of Cape Colony. Mr. Chamberlain in his speech of the 22nd April 1896, laid it down as a proposition to be universally accepted that we must use every exertion and exhaust every means of securing good feeling between the Dutch and English. He reminded us that we were a Dutch Government as well as an English Government, and that it ought to be our object to carry with us our Dutch fellow subjects. On an earlier occasion, the 14th February 1896, he proclaimed that for himself as for his predecessor we were prepared to go as far as Dutch sentiment would support us. He added; "it is a very serious matter, involving the most serious considerations if we are asked to go to war in opposition to the Dutch sentiment." The test and touchstone of good sound policy in South Africa is to ask whether or not it enables us, in Mr. Chamberlain's phrase, to have at our backs the sympathy and support of the majority of the Dutch population in South Africa. Unfortunately that is just what the policy of the present Government has not done. It has thrown the Orange Free State solidly into the arms of the Transvaal, and for obvious reasons. The Free State for more than a generation has been on terms of the greatest friendship with Great Britain. The one absolutely independent Republic in South Africa was the one state with which we were on the best terms. The Colonial policy of Mr. Chamberlain has had the result of detaching the Orange Free State from us, and arraying all the burghers of that independent republic in battle against us, side by side with the Boers of the Transvaal. The origin of this is simple.

The detachment began in the conspiracy which was marred by the undue precipitation of Dr. Jameson. The rooted distrust which Mr. Chamberlain's policy inspired in the Free State led them to conclude a defensive and offensive alliance with the Transvaal. This, however, might have come to nothing had it not been that the distrust engendered by the events of 1895 and 1896 had been deepened and intensified by Mr. Chamberlain's policy in bringing forward the fraudulent claim to the suzerainty of 1881, and by his repudiation of his own proposal the moment it was accepted by the Boers. President Steyn and the Cape Dutch, as Mr. Chamberlain himself admitted, did their best to bring about a peaceful solution, and it was only when they were driven by the evidence of Mr. Chamberlain's own acts to believe that nothing would satisfy him but the destruction of the independence of the Transvaal, that they took up arms on behalf of the threatened republic.

For us who live at home at ease, and speak of war as an animating sport rather than as a dread reality, it is difficult to appreciate the amount of heroic self-sacrifice that is involved in the action of the Orange Free State.

Its immediate result has been to send the whole adult manhood of the tiny republic into the field, to brave not merely the hardships of the campaign but the prospects of utter destruction by the overwhelming forces of the British Empire, and all this on behalf of their threatened independence. We protest of course that we never intended to threaten their independence. How fatuous then must have been the policy which forced the opposite conviction upon men who had everything to lose, and intensified it to such an extent that they were willing to sacrifice their lives to attest the sincerity of their alarm.

No one can allege that the Orange Free Staters treated Englishmen with injustice or inequality. There are no grievances of Outlanders to be alleged against the little Free State, but this is what President Steyn thinks it true and just to say of the policy of our country :—

On October 11th President Steyn issued a proclamation to the burghers of the Free State in which he says that the sister Republic is about to be attacked by an unscrupulous enemy, who has long looked for a pretext to annihilate the Afrikaners. He goes on to say that the people of the Orange Free State are bound to the Transvaal by many ties, as well as by formal treaty, and solemnly declares, in the presence of the Almighty, that they are compelled to resist a powerful enemy, owing to the injustice done to their kith and kin.

Solemn obligations (continues the proclamation) have not protected the Transvaal against an annexation conspiracy. When its independence ceases, the existence of the Orange Free State as an independent State will be meaningless.

Experience in the past has shown that no reliance can be placed on the solemn promises and obligations of Great Britain, when the administration at the helm is prepared to tread treaties under foot.

After giving a historical sketch of the wrongs which he alleges have been done to the Transvaal, President Steyn says :—

The original Conventions have been twisted and turned by Great Britain into a means of exercising tyranny against the Transvaal, which has not returned the injustice done to it in the past. No gratitude has been shown for the indulgence which was granted to British subjects who, according to law, had forfeited their lives and property. Compliance with the British demands would be equivalent to the loss of our independence, which has been gained by our blood and tears.

For many years British troops have been concentrating on the borders of the Transvaal, in order to compel it by terrorism to comply with British claims. The crafty plans of those with whom love of gold is the motive are now being realised. While acknowledging the honour of thousands of Englishmen who abhor deeds of robbery and violence, the Orange Free State execrates the wrongful deeds of a British statesman.

After expressing confidence that the Almighty will help and aid them, and counselling the burghers to do nothing unworthy of Christians and burghers of the Free State, the President concludes with the following words :—

Burghers of the Free State, stand up as one man against the oppressor and violator of right!

Before the ultimatum was launched by the Transvaal Government, President Steyn made a last despairing effort to induce the British Government to desist from its policy of provocation and menace.

In a dispatch dated September 27, President Steyn pointed out that the tone of the British dispatches had altered, and that the Imperial Government had departed from the basis on which the negotiations with the Transvaal had been opened. On his advice, the Transvaal Government had agreed to the holding of an inquiry, and the disappointment of the Free State

Government and the people was therefore great when it transpired that their efforts in favour of a peaceful solution were unavailing.

The Free State Government were still prepared to tender their services in order to bring about a solution of the difficulties on fair and reasonable lines.

The efforts of the Orange Free State to secure peace were further hampered by the fact, that notwithstanding the repeated assurances of the Imperial Government that it did not wish to interfere with the internal affairs of the Transvaal, nor disturb the independence of the Republic, it pursued a policy justifying contrary conclusions. The Free State could not conceive it possible that the difference regarding the franchise and representation could justify the extensive and ever-increasing military preparations on the borders, not only of the Transvaal, but of the Free State. They were therefore reluctantly compelled to conclude that these preparations were intended to secure other objects, the knowledge of which might induce the Free State to make representations with a view to securing their attainment.

In conclusion, President Steyn trusted that the Imperial Government might see its way clear, pending further negotiations, to stop further movements or increases of troops, and he would be glad to be favoured with the views of the Imperial Government, as to the precise nature and scope of the concessions or measures which it might suggest, as necessary or sufficient to secure satisfaction and the permanent solution of existing differences.

President Steyn, telegraphing on October 3, said he did not consider that there were even fair grounds for the movements of British troops. On the contrary, he believed that the increasing military preparations retarded the efforts of himself and those who were sincerely working to maintain peace and effect a fair settlement. He wished to place on record his earnest conviction that on those in authority who had introduced the military element, and who since had continued a policy of menace and intervention, would rest the responsibility should all efforts fail to secure peace and an honourable settlement. He could not but recognise the fact that in view of the action of the British authorities the Transvaal Government could not be blamed for such action as had been taken.

He was the more confirmed in this view by the fact that while he was still without a reply to his despatch on September 27, the reasonable request therein contained, that the Imperial authorities should stay the increase and further movements of troops—which would probably have prevented the calling up of the burghers of the Republics—had not only been ignored, but activity in the military preparations, and the dispatch of troops, was more persistent than ever. He felt deeply impressed with the danger and delay, and urged the need of immediate action, if further attempts were to be made to secure a peaceful solution. Once again he tendered his best services towards the attainment of that object, but he feared that these would probably be useless if unaccompanied or preceded by the assurance requested in his despatch of September 27.

Whatever may be said as to the unfortunate shape of the Boer Ultimatum, no one can take exception to the very moderate remonstrance of President Steyn. If there had been any desire whatever on the part of our government to seek a pacific settlement, President Steyn's overtures afforded them an excellent opportunity. But they were disregarded, and as the result President Steyn, with a reluctance which no one can appreciate unless they have first imagined what it is to order the whole male population of a country into a hopeless and desperate struggle, announced to his people that war had become inevitable.

It is probable that the judgment of the Free State will be thought of more than any other element in deciding the opinions of our people as to the justice of the matter. The Free Staters were in a position which made them quick to discern the real tendency and drift of our Colonial policy. All their interests lay in believing, as long as belief was possible, that our Colonial Minister would deal fairly and honestly with the Transvaal. As the result of his policy and of his antecedents they have been driven most reluctantly to believe that they, equally with the Transvaal, are threatened with the loss of their independence and the extinction of their national existence. They not only think so, but they have staked their lives as proof of their good faith. It would be interesting to know how many of those who are clamouring for war in our country would suddenly become dumb if they were required to give the proof of the intensity of their convictions which has been rendered by the Free State.

As to the Cape Dutch their attitude has been very reserved. They have exerted themselves steadily throughout in favour of peace. Again and again they have intervened for the purpose of inducing Mr. Kruger to make concessions, and again and again they have asserted their conviction that the concessions which he has made ought to have satisfied our Government. On June 15th the Cape Ministry intimated to Sir Alfred Milner through Mr. Schreiner, that in their opinion a state of things had arisen which would not justify interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. On the 7th July the Cape Ministry through Mr. Schreiner made a public statement to the effect that although they were doing all in their power to bring about substantial reforms in the Transvaal they thought that the use of force with that object would not be justified. A day later Mr. Schreiner published his statement that the Cape Government regarded Mr. Kruger's new franchise proposals as adequate and satisfactory, and such as to secure a peaceful settlement. On the 10th July the Cape Town branch of the Afrikaner Bond passed a resolution asking the Government to adopt the principle of arbitration which they were advocating at the Hague.

Fifty-three members of the Cape Parliament signed an address to their brothers in the Transvaal expressing profound sympathy with them in their present tribulation, and advising President Kruger to accept the proposal for a joint commission. This advice President Kruger took, only to find the proposal thrown back in his face by its author. Thereupon the Cape Dutch memorialised Sir Alfred Milner, praying that he should not go back on his word, but should proceed to the appointment of the joint commission which he himself had proposed. They appealed to deaf ears. To have done so would have averted war.

The Dutch of the two Republics confidentially counted upon the support and sympathy of their brethren in the Cape Colony. The High Commissioner and Mr. Schreiner have issued proclamations threatening the Dutch of the Cape with the penalties of high treason if they assist those with whom the Government is at war. On the other hand Cape Colony is flooded with manifestoes appealing to them to support the republic.

One of these manifestoes is a circular issued in English and Dutch, signed by Viljoen, Field Cornet, Johannesburg, headed "Appeal to Afrikaners. Address to compatriots on both sides of the Orange River," asking them to decide what they will do in the uncertain future. It recites England's proceedings with regard to Slachtersnek, diamond fields, Jameson raid. England desires to avenge Majuba, and destroy Afrikaner nation. Owing to existence of two independent Afrikaner Republics the Afrikaner in the English Colonies is still tolerated. If Republics falls into hands of England,

Boers of Cape Colony and Natal will be disarmed. Hottentots will sit with them in Parliament.

Wherefore, men belonging to our race that live under the British flag, know and understand full well that the destruction of the Boer Republics means the destruction of the Afrikaner nation. If the Republics go under the Afrikaner will merely be referred to as a nation that once existed. Know that in that event England's iron yoke will press upon and plague you to the last day. Wherefore I ask, will you allow England to employ your Colony, your money, your cattle, yea, even yourself, to destroy your brothers and compatriots? Afrikanders, be true to your people!

At present everything is in suspense, but the sympathies of the majority of the white population in the Cape Colony are shown in the fact that they are raising a fund in the cause of humanity, the proceeds of which are to be exclusively applied to the Transvaal. The appeal for subscriptions on behalf of the Transvaal wounded and widows, which has been issued over the signatures of Mr. Hofmeyr and other prominent members of the Bond, says:—

Notwithstanding strenuous efforts to preserve peace, war has been virtually declared. There are few Colonial Afrikanders who are not bound by ties of relationship and friendship to the inhabitants of both Republics. It is natural that their sympathy should express itself in a legitimate form. What can they do? Take up weapons and join in the work of warfare? Their duty as British subjects forbids this. We appeal to every Afrikaner to contribute his utmost to the fund.

It is well to remember in this connection the deliberate judgment of Lord Randolph Churchill as to the risks which we ran in prosecuting the Transvaal war eighteen years ago. Lord Randolph had denounced vehemently in his usual style the surrender after Majuba; but when he went to South Africa and saw things with his own eyes, he made a public recantation in terms which it is well to make generally accessible at the present moment. After describing how, in 1891, the old hostility between English and the Dutch seemed to have entirely passed away, "thanks to the genius of the Prime Minister, Mr. Cecil Rhodes," who has "known how to acquire and retain the confidence of the English and the Dutch colonists," Lord Randolph continued as follows:—

In justice it should be added that the sagacious policy of Mr. Rhodes has only been made possible by the termination of the Transvaal War in 1881, and by the manner of its termination. The surrender of the Transvaal and the peace concluded by Mr. Gladstone with the victors of Majuba Hill were at the time, and still are, the object of sharp criticism and bitter denunciation from many politicians at home, *quorum pars parva fuit*. Better and more precise information, combined with cool reflection, leads me to the conclusion that had the British Government of that day taken advantage of its strong military position, and annihilated, as it could easily have done, the Boer forces, it would indeed have regained the Transvaal, but it might have lost Cape Colony. The Dutch sentiment in the colony had been so exasperated by what it considered to be the unjust, faithless, and arbitrary policy pursued towards the free Dutchmen of the Transvaal by Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and Sir Owen Lanyon that the final triumph of the British arms, mainly by brute force, would have permanently and hopelessly alienated it from Great Britain. Parliamentary government in a country where the Dutch control the Parliament would have become impossible, and without Parliamentary government Cape Colony would be ungovernable. The actual magnanimity of the peace with the Boers concluded by Mr. Gladstone's Ministry, after two humiliating military reverses suffered by the arms under their control, became plainly apparent to the just and sensible mind of the Dutch Cape Colonist, atoned for much of past grievance, and demonstrated the total absence in the English mind of any hostility or unfriendliness to the Dutch race. Concord between Dutch and English in the Colony from that moment became possible, and that concord the Government of Mr. Rhodes inaugurated, and has since to all appearance firmly riveted.—"Men, Mines, and Animals in South Africa," by Lord Randolph Churchill, 1892, pp. 23-24.

I cannot close this chapter without calling special attention to the moderate but weighty declaration forwarded to the Government through the

representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa. On 30th June the members of this body forwarded to Sir Alfred Milner a memorial, from which I make the following extract:—

As men holding the responsible position of members of the Moderamen of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa, as preachers of the Gospel of peace, as representing a Church one in creed, language, membership, blood-relationship with the burghers of the Transvaal, as loyal subjects of our beloved Queen, we desire to urge upon your Excellency to leave nothing undone which may tend to avert active hostilities. We shudder to think of the consequences which are sure to follow such an eventuality. The race-feeling between the Dutch and English would be intensified, the breach between the two sections of our South African community would become irreparable, the allegiance of Her Majesty's loyal Dutch subjects would sustain the severest shock it has ever been subjected to, and the hope of a United South Africa would be gone for ever.

To us standing outside the political arena the difference between the proposals of your Excellency and those of President Kruger would hardly appear to justify the horrors in which active warfare between Her Majesty's troops and the burghers of the Transvaal Republic would involve the whole of South Africa for many a day.

A graver warning was never addressed by a religious body to the head of a State on the eve of a terrible war, but like all those which preceded it it fell upon deaf ears.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE GENESIS OF A CRIME, AND ITS NEMESIS.

THE present war, which is an outrage upon Christianity and humanity, has been forced upon the Boers by a policy which it is difficult to characterise in parliamentary terms. The Boers have their own sins to answer for. Nor do I for a moment pretend that their system of government is ideal, or their administration pure. The Outlanders had plenty of grievances which it was our duty to try to redress so far as it was possible to do it without going to war, or without breaking our pledged word not to interfere in the internal affairs of the South African Republic. That may be admitted, and if anyone likes to throw hard words at President Kruger, and abuse him for not having the wit to see that he could have circumvented the war party by accepting the five years' franchise, I shall not say them nay. We have no responsibility for the mistakes and shortcomings of President Kruger. What we have to do is to ask whether our own policy has been free from reproach, whether we have acted throughout in a straightforward honourable fashion, and whether we, being the superior and more civilised Power, have used every available means of allaying the suspicions of the very distrustful Old Peasant with whom we had to deal.

Unfortunately that is just what we have not done. We have done everything imaginable to excite distrust and justify suspicion. Our policy has been slippery and tricky; we have put forward claims which are demonstrably fraudulent; we have absolutely refused to refer the one great cause of dispute to arbitration and we have finally thrust them into war by repudiating our own proposition the moment they accepted it. The best cause in the world—and I have never denied that the cause of the Outlanders is a good cause—would be damned irretrievably by the method by which it has been handled.

Lying at the root of everything, the element which has continually baffled the efforts of all peacemakers has been the intense conviction of President Kruger and his advisers that the Colonial Secretary was determined by hook or by crook to destroy their Republic and reduce the Transvaal to the status of a British Colony.

Now in order to understand President Kruger's belief it is necessary to go back to the conspiracy which was at once exposed and baffled by the never to be sufficiently lamented impatience of Dr. Jameson. It is not very ancient history, for it is only four years old, and it is absolutely impossible to understand the reluctance of President Kruger to accept our assurances or to believe our word unless we put ourselves in his place and look for a moment how things must appear to him.

What President Kruger knows is that in the autumn of 1895, he was served with an ultimatum by Mr. Chamberlain which threatened him with war if he did not reopen the Drifts. To avoid war he gave in, reopened the Drifts and immediately found himself face to face with a conspiracy to overthrow his government which was engineered, armed and financed by the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. In order to facilitate the armed intervention of British troops, he saw that Mr. Chamberlain had made over to Mr. Rhodes a strip of land convenient as a jumping off place for an invasion of the Transvaal. He saw also that Mr. Chamberlain had expedited the arrange-

ment by which the mounted police could be placed at the disposition of Dr. Jameson for use on emergencies. Finally when the conspiracy hung fire among the Outlanders, he saw Dr. Jameson at the head of the troops taken over from Mr. Chamberlain, use the jumping-off place as the base from which he invaded the Republic.

All that he knows as a matter of fact. But besides what is within his own knowledge, he knows that the following statement as to the complicity of Mr. Chamberlain in the deadly "complot" has been publicly made and is widely believed by those who have an intimate knowledge of South African affairs.

Information as to the conspiracy to overturn the Boer Government in the Transvaal was communicated by Dr. Jameson to Lord Rosmead, High Commissioner at the Cape, and was fully expounded to Sir Graham Bower the Imperial Secretary who, owing to Lord Rosmead's illness, was virtually Acting High Commissioner.

It was also communicated to Mr. Newton the Imperial Magistrate on the frontier and was elaborated in detail by Dr. Jameson, administrator under the Crown of the Chartered Company's territory. All this, with the exception of the communication to Lord Rosmead of the outline of the conspiracy, is officially admitted and is on record as proved.

It is further stated that before the Prime Minister of the Cape went very far in his conspiracy he found it necessary to enlist the support of the Colonial Office in his designs. He therefore sent over to London his *fidus Achates*, Dr. Rutherford Harris, with instructions to inform Mr. Chamberlain of what was brewing and to ask him to expedite the transfer of the jumping off territory, and the transfer of the police in order to enable them to support the insurrection from the outside. Dr. Harris executed his mission and cabled to Mr. Rhodes the result of his interview. At first Mr. Chamberlain refused, but subsequently after Dr. Harris had "spoken openly" to Mr. Fairfield of the Colonial Office, and had communicated to Mr. Chamberlain the contents of a cablegram from Mr. Rhodes, warning him that if he thwarted the conspiracy he would lose South Africa, Mr. Chamberlain gave way, and on the convenient pretext of the necessity for protecting the builders of the Bechuanaland railway from (non-existent) savage tribes, handed over the police and the jumping off strip to the Chief Conspirator.

Further Mr. Kruger has heard that the communications between the conspirator's emissaries and the Colonial Office were close and constant, and that during the whole month of November cablegrams were constantly passing and repassing between the chief conspirator at Cape Town and his trusted emissaries and friends in London, who were on his behalf keeping the Colonial Office in touch with the movement. He knows also that on November 4th Mr. Fairfield advised the removal of the Imperial troops before the "ugly row" began in which the leading role was to be played by the forces of the Chartered Company. (This letter is one of the few documents that are in evidence.) He has heard also that so far from Mr. Chamberlain knowing nothing of the complot, he took so keen and close an interest in its development that he insisted that Dr. Jameson's men should go in under the Union Jack, and that the next Governor of the Transvaal should be appointed by the Colonial Office. He has read the telegram from the chief conspirator in reply to this intimation about the flag, and he has drawn from it his own conclusions. Further he knows that just before the Raid took place a cablegram was received at Cape Town from a trusted friend of Mr. Rhodes in London, who immediately, after a long interview with Mr. Chamberlain, telegraphed "Hurry up." He has heard also that another telegram from another friend of Mr. Rhodes arrived with the same urgent

summons, and he has heard that this also was forwarded, as the result of a pressing intimation from the Colonial Office, that it was better to get the Transvaal "ugly row" over as soon as possible, as the Venezuela dispute with the United States was threatening. And he knows that as the result of these urgent cablegrams, sent after visits paid to the Colonial Office, Dr. Jameson did "hurry up" accordingly.

But before Dr. Jameson could get Sir John Willoughby and the regular officers of the British Army who were "seconded" for service with the Chartered Companies troops it was necessary to satisfy them that Mr. Chamberlain was privy to the conspiracy. This communication was therefore formally made to them before the frontier was crossed. Dr. Jameson told Sir John Willoughby that Mr. Chamberlain knew and approved of the enterprize, and Sir John Willoughby in making his statement to his officers used the phrase "Imperial authorities" instead of Mr. Chamberlain. On receiving this intimation the little army invaded the Transvaal, to be captured three days later at Doornkop. The officers were subsequently restored to the regular army, as it was proved they had acted in good faith, believing the assurances made to them by Dr. Jameson on the strength of the cablegrams sent from London by Dr. Harris, Miss Flora Shaw, Mr. Maguire, and others, who were all in touch with the Colonial Office.

President Kruger also knows, for it is in evidence, that when Mr. Rhodes went home to face the music after the raid his first step was to send Mr. Hawksley to tell Mr. Fairfield of the existence of cablegrams which had passed between Capetown and London, which established the complicity of the Colonial Office in the conspiracy. Mr. Rhodes after this went and had two hours' conversation with Mr. Chamberlain at the Colonial Office. Mr. Chamberlain then stood up in the House of Commons and solemnly declared that "to the best of his knowledge and belief everybody, Mr. Rhodes included, were all equally ignorant of the intention or action of Dr. Jameson, and that belief he expressed after having carefully examined all the statements of all the parties concerned." Ten months later Mr. Chamberlain admitted he had never discussed the subject with Mr. Rhodes, whose confidences were not wanted—being indeed unnecessary.

Mr. Rhodes then returned to Africa, where he met Mr. Tatton Egerton, M.P., who told him plainly that Mr. Chamberlain was in the conspiracy up to the hilt. Mr. Kruger also knows that it has been publicly stated in London, and never contradicted, that when Mr. Tatton Egerton was confronted with the Colonial Secretary, he was asked, "Who told you I was in it?" "Rhodes himself," said Mr. Egerton. "The traitor!" was said to be Mr. Chamberlain's only reply.

Mr. Kruger also knows that copies of all the incriminating cablegrams were furnished by Mr. Hawksley to Mr. Chamberlain, that they were kept by him for some days and then returned. He has further heard that the correspondence accompanying these letters frankly recognises the complicity of the Colonial Office in the conspiracy.

All this Mr. Kruger has heard. He knows also that in 1897 a representative Committee of the House of Commons was appointed for the purpose of examining into the truth of these assertions. He knows also that the Committee, which included among its members Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Sir W. Harcourt, instead of making a thorough inquiry, deliberately and resolutely in the face of vehement protests in the press, hushed up the whole matter. They refused to insist upon the production of the incriminating cablegrams, they never demanded, from the Colonial Office or from the other side, any of the correspondence that had passed, and when they found the chief witness, Mr. Hawksley, was actually

displaying a willingness to answer questions, they ordered him off the stand and refused to allow him to give evidence. Then that Committee drew up a report in which they entirely exonerated the Colonial Office from all complicity in the plot, and declared that "the fact that Mr. Rhodes has refused to allow the cables to be produced before the Committee leads to the conclusion that any statements purporting to implicate the Colonial Office contained in them were unfounded, and the use made of them in support of his action in South Africa." This in plain English was a lie, and Mr. Chamberlain, who signed the report, knew it to be a lie. For immediately after signing this damning statement that Mr. Rhodes was a liar and a blackmailer, who made a fraudulent use of cablegrams in order to lure his subordinates into an illegal conspiracy, Mr. Chamberlain stood up in the House of Commons and said, "But as to one thing, I am perfectly convinced, and that is there has nothing been proved and there exists nothing which affects Mr. Rhodes's personal character as a man of honour. So far as I am concerned in considering the position of Mr. Rhodes, I dismiss absolutely these charges which affect his personal honour."

All this Mr. Kruger knows. What possible conclusion could he draw from it except that in dealing with Mr. Chamberlain he is dealing with a man who was privy to the conspiracy to overthrow his Government and annex the Transvaal, and who did not hesitate at any amount of false statement and suppression of evidence in order to save his skin. Nay, it is even worse than this. For the proceedings of the Committee convinced him that both parties in England are willing to join in a conspiracy to conceal the truth whenever it suits the interest of England in South Africa so to do. As Lord George Hamilton ingenuously said when praising Sir W. Harcourt and the Liberal members of the Committee for hushing up the scandal: "They behaved as Englishmen always behave in positions of responsibility. They declined to push the inquiry to a point which would endanger the supremacy of British rule in South Africa."

But we are not left to infer what President Kruger thought. Mr. Hofmeyr, the leading Dutchman of South Africa, being asked by the interviewer of the *Daily Mail* what he thought of Mr. Chamberlain's conduct at the inquiry replied:—

"It took us all by surprise—even more so than Jameson and Rhodes. We trusted in English justice and British fair play. What do we see? With all the documents at their disposal, the Committee refused to call for the most important ones. The House of Commons by a large majority exonerates him. Where are we? What is going to be the next move? We don't know; we feel suspicious. Can you wonder at it? If this is a specimen of public honour, if Chamberlain's idea of personal honour is to govern British statesmen, what are we to expect next? *There can be no trust by the Dutch community in the Colonial Office so long as these principles prevail there.*"

Can any one wonder at the Dutch community? Read what the *Temps*, the most serious and best informed of all the French papers, said of the proceedings of the South African Committee:—

The Committee sacrifices everything, including the honour of England, to its desire to preserve the reputation of that meddling and imperious statesman. The evil is wrought and is irreparable. It is now proved that the Queen's Government has plotted in time of peace the invasion of a friendly country, and that there is no majority in Great Britain to condemn the crime. It is the apotheosis of the Birmingham statesman; it is also the abdication of British conscience.

It is not necessary for the reader to accept the truth of the statements which President Kruger believes to be true. All that I ask is that the reader should ask himself, How was it possible under these circumstances for President Kruger to regard Mr. Chamberlain in any other light than as fellow-conspirator with Mr. Rhodes, and that he should believe that Mr. Chamberlain only differed from the late Prime Minister of the Cape in

being less courageous in admitting his sins, and much less scrupulous in suppressing the truth?

We must then as honest men admit that, rightly or wrongly, President Kruger had the best justification for his intense suspicion of Mr. Chamberlain's good faith. If Mr. Chamberlain were an innocent misjudged Minister, it was nevertheless necessary for him to do his level best to allay the suspicion with which he was regarded, and even to go out of his way to prove that the Dutch distrust was unfounded. Alas, instead of doing this, he took, wilfully or otherwise, the very step which of all others deepened the Dutch distrust into a fixed conviction that in dealing with Mr. Chamberlain they had to do with a man who had no conception of honesty and good faith.

Within three months of his whitewashing by the South African Committee Mr. Chamberlain, in order to justify his refusal to allow the disputes between England and the Transvaal to be referred to arbitration, deliberately revived the dead and buried suzerainty of the Convention of 1881.

Again, I do not ask the reader to accept my deliberate judgment that this was a piece of scandalous sharp practice. I only ask him to try and think what President Kruger must have thought of it. President Kruger was one of the deputation which in 1884 came to this country to negotiate with England for the abandonment of the suzerainty of 1881. He met Lord Derby and Lord Rosmead who in consideration of concessions made by President Kruger on the western frontier deliberately consented to give up the suzerainty. President Kruger with a keen shrewd Dutch eye to the possibilities of

A CONVENTION CONCLUDED BETWEEN HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, &C., &C., AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC.

NOTE.—The words and paragraphs bracketed or printed in italics are proposed to be inserted, those within a black line are proposed to be omitted.

Her Majesty's Commissioners for the settlement of the Transvaal Territory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, bearing date the 5th of April 1881, do hereby undertake and guarantee, on behalf of Her Majesty, that from and after the 8th day of August 1881, complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, Her Heir and Successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal Territory, upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations and limitations:—

Whereas the Government of the Transvaal State, through its Delegates, consisting of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the said State, Stephanus Johannes Du Toit, Superintendent of Education; Nicholas Jacobus Smit, a member of the Volksraad, have represented to the Queen that the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 3rd day of August, 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State on the 25th October, 1881, contains certain provisions which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations from which the said State is desirous to be relieved; and that the south-western boundaries fixed by the said Convention should be amended, with a view to promote the peace and good order of the said state, and of the countries adjacent thereto; and whereas Her Majesty the Queen, &c., &c., has been pleased to take the said representations into consideration. Now, therefore, Her Majesty has been pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared that the following articles of a new Convention ~~*****~~ shall when ratified by the Volksraad of the South African Republic, be substituted for the Articles embodied in the Convention of 3rd August, 1881, which latter, pending such ratification, shall continue in full force and effect.

Signed at Pretoria London this 3rd day of August 1881.

HERCULES ROBINSON,
President and High Commissioner
EVELYN WOOD, Major-General,
Officer Administering the Government
J. H. de VILLIERS.

We, the undersigned, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, Martinus Wessel Pretorius, and Petrus-Jacobus Joubert, as representatives *delegates* of the Transvaal ~~Republic~~, South African Republic, do hereby agree to all the above conditions, reservations, and limitations, under which self-government has been restored to the inhabitants of the Transvaal Territory, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, and we agree to accept the Government of the said Territory, with all rights and obligations thereto appertaining, on the 8th day of August 1881, and we promise and undertake that this Convention shall be ratified by a newly elected Volksraad of the Transvaal State South African Republic within three ~~six~~ months from this date.

Signed at Pretoria, London, this 3rd day of August 1881.

S. J. P. KRUGER.
M. W. PRETORIUS.
P. J. JOUBERT.

the future asked that the abandonment of the suzerainty of 1881 should be made the subject of a special article in the new Convention. Lord Derby explained that to do this would give a handle to the Opposition, but he gave the delegates a paper—reduced herewith—in which he showed them that in the new Convention which was to be substituted for the old one, the preamble which asserts the suzerainty and the last clause which also recognised it would be omitted. Armed with this document and believing the word of a British statesman the delegates returned to Pretoria, and by virtue of their report that the suzerainty of 1881 was gone for ever they secured the consent of the Volksraad to the ratification of the Convention.* That public statement of theirs was never objected to. No one from 1884 down to 1897 ever dreamed of asserting that the suzerainty of 1881 survived. Speaking near Swindon on October 14th, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, M.P., said:—

He was in office in 1884, when the second Convention with the Transvaal was settled, and he believed the members of the Government all considered that the suzerainty was abolished. It was understood that the Convention of 1881 had disappeared, and had been replaced by the Convention of 1884.

Lord Cadogan, indeed, in the House of Lords, took the earliest possible opportunity of declaring that the object of the Convention of 1884 was to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. But in October 1897, Mr. Chamberlain, fresh from his whitewashing at the hands of the South African Committee, confirmed the worst fears of President Kruger by calmly asserting that the suzerainty still existed, and, therefore, that the preamble of the Convention of 1881 still governed the situation!

President Kruger, to express it in the forcible vernacular, felt himself swindled. Who can say without reason? Rightly or wrongly there is no disputing that he and all his people honestly believed that in 1884 they had made an honest deal with honest statesmen, and that England had frankly fully and for ever given up the Convention of 1881, preamble and all, and that not a rag of the suzerainty remained, save and except Article 4 of the new Convention about the right of veto on Treaties. For thirteen years no British Minister had breathed a word about the suzerainty. But in October

* Extract from the Report of the Deputation of the South African Republic to the Honourable Volksraad, 28th July, 1884.

7. Your Deputation, leaving the judgment of the said Convention entirely to your wisdom and declaring itself ready to give all explanations desired in dealing with it, wishes, with all discretion, to refer to some principal points in which this London Convention is distinguished from the Convention of Pretoria.

b. It is entirely bilateral, whereby your representatives were not placed in the humiliating position of merely having to accept from a Suzerain Government a one-sided document as rule and regulation, but whereby they were recognised as a free contracting party.

c. It makes, then, also an end of the British suzerainty, and, with the official recognition of her name, also restores her full self-government to the South African Republic, excepting one single limitation regarding the conclusion of treaties with foreign powers (Article 4). With the suzerainty the various provisions and limitations of the Pretoria Convention which Her Majesty's Government as suzerain had retained have also, of course, lapsed. (Parliamentary Paper, C. 9507, p. 24.)

Contrast this with Mr. Chamberlain's statement in his despatch of October 1896, when he refused to have questions as to the infringement of the Convention submitted to the arbitration of any neutral Powers. He based his refusal to consent on the ground that "Her Majesty toward the South African Republic holds the relation of a suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic self-government upon certain conditions, and that it would be incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the construction of the conditions on which she accorded self-government to the Republic." (*ib.* p. 16.)

1897, Mr. Chamberlain, of all men in the world, revives this dead and buried suzerainty, and adduces it as a reason why he cannot send our disputes with the Transvaal to arbitration? What could President Kruger think—excepting what he did think that he was dealing with a Jeremy Diddler rather than with a Minister of the Crown.

Let no one say, as the more sane of Mr. Chamberlain's apologists pretend, that the reference to the preamble of the Convention of 1881 was necessary merely from the point of view of legal interpretation, and that it is only an affair of historical reminiscence. President Kruger could not take it in that light for several reasons. Mr. Chamberlain in set terms not merely affirmed the suzerainty of 1881 as being still in existence, but expressly refused to allow the question to be submitted to arbitration. (Blue Book.) Mr. Conyngham Greene, the British agent at Pretoria as explicitly declared that the Government never would give up the right they possessed under the Preamble of 1881. (*Ib.*) Nay more even in the last so called conciliatory despatch, Mr. Chamberlain wrecked all hope of a pacific settlement by referring to "the Conventions" in the plural, thereby once more emphasizing the continued existence of the suzerainty of 1881, which the Boers know was abandoned by Lord Derby in 1884.

If Mr. Chamberlain would have frankly abandoned this monstrous fraud and had explicitly declared that he disclaimed all pretensions to interfere in the Transvaal under the Convention of 1881, he could have had the Five years' Franchise in August. But he refused. He would neither give up this fraudulent claim or allow it to be submitted to the judgment of a mixed British and Africander Court of Arbitration. How could we marvel that President Kruger could not trust such a negotiator?

But although President Kruger knew he was dealing with a man as capable of resurrecting dead claims as he was of denying on oath his complicity in the Rhodesian conspiracy, he nevertheless consented to Mr. Chamberlain's proposal of a Joint Commission into the seven years' franchise. But no sooner did he agree to this Concession, a concession which he made most reluctantly fearing that it might entail a recognition of our right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, no sooner, I say, did he agree to this proposition than Mr. Chamberlain went back on his word, changed his terms, demanded a Joint Commission not into the seven years but into the five years' franchise, and so wrecked the last chance of a pacific settlement.

This being the case—and any one who pleases can read the whole scandalous story in the Blue Books of which this pamphlet is a mere digest—can any honest man venture to say that we are in the right in this war which is now raging in South Africa?

The question of the magnitude of the grievances of the Outlanders does not in the least affect the question whether in proposing to remedy them we have acted in honest straightforward fashion or whether we have been adopting alternately the methods of the burglar and those of the long firm.

I claim to have proved beyond all gainsaying or dispute:—

1st. That President Kruger has ample justification for believing that Mr. Chamberlain was a confederate of Mr. Rhodes in the conspiracy of 1895.

2nd. That Mr. Chamberlain has deliberately revived and pressed the claim to the suzerainty of 1881 which was given up by Lord Derby in 1884, and that he refused to give it up even when offered the five years' franchise in exchange.

3rd. That when President Kruger accepted his proposal for a Joint

Commission into the seven years' franchise Mr. Chamberlain went back on his word and raised his terms.

4th. That from first to last, even while promising to discuss the reference of minor questions to arbitration, Mr. Chamberlain has always refused to allow the one burning question to be referred to the judgment of an arbitral tribunal.

This being so, I ask every honest man whether we can for a moment pretend that we are in the right in this quarrel?

Have we not indeed, on the contrary, been entirely in the wrong, no matter how just may be the claim which we make for the redress of the wrongs of the Outlanders?

We have gone into this war with a lie in our right hand, and if, as the ancients believed, there is a God who judgeth in the earth, there is before us but a terrible looking forward to of judgment to come.

That is the real question that underlies all others. Is there a God, a righteous God, to whom deliberate lying, even for Imperial ends, is abhorrent?

It has been my lot for many years past to mingle much with those whom I may call the artificers of empire. They are not religious men as a rule, although there are some notable exceptions.

There are few questions which I have discussed so much with them as this supreme question, of the existence of a righteous Ruler of the universe.

I well remember the discussions that raged over the question whether or not Mr. Chamberlain should be pressed to make a clean breast of it before the South African Committee? I always argued strongly that honesty was the best policy in the long run, that Mr. Chamberlain could quite truthfully minimise his admissions, and although it would, of course, necessitate his retirement from the Ministry, it would not permanently injure his career even if in the end it did not help him to the realisation of his ambitions. But my friends one and all scouted the idea. "Joe," they said, "was in for it and he must lie himself out of it, cost what it might." Some of them said they would not lie themselves but they would not give Mr. Chamberlain away. "He could do his own lying for himself." So the watchword was "Lie! Lie! Lie!" and in the proceedings of the South African Committee we have the result.

It was a risk, an immense risk. Any one of half-a-dozen witnesses might by a single incautious word have spoiled the whole conspiracy of deception. I never believed they could have got through with it. Nor could they have done so had there been one member on the Committee skilled in cross-examination who was not a party to the hushing up. When it was all over I was taunted with my simplicity. "You can always trust to unctuous rectitude," said one of my friends, "and, when that fails, to the natural cunning of the official Englishman."

Far outside the ring of the Africans the evil lesson of that Committee was eagerly taken to heart. Honesty was not the best policy. Truth was not essential in politics. "Just see how Chamberlain came off scot-free. Where would he have been if he had told the truth?" And the apparent triumph of falsehood poisoned the morale of multitudes of our Imperialists.

That it was falsehood; that the verdict was obtained by wholesale suppression of vital evidence and flat denial of essential facts no one who was in the conspiracy ever disputed, nor do they now deny it. On the contrary, I shall be severely handled for referring to the subject again. It is such a pity, when a lie has served its turn, to insist upon referring to so painful a subject.

If "a proud look, a lying tongue, and hands that shed innocent blood," are still an abomination to the Lord, how can we expect Him to go forth with our armies as of old time?

"Hear the word of the Lord ye scornful men that rule this people!

"Because ye have said, We have made a covenant with Death, and with Hell we are in agreement; when the overflowing scourge shall pass through it shall not come unto us, for we have made lies our refuge, and under falsehood have we hid ourselves.

"Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Behold judgment will I lay to the line and righteousness to the plummet, and the hail shall sweep away the refuge of lies and the waters shall overflow the hiding-place. And your covenant with Death shall be disannulled and your agreement with Hell shall not stand; when the overflowing scourge shall pass through, then ye shall be trodden by it.

"For the wicked shall be turned into Hell and all the nations that forget God."

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

The following dates in the early history of South Africa may be useful :—

- 1494.—Cape of Good Hope discovered by Portuguese.
 1652.—First Dutch settlement founded at Cape Town.
 1795.—Cape made over to England.
 1803.—Cape restored to Holland by Treaty of Amiens.
 1806.—Cape Town captured by British.
 1815.—Colony ceded to England.
 1834.—Slaves emancipated in Cape Colony.
 1836.—The Great Trek of Cape Dutch northward.
 1840.—British attack Boers in Natal.
 1843.—Natal added to Cape Colony.
 1848.—Orange Free State annexed to Cape Colony.
 1852.—Transvaal State recognised by Sand River Convention.
 1854.—Orange Free State recognised as independent.
 The brief period when the Transvaal was a British possession lasted from 1877 to 1881. Its events were chiefly disasters.
 1877.—Annexation of the Transvaal.
 January, 1879.—British defeated at Isandlwana by Zulus.
 December, 1879.—Boers repudiate English rule.
 December 16, 1880.—Boers proclaim South African Republic.
 December 20, 1880.—British defeated at Bronkhorstspruit.
 January 21, 1881.—General Colley defeated at Laing's Nek.
 February 8, 1881.—General Colley defeated at Ingogo.
 February 26, 1881.—General Colley defeated and killed at Majuba.
 April 5, 1881.—Royal Commission appointed.
 August 8, 1881.—Convention of Pretoria restore Transvaal to Boers.
 1883.—Boers raid and settle in Bechuanaland.
 February 27, 1884.—Convention of London, 1884, substituted for Pretoria Convention, 1881.
 Sir Charles Warren's Expedition to Bechuanaland.
 The history of the South African Republic may be said to have begun in 1886, with the discovery of Gold Fields of the Rand.
 1892-3.—Kruger re-elected President by 7854 votes against 7009 given to Joubert.
 1894.—Lord Loch visited Pretoria.
 May, 1894.—13,000 Outlanders petition Volksraad for franchise.
 April, 1895.—32,500 Outlanders petition Volksraad for franchise.
 October, 1895.—Closing of the Drifts.
 November 15.—Drifts opened by ultimatum.
 November 20, 1895.—Mr. Lionel Phillips addresses Chamber of Mines.
 December 27, 1895.—Manifesto of National Union of Outlanders.
 December 30, 1895.—Dr. Jameson crosses the frontier at Pitsani with 512 men.
 January 1, 1896.—Jameson and his men captured at Doornkop.

February 25, 1896.—President Kruger proposes repeal of London Convention and various changes.

July 20-27, 1896.—Jameson and Willoughby tried and convicted in London.

April 27, 1896.—Mr. Chamberlain withdrew his invitation to President Kruger for Conference.

February-July, 1897.—South African Hush-up Committee at Westminster.

August 7th, 1897.—Report of Government Industrial Commission presented to the Volksraad.

May 7, 1897.—President Kruger asks for arbitration.

October, 1897.—Mr. Chamberlain refuses because Britain is suzerain.

December 18, 1898.—The killing of Edgar.

December 24, 1898.—Arrest of Webb and Dodd for holding demonstration. First Petition to Queen presented but not forwarded.

January 16, 1899.—Outlander meeting in Amphitheatre broken up by Boers.

March 24, 1898.—Second Petition to Queen signed by 21,684 British subjects forwarded to Sir Alfred Milner.

March 17, 1899.—President Kruger in a speech at Heidelberg proposes a 9 years' franchise.

March 25, 1899.—President Kruger's speech at Rustenburg.

April 1, 1899.—President Kruger addresses Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg.

May 4, 1899.—Sir Alfred Milner telegraphs the "Political Helot", Despatch.

May 5, 1899.—9000 Outlanders present a counter petition to President Kruger.

May 10, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain replies to Sir A. Milner.

May 9, 1899.—Mr. Hofmeyr proposes to Sir A. Milner a Conference with President Kruger at Bloemfontein.

May 10, 1899.—President Steyn through Mr. Schreiner invites Sir A. Milner to Bloemfontein.

May 12, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain approves proposed Conference.

May 19, 1899.—Conference arranged.

May 22, 1899.—Sir A. Milner telegraphs home suggesting 5 years' franchise, 7 members or one-fifth of Raad.

May 24, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain approves; gives free hand as to franchise, but suggests Home Rule for Johannesburg "if President fears that independence will be endangered by concession of general franchise."

May 31, 1899.—First day of Bloemfontein Conference.

June 5, 1899.—Last day of Bloemfontein Conference.

June 14, 1899.—Sir A. Milner reports results of Conference to Mr. Chamberlain.

April, 1899.—Correspondence between the State's Secretary and the Industrial Representatives. (Blue Book, c. 9345, pp. 213-223.)

May 10, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain's despatch to Sir Alfred Milner, on the petition to the Queen, suggesting that Sir A. Milner should proceed to Pretoria to confer with President Kruger. (Blue Book, c. 9415, p. 8.)

June 9, 1899.—The State Secretary of the Transvaal proposes arbitration to the British Agent. (Blue Book 9518, p. 3.)

June 10, 1899.—Sir Alfred Milner sends a telegram explaining his statement on arbitration at Bloemfontein. (Blue Book 9415, p. 6.)

Mass meeting of 5,000 Uitlanders at Johannesburg accepting Sir A. Milner's proposals. (Blue Book 9415, p. 8.)

June 11, 1899.—Mr. Schreiner informs Sir A. Milner that the Cape Ministry thinks President Kruger's franchise proposals practicable and reasonable, but capable of improvement. (Blue Book 9415, p. 7.)

June 12, 1899.—Sir A. Milner receives a deputation at Cape Town on his return from Bloemfontein. (Blue Book 9415, p. 14.)

June 13, 1899.—President Kruger asks the First Volksraad to consider his new draft law 9 years and 7 years on the Franchise. (Blue Book 9415, p. 26.)

June 14, 1899.—President Kruger makes a speech in the Volksraad on the Franchise. (Blue Book 9415, p. 38.)

Sir A. Milner reports to Mr. Chamberlain, with comments, on the State Secretary's proposal for arbitration. (Blue Book 9518, p. 1.)

June 15, 1899.—Second interview between Mr. Schreiner and Sir A. Milner, suggesting amendments in President Kruger's scheme. Stated that in the opinion of the Cape Ministry "a state of things had not arisen that would justify interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal." (Blue Book 9415, p. 10.)

June 16, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain asks the Cape Ministers to urge President Kruger to give way, and so obviate the necessity of British intervention in the internal affairs of the Transvaal. (Blue Book 9415, p. 10.)

June 17, 1899. Meetings of burghers at Paardekraal to approve the franchise proposals of President Kruger. Similar meetings at other places endorse the measure. (Blue Book 9415, pp. 41, 48.)

June 23, 1899.—Sir A. Milner replies to the Transvaal Government on the subject of arbitration. (Blue Book 9518, p. 5.)

June 27, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain sends a long despatch to Sir A. Milner expressing the satisfaction of the Government with the concessions made by the Transvaal in establishing a seven years' Franchise, and proposing a Mixed Commission to examine the details. (Sent by post, contents not communicated to the Transvaal Government until Aug. 23.) (Blue Book 9518, p. 7.)

June 29, 1899.—Sir A. Milner reports result of Mr. Fisher's mission to Pretoria. (Blue Book 9415, p. 13.)

June 30, 1899.—The Dutch Reformed Church addresses Sir A. Milner, warning him that war with the Transvaal would make an irreparable breach between Dutch and English, when the hope of a united South Africa would be gone for ever. (Blue Book 9518, p. 16.)

July 1, 1899.—Declaration of rights by the Uitlander Council. (Blue Book 9518, p. 19.)

Messrs. Hofmeyer and Herholdt leave Cape Town on a mission to Bloemfontein and Pretoria. (Blue Book 9518, p. 24.) They secure nine alterations in the Franchise Law, and return to Cape Town on July 10. (p. 25.)

July 4, 1899.—The Uitlander Council of Johannesburg issues a report on the new Franchise Law. (Blue Book 9415, pp. 54-57.)

July 5, 1899.—Third interview between Mr. Schreiner and Sir A. Milner, complaining of unfair and damaging statements in the telegraphic summary of Mr. Chamberlain's speech. (Blue Book 9415, p. 29.)

July 7, 1899.—Fourth interview between Mr. Schreiner and Sir A. Milner. Mr. Schreiner satisfied with the explanation, but makes public the view of the Cape Ministry, that although doing all in its power to bring about substantial reforms in the Transvaal, it thinks that the use of force in that object would not be justified. (Blue Book 9415, p. 30.)

July 8, 1899.—Mr. Schreiner publishes in the *South African News* the statement that his Government regard Mr. Kruger's new Franchise Proposals as adequate, satisfactory, and such as to secure a peaceful settlement. (Blue Book 9415, p. 31.)

July 11, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain asks that full particulars of the new Franchise scheme should be furnished the British Government officially, and that President Kruger should not proceed with the measure until the British Government had an opportunity of considering it, and of giving him its views. (Blue Book 9415, p. 43.)

July 12, 1899.—Copy of draft of Franchise Law officially communicated to the British Government, before receiving Mr. Chamberlain's telegram. (Blue Book 9415, p. 44.)

The Cape Town branch of the Afrikander Bond passes a resolution recommending—in view of the destructive and indelible effects of a war with the Transvaal—the acceptance of the seven years' Franchise Law, and proposing that the principles of arbitration approved by the British Government at the Hague, should be applied by legal experts for disputed interpretations of the London Convention of 1884. (Blue Book 9518, p. 31.)

Full text of the new Franchise Law laid on the table of the Volksraad. (Blue Book 9518, p. 41.)

July 13, 1899.—Sir A. Milner sends outline of Franchise Bill to Mr. Chamberlain. (Blue Book 9415, p. 45.)

State Secretary replies that, As draft law had passed out of the hands of the Transvaal Government, they could not meet Mr. Chamberlain's request, but would always be ready to consider any friendly advice. (Blue Book 9415, p. 45.)

Sir Alfred Milner telegraphs to Mr. Chamberlain expressing doubts as to the value of President Kruger's Franchise Bill, seeing the question is, Does it insure an immediate and substantial share of political power for the Uitlanders? (Blue Book 9415, p. 46.)

July 18, 1899.—Full text of President Kruger's Franchise Bill communicated to Mr. Chamberlain. (Blue Book 9415, pp. 50-52.)

Draft Franchise: expert legal analysis. (Blue Book 9518, p. 54.)

Sir A. Milner reports to Mr. Chamberlain on the provisions of the new Franchise Law. (Blue Book 9518, p. 45.)

July 20, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain makes a statement in the House of Commons, that the Government hope that the new law may prove a basis of settlement and feel assured that the President, having accepted the principle for which they have contended, will be prepared to reconsider any details of his scheme which could be shown to be a possible hindrance to the full accomplishment of the object in view. (Blue Book 9415, p. 53.)

July 26, 1899.—Sir A. Milner again reports on the Franchise Law, calling attention to its grave defects. (Blue Book 9518, p. 51.)

New Franchise Law comes into force. Full Text. (Blue Book 9518, pp. 64-71.)

July 31, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain instructs Sir A. Milner to invite President Kruger to appoint delegates for a Mixed Commission on the Franchise Law. (Blue Book 9518, p. 29.)

August 12, 1899.—Interview of Mr. Greene with the State Attorney Smutz; when he warned him that nothing could save the Transvaal but immediate surrender, because the British Government had given a pledge to the Outlanders and would press their demands, if necessary, with force. (Blue Book 9521, p. 45.)

August 15, 1899.—Mr. Greene telegraphs to Sir A. Milner reporting the Transvaal's readiness to consider five years' franchise—on conditions. (Blue Book 9521, p. 45.)

August 17, 1899.—Sir A. Milner telegraphs declaring that the alternative

proposals would not be considered a rejection of the joint inquiry into the seven years' franchise. (Blue Book 9521, p. 46.)

□ August 19, 1899.—The Transvaal Government by post offers to concede the five years' franchise on three conditions. (Blue Book 9521, p. 46.)

August 21, 1899.—Transvaal Government telegraphs declaring offer expressly conditional. Telegram arrives same time as note of 19th. (Blue Book 9521, p. 47.)

August 23, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain's despatch of the 27th of July delivered to the Transvaal Government. (Blue Book 9521, p. 48.)

□ Sir A. Milner writes a long despatch to Mr. Chamberlain declaring, that while the franchise was the best remedy for the Uitlander grievances, there were many subjects in dispute between the two governments all of which should be disposed of now so as to leave us with a clear slate. (Blue Book 9521, p. 60.)

August 28, 1899.—Mr. Chamberlain sends a despatch rejecting the conditions appended to the offer of the five years' franchise. (Blue Book 9521, p. 49.)

August 31, 1899.—Sir A. Milner telegraphs Mr. Chamberlain urging the Government to terminate the state of suspense. "British South Africa is prepared for extreme measures, and ready to suffer much to see the vindication of British authority." (Blue Book 9521, p. 51)

September 2, 1899.—Transvaal Government regret the rejection of their proposals, and accept the joint inquiry. (Blue Book 9521, p. 52.)

September 8, 1899.—Cabinet despatch to Sir A. Milner demanding five years' franchise, repudiating joint commission of inquiry into the seven years' franchise and proposing a conference between President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner, and threatening that if the reply was negative or inconclusive to consider the situation *de novo*, and to formulate their own proposals for a settlement. (Blue Book 9521, p. 64.)

September 16, 1899.—State Attorney replies protesting against the demand for five years' franchise while the *quid pro quo* was refused, and repeats offer of seven years and a commission.

September 22, 1899.—Second Cabinet Despatch repeating demand for five years' franchise, and offering guarantee against external attack. All negotiations broken off.

October 7, 1899.—The Duke of Devonshire declares that the new Proposals have been formulated, and that ample time will be given to the Transvaal Government for their consideration.

October 9, 1899.—New Proposals, forwarded to Sir A. Milner, containing demands entailing interference destructive of the Independence of the Transvaal. Before this was delivered an Ultimatum was sent by the Transvaal Government demanding the recall of all troops sent to South Africa since the Bloemfontein Conference, and the reference of all disputes to arbitration. The answer to be given in forty-eight hours.

October 10, 1899.—British Government reply, stating that they refuse to discuss the demand.

October 11, 1899.—The Reply of the British Government being accepted as a formal declaration of war, the Boers cross the frontier.

October 12, 1899.—Occupation of Laing's Nek and Van Reenen's Pass. Armoured train blown up by Boers between Mafeking and Vryburg.