7.

The Dynamics of Reform & Revolt in Current South Africa

Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert

A Three Part Talk as Tanner Lecturer, Brasenose College, Oxford, October/November 1987

LECTURE ONE:

From Apartheid to Reform: The Ideological Preparation for the Total Onslaught
IDASA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

This series of papers is being published by IDASA as part of its contribution to the struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa. The first six papers formed part of the proceedings of the first national conference organized by IDASA in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on 8—9 May, 1987. The next three papers were presented by Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert as the (guest) Tanner Lecturer at Brasenose College, Oxford University, during October/November 1987. Other papers are drawn from a variety of sources. The full series, available from IDASA, is listed on the last page.
INTRODUCTION
All the ingredients for a climactic eruption in South Africa have been present for decades. Even this potential remains unfilled. So much so, that one rates doomsday scenarios, not so much on predictive accuracy, as on the originality and freshness of new assumptions. South Africa is waiting to become — a hovering society. Almost universal agreement on the untenability of the present is matched by equally deep differences on the pattern for the future. The conflict is also rooted in the divergence and diversity of hopes about what is to come. South Africa is not a hopeless society; perhaps that is why its central conflict appears to be so intractable. Some have what others want, and others are determined to monopolize what some want to get at. It is a deeply divided society where one side’s dreams and expectations for the future becomes the other’s threat to, and frustration of, the present. That is why increasingly, it is becoming a violent, bitter and brutalized society. People are beginning to hate each other out of the future.

The question is, why? What is the underlying issue? Is it class, race, ethnicity? Obviously greed, intolerance and fear are primordial emotions that run deep in South Africa, but they epitomize rather than explain the dilemma. South Africa escapes analytical precision and closure. It is a land of shifting paradigms: Marxists end up making concessions to race and ethnicity; liberals to class; and pluralists to almost anything that disturbs their train of thought. Very often residual categories in one framework pop up into prominence at the very moment their irrelevance has been defined.

Because analyses of South Africa are often so starkly divergent, it provides a fertile climate for ideological dogmatism. Differences of opinion, tactics and strategy often blow up into major confrontations and are seized upon to pronounce on moral sanity, sincerity of commitment or some anticipated state of grace or retribution. Ideological certainty depends on intellectual compromise and South Africa is rife with compromised intellectuals who know better but refrain from saying so. The need for certainty is often the most compelling evidence for uncertainty. Sometimes ending on the loser’s side is a greater sin than being right. It becomes easy to confuse silence with wisdom.

What then is the underlying issue? Perhaps it is easier, if not necessarily safer, to begin with elimination. Although South Africa shares many of the characteristics of a typical colonial society, it is not. It has the characteristics of a typical colonial society without the colonial options of external metropole intervention, or minority withdrawal towards it, or both. Algeria had France; Rhodesia — Britain; Mozambique and Angola — Portugal. South Africa has neither this kind of retreat and/or intervenor. Anyone who plans strategy on the assumption that it has, is preparing for a false confrontation. And it is not very helpful to view South Africa as “colonialism of a special kind” as some Marxist scholars do. A civil war can only be seen as a stage in a “special” colonial struggle at enormous cost to human and natural resources before the error inevitably will have to be acknowledged. And yet, it is precisely South Africa’s colonial past without the “normal” decolonialization option on the way to the future which makes the resolution of the present conflict so intractable and costly.

If South Africa is locked into a conventional class conflict, it so far stubbornly refuses to come to terms with it. At present there are simply too many “false consciousnesses” straying across enemy lines. And yet, nobody can deny that South Africa has all the characteristics of a class struggle: extraordinary concentration of capital, collusion between state and business at key periods in its history, and a growing political and alienated working class. However, it is precisely because of the intransigence of racial and ethnic factors that good old-fashioned Marxists are tempted to look on South Africa as first having to resolve the struggle for “national liberation” (colonialism of a special kind), before settling down to the “real” class revolution.

It is difficult to find any black liberal amongst workers and working class academics. This does not serve to inhibit the optimism of liberal economists that South Africa will inevitably “grow” itself out of its present crisis if only the philosophy and practice of free enterprise is allowed to have its way. Too often the “if only” qualification becomes an intellectual escape route. There is enough evidence from the past that growth without efficient political redistribution increases a sense of relative deprivation and compounds the conflict. At the same time, it is quite true that without growth in the economy the politics of redistribution dies on the vine. It is as futile to attempt to redistribute what society does not have, as it is dangerous to refuse to distribute as equitably as possible what it does have. However, more than a few big businessmen’s courage has failed them when they have had to face the political consequences of this kind of economic analysis. It is almost pointless to wax eloquent on the virtues of free enterprise in a politically unfree South Africa; it is not so pointless to ponder how well free enterprise will survive in a politically free South Africa. How compatible is freedom with the demand for equality?

The underlying issue is not really Apartheid. Apartheid is simply the flare that illuminates the scene of battle. From South Africa’s colonial past, in every class analysis which comes to grips with the complexities of the present as well as the source of tension in the liberal economist’s attempt to reconcile growth and redistribution lies the issue of White Minority Domination: socially, economically and politically.

Obviously colonial conquest created the social and political infrastructure for white domination and British and Dutch trade and financial imperialism gave it economic context. Apartheid was Afrikaner-Nationalism’s uniquely “South African way” of articulating white domination. It was also a futile and therefore brutal attempt to escape the pitfalls and consequences of continued colonialism. Whatever the case, it is on the fact and intractability of white minority domination that the paradigms of liberals, pluralists and Marxists briefly converge before they go their separate ways to explain its significance and to predict its end.

And today, when international anger, outrage and moral revulsion is mobilized to sanction the obstinacy of Apartheid and domestic forces revolt to bring about its demise, what is at issue in the “total dismantling of Apartheid” is not only doing away with racist legislation, or giving “Blacks a fair deal” or even “sharing political power” (whatever that implies). It means a transfer of political power away from exclusive white domination and with the demonstrable
support of the total adult population, no matter how this
support is manifested or how long it will endure. This is the
central issue at stake in the international and domestic
pressure building up against those in power in South Africa.

The South African state has responded to this pressure
with a “programme of reform”; this in turn has precipitated
revolt on a scale not experienced before in this century. It
is the purpose of these few lectures to stimulate some dis-
cussion on the current dynamics of Reform and Revolt in
South Africa. I will try to do so in three talks, each one
concentrating on a different perspective on the relation-
ship between Reform and Revolt. Firstly, I wish to discuss
the ideological shift from Apartheid to “Reform”, after
which I wish to illustrate how this shift is reflected in policy,
bureaucracy and new institutions. Finally, I wish to look at
the whole area of reaction or resistance to the “reform”
which I broadly refer to as revolt. I say broadly, because I
wish to discuss not only the political actions of domestic
and exiled groups experiencing repression and “reform”,
but also wider responses to the South African community,
such as international pressure through diplomatic isola-
sation, sanctions, etc.

Before I begin discussing the ideological shift from Apart-
heid to Reform, a brief methodological note could be
useful. Throughout I will refer to those in power as the
South African State, rather than “the Government” or “the
Regime” or the “Nationalist Party.” The reasons for this
will become obvious as my analysis proceeds. At this stage,
I only wish to say that I regard the South African State as an
autonomous entity with its own goals, structure and in-
terests. I do not use it in any mystical, disembodied or
holistic sense, but in the sense of a collective unit manned
by real people with definable interests, where those interests
cannot simply be seen as an extension or reflection of class
interests or where they are simply the “disinterested” or
“neutral” protectors of a state structure within which other
interest groups pursue their goals. My use of the word
“State” in analysing the Dynamics of Reform and Revolt is
similar to that of Skocpol in her fascinating analysis of
revolutions in Russia, France and China, although I do not
for one moment intend to embarrass her with the crudity of
my own attempt.

FROM APARTHEID TO REFORM

There was, of course, a time when colonialism was fashion-
able and white domination unproblematical. It was a time,
particularly between the two World Wars of this century,
when whites in South and Southern Africa had their heyday.
South Africa belonged to the Commonwealth and its whites
were decorated as War Heroes, won Olympic medals and
had “representative” sporting tours to and from other
countries; and its political leaders could even qualify as
“Statesmen” of international repute as in the case of General
J C Smuts, a close confidante of Winston Churchill.

However, by the end of the Second World War, the
West, in particular, was beginning to feel the impact of
powerful philosophical and economic forces. Slavery,
racism and economic exploitation became anathema and
this, together with the declining economic fortunes of the
former colonial powers, made decolonization a very attrac-
tive option. As this process gathered momentum, so the
very idea of white domination became increasingly em-
barrassing and repugnant. Wherever there was majority
domination, e.g. USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
whites could successfully impose their own variations of
liberal democratic Governments and gradually, through
force of circumstances, accommodate those who were not
white into the arms of Government and social and economic
life. By the time the pressures for decolonization gathered
momentum these white-majority dominated societies, to-
gether with white-minority dominated South Africa, had,
through various processes, gained Independence. The drive
for Independence during the post-World War 2 period of
decolonization was also a drive to get rid of white minority
domination in India, Ghana, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia,
Tanganyika, Nyasaland, etc. etc. A last-minute desperate
attempt to gain special “South African like status” for white
domination was Rhodesia’s futile attempt at Unilateral
Declaration of Independence on 17 November 1965.

South Africa had Independence at the onset of de-
colonization after World War 2. But the whites who elected
the Government were determined not to succumb to the
same pressures which gave it momentum. Having had all
the economic and political privileges of colonial administra-

ation without the option of imposing a majority solution on
the domestic situation, or minority withdrawal to the
metropole, most whites were determined to set themselves
apart from the majority of people in their own country and
continue to maintain a colonial lifestyle despite decoloniza-
tion. Thus with the advent of Nationalist Party rule in 1948
was born Apartheid or Separateness. The first two Afri-
kaner Nationalist Premiers, Malan and Strydom, were quite
crude and unsophisticated about the racist measures with
which they attempted to maintain the segregated privileges
of whites. In their era, 1948-58, the basic legal infrastruc-
ture of Apartheid was created: The Population Registration
Act No 30, 1950; Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act No 55,
1949; Immorality Amendment Act No 21, 1950; Reserva-
tion of Separate Amenities Act No 49 of 1953; Group Areas
Act, No 41, 1950; as well as the group of Statutes, Laws and
proclamations broadly known as the “Pass Laws” which
primarily affected the movement of black Africans. There
was an absolute frenzy of legislative action during the first
10 years without any coherent ideological justification other
than the simple “Baaskap” which Strydom coined: in “his
own” country the white man was going to be “boss”.

Ironically, it took a Dutch-born naturalized Afrikaner,
HF Verwoerd, to realise the complete untenability of this
approach in the prevailing African and international cli-
mate. He became Prime Minister after Strydom in 1958,
and until his assassination in 1966 a torrent of energy was
unleashed in Afrikaner academic and cultural circles to
develop a coherent and intellectually defensible ideology
for Apartheid. It became Separate Development. Verwoerd
was its architect and supreme articulator. He defended it in
international circles when he led South Africa out of the
Commonwealth and into a Republic and with tireless zeal
he convinced his supporters that Separate Development was
not only morally just, but the only way out of the
problem and away from white domination. His white
opponents in the old United Party were defenceless against
his attack that their alternative was simply a “softer”
variation of white domination, and those opponents left of
the United Party were simply accused of exchanging one
form of racial domination for another.

Verwoerd understood quite clearly that the challenge
posed by Africa’s demand for independence had to be met
also in South Africa. For Africa generally, this demand
meant that white minorities had to relinquish exclusive
political control and/or withdraw to the mother country.
Verwoerd was going to do exactly the opposite — instead of getting rid of the whites, he was going to get rid of the blacks. In fact, one of his protégés, Dr Connie Mulder, then Minister of Information and the Crown Prince to succeed John Vorster as Prime Minister, could with a straight face argue in the White Parliament 10 years later that once Separate Development had been fully implemented, there would be "no Black South Africans". From a very important perspective Separate Development was a massive exercise in social engineering aimed at denationalizing the majority of South Africa's citizens.

South Africa, so the Separate Development theory goes, is not a land consisting of Black and White people. It is a culturally diverse population — in fact a plurality of cultural minorities. There is not one nation in South Africa, but many nations striving for independence. Just as Europe and its colonial masters were assisting African nations towards maturity and independence, so the whites in South Africa had to assist the black ethnic tribes (nations) in South Africa to their independence. The 1913 and 1936 Land Acts of South Africa had set aside traditional African land for Blacks. This should form the geographic basis for the different Black African Nations to live out their political aspirations. As each one eventually took full independence so their citizens would lose their South African citizenship and become foreigners just like any other foreigner who visited what would then be white South Africa. Once all these nations were "independent" the problem of white domination would have been solved, because there would be no blacks to dominate.

Upon the existing racist legal infrastructure to achieve Apartheid, Verwoerd now constructed a new legal superstructure called Separate Development. Key elements of both structures were intimately related to one another, but there were many aspects of Apartheid not necessary for Separate Development and vice versa. But that was for another era to discover — when "reforms" became fashionable. Initially Verwoerd was reluctant to go for "full Independence" for blacks, feeling that this was an option forced on the white minority by the outside world, but by the time of his assassination in 1966, the Department of Bantu Administration was the major bureaucracy of Government and most of the legislative underpinning for Separate Development in the pipeline. In fact, John Vorster who succeeded Verwoerd spent the next 10 years (1966-76) primarily doing two things: giving content to Verwoerd's version of internal "independence" and creating an encompassing network of far-reaching security laws and measures to act against those who did not comply.

The major point I wish to emphasize about the period of Apartheid and Separate Development which has been thoroughly researched, is that it was all done to maintain White Minority Domination at a time when this was the distinctive feature of colonial administration and when every anti-slavery, anti-Nazi, anti-racist and anti-capitalist exploitation lobby could cite this as an example of the ultimate evil. When, in a sense, the West was going one way, South African whites were going the other. This alone guaranteed that South Africa would remain controversial in international affairs for a long time to come.

But another major point I wish to emphasize about the Apartheid-Separate Development era is of domestic or internal relevance. The whole exercise created a massive and pervasive bureaucracy — a new State structure which began to take on a life of its own. Given its size, there are not many countries that can compare with South Africa where this is concerned. By 1985 the political system had given birth to 13 Houses of Parliament or Legislative Assemblies, as well as the President's Council with quasi-legislative functions. There are three legislative chambers in the Central Parliament, six legislative Assemblies in what are termed the "non-Independent Black States" and four Legislative Assemblies in the "Independent States".

Occupying seats in these 14 bodies are 1 270 members consisting of 308 Members of the 3 Houses of the Central Parliament; 60 Members of the President's Council, 501 Members of the Legislative Assemblies of the "non-Independent Black States" and 401 Members of the Legislative Assemblies of the "Independent Black States" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Of the 1 270 persons, 121 are Ministers of Government, (approximately 1 out of 10), and in addition, there are at least 21 Deputy Ministers.

Each of the legislative organs has Government Departmental structures which, by August 1986, had spawned 151 Government Departments in South Africa. These Departments included 18 Departments of Health and Welfare; 14 Departments of Education; 14 Departments of Finance and Budget; 14 Departments of Agriculture and Forestry; 12 Departments of Works and Housing; 13 Departments of Urban Affairs or Local Government; 9 Departments of Economic Affairs or Trade & Industry; as well as 5 Departments of Foreign Affairs, Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Labour and Manpower, Law and Order, Defence or National Security; 3 Departments of Justice, 1 Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs, 1 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. Finally, these 140 Departments were responsible to 11 Presidents, Prime Ministers or Chief Ministers in South Africa.

As M Savage wryly observes: "This legislative network with 121 Ministers and 151 Government Departments is not cheap to run." It may not be cheap to run, but it certainly provides security of income and many privileges for those who work for it. As time went by those involved in it developed a powerful vested interest in keeping the whole system going, whatever the ideological goals it was supposed to pursue. The original idea, of course, was that all these duplicated departments and legislative assemblies would reach a certain level of maturity, "take-off" and develop separately and independently. South Africa would then have its own "commonwealth of sovereign nations" which could even broaden into a "confederation of Southern African States".

Vorster was the last National Party Prime Minister who seriously tried to pursue the goals of old-style Separate Development and Apartheid. But even during his period of office the cracks were beginning to show. The first right-wing break away occurred in the beginning of the Seventies because of concessions to multi-racial sport; a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Homeland Consolidation concluded that it was a futile and economically unproductive exercise (thus undermining a cherished goal of Separate Development), and the Commission of Inquiry into the position of the "Coloured Population Group" concluded that they had to be accommodated on all levels of Government in South Africa.

Separate Development, which was essentially centrifugal by design, was also being eroded by powerful centripetal demographic and economic forces. The decade of the
Seventies saw an accelerated rate of overall, but particularly Black, urbanization, increased economic integration and far-reaching changes in Black labour organisations. Black resistance and alienation were rapidly developing and exploded with the Soweto riots of 1976, when the compulsory instruction of Afrikaans was seized upon by Black schoolchildren to symbolize their deep rejection of the goals of Apartheid and Separate Development.

In 1987, eight years after P W Botha succeeded Vorster, most of the major goals of Separate Development as well as the philosophy of Apartheid (an “outmoded concept” according to Botha) had been abandoned. Homeland Independence was preferable, but not mandatory; Blacks could “in principle” own land outside the homeland areas; consolidation was no longer a priority; Blacks were entitled to South African citizenship. In fact, one Cabinet Minister, Chris Heunis, proudly announced — South Africa should be “one country, with one citizenship and one Government” and negotiation and consensus should be the political style rather than unilateral decision-making. Even some of the old racist segregationist measures had been repealed, such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, aspects of the Separate Amenities Act and the Improper Political Interference Act. The policy of influx control had been abandoned and systematic Black urbanisation was accepted as the desired alternative. Even the so-called Coloured Labour Preference Policy for the Western Cape was repealed in the face of inevitable Black urbanization.

It was, however, the new tricameral constitution which became the prize offering symbolizing the era of “reform”. It was put to a referendum for white approval only, and succeeded in seducing the majority of whites, businessmen and some Western Governments as a “step in the right direction”. The Blacks who were excluded from it, and the so-called Coloureds and Indians who were going to be the prime beneficiaries of the new constitution, were not given the opportunity to express an opinion. The paradox was that the new constitution which was to herald “reform” and the beginning of the end of Apartheid, also precipitated the most widespread revolt the country has known. Revolt from both ends of the political spectrum. For the majority it became increasingly obvious that the Government was going to abandon key aspects of Apartheid and Separate Development without sacrificing white domination, and for right-wing whites it became clear that this kind of concession was the thin end of the wedge which would eventually lead to black rule. The tricameral Parliament not only flushed out the right-wing Conservative Party of Andries Treurnicht, it also led to the creation of the UDF.

Both Vorster and Botha were sensitive to right-wing electoral threats. Vorster responded to it by simply doing nothing, or as little as possible, to create the impression that Apartheid or Separate Development was being abandoned. Botha, however, had inherited a situation where it became more and more obvious that Separate Development and Apartheid were coming unstuck. The ideological void which was beginning to develop because of the untenability of Apartheid and Separate Development was slowly being filled by the concept of a Total Onslaught which necessitated a Total Strategy to cope with it. The whole bureaucratic edifice which had been created to achieve Separate Development was now going to become part of the Total Strategy to cope with the Total Onslaught. This Onslaught also became the supreme justification for “reform”. Thus security and domestic constitutional policy intersected and reinforced one another. Reform was necessary for security, but security was also necessary for reform. It was the historic responsibility of the dominant white minority not to lose control and thus disturb the delicate balance between the two. This, as Botha repeatedly stressed during the recent all-white election, would lead to “chaos and a communist dominated ANC government”. Botha won a handsome white mandate — to progressive whites he promised that security would not jeopardize reform, and to reactionary whites he could promise that reform would not jeopardize security.

The concept of Total Onslaught did not materialize overnight. As Minister of Defence, P W Botha together with his then Chief of Staff, Magnus Malan, and Chief of the Army, Constand Viljoen, worked tirelessly to promote the idea of a total onslaught against South Africa that necessitated a total strategy. If one could pinpoint a date which gave momentum to the idea of a total onslaught it would be 25 April 1974 when a coup in Lisbon led to the independence of Mozambique and Angola. For the first time, the cordon sanitaire of white minority governments north of South Africa had been broken. Rhodesia came under extreme pressure after that. Vorster’s initial response was benign, almost indifferent to a Marxist government in Luanda and Maputo. He reiterated the old foreign policy principle of non-intervention and good neighbourliness and even continued with limited initiatives elsewhere in Africa. Not so the Defence Department under P W Botha. Almost immediately it began to redefine the security interests of the Republic of South Africa. A year later, 1975, South Africa had penetrated militarily deep into Angola in an attempt to influence the composition of the Government about to take over. Soon afterwards South African security personnel began to involve themselves in Rhodesia’s civil war. The principles of good neighbourliness and non-intervention had to be sacrificed to cope with the “total onslaught”.

When Botha took over as Prime Minister and later as President, the whole security bureaucracy became the central focus of government administration. Not only did destabilization of neighbouring countries become established practice, but the Defence Force was brought into townships to cope with domestic unrest on a “continuous basis”. The “total onslaught” became standard propaganda fare on all Government controlled and supporting media. But at the same time, it could be used to explain why Apartheid and Separate Development had to be abandoned and why “reform” was necessary. A careful look at what “reform” is all about will show how it inevitably had to precipitate revolt. Because in the final analysis it was simply another, new way of extending White Minority Domination. The White Minority was embarking on “reform” by looking for a way to share power without losing any. More about this in the next talk.

4. All of them were deeply influenced by the work of Baufre, Andre: Introduction to Strategy, Faber & Faber, 1965, in which he related his experiences in World War II and the war in Indo China. Therein he propagates the idea of a “total strategy” in conditions of “total war”.
IDASA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Democracy and Government: A Post-Leninist Perspective
   Dr Charles Simkins, associate professor of economics, University of Cape Town.

2. Democracy and Law
   Advocate Arthur Chaskalson, national director, Legal Resources Centre.

3. Democracy and Government: Towards a People’s Struggle
   Presented by Mr Andrew Boraine on behalf of the United Democratic Front.

4. Democracy and Business
   Mr Leon Louw, director, Free Market Foundation.

5. Democracy and the Church
   Prof J.W. de Gruchy, professor of Christian studies, University of Cape Town.

6. Democracy and the Media
   Mr M. Latakgoma, editor, The Sowetan.

7. The Dynamics of Reform & Revolt in Current South Africa
   Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert
   A three-part talk as Tanner Lecturer, Brasenose College, Oxford, October/November 1987.
   LECTURE 1: From Apartheid to Reform: The Ideological Preparation for the Total Onslaught.

8. The Dynamics of Reform & Revolt in Current South Africa
   Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert
   Lecture 2: The Dynamics of Reform: Co-optive Domination — Sharing Power without Losing Any

9. The Dynamics of Reform & Revolt in Current South Africa
   Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert
   Lecture 3: The Dynamics of Reform: Patterns of Resistance and Revolt

10. Dakar Report Back
    Dr Alex Boraine, executive director, IDASA, Cape Town

11. The Dakar Reports: Responses from Sixteen Delegates

12. A View of the Economy Beyond Apartheid
    Five perspectives from the seminar held on 22 April 1988 in Cape Town.

13. Beyond the Bend: South Africa, Southern Africa and Namibian Independence
    Peter Vale, research professor & director, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Grahamstown

14. South Africa as seen by Russian and Soviet People, and Their Perception of the “South African” Problem
    Irina Filatova (doctor of science in history, Moscow State University).

15. Socialist Construction in the USSR: Restructuring, Openness and Democracy
    Dr Vladimir B. Iordansky
    The Southern African Policy of the USSR in the Context of its Global Foreign Policy
    Vyatcheslav N. Tetekin of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

16. Integration and Disintegration in Southern Africa
    Peter Vale, research professor & director, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Grahamstown

17. A Map of Political Violence in Contemporary South Africa
    Dr Jacklyn Cock, department of sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

ALL AVAILABLE AT R2,00 EACH (POSTAGE INCLUDED) FROM:

IDASA
1 PENZANCE ROAD MOWBRAY 7700