PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INTO INFORMAL SETTLEMENT IN STELLENBOSCH

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MARCH 1993

1. **INTRODUCTION**

The process of urbanization creates a demand for appropriate housing for the people who move to the cities. Those who cannot find housing that they can afford have the option of either sharing the accommodation available or building shelters of their own. The shortage of formal housing and the extent of overcrowding in existing townships are such that the development of informal settlements is inevitable.

Since 1983 the Government has been retreating from the provision of housing in favour of private sector involvement. Although it is acknowledged that a broad spectrum of housing must be provided to suit various levels of affordability, the private sector is not providing housing appropriate to the poorest people of the community. Its ability to do so is limited by a number of factors such as the availability of affordable land, the availability of finance and inappropriate standards.

The development of informal settlements is not a process unique to South Africa. It has happened and continues to happen throughout the Third World. This does not justify the unconditional acceptance of the process but indicates that informal settlements should be accepted as an important and permanent component of the residential sector and that the major forces which precipitate it should be employed positively.

Important initial work and research was already done on the subject of informal housing and the Planning and Development Department of the Stellenbosch Municipality does not have the intention of redesigning the wheel. This report therefore to a great extent rests on documentation of institutions and organizations which are active in this field. This documentation can be made available to any person who wants to study the subject in more detail.

The purpose of this report is not to provide instant solutions to the problems of low cost housing, but to lay the table for a planning process during which different possible strategies can be negotiated with the community and which would hopefully lead to generally accepted solutions.

Because of a lack of information on the informal dwellers in Kaya Mandi, the Department was forced to look at the findings of studies undertaken by the Urban Foundation in the PWV and by the HSRC in the Hottentots Holland Basin. A similar study with respect to the informal dwellers in Kaya Mandi will undoubtedly be of great assistance in the future planning for low cost housing in Stellenbosch.

Consequently, this report in the first place looks at the findings and viewpoints of the Urban Foundation, the ANC and the HSRC by virtue of intensive studies undertaken. Secondly, the situation in Kaya Mandi is thoroughly analysed by virtue of the Structure Plan study undertaken by Macroplan and thirdly the report looks at the availability of land in and around Stellenbosch.

2. **FINDINGS AND VIEWPOINTS OF THE URBAN FOUNDATION**

Source: Policies for a New Urban Future : Informal Housing : Part 1 - The Current Situation, August 1991.

2.1 *Findings of the PWV study (October 1987 - March 1990)*

    (a)   The following statistics are particularly informative:

            -    Nearly 60 % of the total number of black homes are informal. By far the majority of these (86 %) are backyard shacks or outbuildings, whilst a minority (14 %) are located in free-standing settlements (clusters of informal structures located on tracts of land within and around formal townships).

- The total number of shacks in free-standing settlements on the PWV increased from 28 500 in November 1987 to 49 200 in late 1989. The free-standing settlement population grew by 300 % in the space of two years.

- People living in free-standing settlements had, in 1990, an average household income of R450 per month. By contrast, the average household income of backyard shackdwellers and the occupants of outbuildings was R750 per month, and that of people in formal houses R900.

- The average monthly expenditure on accommodation in free-standing settlements was only R1,00 in comparison with R36 in backyard shacks.

- In terms of absolute numbers, more informal houses were erected in backyards between 1987 and 1989 than in the free-standing enclaves.

(b) *The following important conclusions were derived from the study:-*

- The inhabitants of free-standing settlements are sometimes inaccurately stigmatised as an unemployed, politically volatile and parasitic group that has swept into cities from the countryside, especially since the abolition of influx control. Elements of this cliché may be valid in particular circumstances, but the *reality is far more complex*.

- Further, images of a general state of destitution are false. In fact, there is a *distinct socio-economic hierarchy* across PWV informal housing types (backyard shacks, free-standing settlements and outbuildings). The lowest socio-economic levels are found in spontaneous free-standing settlements.

- Of all the people in informal housing on the PWV, 49 % were born in the PWV and a further 22 % in other metropolitan and urban areas. Altogether 72 % of informal dwellers had been in the PWV for ten years or longer.

- There is, however, evidence that growing numbers of informal housing occupants in the PWV are new in-migrants.

- *Housing shortages, affordability considerations and a design for space and autonomy* are the major reasons for living in informal circumstances. The fact that most informal settlement occurs near major employment areas, however, emphasises the importance of *proximity to employment opportunities*.

- Although households in informal housing generally have lower incomes than their counterparts in formal housing, it is striking that *levels of unemployment* do not seem to be higher in the informal areas. Some 23 % of the sample aged 18 - 65 in formal housing were actively seeking work compared with 21 %, 20 % and 16 % in backyard shacks, free-standing settlements and outbuildings respectively. It is therefore possible to argue that PWV informal housing residents are to a considerable extent a part of the urban regional economy.

- In parallel with incomes, a clear hierarchy of *education and skills* is evident across the residents of the three dominant informal housing types in the PWV. The lowest level of skills is found with the residents of free-standing settlements (41 % of the employed population is unskilled). Contrary to the perception of informal settlement as uniformly impoverished communities living on the margins of the urban economy, the informal population is as heterogeneous and economically integrated as the formally housed population. The main differences between the informal and formal populations are found in the levels of education, skills, occupation and income.

(c) It is to early to attempt nationwide generalisations arising out of the PWV survey results. However, overall results regarding the mixed origin of informal settlers and the relative poverty of free-standing settlement dwellers seem likely to be substantiated nationally.

2.2 *Important viewpoints of the Urban Foundation*

(a) It is important to *avoid romanticising* the crisis-driven self-help efforts of households desperate to secure suitable shelter. In many situations it entails considerable hardship in the face of obstacles such as tenurial insecurity, a lack of finance, and the absence of basic technical advice and assistance. From another perspective, however, informal housing represents a constructive response by homeless people to the housing crisis in South Africa.

(b) A central feature is the *general powerlessness and vulnerability* of those who have had to adopt informal routes to urban housing. They are often excluded from formal political and social structures and their interests are generally not well represented, if at all.

(c) The phenomenon of informal settlement is driven by multiple sources of *potential and real conflict*. It is crucial therefore that the political context of informal settlement be considered and mechanisms for conflict resolution investigated. The conflict has been manifested in a number of ways, but six key contexts can be identified:

- Conflict between factions within informal settlements;

- Conflict with formal townships;

- Conflict with hostel dwellers;

- Conflict with high income neighbours;

- Conflict with authorities; and

- Conflict between authorities and high income residents.

(d) Formal housing programmes have failed to deliver housing at the rate and scale required. The homes that were provided have frequently proved to be unaffordable for the poor. Further, no *single* sector has the resources to adequately address backlogs and burgeoning demand.

(e) Informal housing is a *major and permanent* component of the residential sector. Viewpoints envisaging the formal rehousing of all or most of these people will have to come to terms with the scale and the fiscal consequences of the programme that is implied.

(f)   *Community participation* is an essential component of the search for solutions for the housing problem.   In this planning process, it is important that communities are effectively organised with a view to participation.

3.   *FINDINGS AND VIEWPOINTS OF THE ANC*

Source: A Summary of the proceedings of the Housing Workshop hosted by the ANC - Department of Economic Policy, Soweto, September 1991.

3.1   *Defining housing and the elements of housing*

There are two ways in which one can look at housing:

-       It can be seen as a *physical product* fixed in space, a commodity sold for profit; or

-       It can be seen as a *process* which is made of various things and which means different things to different people.

If housing is considered as a process, this can mean the following:

(a)   Housing should offer a person a sense of *security* and *permanency*, i.e. he/she will not be forced to move. What constitutes this sense of security could vary - it is not only a freehold title to land.

(b)   A person must know that he/she can meet the *cost of housing*, especially those receiving their incomes irregularly.   After a person paid for housing costs, there must still be sufficient money to pay for other basic needs like food an clothing.

(c)   Housing should provide *adequate shelter* and *proper facilities* such as water, sanitation and energy in a way that does not force them to cut on other areas of essential consumption, eg. food.

(d)   The *location* of a person's home in relation to work and the *cost of transport* to work is crucial to a person's survival, especially irregularly employed people. Access to educational, cultural and other facilities is also very important.

(e)   People should take pride in and feel satisfied with the place where they live.

(f)   Housing should be seen as an *investment* by the residents.

(g)   Housing plays an important role in *empowering* communities in the development process. This happens through people working together on housing issues and building strong community based origanisations.

(h)   Housing can be a tool for *restructuring* the apartheid town and city - to bring the poor section of the community closer to the business and employment areas and to improve people's access to the resources of towns and cities.

Attached as **ANNEXURE 1** is a direct excerpt from the mentioned document which sets out the *elements of housing*. The questions asked here can serve as a check-list when planning for low costs housing is done. It should be considered on joint forums where housing issues are discussed.

Attached as **ANNEXURE 2** is a further direct excerpt from the document which sets out and briefly analyses the different possible housing types.

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4. FINDINGS AND VIEWPOINTS BY VIRTUE OF THE HOTTENTOTS HOLLAND BASIN STUDY

Source: Squatting in the Hottentots Holland Basin: Perspectives on a South African Social Issue, HSRC, 1992.

4.1 Origin and causes of informal settlement in the Hottentots Holland Basin.

It is commonly assumed that the enormous increase in informal housing in the Hottentots Holland Basin was a direct result of the abolition of influx control and that the majority of shack dwellers came form independent states like the Transkei and Ciskei. The study however found that nearly two-thirds of the persons who were interviewed had been living in the Basin before they moved into their current shack settlements. The study found the following:-

(a) 52 % of the shack dwellers were born in the Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape, 33 % in the Western Cape and Cape Peninsula (excluding the Hottentots Holland Basin) and 14 % in the Hottentots Holland Basin. The majority of the dwellers that were born outside the Hottentots Holland Basin moved to and lived in other locations in the Basin before moving into their current settlements. Only 9 % came directly from the Transkei and Ciskei.

(b) 52 % of the shack dwellers had lived in the Hottentots Holland Basin for longer than five years and 31 % for longer than ten years. The average length of residence in the Basin was 9,4 years. On the other hand only 15 % of the shack dwellers had lived in their current settlements for longer than five years with an average residence period of only 3,9 years.

(c) Although the migration of shack dwellers *to* the Hottentots Holland Basin *did* increase after 1985 -1986, this increased migration cannot explain the phenomenal growth of informal housing in the Basin during the last three to four years. In other words the growth of informal settlements is not in itself and accurate indication of influx into the Hottentots Holland Basin or, for that matter, of urbanization *per se.*

4.2 Reasons for informal settlement

(a) Economic or job-related issues were extremely important in the range of reasons that informal dwellers gave for leaving their previous places of residence. 41 % of the persons who were interviewed left their previous places of residence for reasons such as loss of work, unemployment, retrenchment, low wages and distance from work.

(b) The other main reasons mentioned were accommodation related. 50 % of the informal dwellers mentioned reasons such as no or lost accommodation, family-related problems, overcrowding, forced to leave by law, lack of privacy and disliked previous place.

(c) The main reasons provided by respondents for settling in the specific settlements are the following:

- No other place to go (36 %)
- Closer to family and friends/better circumstances (23 %)
- Came to look for work/close to work (12 %)
- Want to be independent/have an own place (9 %)

It is of interest that only 8 % said that they settled in the shack areas because they liked the place or the people. Even more surprising is that only 2 % mentioned the affordability of squatter housing as their main reason for choosing the shack areas.

(d) 61 % of the informal dwellers said their present accommodation in the shack settlements was an improvement on their previous accommodation. Only 28 % saw it as a deterioration.

4.3 *Economic profile*

(a) 31 % of the economically active segment of the informal population is unemployed. This shows that the levels of formal employment in informal settlements do not differ greatly from those encountered in formal settlements. 60 % of the economically active population is employed in the *formal sector*. This leaves only 9 % which is employed in the informal sector.

(b) Of *al* the residents -

   - 25 % are employed in the formal sector;

   - 7 % are employed in the formal sector, but supplement their earnings with some sort of informal activity;

   - 5 % are employed in the informal sector;

   - 7 % are housewifes;

   - 16 % are unemployed; and

   - 38 % are of school going age or younger.

(c) The main types of work done by the informal dwellers are domestic servant/char/cleaner (28 %), gardener (13 %) and handyman/car washer (16 %). 90 % of the people work in the Hottentots Holland Basin.

(d) The average personal income of the head of household and spouse is R454 per month. The average household income is R528 per month. The study found that the mean monthly household savings is only R74 which means that the potential for significant mobilization of resources for improved housing and living conditions is severely limited.

4.4 *Needs and preferences of informal dwellers*

(a) When the most needed social facilities are taken separately, the need for a health clinic is, generally speaking, the most frequently cited (82 %), followed by a church (78 %) and a creche (64 %).

(b) More than half (53 %) of the dwellings in the study area had no access to sewerage facilities of any kind.

(c) The study further showed that *running water* in the house was perceived to be the main infrastructural need (excluding sewerage). The priorities was as follows:

-	Running water in the house	(54 %)
-	Electricity in the house	(26 %)
-	Enough land to add to house	(18 %)
-	Street light system	(2 %)

(d)   It is quite remarkable what lengths some shack dwellers have gone to in order to create attractive *homes* within their rudimentary shacks. People from the outside should therefore not judge a informal settlement merely from the external appearance, but by the numerous ways in which the squatter family generate acceptable internal environments.

(e)   The shack dwellers have particularly low value-expectancies with respect to the needs dimension "status, comfort and autonomy". Apart from the obvious conclusion that shack dwellers in the area have very few comforts and enjoy little autonomy, they seem to see themselves as having a low status in the community.

4.5 *Summary*

Attached as **ANNEXURE 3** is a direct excerpt from the mentioned document in which the main issues are discussed as a summary.

5. *ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN KAYA MANDI*

Source: Kaya Mandi Development Plan: Final Motivation Report, Macroplan, October 1992.

5.1 *Population size*

Table 1 depicts the actual and projected population as calculated by Macroplan.

TABLE 1 : POPULATION

YEAR	ACTUAL	ESTIMATED	
	1989	1993	2010
POPULATION	6 500	8 000	11 700

An unusually low annual growth rate of only 1,5 % was used in the light of the accepted policy of limited growth for Stellenbosch. In contrast to this, the rate of urbanization for the Cape Metropolitan Area as estimated by the Central Statistics Bureau was 2,4 % per annum. This figure was however also taken into consideration.

Table 2 depicts the expected population growth as estimated by Macroplan. It makes a distinction between people within a family relation and hostel dwellers.

TABLE 2 : POPULATION PROJECTION

YEAR	POPULATION (FAMILY BASED)	HOSTEL-DWELLERS*	ACCUMULATIVE POPULATION
1992	6 121	1 659	7 780
1993	6 399	1 567	7 966
1994	6 681	1 475	8 156
1995	6 968	1 383	8 351
1996	7 260	1 291	8 551
1997	7 555	1 199	8 754
1998	7 791	1 107	8 898
1999	8 095	1 015	9 110
2000	8 403	923	9 325
2005	10 015	463	10 478
2010	11 751	3	11 754

* Hostel dwellers decrease by 92 per year and is added to the family based population.

5.2 *Housing of existing population*

The people of Kaya Mandi is presently accommodated in single residential units, hostels and informal structures. (See Table 3).

TABLE 3 : RELATION : PEOPLE VS HOUSING : 1989

HOUSING TYPE	POPULATION	PERCENTAGE
SINGLE UNITS	1 151	18 %
HOSTELS	4 786	73 %
INFORMAL	587	9 %
TOTAL	6 524	100 %

Although the population increased by only 1256 from 1989 to 1992, this increase represents an annual growth rate of 6,04 %. It is further interesting to note the change in the distribution of the population amongst the different housing types during this period (Table 4).

TABLE 4 : RELATION : POPULATION VS HOUSING : 1992

HOUSING TYPE	POPULATION	PRESENTATION
SINGLE DWELLING	1 236	16 %
HOSTELS	2 812	36 %
INFORMAL	3 732	48 %
TOTAL	7 780	100 %

5.3 *Overcrowding*

The relationship between family size and household size gives an indication of the existence of overcrowded conditions. Table 5 reflects the situation as in 1989.

TABLE 5 : FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD SIZE : 1989

HOUSING TYPE	HOUSEHOLD SIZE	FAMILY SIZE
SINGLE DWELLING	7,8	5,5
HOSTELS	3,3	3,3
INFORMAL	7,0	5,0

5.4 *Availability of serviced and planned erven*

Table 6 depicts the number of erven in Kaya Mandi and makes a destinction amongst the location, serviced or unserviced and status of occupancy.

TABLE 6 : AVAILABILITY OF ERVEN

LOCALITY	ERVEN	SERVICED	OCCUPATION	AVAILABLE
Existing single dwelling	302	serviced	occupied	0
18,5 ha (phase 1)	195	serviced	occupied	195
1,9 ha	70	serviced	occupied	0
Monde Cresent	20	serviced	occupied	0
TOTAL	587	-	-	195

Available land that will be serviced in the near future is listed in TABLE 7.

TABLE 7 : AVAILABLE LAND TO BE SERVICED

LOCATION	ERVEN	SERVICED	OCCUPIED	AVAILABLE
18,5 ha (phase 2)	242	un-serviced	unoccupied	242
Monde Cresent	76	un-serviced	unoccupied	0
TOTAL	318	-	-	242

5.5 *Demand for additional erven*

The Kaya Mandi Structure plan strives to accommodate the total population in single residential units. It is essential that this goal be reviewed as this phenomenon is rarely encountered elsewhere. Some form of high density accommodation and informal settlement is usually present. All the statistics in this document are, however, based on the assumption that only single residential units will be provided.

Macroplan calculated the immediate demand for housing by determining the number of units necessary to provide a single dwelling for each family presently living in informal structures and hostels. At the time that planning was undertaken, 751 informal structures and 355 families in hostels were counted - a total of 1106 erven thus needed.

Towards the end of 1992 a fire destroyed 255 informal structures leaving only 526 intact. 115 of the 225 households affected were resettled on the serviced 1,9 ha and the rest in backyards. The burnt down area is already occupied again and the remaining 526 shacks increased to 1400. This suggests a substantial growth in the informal population and influences the estimates done by Macroplan.

Not only has the demand for housing thus increased, but has the supply decreased. For example, the previously planned 70 erven on the serviced 1,9 ha were since resubdivided and allocated to 115 families already living on the site. Further more, all of the 195 erven (18,5 ha, phase 1) were already allocated to residents but only 15 managed to obtain finance. Because the 195 erven were allocated to residents of Kaya Mandi who are still living in other forms of accommodation, this portion of land can still be viewed as "available".

The present backlog in housing can be determined by subtracting supply from demand.

Demand   :   1750   (1400 + 350)

Supply   :   437   (195 + 242)

Backlog   :   1313

From the above it is clear that more than 1300 single residential erven are required immediately to address the present backlog experienced by the residents of Kaya Mandi. If normal population increase is taken into consideration, this figure can be even higher. Table 8 gives some idea of how many erven or how much land will be required to address the housing shortage.

TABLE 8 : LAND REQUIRED TO 2010

DEMAND	YEAR			
	1993	1995	2000	2010
Population (Family related)	6121	6968	8403	11 851
Housing	1313	1500	1818	2 562
Land @ 22 units/ha	60 ha	68 ha	83 ha	116 ha

The above table reflects a theoretical exercise based on the projected population growth which, in turn, is based on the policy of limited growth. When the actual population growth is determined and incorporated in the calculations, the resulting need for additional houses and land may differ vastly from the figures in Table 8. As such Table 8 should only be used to underline the fact that the shortage of housing is already critical and that the situation can only deteriorate.

5.6 *Land available for development*

In addressing the present shortage of housing and land, Macroplan identified land suitable for township development (See Table 9).

TABLE 9 : ADDITIONAL LAND FOR TOWNSHIP DEVELOPMENT

LAND	OWNER	AREA (Ha)
Farm 182/2	L Costa	5,1
Farm 182/3	L Costa	1,4
Farm 183/37	WS Smit	0,9
Farm 81/8	WS Smit	0,9
Farm 183/12	WS Smit	0,1
Farm 183/5	WS Smit	3,1
Farm 183/1	WS Smit	0,1
TOTAL		11,5 HA

Macroplan suggested a density of 20 units/ha for the above 11,5 ha. The nett area available for residential usually erven vary between 60 % and 70 % of every ha suitable for development. The other 30 % to 40 % is utilized for roads, open space, schools etc. The higher the density, the more land is required for roads and other non-residential uses.

Table 10 gives an indication of the influence of density on the number and size of the resulting erven. In all cases the gross area was taken as 11,5 ha.

TABLE 10 : DENSITY OF DEVELOPMENT

DENSITY	NUMBER OF ERVEN	NETT AREA (60 %)	ERF SIZE
20/HA	230	6,9 HA	300 m²
25/HA	290	6,9 HA	240 m²
30/HA	345	6,9 HA	200 m²
35/HA	403	6,9 HA	170 m²

A density of 20 units per hectare as suggested by Macroplan will therefore provide an additional 230 erven. Should the density increase, it is clear from Table 10 that more erven, although smaller, can be provided.

Should the identified 11,5 ha be developed at the above-mentioned density, approximately a 1000 erven still have to be provided to satisfy current demands. Additional land will therefore have to be identified for purposes of residential development.

5.7 *Conclusion*

The Structure Plan of Kaya Mandi emphasizes the following aspects:

(a)   Acceptable growth rates;

(b)   availability of land;

(c)   type and density of housing; and

(d)   financing.

5.7.1 *Growth rate*

The preceding survey and analyses clearly underline the problem of the planner. In order to plan for the future a scenario in respect of future population figures must be accepted. Because of numerous external factors that can influence growth rates it is sometimes very difficult to create credible scenarios.

In the case of planning for Kaya Mandi, the consultant based his calculations the principle of limited growth.   Reality has shown, however, that this scenario is to simplistic and that it cannot be applied without drastic consequences.   The HSRC is of the opinion that a limitation on the physical release of land in any community will only cause densification and overcrowding and will postpone the real problem only temporarily.

It is clear that the controlled release of land to Blacks in the past (through influx control) is to a large extent responsible for the accumulated shortage which now confronts the authorities.

In practice this means that, if limited growth is applied to Kaya Mandi, the authorities will in 5 to 10 years time face the same problems as at present.

It is thus of vital importance that a realistic growth rate is accepted. Such a growth rate can only be determined by means of thorough research and with the full co-operation of the community. It is highly questionable whether population projections can be done for the full planning period in the absence of basic information.

5.7.2 *Development versus conservation*

The Structure plan of Kaya Mandi underlines the fact that a substantial shortage of land is experienced.   The shortage will be increased or decreased by a manipulation of the growth rate.

In the light of the exceptional rural and historical character of Stellenbosch, it would not be desirable to use land in an uncontrolled manner for township development. There is very limited land available around Kaya Mandi and in the most instances township development has to be weighed up against the existing utilization of land and the possible conservation thereof.

Alternative land for development will have to be identified urgently. Such a process of identifying land will have to be thoroughly researched in co-operation with the community. A wider area than just Stellenbosch must be examined, for example areas such as Webersvallei, Pniel, Kylemore, Koelenhof and Klapmuts. These areas will probably only address the *long term needs* since they are situated far from work opportunities.

5.7.3 *Housing*

The subject housing should be addressed in terms of housing type, housing density and housing policy.

Alternative types of housing must be examined in order to find a balance between affordability and quality. Numerous examples of housing types already exists and warrent further attention. The preferances of the community in terms of housing types must be taken seriously due to the fact that prejudices and misconceptions already exists. The possibility to develop a site with a variety of housing types as examples must be examined in more detail.

Changes in density have far reaching consequences as illustrated in Table 10. Not only are more erven made available, but is the opportunity to examine alternative types of housing created.

5.7.4 *Financing*

The economic status of the community, in most cases, determine the quality of housing to be provided. Only 15 of the 195 "landowners" in Kaya Mandi's new development could obtain finance. The lack of finance puts home ownership out of reach of the broader community.

In order to be able to address this problem less expensive housing must be provided or community income raised. According to Macroplan the average monthly income per household (1987) was:

Single residential : R1125/month

Informal : R647/month

Hostels : R461/month

Cheaper housing can only be achieved by providing alternative types of housing or through subsidisation. Income can be increased through the creation of job opportunities and by the stimulation of economic growth.

It is thus obvious that extensive community involvement, thorough research and innovative thinking is a prerequisite for the successful planning of Kaya Mandi.

6. *LAND AVAILABLE IN AND AROUND STELLENBOSCH*

The expansion of the developed area of Stellenbosch is to a great extent limited by topography (eg. mountains), natural vegetation (eg. fynbos) and fertile farmlands (eg.

vineyards and strawberry lands). These limiting factors have an impact on the affordability and desirability of township development.

The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the available land in and around Stellenbosch and to find, by a process of elimination, vacant land which can possibly be used for township development. This study is based on a project carried out by Macroplan in which all vacant land, including Municipal land under lease agreement, public open spaces, State land and private farmland in and around Stellenbosch Municipal area, was identified.

6.1 The evaluation of land

The maps referred to will be *tabled* at the meeting.

Within the developed town area only a small amount of vacant land is available, except for public open spaces *(Map 1) and private vacant erven. Land suitable for low cost housing, which measure up to the necessary conditions, is therefore situated outside the existing town area.

All State, Municipal and private land situated in and around the municipal area was identified (Maps 1 and 2) and is described in Table 11.

TABLE 11 : MUNICIPAL AND STATE LAND

MAP NO	FARMS NO(S)	FARM NAME	USE	AREA
1	165/1	IDASVALLEI PROPER	PLANTATION	
	165/1A	SCHOONGEZICHT	CULTIVATED FIELDS	
	169/1	LITTLE WEDGE	VINEYARDS	390
	170	GLEN ALPINE		
	171	GLENCOE		
6	3363	MUNICIPAL	NURSERY	
		NURSERY	PLANTATION	67
18	181 and 183		VINEYARDS	66
19	183A, B & C		VINEYARDS	55
24	279A		ORCHARD	9,40
25	279D		VACANT	5
32	368		CULTIVATED	91
33	376		GHOLF COURSE	71
34	377A – F	VREDENBURG/ VLOTTENBURG	VINEYARD	9,42
36	376B,D,J,H	BLAAUWKLIPPEN	VINEYARD	16,27
	369G	BLAAUWKLIPPEN		27
38	369C,P	CHRISTIAN BROS		3,50
		VALLEY LUSTRE		62
	366	KWV (STAATSGROND)		38
92	183/17	PLANTKWARENTYN	AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES	27
TOTAL				938 ha

Most of the Municipal and State land, as well as private land, is used for agricultural purposes such as vineyards. With the aid of the 1987 aerial photographs and site inspections vacant areas were identified. These areas are described in Table 12.

TABLE 12: LAND NOT USED FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES

MAP NO	LOCATION	OWNERSHIP	AREA	DISTANCE 1)	DESCRIP TION
1*	PL 165/1	MUNICIPALITY			GARDEN
	165/1A	MUNICIPALITY	10	4+	CITIES
12	ERF 7271	MUNICIPALITY	2	4+	VACANT
14	ERF 7255				
	6948,and				
	6943	MUNICIPALITY	4	4+	"
26	PL 279D		23	4+	" 2)
43A	PL 283	PRIVATE	78	4+	
93	PL 175/3	PRIVATE	3	1,5	VACANT
94	PL 272	PRIVATE	2	4+	VACANT
95	PL 167/1	PRIVATE	6	4+	VACANT FARM- HOUSE
96	PL 1075/	PRIVATE	9	4	VACANT
TOTAAL			137		

1)Distance from the town centre (Market Square) in kilometers.

2)Farm houses, but no farmland (possibly a National Monument).

* A portion of farm 165/1A was sold to Garden Cities but is still undeveloped.

This identified land covers a total area of 137 ha. At this point in time only 39 ha of the municipal and state land is available and this represents ± 4 % of the total of 938 ha. These sites are situated ± 1,5 - 4 km from the town centre.

One has to realise that the identification of this land is based on the fact that it is not used for agricultural purposes. More detailed aspects concerning the identified land has to be explored, inter alia whether this land will meet the conditions set for low cost housing, if at all.

This identified land can be used as a basis for further discussions. It is important to take into account the needs of the public.

Except for the land shown in Table 11 there is ±1133 ha of municipal land under lease agreement to the far south of the municipal area. This land will be under lease for the next 50 years. On this land an input price of ± R1,5 million was spent on an irrigation scheme known as the Helderberg Irrigation scheme.

Except for the identified vacant land shown in Table 12 there is also municipal land shown in Table 11 which will become available within 20 years time, for example farm 181/183 to the west and north of Kaya Mandi.

It is clear that the identification of additional land for township development and especially for low cost housing is no easy and inexpensive task.

7. *PLANNING OPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS*

7.1 *Basic requirements*

According to *Habitat* (the United Nations' Centre for Human Settlements), there are three critical factors to be taken into consideration in the planning for shack settlements:

(a)   *Understanding the problem*

    Informal settlements and slums will not simply disappear because they are being ignored or wished away. If planning is left to spontaneous forces, these informal settlements will probably grow at a much faster rate than the town's or city's population.

    It should also not be accepted as "normal" in the sense that nothing or little is done about the situation.

(b)   *Political will to improve the situation*

    Authorities must commit themselves to solve the problem of informal housing. In Sri Lanka and Colombia where authorities decided to make a national housing policy the central part of a high level political strategy, relative success was achieved to address the needs of the poorest segment of the population.

(c)   *Acceptance of a clearly defined policy with specific goals and realistic targets.*

    This is essential for motivating and mobilizing officials and the general public to tackle the housing problems. It is, however, of crucial importance that communities are actively involved in the formulation of the policy and goals as well as in implementation.

7.2 *Economic aspects*

Informal communities cannot realistically expect substantial investment in housing infrastructure from the current or a future government. Central government expenditure on housing are severely constrained by the scarcity of fiscal resources and a massive state-sponsored housing programme seems unlikely. Therefore, it would seem prudent to consider the more "pessimistic" approach and examine the potential for the informal communities to finance the planning options themselves. Thus, the discussion below concentrates upon the questions of affordability levels, access to housing finance, costs of services, and the economics of various methods of service delivery.

(a)   *Affordability levels*

    According to the HSRC the minimum income required for a household of four to sustain itself at the time of survey (March 1991) was R463,62. If inflation is taken into account, this amount can be more than R600,00 at present. If a household earns an income which is equal to or less than the minimum living level, no money is available for housing. In the case of the informal dwellers in the Hottentots Holland Basin, the average monthly household income was R528, or R64 more than the minimum living level. According to Macroplan the average monthly household income of informal dwellers in Kaya Mandi is R647 (1987). To repay a bond of R10 000 over 25 years at an interest rate of 15 % per annum, would require repayment at a rate of R128 per month. The prospects of informal dwellers making a substantial contribution to their own housing finance are therefore quite bleak.

(b)   *Access to housing finance*

    One of the main barriers to the development of more formalised housing arrangements for low-income families is access to housing or mortgage finance. Even where land is available, households will be unable to improve their physical living conditions without access to housing finance.

Financial institutions are still unwilling to extend finance to these communities. The major institutions have indicated that they are unlikely to lend money to prospective home-owners where the property and house is valued at less than R35 000.

Recently, however, a range of financial packages have been developed in order to address this problem. The first type of scheme is the one-of capital subsidy of the Independent Development Trust (IDT) where R7 500 is paid to provide serviced sites for households earning less than R1 000 per month. The second type of scheme is aimed at meeting the demand for housing between R12 500 and R35 000. The major scheme of this type that is currently available is the Loan Guarantee Initiative which has the benefit that borrowers only need to provide a 5 % deposit, but the repayment rate is till a major problem as it is out of reach of the majority of informal dwellers.

Thirdly, the Old Mutual and Perm have structured packages whereby pension/provident funds supply collateral for loans to individuals earning at least R700 or R800 per month. Only a minor portion of the informal population, however, earns enough to qualify.

The fourth type of financing is the group credit scheme. The IDT and Urban Foundation have both explored options for lending small loans of up to R5 000 to members of informal credit associations. Although the loans are paid to individuals, the group accepts joint responsibility (suretyship) for the loan.

From a planning point of view, the above-mentioned suggests that a more realistic and desirable scenario would be an incremental approach to the provision of affordable housing-related services. In linking such improvements to security of tenure, squatters will be given additional incentives to incrementally improve their housing circumstances themselves using the limited resources available to them.

(c) *Costs of services*

The system of service provision that is adopted must be structured in such a way that it is affordable for shack-dwellers, at least in terms of running expenses. In the upgrading process, three questions should be considered with respect to cost-recovery for services.

- Firstly, who pays for the service? Services may be paid by individuals according to individual usage, or a flat tariff may be levied against all members of the community.

- Secondly, when are service fees to be collected? Services fees may be collected before the time of use, at usage or after usage.

- Thirdly, who collects the usage fees from the individual? Collection may be done by a private entrepreneur or by municipal officials, or it may be organized at a community level.

There is no "right" system of cost recovery, although in each situation there is a "best" system. It should be clear from the discussion that economic efficiency, with particular emphasis on lowering the administration costs of the particular system, must be a prime concern of planners. It seems that the prospects for the affordable provision of basic services (water, sewerage and refuse removal) are good, provided that *capital costs* can be covered by *external sources* and that services are provided along the same lines as in formal settlements.

7.3 *Advantages and disadvantages of certain options*

Attached as **ANNEXURE 4** is a direct excerpt from the report of the HSRC in relation to the Hottentots Holland Basin study which describes certain options with the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

ELEMENTS OF HOUSING

The elements of housing can be identified as: land, services, infrastructure, houses, finances, communities and cities. We need to decide on our approach to issues arising from each of these. How does our approach influence our housing policy ? Some of the strategic issues arising in relation to the elements of housing are as follows:

I   **LAND**

- How will the disadvantaged get access to land ? At what price ? In which locations ?

- Will there be redistribution to redress historic imbalances and injustices ?

- What is our approach to squatting and occupation of land ?

- What is our approach to removals ?

- What alternatives do we have to market control of land ? Some ideas are land banks, community controlled trusts.

- What tenure options will be available ? Rent, freehold ownership, co-operative or other forms of non-profit ownership ?

- What kind of densities are we looking at for development of land ?

- What will be the relationship between different land uses such as residential, industrial and commercial ?

- What will be the size of stands ? What densities are acceptable ?

II   **SERVICES: e.g. roads, water, electricity, sewerage disposal, refuse removal**

- What are the basic minimum services that should be provided to every home ?

- Who should pay for the construction and use of these services ?

- Should end users pay for the full cost of providing the service ? Or should they be subsidised by the state/employers ?

- How can the poor benefit from the services infrastructure that already exists in the urban areas ?

- How can the community participate in choosing what services they want and controlling the provisions ?

III   **COMMUNITY FACILITIES: e.g. education, commercial, sports and community facilities**

-    What facilities should be provided to every community ?

-    How can existing facilities in urban areas be used by the poor ?

-    Who should pay for building and maintaining the facilities ?

-    High costs of facilities provision are also related to the monopoly in the construction industry - what can we do about these monopolies and high costs ?

-    What community involvement and control can there be in the provision of infrastructure ?

IV   **HOUSES**

-    What types of houses should be provided/offered ?   subsidisation vs cost recovery, self-help (site and service), housing, completed houses, duplexes, flats, high rise flats etc.

-    Where should the money for houses come from ?

-    Who should be building the houses ? local state, national state, private construction companies, community housing co-operatives, families or individuals ?

-    What kinds of tenures should be offered ?   rental, individual or community ownership - profit or non-profit, joint ownership with community trust ?

-    Who should be responsible for allocation of state housing ?

-    Who should be responsible for maintenance and management of housing ? Where should the money for this come from ?

-    What types of community involvement and control should there be ?

-    What can we do about high costs of building houses ?

-    What can we do about high costs of building houses ?

-    How can we upgrade existing housing stock ?   What priority do we give this ?

V   **FINANCE**

-    A key element of the housing process is finance - where should the money come from for all of the above i.e. land, services, infrastructure, houses ? Local/national state, private sector, individuals ?

-    How can we make housing affordable ?   What are the criteria by which we measure affordability ?

- What is our approach to subsidisation and full cost recovery ?

- What form should be public subsidy take ?

  * a once off capital subsidy for providing infrastructural services,

  * subsidy based on household income i.e. the lower people's income the greater the amount of subsidy,

  * subsidies granted to banks and building societies to enable them to reduce interest rates (on average for every R100 you borrow, you pay back an extra R460 in interest),

  * subsidies to financial institutions which are used to guarantee the loans they make in case of default by borrowers (this is the basis of the Loan Guarantee Fund);

- How can we make finance available to those who do not presently qualify for loans from banks, building societies ?

- Assuming resources are limited - how should resources be distributed amongst all those who need it and also in terms of the various elements of housing discussed above i.e. land, services, infrastructure and houses.

VI   **BUILDING COMMUNITIES AND CITIES**

- What kinds/types of communities and cities do we want to build ?

- How do we reshape the apartheid city ? What physical constraints face us in this task ?

- How can we increase employment and community facilities in areas which do not have them now ?

- What is the future of the CBDs ?

- What building regulations and standards should we change ?

- What mixes should we have in our areas in trerms of (i) incomes, (ii) races and (iii) densities ?

- What special opportunities should we create for the poor and marginalised ?

- How can communities participate in and control the planning of our communities and cities ?

BOHOUS/LF/il

THE FORM OF HOUSING DELIVERED

The resources available to address the housing need will always be limited to reach the ideal provision of housing. The needs therefore have to be prioritised and for this purpose they have to be properly defined. We have to look at whether we want to use our resources to provide some serviced/housing for as many people as possible (i.e width) or we usethe resources to give a better quality service/housing to fewer people (i.e. depth) or some combination of the two. Because different types of housing have different cost, social and environmental implications and lend themselves to different locations, forms of tenure and process of construction they have important implications for WHO (how many) are going to get WHAT (product), WHERE (near or far), WHEN (1, 2, 5, 10 years) and HOW (provided by the state or made by people themselves or a bit of each) ? In examining these questions we could use the following method:

(a)   identify different types of houses

(b)   identify issues to be considered about each type of house

(c)   look at the implications of each issue for each type of house and draw out a range of specific and general implicatons.

(i)   **SERVICED SITES**

        DIAGRAM 2

(a)   **Type of Housing**

        -   Low level site and service to high level site and service

        -   free standing houses tend to use more land than attached houses

        -   if brick houses are not built plots need to be more than 250 sq metres to provide safety from fire and privacy

- if low level services then not a good location for inner city

- lots of land required - therefore not good for inner city

- houses most likely to be different types of shacks

(b)   Location

The diagram above shows the location of housing within the city i.e. whether it should be in the inner city, suburbs or periphery. The suggested location for serviced sites is the periphery. One of the determining factors for the location is the cost of land.   The lower diagram shows the type of house/product graphically.

(c)   Cost/Finance

- Cost of sites will range from R1 500 (for low level sites) to R15 000 (for high level sites on difficult terrain)

- Less money required for sites only - therefore could be spread widely

- Private financial institutions unwilling to lend against sites with low level of servicing

- Mobilises household savings and sweat equity labour

(d)   Tenure

- Security of tenure necessary for *'consolidation"* i.e. for the resident to build and develop the plot according to his/her needs

(e)   Process of delivery

- Servicing of sites by the developers or state (local/national) some servicing could be done by peoples community trusts

- Individual responsible for house construction and improvement

- Little participation required

(f)   Consequences

- *'Freedom to build'*

- Potential Ghetto

- Many sites available fast

- Easy to administer

- Little cost to state - therefore sustainable

- Social prejudice - shacks vs bricks

- High transport costs - distant location

- Low denisty - lots of land required

- individuals responsible for building house

- Potential fire hazards and poor quality housing

- little profit made on sale

- Little positive effect on the economy because few backward linkages into the materials sector are exploited

(ii)   **SITE AND SERVICES AND ASSISTED HOUSING**

DIAGRAM 3

CATEGORY 2

SITE AND SERVICES
+
ASSISTED HOUSING

PERIPHERY SUBURBS INNER CITY   SUBURBS PERIPHERY

SITE + MATERIALS - - - SITE + WALL + SLAB - - - SITE + SHELL HOUSE

(a)   Type of Housing

- Site and materials to site and shell house

- Usually serviced site plus materials and maybe wall or slabs or shell house

- site could be smaller - 150 - 200 sq metres

(b)   Location

Because of size of plots and level of services - most suitable location is the periphery of the city.

(c)   Cost/Finance

- R7 500 --> upwards (depents on how much of the house is provided)

- more money required - therefore number of sites less than in first category

- no initial private financial institution involvement.

(d)   Tenure : long term security necessary for *'consolidation'*

(e)   Process of delivery

- serviced sites by developers/state/community trust/small builder

- lots of responsibility on the individual

- participation has to be organised

- mainly self-build or small builder activity

(f)   Consequences

- Relative *'freedom to build'*

- Peripheral location --> same problems as site and service

- Less social prejudice because formal housing is in process

- Some form of permanent house is possible

- Poor quality of house means that little profit can be derived from sale

- More direct benefits to economy --> building materials are used and labour employed.

(iii)   **LOW DENSITY COMPLETED HOUSES**

DIAGRAM 4

CATEGORY 3   LOW DENSITY COMPLETED HOUSES

PERIPHERY SUBURBS   INNER CITY   SUBURBS   PERIPHERY

SINGLE HOUSE ON PLOT--- SEMI - DETACHED--SINGLE STOREY ROWS

(a)   **Type of housing**

- Single house on plot - to - semi detached houses - to - single storey row houses

- Complete house on own plot, freestanding or joined to neighbour, double or single storey

- sites between 100 - 200 sq metres.

(b)   **Location**

on the periphery or suburbs - because still require fair amount of land

(c)   **Cost/Finance**

- Cost from R25 000 --> upwards (depending on size, quality, location)

- Requires large amount of money therefore reduced width (therefore more depth)

- Private sector can be more easily mobilised thereby increasing width

- Subsidy necessary to be affordable for more people

(d) Tenure

Form of tenure (rental, freehold etc.) is not critical except if short term cost recovery is required whereupon freehold tenure becomes necessary

(e) Process of Delivery

- sites and housing to be developed by private developers state/community trusts

- relatively little choice in design, unless users involved early. This is because mass supply is cost effective

(f) Consequences

- Lots of resources required - time, money, labour, materials

- More difficult to administer than site and service

- Shape and size not very flexible - costly to modify or expand

- Only 15 - 20 % of African people can afford this type of housing without subsidy

- Location in suburbs - somewhat better than periphery

- Can be sold relatively easily

- If do not require high levels of subsidy could have larger benefit to economy - materials, labour, consumer goods.

(iv)   **COMPLETE HIGH DENSITY HOUSING**

DIAGRAM 5

CATEGORY 4   COMPLETE HIGH DENSITY HOUSING

PERIPHERY SUBURBS INNER CITY SUBURBS PERIPHERY

DOUBLE STOREY ROW HOUSES - - - FOUR STOREY WALK UPS

(a)   **Type of housing**

-   Double storey row houses and/or four storey walk ups

-   Occupy small amounts of land

-   Complete units with some self-help finishing possible

-   great range of options - bachelor units 3 - 4 bedrooms

(b)   **Location : suburbs or inner city - because high density**

(c)   **Cost/Finance**

-   R25 000 for very small units - ranging upwards

-   Large amount of money required initially - less width

-   Private sector financing possible

-   Subsidy required to be affordable to poor people - which may in part be balanced by creating a more compact city and so reducing transport subsidies, also resulting in better use of existing facilities.

(d)   **Tenure : appropriate for rental, co-operatives or private freehold ownership**

(e)   **Process of Delivery**

- sites and housing developed by developers/state/possibly community trusts

- participation is necessary but must be organised

- relatively little choise in design, unless users involved early

- many units have to be built together

(f)   **Consequences**

- inner city location means better access to work and facilities

- inner city location means more efficient use of resources and existing services and facilities

- possible noise, privacy, traffic implications

- design of units is critical

- can be sold immediatly depending on tenure.

(v)   **MULTI-STOREY FLATS**

DIAGRAM 6

CATEGORY 5   MULTI STOREY FLATS

PERIPHERY   SUBURBS   INNER CITY   SUBURBS   PERIPHERY

(a)   **Type of housing**

- Multi-storey flats - requiring high technology such as lifts

- many units on small piece of land

- no direct access to ground

- range of units possible - bachelor to 3 - 4 bedrooms

(b)   Location : inner city because of high density

(c)   Cost/Finance

- cost of units R30 000 upwards

- very large amounts of money required for one building

- private sector institutions could be involved

- subsidy necessary to make affordable to more people

(d)   Tenure : range of options possible : rental to individual or collective ownership (sectional title)

(e)   Process of Delivery

- site and housing developed by developers/state/possibly community trusts

- limited input of users in design due to sophistication

(f)   Consequences

- huge requirement of resources - labour, materials, technology, time

- city centre location with all benefits - many people housed - get benefits

- negative consequences for poor and for families

- reliance on technology could be long term problem - maintenance costs are high

- noise, traffic, privacy, pollution implications

- can be bought and sold depending on form of tenure.

4. Discussion of the issues

(a) Approaching squatting as a human issue

Throughout this report we have emphasized that squatting is not simply a technical problem, but a distinctly human issue involving intergroup conflicts, misunderstandings and distorted perceptions. Yet authorities have largely approached squatting as if it were a purely technical problem involving the physical identification and planning of sites. In each case where a technicist approach has been adopted, the human dimensions of the issue have come to the fore to frustrate the efforts of bureaucrats and technicians.

Clearly no headway will be made with the issue of squatting until its distinctly human dimensions are addressed and due recognition is given to the conflict inherent in the relationship between squatters and established communities.

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(b)   The importance of process

Human problems do not easily lend themselves to simple and straight forward one-off interventions, but rather require a continuing process of intervention and interaction. Both the problems and solutions of the squatting issue are intimately tied up with social changes that require profound transformations in personal meanings, attitudes and orientations. Such changes require more than a simple intellectual reorientation. In other words, people require more than rational, or even scientific, arguments and data in order to change their understandings and approaches to specific issues. Chin and Benne (1969:43) state that "intelligence is social, rather than narrowly individual", and that people "...are guided in their action by socially funded and communicated meanings, norms and institutions, in brief by a normative culture." According to them, people are guided at the personal level by "internalized meanings, habits and values" (p. 43). Chin and Benne believe that changes in the patterns of action/practice therefore occur not only in the rational informational equipment of people, but (at the personal level) also in habits and values. They continue: "...at the socio-cultural level, changes are alterations in normative structures and in institutionalized roles and relationships, as well as in cognitive and perceptual orientations" (Chin & Benne, 1969:43).

Research, training and action should be integrated in the solution of human issues, in "a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action, and fact-finding about the result of the action". People need to participate in their own education if they are to be educated at all, and education involves a normative change, as well as a cognitive and perceptual change (Chin & Benne, 1969:43-4).

At a practical level, we have argued that a simple housing package is unattainable due to financial and other constraints. The provision of services and improvements in housing conditions should also be approached in an incremental and process-orientated way. Thus solutions can be found that are both appropriate and enjoy the support/confidence of the public, rather than attempting to meet all physical needs at once, which in all likelihood will result in disappointment and even resistance.

(c)   Responsibility for squatting

Among the changes that will have to take place in order to address the problems of squatting effectively, are the orientations of people towards the squatting phenomenon, including their sense of responsibility towards shack settlements.

We have shown in some detail in the early chapters of this report that squatting in the Hottentots Holland Basin is not simply a result of urbanization, but of a severe housing shortage and the consequences of apartheid policies. This has some clear implications for the moral responsibility of formal communities towards squatters.

Squatters in the Hottentots Holland Basin are not simply outsiders who have appeared from elsewhere to make demands on the resources of the community, but for the most part have been living in the Basin for several years and have been supplying their labour to a variety of employers. Some of them lived on farms or in domestic servant's quarters which they were forced to vacate for a variety of reasons. Others lived in hostels, often without their families and under the most appalling circumstances. Still others were forced to abandon accommodation in formal housing and backyard rooms which were unacceptably overcrowded or unaffordable. (See Chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed analysis of the causes of squatting.) In many respects therefore it was the community which failed to provide them with adequate accommodation and which therefore bears at least a degree of responsibility for their plight.

The moral responsiblitities of host communities to shack settlements can also be traced in more specific terms. In Chapter 4, for example, we showed that the troublesome anomaly of shack settlements arising alongside high-income housing was not purely a product of the arbitrariness of squatting. Instead this anomaly can be traced to applications of the Group Areas Act which created an artificial preponderance of high-income housing in the area and failed to make sufficient provision for low-income housing. As a result there are few sites for low income housing in the area and property owners who live near squatter settlements find that their property values are falling.

Until formal residents are able to understand these complex relationships with the past, they will continue to regard squatters as intruders who have no

claim on the resources of the community and for whom they have no responsibility.

(d)   The positive features of shack dwelling

A related issue is associated with the negative ways in which shack dwelling is regarded - what we called the *stigma of squatting* in Chapter 4. Thus far the tendency among formal residents has been to see shack dwelling in purely negative terms. This need not always be the case. While squatting currently makes enormous demands on formal commmunities, it should be borne in mind that shack dwelling also provides a creative solution to a number of severe social issues, not least of which is the national housing crisis.[1]

Through squatting, shack dwellers provide themselves with a form of shelter which (notwithstanding its inadequacies) could not be provided by any other source. These shack settlements often provide access to job markets which would otherwise be inaccessible, and, no matter how disorganized and unsightly they might appear to some formal residents, furnish their residents with a minimum of security, stability, sense of community, and a basis for family life.[2] To some extent squatting has also retarded the social disintegration of South African society, because **without** squatting there may well have been higher levels of political instability, violence, crime and disorder in the country.

(e)   The need for a national and sub-regional policy with clear goals

The need for a clear policy at national, regional and sub-regional levels is undisputed. As indicated in Chapter 7, a national policy is needed to give direction to lower-tier governments on how to deal with the problems in their area through accommodation (instead of restrictive approaches such as forced removals). Without a clear policy, authorities at all levels are able to shift the "blame" upwards, downwards and across by claiming that it is not their res-

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[1]   Some people may see squatting as a means of exerting pressure on formal housing channels rather than as a solution, but we believe, based on our research in the Basin, that such an assumption is without foundation for the study area.

[2]   We also need to ask the question - how much more would squatters have done (or do in the future) under the same physical circumstances but with legal tenure, in terms of investing in housing.

ponsibility. The converse of this is that authorities are not prepared to take responsibility for the problem, because then all other authorities may hold them responsible. While we would argue that decisions should be taken at a local level, we appreciate the dilemma of local authorities in the Basin in not being able to take the initiative. Rather than sit back and wait for direction and even imposition of plans from above, we argue that the authorities in the Basin should be proactive and engaging. In other words, they should together (and in close consultation with the communities at large) formulate plans and guidelines that can be pushed upwards as part of the process of defining a national policy on informal housing.

(f)   The need for decision-making at the local level.
Although national and provincial authorities clearly have a key role to play in helping local communities find solutions to the problems of squatting, major decisions that affect the lives of people on the local level should be taken on the local level. The failure of provincial and national government attempts to identify a site for an informal settlement in the Hottentots Holland Basin provides a clear example of how displacing decisions from the local to a higher level are doomed to failure.

In Chapter 7 it was indicated that local initiatives such as neighbourhood forums can contribute a great deal toward resolving conflicts. In this regard the formal communities have a vital role to play in setting the ball rolling.

(g)   The need for public participation
Not only is it necessary for major decisions to be taken at the local level, but extensive consultation and participation of all relevant communities is required. While the difficulties of the squatting dilemma have prompted officials at all levels to despair of democratic and participatory solutions, the alternative of public ignorance, hidden agendas and forced decisions has been shown to be a dead end. In various parts of the country including the Hottentots Holland Basin, civic interests have shown that they will not tolerate decisions that are imposed upon them.

The importance of public participation lies not only in its function as a means for allowing democratic decision-making, but also as a tool for educating the public. Through civic participation and negotiations with competing inter-

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ests, members of the public become informed in a meaningful way, and are made aware of the complexities of the situation, the needs, interests and positions of other parties, and the advantages of compromise. Public participation is of course not an easy option, but the alternative is to keep people in the dark which creates rumours and suspicions, encourages emotional responses, and generally leads to a hardening of positions.

The neighbourhood forums can also play an important role in ensuring that public participation is maintained at acceptable levels.

(h) Decentralizing solutions to the issues of squatting

In order for participation to succeed, it will be necessary to create more room for both choices and compromises. A key element in creating greater space for local level choices and compromises is to allow for the decentralization of solutions. What is meant by this is that instead of creating one large informal settlement, a number of smaller, and by implication more manageable, settlements should be created in various parts of the Basin.

There are a number of reasons why a decentralized solution is more likely to succeed than a centralized solution.

Firstly, while centralizing squatters on one site has the supposed advantage of restricting the issue to only one area, it blatantly offends people's sense of equity in that it forces a single segment of the formal community to accept the responsibility for or bear the consequences of squatting. Underlying the durability/persistence of the NIMBY-syndrome is a fundamental moral understanding of what is right and just, namely that one section of a community should not be forced to bear the brunt of the problems of the whole community. Such an understanding is at the basis of the objection of farmers and small-holders in the vicinity of the Waterkloof shack settlement, as it is of the Strand Municipality.

Secondly, it was clear from our qualitative findings, that the larger squatter settlements are, the more threateningly they are perceived. Thus as the largest of the settlements, Waterkloof appeared to be regarded as the most threatening of all the settlements in the Basin. Formal residents appeared to regard the smaller settlements as far less threatening and often entered these

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settlements in search of casual labourers. Even the issue of falling property values on account of the proximity of squatters appeared to be somewhat less contentious in relation to smaller settlements such as Remhoogte and Ambulance Park than with respect to the larger settlements. On the whole therefore smaller settlements would be regarded as less threatening, provided that an appropriate degree of control is exercised over the growth of such settlements.

A third but related point is that it is easier for internal leaders to control smaller settlements. Such settlements are generally less alienating to their inhabitants, allow for a greater sense of community and consensus among their residents, and facilitate compliance with both internal and external community norms. As the Moss Report (1990:35) pointed out, the forced grouping of people in a large and heterogeneous settlement can cause large-scale social disruption, as the example of the Cape Flats so vividly illustrates. It is also more difficult for criminal or anti-social elements to find refuge in small settlements, or to indulge in activities that offend against the general norms of the community.

Fourthly, it will be easier to integrate a number of smaller settlements into the broader community than one large settlement. Squatter settlements are largely a "problem" to more established communities because they are not integrated into the broader community, since they stand out as different or even alien. A single large settlement lends itself to the stereotyping, stigmatization and labelling of informal settlers as "bad", "criminal", "anti-social" etc. because it increases the isolation/insulation of the settlement from the rest of the community. Smaller settlements would also facilitate greater contact between formal and informal residents not only by making these settlements more physically accessible, but also by spreading responsibility for shack dwellers more evenly and reducing the challenges to a more manageable scale.

Fifthly, we have argued that the populations of shack settlements in the Hottentots Holland Basin include a broad range of different types of people who originate from different places, have very different reasons for squatting and therefore very different aspirations and expectations. It would therefore be very difficult to accommodate this diversity of people within a single area. Shack dwellers and their support organizations place a high premium on freedom of

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choice as a democratic right, but catering for such choice could not only serve the interests of the shack dwellers, but also those of the formal communities, as the Moss Report (1990:36) attests:

> One of the greatest guarantees of social harmony and property lies encumbered within the opportunity created for people to exercise their own choice of where to live. Such a choice must, however, take place within the orderly scheme of things and in such a way that established interests are also served.

Finally, allowing freedom of choice would considerably facilitate negotiations between the shack dwellers and the formal residents and their authorities. Even if it were possible to get neighbouring formal communities to accept a single site for all or most of the squatters in the Basin - and all indications are that this is highly unlikely within the current emotionally charged situation in South Africa - the squatters themselves would still have to be persuaded to move to this new site.

Evidence from both the local and international contexts indicate that there are formidable obstacles in the way of relocating squatter settlements to new sites. From the international experience discussed by, among others, Laquian (1981), it is clear that resettlement attempts very often fail in spite of considerable show of force by the governments who almost inevitably have to give in eventually to the demands of the squatters to legalize the settlements. Similar examples are found in South Africa, and one of the best known cases is that of Cross Roads on the Cape Flats.

This applies in particular to the larger settlements of the Hottentots Holland Basin. In our discussions with both leaders and residents of the shack settlements, it became clear that there was considerable resistance to the possibility of being moved to a new site. This was particularly apparent in relation to the larger settlements like Waterkloof and Sun City.

Moreover, the identification of a single site to which all squatters would have to move is inevitably coercive because it excludes all possibilities of choice. As South Africa's whole history of forced removals vividly illustrates, coercion usually has the effect of galvanizing resistance in communities. Even where a substantial percentage of people are in favour of a move, the presence of others who oppose such a move is likely to lead to resistance of the whole community

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in the interests of group unity and cohesion.

Allowing a choice between different sites would completely transform the situation from an inflexible and coercive one to a more flexible and open situation which would allow considerably greater scope for negotiation and creative solutions to what has become an intractable problem. This applies not only to squatters, but also to formal residents.

Allowing greater freedom of choice not only removes the coercion implied in a single site, but also allows greater flexibility and sensitivity in planning. For example, it opens up the possibility of implementing different types of settlement and upgrading schemes which cater not only to the different needs and preferences of squatters, but also to those of the neighbourhoods within which the settlements are located. Finding a fit between the divergent interests of squatters and formal residents is therefore considerably simplified.

In relation to Waterkloof, the most controversial of the squatter settlements in the Basin, for example, the current fixation with a single settlement has resulted in an impasse where both the current and the future or potential neighbours of these shack dwellers refuse to accept them. Under these circumstances, no compromise is possible and the different interests are forced to adopt increasingly inflexible positions because the loser stands to lose everything. In other words, the strategy of identifying a single site forces the situation into a zero-sum (or winner-takes-all) conflict.

The strategy of adopting the principle of several sites admits the possibility of increasing the range of compromises. In relation to Waterkloof, for example, the option would be not simply to remove this settlement or leave it where it is, but to reduce it to a more manageable size. At the same time work could begin on upgrading the settlement that remains, screening off views of the settlement that are considered unsightly, and improving relationships between squatters and non-squatters in the area.

Similarly, while the Strand municipality has indicated on several occasions that it may be prepared to accept responsibility for some of the squatters in the Basin, it is deadset against accepting responsibility for all the squatters in the area. The possibilities for a compromise in which the Strand might accept a part

of the Waterkloof squatters establishing themselves on the site identified by the Department of Provincial Affairs and Planning seem good. The exact proportion of squatters to be established on this site would of course have to be negotiated, but our figures on the distribution of workplaces of squatters from the relevant communities could serve as a guideline. The same may be said of Somerset West, Sir Lowrys Pass, and Gordons Bay.

5. Objections

Given the heated nature of the squatter dispute and the current climate of political uncertainty and change, it is unlikely that any suggestion aimed at addressing this problem will meet with general approval. Until now all proposals that have been submitted have met with vehement rejection from at least one of the parties involved, and there is no reason why this report should be an exception.

Although our proposals may not be accepted immediately, we believe they are ideally suited to the context of change which South Africa has entered. The process of change in South Africa has irrevocably demonstrated that proposals which at one time were unthinkable, can become acceptable in relatively short periods of time and be implemented with enthusiasm. The emphasis we have placed on long-term processes rather than one-off products are ideally suited to the shifting attitudes and conditions within a context of rapid change. So too are the emphases on democratic procedures, addressing the interests of all the parties involved, educating and informing people, seeking flexible and creative compromises, and spreading the burdens of change.

However, as our approach throughout this research project has been actively to seek out criticisms of our findings and recommendations, we would like to conclude this report by anticipating some the objections that may be raised to our suggestions. Our list of possible objections could never be comprehensive, but may answer some of the questions raised in people's minds:

■ **Would not the creation of several sites increase the costs of squatting by multiplying the problems?** Rather than thinking in terms of multiplying the problems, our approach should be seen as breaking up a problem (which has largely proved insoluable) into smaller, more manageable problems. We also propose spreading or sharing the burden of the problem among many, rather than leaving an unfortunate few to bear this burden.

■ **Would not allowing squatters greater choice and attempting to accommodate them only serve to attract more squatters?** While it is difficult to predict patterns of growth of squatter settlements, there are several indications that adopting a more accommodating approach to squatters will *not* lead to unmanageable growth of the settlements. As the formal communities have not yet succeeded in displacing squatters from the Basin and are unlikely to be able to do so in the future given the absence of a legal mechanism such as influx control, the alternative is simply to do nothing. As jobs in the area are limited, the labour market may act as a restraint on in-migration to the area. It would also be possible to enter into agreement with squatter leaders about the sizes of their settlements. Furthermore, the more stable informal settlements become, the more likely it is that they will resist the influx of outsiders into their areas.

■ **Smaller settlements are likely to be more expensive to service, especially if they are distant from existing settlements.** This will depend upon the nature of the economies of scale involved, in other words where the specific sites are located and how they are planned. It is true that unit costs are higher for new sites which are isolated and separate from existing service infrastructures. However, there is no reason to believe that small settlements which are fully integrated into existing service infrastructure networks will be more expensive than one newly developed large site. In fact, the smaller settlements may well prove to be cheaper, particularly if existing spare capacities can be utilized.

In addition to this, an appreciation of the true costs (regardless of

who bears them) should be borne in mind. A single site that moves people further from their place of work may well prove to be more expensive when the additional transport costs and associated lower productivity are taken into account. Smaller sites which allow people to live nearer to their place of work may well be less expensive for these reasons.

- **Formal residents are just as likely to resist the establishment of smaller settlements in their areas as they have resisted the establishment of large settlements.** As we have pointed out, smaller settlements tend to be less threatening than large settlements. Residents would have to be educated about squatters and this may take some time. In the interim it may be possible to utilize sites which are less controversial, such as those which are near existing low-cost housing (as in the site identified in the Strand) or sites that are still in the process of being developed for settlement. It is also possible to tailor informal settlements to suit the areas where they will be located and to plan for the screening of such settlements.

- **Will not the breaking up of large settlements into smaller communities be perceived by squatter interests as a threat to squatter safety and leadership, and the internal cohesion of communities?** When one takes into account the negative perceptions shack dwellers probably have of all resettlement attempts, it would be logical to expect them to be sceptical about such initiatives as well. By breaking up communities, their leadership structures are interfered with. This also happens when people from different smaller settlements are grouped together in a single large settlement. New leaders will have to be elected.

By breaking up settlements one disrupts their internal cohesion and this may cause a great deal of uncertainty and even isolation during the first number of weeks. They may also feel threatened by the idea of having to settle in small numbers, because that may make them vulnerable and may expose them to the potential antagonism of the people already living in that neighbourhood,

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some of whom who may not want them there.

These are some of the risks that the shack dwellers will have to take. If it is thought that they will have little difficulty in deciding what would be best for them, and that some decisions can be made on their behalf, the people who believe that should think again. The authorities would have to prepare themselves for a period of negotiation and exchange of information on the options that may be available to the squatters. Certain squatters have much to lose and should be given sufficient time to make their decisions.

On the positive side, however, it should be understood that when people are given a choice, they can weigh up all the factors that are at stake and make informed decisions. For example, they can weigh up the disadvantage of the destruction of group cohesion or the lack of safety found in numbers against the advantage of the closer proximity to their work or the benefit of having a variety of settlement types (and therefore opportunities) to choose from.

- **Will the solutions that are produced at the micro level not adversely affect solutions that may be introduced from the macro level?** It may be argued that preempting policy direction from the top will worsen the situation in the Basin. In other words, it may be thought that it is not in the interests of the local residents to take it upon themselves to solve a problem of national importance. Also, it may be believed that solutions at a micro level could be undermined by incompatible solutions (or a lack of solutions) at the macro level. While this may be true, it would seem unwise to continue avoiding the issues at stake here. *Ultimately the squatting issue of the Hottentots Holland Basin is a problem that will have to be addressed within the Basin.* In addition to this, pressure cannot be brought to bear at a macro level if solutions are not at least being sought at the micro level. It is only through arriving at micro-level solutions that any effective pressure can be brought to bear on the solutions that are offered at the macro level.

Concluding remarks

It has been our privilege to be associated with the people of the Basin during the past 18 months.

We are convinced that if people really want to work together and search for common solutions, there is little chance of failure.   We trust that this study will contribute to this search for solutions to the problems in the Basin.

Direct intervention

Direct intervention involves active interference. Examples of strategies (i.e. planning options) that are important here are the replanning and servicing of existing squatter areas (i.e. *in situ* upgrading projects), provision of sites and services (i.e. site-and-service projects), low-cost rental housing (i.e. public housing projects). These three strategies are discussed in detail below. A fourth strategic option, namely migration control (i.e. a closed-city policy), is also discussed briefly to round off the picture.

(a) <u>In situ</u> **upgrading projects**

This type of direct intervention entails the legalization of an existing squatter area, the replanning of the area to make room for individual plots and roads, and the provision of (affordable and therefore often rudimentary) essential services such as water and sanitation. It usually entails the resettlement of some

or all of the households[2] in order to make room for these roads and services. The advantages and disadvantages of this planning option are as follows:

Advantages

- People can, generally speaking, stay where they are, which means that community cohesion remains intact.
- Current investments in housing and "plots" (for the greater part) remain intact.
- Current business investments, contacts and clientele of people operating businesses in the settlement are not threatened, but limitations on the size of the settlement may prevent expansion because the market is limited to its present size.
- At least rudimentary services are provided, with the resultant improvement in living conditions.
- Legality of tenure is ensured, and people can no longer be threatened with eviction.
- There are not *new* formal neighbours wanting to impose too restrictive standards to keep people out (because they are already there).
- The current leadership of the settlement may remain intact.
- It is not necessary for the residents to get used to new leaders, new neighbours, new transportation or other new / unfamiliar things.

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[2]In the so-called *roll-over approach* all the households in the settlement are resettled once. This may be a fair approach since all households are affected in the same way, but it is a relatively costly method which may not always be necessary nor advisable. Very often only a small portion of the families have to be resettled (see for example Turner, 1980:254-258), but the practical problem with this approach is that there are the unfortunate few households who have to be moved. The selection of the "unfortunate few" (households) can be a problem, but if the upgrading is fully supported by the shack dwellers themselves (which should be regarded as a prerequisite for any successful upgrading), the selection procedure can usually be left to the people to sort out among themselves in the fairest possible way.

Disadvantages

- Land for the settlement may have to be purchased from a current owner, and these costs may be recovered from residents.
- Although the provision of bulk services may be subsidized, residents may have to pay part of the initial costs.
- Certain settlements may be so small or so distant from existing services that the provision of bulk services will be extremely costly to the residents.
- Residents may have to pay in full for the consumption of services.
- Internal roads may have to be provided, and this means that certain residents' houses may have to be moved.
- Existing discontent about the presence of shack dwellers near formal communities will not easily be resolved.
- For authorities to accept this option, the leaders may have to agree to a size restriction (i.e. that after the settlement has reached a certain size, further in-migration may have to be prevented).
- For formal neighbours to accept this option, the leaders of the shack dwellers may have to agree to:
    (i) certain minimum standards for housing quality (i.e. that after a negotiated period of time, all houses not conforming to the negotiated standards may have to be removed) or to ways and means of "screening off" unsightly structures from the public eye.
    (ii) certain requirements concerning conduct (e.g. on matters such as rubbish dumping, nuisance, crime, etc.).
- Planning of the upgraded settlement may be inhibited by existing structures.

(b) Site-and-service projects

In site-and-service projects a vacant piece of land is usually developed by providing roads and other essential services. Plots in the project are usually provided free of charge to qualifying poor families but they are normally expected to pay for the services they consume. As in the case of *in situ* upgrading, people erect their shacks on the plot until such time as they have acquired enough money to upgrade or otherwise improve the dwelling.

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Advantages
- At least rudimentary services are provided, with the resultant improvement in living conditions.
- Since the location of the site-and-service project is planned in a pro-active manner, the chances are better that bulk services to the new settlement can be provided at economic rates.
- Planning of the new settlement will probably not be inhibited by existing structures.
- Since building takes place from scratch, there may be a greater choice in terms of the types and quality of houses being erected.
- Since site-and-service projects are often larger than existing squatter settlements, those wishing to operate businesses in the new settlement have a potentially larger market.
- Legality (i.e. security) of tenure is obtained, and people can no longer be threatened with eviction because of trespassing and/or squatting (except in the case of a *transit camp*[3] from where people may have to be removed again).

Disadvantages
- People have to move, which means that community cohesion is most probably disrupted.
- Current investments in housing and "plots" are partly destroyed.
- The current business interests of the people to be resettled may be threatened.
- The new formal neighbours may want to impose too restrictive standards to keep people out.
- People will have to get used to new neighbours, new transportation schedules and other new/unfamiliar things.
- Land for new settlement may have to be purchased from the current owner, and these costs may have to be recovered from residents.
- Although the provision of bulk services may be subsidized, residents will probably have to pay at least part of the initial costs.

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[3]See Section 6(1) of the *Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 (Act No. 52 of 1951)* for a description of the term "transit camp".

- Residents may have to pay in full for the consumption of services.
- The costs of moving may have to be borne by the people themselves (unless they are being moved to a transit camp, in which case the authorities should pay for the costs of removal).
- The costs of rebuilding the house in the new locality will probably have to be borne by the people themselves (unless they are being resettled in a transit camp, in which case the authorities should be willing to pay for the costs of reconstruction).
- New leaderships may have to be established in the new settlement, and this may cause some disruption.
- For authorities to accept this option, the leaders may have to agree to a size restriction (i.e. that after a certain size, further in-migration may have to be prevented).
- For the new formal neighbours to accept this option, the current squatter leaders involved may have to agree in advance to:
    (i) certain minimum standards for housing quality (i.e. that after a nego-tiated period of time, all houses not conforming to the negotiated standards may have to be removed) or to ways and means of "screening off" unsightly structures from the public eye, and/or
    (ii) certain requirements concerning conduct (e.g. on matters such as rubbish dumping, nuisance, crime, etc.).
- If the new site is a transit camp, people may be asked to move again (to a permanent place) in future.

(c) Public housing projects

In public housing schemes the emphasis is on the provision of mass formal rental accommodation for lower-income families. This planning option pre-supposes a major reallocation of scarce economic resources to increase the housing stock and improve the housing infrastructure. Soweto, Atteridgeville and Mamelodi (PWV area), Mangaung (Bloemfontein), Langa and Nyanga (Cape Peninsula), New Brighton and Zwide (Port Elizabeth), Mdantsane (near East London), and Umlazi and KwaMashu (Durban) are examples of massive public housing projects which were aimed at alleviating housing shortages - par-ticularly for lower-income families - in South Africa's largest cities.

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People in shacks generally prefer this type of housing alternative, but as indicated by Tomlinson (1990), public housing does not have a satisfactory track record. From the literature on the subject it is clear that public housing may have many advantages but it generally has numerous disadvantages as well.

Advantages
- Good housing and services are provided, with the resultant major improvement in living conditions.
- Since the location of the public housing project is planned in a pro-active manner and the project will probably accommodate a large number of families, the chances are good that bulk services can be provided at economic rates to the new residents.
- Legality (i.e. security) of tenure is obtained, and people can no longer be threatened with eviction because of trespassing and/or squatting.

Disadvantages
- People have to move, which means that community cohesion is most probably disrupted.
- Current investments in housing and "plots" are destroyed.

- Public housing has generally been a numerical failure and this will probably also be the case here: "Fiscal constraints would ensure that an insufficient number of houses would be constructed", and "in the resulting allocative scramble, it would be naive to think that the poor would benefit" (Tomlinson 1990: 86).
- Since building costs must be kept low, there is probably no great choice in terms of the type and quality of apartments and/or houses being erected, and even then the relatively high standards may still result in the new units not being affordable to the vast majority of the poor who currently occupy shacks (see also Section 4).
- Since public housing projects are often subjected to greater control, those wishing to operate businesses in the new project may find it very difficult to do so (in spite of a potentially larger market than in the shack settlement).
- The current business interests of the people to be resettled may be threatened.
- People will have to get used to new neighbours, new transportation schedules and other new/unfamiliar things.
- Land for the public housing project may have to be purchased from the current owner, and these costs may have to be recovered from residents.
- Although the provision of bulk services may be subsidized, residents will probably have to pay at least part of the initial costs.
- Residents may have to pay in full for the consumption of services.
- The costs of moving may have to be borne by the people themselves.
- New leaderships may have to be established in the new setting, and this may cause some disruption.

(d)   Migration control and closed-city policies[4]

Up to June 1986 South Africa pursued a policy of (racially based) migration control which, among other things, attempted to prevent people from entering

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[4]Although migration control and closed-city policies are probably not acceptable to our society in general, some people may still believe that they may represent viable "planning options". It is for this reason only that we give some attention to these "options".

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the urban areas in search of better opportunities. Prior to its abolition on 1 July 1986, this policy had been evaluated by the Human Sciences Research Council and the Urban Foundation, and in the light of experience elsewhere in the world, had been found to be generally ineffective and morally, economically, socially and politically unjustifiable.

The problems with closed-city policies are that their implementation is extremely costly and that they have not been successfully implemented anywhere - with the possible exception of the People's Republic of China. Research has shown how these attempts failed in Jakarta (Indonesia), Manila (Philippines) and Eastern Europe. The South African President's Council (*South Africa*, 1985) also indicated to what extent influx control had failed in this country and how costly the attempts to implement the policy had been.

The conclusion that is reached from the above is that migration controls and closed-city policies are not viable planning options. The emphasis should therefore be on pro-active urban accommodation strategies.

Conclusions
From the above discussion it should be clear that each of the four planning/policy options mentioned above has a number of important disadvantages. To us as researchers the advantages of *in situ* upgrading seem to outweigh the disadvantages. **The same cannot necessarily be said for the other three options.** It should, however, be remembered that each settlement has unique circumstances. This means that these general principles do not necessarily apply to every one of the remaining squatter settlements in the Basin. Resettlement may, therefore, have to be considered in some cases.

In that event the residents concerned may feel obliged to prolong their resistance against any such proposed resettlement, particularly if they do not fully accept the *intended destination* of the resettlement action. Such a prolonged resistance may have a number of advantages and disadvantages that need to be considered.

Advantages
- People can, in principle, stay where they are, which means that community cohesion remains intact.

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- Current investments in housing and "plots" (for the greater part) remain intact.
- The current leadership of the settlement may remain intact.
- It will not be necessary for the residents to get used to new leaders, new neighbours, new transportation or other new / unfamiliar things.
- Since the land for the settlement may not have to be purchased from a current owner, such costs will not be recovered from the residents.
- Since no services are provided, residents are not liable to pay for the consumption of services.
- Since they do not move to formal housing, residents may see this as a possible way of resisting the payment of rent.
- Since internal roads are not provided, no houses have to be moved.
- There are not *new* formal neighbours wanting to impose too restrictive standards to keep people out (i.e. they are already there).
- There may be confidence among the residents that if they prolonged the resistance long enough, they may eventually be recognized by the authorities (particularly in view of the fact that a more "empathetic" regime is expected to be taking over power at the national level in the foreseeable future).

Disadvantages
- Legality of tenure is not ensured, and the people constantly face the threat of eviction.
- In spite of changes in the national regime, the people may eventually be forced to move anyway, because their legality of tenure cannot be ensured.
- Not even the most rudimentary services are provided, with the result that there is no improvement in the living conditions.
- To enable the formal neighbours to be somewhat accommodating with respect to this option, the leaders may have to agree to some unpopular measures **while they have no strong bargaining platform:**
    - certain minimum standards for housing quality (i.e. that after a negotiated period of time, all houses not conforming to the negotiated standards may have to be removed) or to ways and means of "screening off" unsightly structures from the public eye, and/or
    - certain requirements concerning conduct (e.g. on matters such as rubbish dumping, nuisance, crime, etc.).

These conclusions point to the need for planning to be undertaken in close collaboration with the people concerned and for providing everyone with all the available information.